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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to explain the emergence of active perception. It takes an 
interdisciplinary approach, by providing the necessary conceptual foundations for 
active perception research - the key notions that bridge the conceptual gaps re- 
maining in understanding emergent behaviours of active perception in the context 
of robotic implementations. On the one hand, the autonomous agent approach 
to mobile robotics claims that perception is active. On the other hand, while 
explanations of emergence have been extensively pursued in Artificial Life, these 
explanations have not yet successfully accounted for active perception. 
The main question dealt with in this thesis is how active perception systems, 
as behaviour -based autonomous systems, are capable of providing relatively op- 
timal perceptual guidance in response to environmental challenges, which are 
somewhat unpredictable. The answer is: task -level emergence on grounds of 
complicatedly combined computational strategies, but this notion needs further 
explanation. 
To study the computational strategies undertaken in active perception re- 
search, the thesis surveys twelve implementations. On the basis of the surveyed 
implementations, discussions in this thesis show that the perceptual task executed 
in support of bodily actions does not arise from the intentionality of a homuncu- 
lus, but is identified automatically on the basis of the dynamic small mod- 
ules of particular robotic architectures. The identified tasks are accomplished 
by quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules, which maintain 
transformations of perceptual inputs, compute critical variables, and provide 
guidance of sensory -motor movements to the most relevant positions for fetching 
further needed information. Given the nature of these modules, active perception 
emerges in a different fashion from the global behaviour seen in other autonomous 
agent research. 
The quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules cooperate by estimat- 
ing the internal cohesion of various sources of information in support of the 
envisaged task. Specifically, such modules basically reflect various computational 
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facilities for a species to single out the most important characteristics of its eco- 
logical niche. These facilities help to achieve internal cohesion, by maintaining a 
stepwise evaluation over the previously computed information, the required task, 
and the most relevant features presented in the environment. 
Apart from the above exposition of active perception, the process of task - 
level emergence is understood with certain principles extracted from four models 
of life origin. First, the fundamental structure of active perception is identified 
as the stepwise computation. Second, stepwise computation is promoted from 
baseline to elaborate patterns, i.e. from a simple system to a combinatory 
system. Third, a core requirement for all stepwise computational processes is 
the comparison between collected and needed information in order to insure the 
contribution to the required task. Interestingly, this point indicates that active 
perception has an inherent pragmatist dimension. 
The understanding of emergence in the present thesis goes beyond the distinc- 
tion between external processes and internal representations, which some current 
philosophers argue is required to explain emergence. The additional factors are 
links of various knowledge sources, in which the role of conceptual foundations is 
two -fold. On the one hand, those conceptual foundations elucidate how various 
knowledge sources can be linked. On the other, they make possible an interdisci- 
plinary view of emergence. Given this two -fold role, this thesis shows the unity of 
task -level emergence. Thus, the thesis demonstrates a cooperation between sci- 
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1.1 Aim of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to explain the emergence of active perception, by focus- 
ing on the processes of emergence at the task level, as seen in present research 
on active perception, which is a branch of research on behaviour -based systems. 
The envisaged emergence is explained from a multiplist point of view - explana- 
tory interlock - which is realised in the establishment of a variety of conceptual 
foundations. 
There are two aspects to an informative theory of active perception - sci- 
entific understanding and philosophical explanation. On the scientific side, the 
present thesis emphasises the need for an explanation of how active perception 
systems accomplish their tasks. In particular, two important properties of active 
perception have not been identified in previous discussions of the topic. One is 
the understanding that active perception systems accomplish their tasks through 
emergence, as opposed to full determination by design. The other is that the 
course of emergence mostly takes place at task level, i.e. during run -time (as 
opposed to learning), in support of the accomplishment of certain tasks. Specifi- 
cally, the emergent processes at the task level of active perception implicitly head 
toward the accomplishment of tasks without being fully pre- determined in the 
design of active perception systems /implementations. 
On the philosophical side, this thesis raises the need to go beyond the dis- 
tinction between internal and external processes of emergence, which relate to 
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the determinative powers of internal representations and organism- environment 
interactions respectively. Those processes are currently the focus of philosophical 
discussions on the emergence brought forth by behaviour -based systems. The 
problem is that attributing determinative power to different sources relative to 
skin and skull does not seem efficacious in explaining why active perception sys- 
tems in general can accomplish their tasks in the course of emergence. Hence, as 
yet, the explanation of the envisaged task -level emergence remains incomplete. 
As an alternative to the above distinction, discussions in the present thesis 
concentrate on developing an explanation of emergence by answering the why 
question - why active perception systems in general can accomplish their tasks 
in the course of emergence. This why question is to be answered by explaining 
task -level emergence using a combination of theoretical constructs and philosoph- 
ical notions, in the hope of explaining the unity of emergent processes without 
sacrificing the comprehensive coverage over the related strategies of implementa- 
tion. 
To address the above how and why questions, the present thesis introduces 
a notion - activeness - which concerns what makes active perception work. As 
a consequence, the efforts to build conceptual foundations can be seen as con - 
tributing to an understanding of activeness. 
1.2 Background Knowledge 
1.2.1 Definition and Analysis of Active Perception 
The term `emergence of active perception', in the present thesis, is meant to de- 
note the emergence of perceptual facilities for bodily actions which is maintained 
by the active processes of perception. The active processes of perception, accord- 
ing to current research in active perception, comprise (1) sensory -motor activities 
(such as saccades and pursuit) or bodily movements which contribute to percep- 
tual tasks by focusing iteratively on the most relevant perceptual inputs in the 
environment, and thereby contribute to simplifying perceptual judgements, (2) 
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perceptual processes that fulfil perceptual tasks not simply by building up per- 
ceptual features for recognition (as seen in Marrian visual systems') but instead 
by providing guidance for, and consequently contributing to, bodily actions. In 
other words, active perception is deemed to be active on the grounds of (ia) the 
orientation toward most relevant inputs which is maintained by sensory -motor 
activities, (ib) the simplification of perceptual processing made by bodily actions, 
(is) iterative arrangement along with the changing environment, and (ii) the use 
of perceptual judgements only for the need of bodily actions, i.e. perceptual 
processes must be task -specific. 
It is worth noting that the selection of internal processes may contribute 
to active perception, but there must be some internal processes subserving the 
control of sensory -motor or bodily actions in the first place, as required above by 
(la..b) Specifically, the above points (ia) and (ib) concern selection of perceptual 
processes that in turn serve to select the sensory -motor or bodily actions that di- 
rect the perceptual system toward most (relatively, as the systems can respond) 
relevant perceptual information in the environment. Internal processes, as a re- 
quirement of active perception, serve not only to drive sensory -motor and bodily 
actions, but also to work out what perceptual information (to be collected) is 
most relevant to the required tasks. Accordingly, active perception systems are 
active because they carry out process selection for computing the most relevant 
perceptual information (to the required tasks) and thereby direct their recep- 
tors /sensory organs toward certain perceptual information in the environment. 
In other words, active perception systems manage to participate with the en- 
vironment interactively in order to collect the needed information for required 
tasks. 
The requirement (is) is the iterative arrangement along with the changing 
environment. This serves to complement the previous requirements (ia,b), by 
further stipulating that these two requirements must be maintained in iterative 
steps, so that observers can take account of environmental changes and thereby 
hopefully tend to be more likely to keep track of the changing environment. As 
1Marrian visual systems are initiated by David Marr (1982). 
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a further but optional constraint, an active perception system may carry out its 
iterative process arrangement incrementally, as manifested in the attentive control 
of saccadic movements. The incremental processes of information collection make 
possible the influencing of later steps by previous results. 
Requirement (ii) concerns the economy of internal processes, which certainly 
has an effect on the economy of external (sensory -motor and bodily) actions. 
The emphasis of (ii) is that internal processes must be highly task- specific, as 
opposed to serving general- purpose functionality. In particular, there must be 
certain heuristics for driving sensory organs or deriving perceptual features, in 
order to provide efficient perceptual guidance of bodily actions - the tasks. As 
an example, making a decision under uncertainty is facilitated by certain task - 
specific heuristics which manage to make a quick judgement over the relating 
tasks, by deriving the most likely perceptual features and ignoring details. 
Note that the conception of active perception does not consist of a single 
criterion, but comprises a combination of requirements, as discussed above. It 
is not hard to realise that different research paradigms of active perception may 
adopt different combinations of requirements. It is even possible that different 
organisms need different conceptions of active perception. 
A confusion concerning the conception of active perception may arise, namely 
that the successful performance in the real environment (which is subject to real - 
time constraint) is the ultimate criterion of active perception. This confusion 
should be avoided. While it serves to motivate the present paradigm of active 
perception research, the success in real -time performance is not required in the 
definition as a characteristic of active perception. Rather, real -time performance 
is an envisaged result of implementation. By conception, it is possible that ac- 
tive perception systems turn out respond unsatisfactorily in the real environment 
(probably due to unstableness or the time -consuming computation for fulfilling 
requirements ia,b,c). However, in reality, active perception systems actually per- 
form satisfactorily in the real environment. It needs explanation as to why such 
systems, as characterised in the aforementioned definition, turn out to be so 
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competent. 
1.2.2 The Relation of Active Perception Research to Traditional 
AI. 
Active perception research stands as a reaction against Marrian vision theory 
and its generalisation to other perceptual modalities. Note that Marrian vision 
theory is a hallmark of traditional AI. As a direct consequence, the movement 
of perceptual systems arises as a requirement of active perception systems in 
order to select perceptual inputs by participating in the environment, as mani- 
fested in requirements (ia,b,c) of active perception. Apart from this difference from 
traditional AI, active perception research departs from traditional AI in two re- 
gards. Firstly, traditional AI adopts general -purpose programs (as opposed to 
task- specific facilities) which attempt to take full account of the environment by 
reconstructing a fully elaborate map. Secondly, active perception research is a 
reaction to model -based systems, by shifting to behaviour -based robots, which are 
also termed autonomous agents. 
Task -specific Facilities. Consider the first departure - undertaking task - 
specific facilities in active perception systems. This is requirement (ii) of active 
perception. Provided that this requirement is fulfilled, together with the re- 
quirements (ia,b,c), a perceptual system which completely consists of a model of 
symbolic descriptions can be conceived of as an active perception system. Given 
this, active perception research is not entirely abstinent of symbolic descriptions. 
There are indeed continuities between traditional AI and active perception re- 
search (Brooks 1992b). Those continuities would not prevent a perceptual sys- 
tem from being active, because in the previous requirements on active perception 
((ia,b,c) and (ii)) there is no mention of the adoption of symbolic descriptions. So 
long as the implementation is successfully working in a real environment - the 
original motivation for active perception research - the architecture of this imple- 
mentation will contribute to the understanding of active perception. Yet, this is 
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a real departure from traditional AI, because the adopted symbolic descriptions 
no longer serve to expand or elaborate a full model of the world. Conversely, 
the robot design of active perception systems emphasises task -specific heuris- 
tics /utilities. 
Behaviour -based Systems. Consider the second departure from traditional 
AI. Although a perceptual system based on task -specific descriptions can be con- 
ceived of as active, merely being labelled `active' does not guarantee its successful 
implementation in the real environment. In fact, the present implementations of 
active perception are rarely grounded on such descriptions. Rather, active percep- 
tion research is mostly behaviour -based. Although this may be regarded as simply 
a contingent fact of academic research - that active perception research arises as a 
branch of mobile robotics - this fact seems to have a theoretical ground. To wit, it 
is generally a difficulty with mobile robotics to expect successful implementation 
from using pre- specified models of the unpredictable environment. This difficulty 
seems to be a central motivation for behaviour -based robotics. This approach is 
successful in implementing low level cognitive functionality, such as the navigation 
implemented in Brookian robotics - an approach to robotics which emphasises 
the embodied and embedded activities for the implementation of situated robots 
(see discussions in chapter two). 
The task -specific facilities implemented in the behaviour -based approach are 
different from those in traditional AI, mainly because the behaviour -based task - 
specific constraints are more fine -grained and their response to environmental 
conditions is rapidly incremental. This is a design strategy of behaviour -based 
control (Mataric 1993). 
With this strategy, a behaviour -based system is constrained by small and 
incremental movements which rapidly adapt to current environmental circum- 
stances. The way to accomplish tasks is not entirely characterised by pre -fixed 
categories (e.g. knowledge representations), unlike the planning for accomplish- 
ing the tasks in traditional AI. 
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Basic Strategies of Implementation Underlying Behaviour -based Sys- 
tems. Behaviour -based systems can be largely characterised according to their 
basic strategies of implementation, as seen below. 
Situatedness and Embodiment. The above -mentioned capability of behaviour - 
based systems to rapidly adapt to current environmental circumstances is grounded 
on two characteristics of such systems - situatedness and embodiment (see de- 
tailed discussions in chapter 2). Both characteristics uphold the importance of 
direct contact with the environment, as opposed to maintaining searching on the 
knowledge representations of a world model. However, these two characteristics 
have respective emphases. In brief, the notion of situatedness concerns organ- 
isms' relation to the environment, while the notion of embodiment concerns the 
effects brought about on account of organisms' bodies. 
Being situated, behaviour -based systems count on rapid contact with the 
various aspects of the environment without undergoing a long path of search 
over a world model. The gist is to let organisms intensively contact various 
aspects of the environment, i.e. letting organisms confronting with and wandering 
between various situations. As Brooks describes, such systems continuously refer 
to sensors rather than maintain searching in the internal model. Information from 
sensors is, and must be, responded to `in a very short time span' (Brooks 1991b, 
italics added). 
Being embodied, a behaviour -based system gathers information based on 
various effects of its body which are evoked when the system contacts the envi- 
ronment: including the sensory features provided by their sensors, the movements 
of their bodies, and even the new relations with the world created by their bodily 
actuators or posited by their sensory -motor actuators. In this regard, Brooks con- 
tends that in order to gain precise understandings of the world, `[a]11 the details 
and issues of being in the world must be faced' (ibid., p. 15). 
An important effect of the aforementioned direct contact with the world, as 
Brooks contends, is the physical grounding of the processing going on within a 
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computational system. However, Brooks does not discuss the hybrid cases where 
embodied systems are endowed with knowledge representations, hence, he does 
not really explain symbol grounding. Despite this, it is fair to say that Brooks 
brings a new light to resolving the symbol grounding problem. To wit, because of 
the direct contact with the world, there is no need for a computational system to 
rely completely on knowledge abstraction. In this particular regard, it is not unfair 
to say that the capabilities of behaviour -based systems go beyond traditional AI. 
Accomplishing Tasks Based on a Collection of Modules. The accomplish- 
ment of tasks in the behaviour -based approach takes advantage of the convergent 
effects of various modules distributed throughout the behaviour -based system 
without any central control. Tasks can still be decomposed, on the basis of vari- 
ous task -specific constraints. However, task -specific decomposition is maintained, 
as \'Iataric (1993) describes, in a way very different from intuitive software engi- 
neering. The convergent effects are not maintained through the correctness and 
consistency of information exchanged between modules, but through the medi- 
ation of the world and the current states and goals of the robot /system (ibid.). 
Because of the indispensable unpredictability brought about in the above course 
of mediation(see relating discussions in Section 2.3, page 34), these two sources 
of determination - world and current system conditions - are by no means en- 
tirely pre- categorised. and consequently this determination of behaviour is very 
different from the maintenance of task -specific computation in traditional AI. 
The current states and goals are maintained by a variety of modules, de- 
pending on the tasks and the environment, as we will see when we examine in 
detail the architectures of active perception systems. However, modules in a 
behaviour -based system must be small, as Mataric (1993) contends. This is 
because the control of a behaviour -based system is distributed, which may re- 
sult in high complexity unless the inter -module dependence and computation is 
minimised. 
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Emergence on Grounds of Situated Robotics. A fascinating property of 
the active perception systems, which are principally behaviour -based as just men- 
tioned, is their emergent functionality. The situated activities of robots provide 
abundant emergent phenomena because the generated capabilities are basically 
global behaviours arising from local activities. More intriguingly, the emergence 
takes place at the task level, as opposed to evolutionary, developmental or learning 
levels. That is, the perceptual information provided by active perception systems, 
in contrast to the generated capabilities resulting from computer learning, is itself 
an emergent phenomenon. The task -level emergence is a distinguishing property 
that makes active perception research outstanding in the understanding of emer- 
gence, because it is as yet the only case of emergence happening at the task level. 
The present thesis is dedicated to the study of emergence at this level, in order 
to contribute to the study of emergence. 
1.3 Seeking Conceptual Foundations 
1.3.1 The Explanatory Role of Conceptual Foundations 
The term `conceptual foundations' is meant in this thesis to signify the key notions 
that bridge the conceptual gaps remaining in understanding emergent behaviours 
of active perception in the context of robotic implementations. The emphasis is 
on the conceptual explanations required, as opposed to conceptual analysis of 
terminological usage, philosophical notions, theoretical comparison, numerical 
description, computer implementation, or experiment. 
Like most philosophical notions, conceptual foundations are presented at 
the level of concepts; yet these activities, despite being conceptual, are distinct. 
Conceptual foundations can be seen as a middle ground between philosophical 
notions and theoretical constructs. The idea of this thesis to develop conceptual 
foundations is inspired by a distinction made by Patee (1995) in the context 
of ALife - between genes and biological principles (including dynamical systems 
theory) - for explaining different roles in the determination of life. As Patee points 
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out, genes provide information while biological principles (including dynamical 
systems theory) serve as physical principles. 
Although Patee labels the distinction he has drawn as `epistemological', it 
seems more appropriate to see the above two explanatory roles as the conceptual 
foundations of the issue which concerns Patee - the different roles played by 
genes and biological principles in the determination of life. The reason is two- 
fold. On the one hand, the above distinction does not seem to fall squarely into 
the categories of traditional epistemology, which concerns general properties of 
knowledge and its justification, specifically comprising the scope and limits of 
knowledge, its sources and justification, and sceptical arguments over claims of 
knowledge (Grayling 1996). On the other, the aforementioned notion raised by 
Patee - genes providing information vs. dynamical systems theory characterising 
physical principles - serves as conceptual groundwork to enable discussion of 
an issue arising from the exposition of scientific theories. Such a notion can 
consequently be considered as a conceptual foundation. 
1.3.2 Epistemology cf. Conceptual Foundations. 
The provision of conceptual foundations can be regarded as a particular aim of 
epistemology. That is, certain epistemological discussions aim to establish the 
conceptual foundations of a certain field. Hence, there is a typical difference 
between epistemology and conceptual foundations: conceptual foundations, by 
necessity, are intrinsically associated with a particular field of academic knowl- 
edge. By contrast, epistemological discussions may be focused on a general notion 
for explanation, e.g. representation or emergence. 
Unlike epistemology, conceptual foundations emphasise contrasts in explana- 
tory stances. For example, regarding the control of bodily actions, different ex- 
planatory stances may be highlighted, say between externalism and cognitivism, 
and accordingly either organism- environment interaction or the information pro- 
cessing in the brain is defended. Epistemological discussions emphasise more the 
defence or criticism of such explanatory stances in general. Different stances are 
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compared, usually in paired opposites, and a certain stance is seen as more plau- 
sible than others. The supporting evidence may be collected across fields. By 
contrast, conceptual foundations emphasise the explanation of particular phenom- 
ena in a specific field, e.g. in the field of cognitive development, or alternatively 
in active perception. Evidence in a certain field will be collected to support one 
or even some explanatory stances, depending on which particular phenomena 
are to be explained. For example, emergence can be explained by a hybrid of 
explanatory stances, such as the combination of exploration and exploitation. 
The fact that more than one stance of explanation may be simultaneously 
appropriate can result from a contrast: a common term (emergence) being applied 
to a variety of (emergent) phenomena which are subject to different mechanisms. 
In this regard, the work on conceptual foundations seems to be more flexible than 
epistemological discussion, in focusing on different phenomena and consequently 
accepting critically a variety of explanatory stances. 
An advantage of developing conceptual foundations, beyond the scope of tra- 
ditional epistemological discussions, is to extract from the scientific experiments 
or computer implementations of a certain subject matter (e.g. active percep- 
tion, or embryogenesis) their latent explanatory thrusts which may contribute 
to the theoretical understanding or philosophical deliberations in connection to 
that subject matter. For example, the algorithms in Brooksian robotics are con- 
ceptually elaborated in support of externalism (see detailed discussions in chap- 
ter 7), a philosophical thesis which attributes cognitive capacities to organism - 
environment interactions. By contrast, the algorithms in traditional AI are gener- 
ally taken to support cognitivism, another philosophical thesis which regards the 
search of a database as the prototype of cognitive behaviour. In addition, the no- 
tion of factorial conditions developed in the present thesis (see Section 5.4.1, 
page 176)2 is a conceptual elaboration of certain strategies of implementation 
'Throughout this thesis, the number `x' in the parentheses `(see Section x, page y)' refers to 
the section (or sub -section) where the addressed topic first appears in the present thesis. The 
number 'y' refers to the precise page where the given topic begins in that section. Notice that the 
topic in that section may continue across pages. In addition, when a term denoting a conceptual 
foundation (e.g. factorial conditions) first appears in the present thesis, it will be put in bold 
face (e.g. factorial conditions). Moreover, a conceptual foundation is necessarily a notion 
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undertaken in active perception research, such as Kalman filter, Snake, and the 
computation over certain specific variables in the implementation of Adept (a 
robot). This notion marks a difference between active perception systems and 
other behaviour -based systems, as we will see in chapters 5 to 7. Thus, the deriva- 
tion of this conceptual foundation contributes to the theoretical understanding 
of active perception systems. 
1.4 The Scope of the Present Thesis 
As an interdisciplinary study this thesis has a broad scope. However, it has its 
emphasis - seeking conceptual foundations with which to explain the unity of 
emergent phenomena at the task level. With this emphasis, the present thesis 
does not plan to address everything relating to active perception research. In 
particular, this thesis does not aim to explain formally how the behaviour -based 
approach implements cognition or why this approach outperforms traditional AI, 
for the following reasons. 
In implementing cognition, so far, it seems still difficult to provide a for- 
mal account which can explain the applicabilities of all behaviour -based systems, 
because the applicabilities of behaviour -based approach to various tasks and en- 
vironmental conditions have not yet been fully examined, as Mataric (1993) in- 
dicates. As yet, only a limited range of possible robotic capabilities are imple- 
mented and examined. Note that a significant amount of contingencies confront 
the behaviour -based approach - that the architectures of behaviour -based sys- 
tems are task -specific, that tasks are various, and that the computation remains 
dependent on the environment which is largely unpredictable. As a consequence, 
the range of implementations may be quite broad. 
Given the remarks above, debates on the issues of whether and why the 
behaviour -based approach to intelligence generally outperforms traditional AI 
(but not vice versa). Hence, for the sake of convenience the term `the conceptual foundation 
of factorial conditions' is usually shortly written as `the notion of factorial conditions'. Such a 
usage will apply to other conceptual foundations. 
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would be difficult to resolve on purely formal grounds. Comparison between these 
two paradigms needs not only to provide general explanations but also to consider 
explanations with respect to the aforementioned contingencies. Such a formal 
account is certainly worth pursuing someday, but it needs empirical supports 
from a broad range of implementations. The present thesis certainly cannot have 
so broad a coverage, but will instead focus on the explanation of a particular 
theme: the conceptual foundations for explaining the task -level emergence of 
active perception. 
1.5 Outline of this Thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the background to this research, including discussions of cer- 
tain important notions, e.g. autonomy vs. adaptability, and underlying theories 
of behaviour -based systems, such as the subsumption architectures in Brooksian 
robotics. 
Chapters 3 and 4 serve to analyse the present theories and implementa- 
tions of active perception. Regarding the theories, discussions characterise the 
paradigm of active perception research by the distinction of the AB and the 
BC perspectives of active perception, which have certain commonalities but pos- 
sess significantly different emphases. Regarding the implementations, the active 
perception systems discussed can be generally put into four groups, according 
to the difference between implemented capabilities. The first group concerns 
gaze control, including attentive control of saccades and the control of pursuit 
movements, to mention the two which are discussed most regularly. The second 
group consists of tracking systems, comprising Snake and dynamical Kalman fil- 
ter (including Dickmanns' car). The third group has only one implementation, a 
distinctive type of active perception system - Adept - which deals with run -time 
planning of visual path. Its type of computation is also distinctive - the com- 
putation of certain critical variables which are characteristic of the geometric or 
geographic conditions relating to the envisaged visual path. The fourth group 
concerns active perception beyond the visual modality. Three implementations 
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are discussed - Roberts' system of active haptic perception, Allen and Bajcsy's 
robot with visual -tactile integration, and Scheier and Lambrinos' robot with ac- 
tive categorisation. Cross -modal active perception is also illustrated, to convince 
readers of the following point: although understandings of active perception in 
current theories are mostly derived on the basis of systems of visual modality, 
active perception does include other modalities. 
Efforts to build conceptual foundations are presented in chapters 5 and 6, 
which respectively address two dimensions of task -level emergence. Regarding the 
first dimension, chapter 5 serves to characterise the explorative and exploitative 
control of active perception systems in the form of conceptual foundations. Re- 
garding the second dimension, chapter 6 strives to explain task -level emergence, 
specifically to account for why local activities lead to emergent phenomena - the 
accomplishment of required tasks. 
In chapter 5, the analysis of active perception makes a distinction between 
task identification and process arrangement. The former concerns the ap- 
propriate initiation of processes, while the latter concerns the continuation of 
computation leading to the accomplishment of required tasks. In addition, ar- 
gument suggests that the control of active perception systems consists of quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules. 
In chapter 6, task -level emergence of active perception is understood in terms 
of certain principles, which are generalised from four models of life origin - Rosen's 
(M,R)- system, Kauffman's autocatalytic network, Varela's notion of autopoietic 
unity, and Eigen's model of hypercycle. The understanding of task -level emer- 
gence is also based on a novel notion introduced in this thesis - internal co- 
hesion - which particularly characterises the formation of serial orders in the 
task -level emergence of active perception. 
The last section of chapter 6 provides a novel point of view to account for 
the relationship between environment, on the one hand, and the explorative and 
exploitative control of behaviour -based systems, on the other. This viewpoint is 
introduced in the notion of inverse ecological niche. 
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Chapter 7 seeks philosophical explanations over the task -level emergence of 
active perception. Discussions in this chapter show that the conceptual founda- 
tions which have been introduced can serve to elucidate the unity of emergent 
phenomena, which is conceived of in a Clark's notion: multiplist interlock of 
various aspects of cognition. The conceived interlock is realised by several links 
between knowledge sources, which are elucidated by the previously built concep- 
tual foundations, mainly on grounds of the notion of internal cohesion, a notion 
serving to bring together all the detailed computational processes contributing to 
the generation of perceptual guidance in the course of task -level emergence. Thus, 
those conceptual foundations serve to explain the unity of task -level emergence. 
Chapter 8 - the concluding chapter - draws together the conceptual foun- 
dations and philosophical notions discussed in the preceding chapters. Such con- 
ceptual foundations elucidate various links to merge different aspects of emergent 
phenomena in connection with active perception, with the effect that the unity of 
task -level emergence is explained. This chapter also suggests several directions for 
future research. With the establishment of those conceptual foundations and the 
above- mentioned unity, the thesis concludes that the derivation of conceptual 
foundations leads to a cooperation between science and philosophy for under- 




This chapter fills in the background knowledge needed for understanding the 
task -level emergence of active perception. The background knowledge centres 
around three topics - organisms' adaptability to environmental factors, the in- 
ternal control of behaviour -based systems, and the definitions of three regularly 
used terms. 
The first topic divides in two - the relation of autonomy vs. adaptability 
(Section 2.1), and ecological niche (Section 2.2). Autonomy and adaptability are 
two sides of a trade -off relation, an account of which is crucial for understanding 
emergence. Ecological niche concerns the environment, with the emphasis on 
what organisms need for survival. 
The second topic - the internal control of behaviour systems - concerns 
the root of active perception research in behaviour -based systems, including 
Brooks' subsumption architectures (Section 2.3), and the exploitative control 
of behaviour -based systems (Section 2.4). In particular, the present account of 
exploitative control is based on two implementations - Maes (1990b) and Steels 
(1990a) - their discussions of the appropriateness of internal control, and Thrun's 
(1992, 1995) account of active control. What they are generally concerned with 
is to go beyond the focus of Brooks' subsumption architectures in order to im- 
plement more complicated capabilities. 
Regarding the third topic, the terms that need to be defined are: (i) internal 
representations, (ii) emergence, and (iii) certain considerations on the working 
definition of active perception, familiar from the introduction of this thesis. In- 
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ternal representations are grouped into six types, according to different roles they 
play in the architectures of cognitive systems (Section 2.5). The term `emergence' 
is defined as a negative counterpart of the concept of pre- determination, which in 
turn is defined in terms of pre- categorisation (Section 2.6). In addition, the previ- 
ously defined term `active perception' may be extended by further research. The 
present working definition, still, will be sufficient to engage with several aspects 
of active perception (Section 2.7). 
2.1 Autonomy and Adaptability 
2.1.1 Autonomy 
The notion of autonomy mainly concerns the self -sufficiency of a certain (real or 
artificial) organism /system with respect to the deployment of one of its psycho- 
logical traits and its generation from within the organism (in contrast to being 
imposed from the outside)1 effectively.2 In addition, the notion of autonomy 
also concerns the fragility of that trait, and the trait's underpinnings which are 
non- controllable from the external3. Note that the term `self' does not neces- 
sarily refer to a conscious self, but instead refers to the control maintained by 
organisms' capacities /capabilities, which are often maintained unconsciously. 
According to this notion of autonomy, a trait has high autonomy provided 
that the organism itself can deploy that trait with few instructions from the 
'The generation of capacities from within, as opposed to imposing instructions of behaviour 
on organisms from the outside, is a requirement of autonomy characterised by Boden (1995). 
2For an autonomous organism, be it real or artificial, the supply of energy must suffice to 
maintain its activities, and its architectures should be designed so that irrecoverable deficit 
would not occur, as Pfeifer (1996) points out. The latter requirement concerns the fragility of 
that organism. We state this requirement explicitly. 
3The requirement of non -controllability from the external is suggested by McFarland (1992). 
Also it is seen as an essential principle of animats (autonomous agents) by Pfeifer (1996), that 
agents must be `function without human intervention, supervision, or instruction' (Pfeifer 1996, 
p. 5). Although environmental factors may initiate organismic internal functionality, the internal 
mechanism beyond simple stimuli -reaction association is itself non -controllable. No external 
factors can change the internal setting (or configuration). In this regard, Brooks' situated robots 
are weakly autonomous, for they have hardly any bona fide internal representation (specifically 
referring to representations of type 2 and 3, see Section 2.5, page 58) and consequently are 
`constantly pushed around' by the environment (Beer 1995, p. 210). 
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outside, and that the maintenance of that trait is not easily interrupted, or hard 
to control, by external factors. For example, organisms are highly autonomous 
in the resolution of visual boundary, while is less autonomous in the detection 
of a word from a noisy background which would demand significant support of 
attention. The memory of a friend's face is not highly autonomous, for the 
activation of the memory may become difficult as time passes, and as the context 
of knowing that friend changes. 
2.1.2 The Relationship between Autonomy and Adaptability 
The notion of autonomy is multi- layered, each layer of which manifests a particu- 
lar perspective of `inner drive' that controls the behaviour of individual systems, 
be they real physical systems (e.g. a pendulum), artificial systems (e.g. a robot 
ant, or its computer simulation) or living organisms (e.g. a real ant). A subtle 
property of autonomy is its connection to adaptability. In relation to this con- 
nection the different perspectives of autonomy can be analysed, largely along two 
directions. 
According to the dominant metaphysics of nature in modern science - me- 
chanicalism - the autonomy of a system is reducible to the autonomic machinery 
that controls it. Thus, systems behave like a clock, the archetypal metaphor of 
single mechanisms. This aspect of autonomy appears in McFarland's cost -based 
theory of animal behaviour, as we will see in a later section (McFarland 1992). He 
sees this aspect of autonomy as the operations of a system which is uncontrollable 
from the external. 
In contrast, intuition suggests that human autonomy implies the `freedom' of 
behavioural control from both external pressures and a fully dominant `internal 
plan' (Boden 1995, pp. 95, 101).4 It seems that an internal subtlety is responsible 
for the autonomy of humans. In addition, autonomy in this sense can also be 
ascribed to artificial systems where their behaviour appears to be `adapted' to the 
The page numbers, here and in the following quotes, are based on the reprint in Boden 
(1996). 
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changing environment they inhibit (Boden 1995, p. 101). Their adaptability must 
originate in the design. For example, the adaptability to a changing environment 
is manifested in artificial insects, a success in nouvelle AI, a new perspective 
in AI.5 This new perspective of AI sees behaviour as being determined by the 
interactions between the environment and the organisms with regard to their 
low -level operations in the artificial system (Boden 1995, p. 98; Clark 1997). 
2.1.3 Autonomy as Freedom 
Boden (1995) highlights three intrinsic properties of autonomy, with regard to 
freedom. First, the behaviour of a system is highly determined by its accumu- 
lated experiences, as opposed to environmental factors and the system's innate 
capacities. Second, the control of behaviour is self -organised instead of being 
pre- figured by way of design. Last, a system's inner mechanisms can be reflected 
on or selectively modified by the individual concerned, with the general effect of 
creativity. 
The first property, i.e. the determination of behaviour by experiences, relates 
to the importance of personally unique activities in the life time, such as idiosyn- 
cratic behaviour. It is not hard to realise that behaviour arising in this way is by 
necessity neither innate nor in -built in any artificial systems. Apparently, they 
manifest the freedom of individuals from both external factors and the limitation 
of innate capacities. Individual Experiences, hence, can be regarded as a source 
of unpredictability, and can accordingly be further considered in the discussion 
of the third property of autonomy. 
The second property, namely self -organisation, as Boden points out, high- 
lights the biological unreality of current AI and ALife study (Kugler 1992), be- 
cause `today's computer modelling' is unable to `allow for "latent" perceptual 
powers, actualized only by newly emerged environmental features' (as reported 
by Boden 1995, p. 103 in Boden 1996; italics added). The uniqueness of such 
'The term `nouvelle AT largely refers to certain newly arisen approaches to studying in- 
telligence, including animat research, dynamical systems modelling, connectionist AI, and the 
artificial life (ALife) study, in sharply contrast to traditional /classical AI. 
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newly arisen environmental features can be attributed to the unpredictability of 
the environment, which leads to a permanent limitation of computer modelling: 
the self -organising patterns can be theorised as outcomes of systems dynamics; 
however the actual algorithm would remain un- detected or un- explored. 
The third property of autonomy, to wit creativity, as evident in humans, is an 
unpredictable process of transformation which results in someone being capable 
of doing something that she not only `did not do before' but also `could not have 
clone before' (Boden 1995, in Boden 1996, p. 105, italics original). The question 
is, as Boden points out, what is transformed and how. 
Boden places the understanding of unpredictability in the context of AI, a 
modern technology which is regarded by some as an appropriate way of expla- 
nation (Langton 1989). She contends that this property of autonomy can be 
explained and modelled in ALife and nouvelle AI. For example, some connection- 
ist modelling includes non -deterministic (stochastic) processes. In addition, she 
cites a point made by Langton (1989) that in chaos theory a fully deterministic 
dynamics process may be theoretically unpredictable. The differential equations 
can characterise and explain a certain change of phenomena. However, the change 
is not predictable, for no analytic solution can describe that change. 
With this (third) property of autonomy being both extracted from human 
intuition and explained in ALife and nouvelle AI, Boden sincerely reaffirms a 
claim made previously by Langton (1989) in relation to ALife study but further 
extended by Boden to nouvelle AI: that these two studies provide a mechanistic 
and a reductivist (but not in the sense of micro -reduction) account of autonomy. 
Her claim is encouraging for people engaged in these two studies: the notion 
of autonomy incorporated in ALife and nouvelle AI modelling not only does not 
reduce human self -esteem but, on the contrary, helps us to understand how human 
autonomy is possible. 
'In the present thesis, a distinction is deliberately made between the two terms `dynamic 
systems' and `dynamical systems'. The former term (`dynamic systems') generally refers all 
systems of which certain relations can be understood in terms of dynamics, such as Newtonian 
dynamics or dynamic semantics. By contrast, the term dynamical systems is specifically reserved 
for the dynamics characterised by dynamical systems theory, as opposed to other types of 
dynamics. 
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Unification in Technology. The above claim, made by Boden and Langton, 
presents the possibility of offering a unified account of the aforementioned two 
main aspects of autonomy, namely mechanism and adaptability. These two as- 
pects of human autonomy are usually treated as very different by traditional 
studies of the mind, such as psychology and philosophy. For the first time, a 
unified account can be given to them. More importantly, the unification can not 
only be explained in terms of theoretical constructs, but can also be tested by 
computer modelling, which lends significant power and accuracy to the explana- 
tion of emergence. Also for the first time, technology, as opposed to explanations 
in terms of mental capacities, is assigned a role in the explanation of the na- 
ture of mind. This is, in fact, seen as a new approach to doing philosophy that is 
propounded by Dennett (1995), who sees this as an advance on the view that phi- 
losophy is concerned with seeking the foundation of science (mostly mathematics 
and physics). 
Understanding the Deterministic Processes. The technology, as exploited 
in ALife and nouvelle AI, does not end up as mere instruments which simply 
facilitate conceptual activities. It must stress that the technology is irreplaceable, 
in the sense that `we cannot necessarily understand' them with regard to the 
emergence of patterns via such processes, claimed by Boden (1995), although 
everything here is within the reach of explanation, even within the coverage of 
computer implementation (p. 103). 
To understand Boden's idea, we had better to read the term `understand' as 
`comprehend', because the meanings of explanation and understanding are very 
close, while Boden does not account for their difference in this particular context 
- the emergence maintained by machine. A significant difference between them 
can be identified: explanations can be achieved with recourse to the processes of 
determination, which may be beyond comprehension. Such a difference especially 
applies to complex /nonlinear systems, where local activities between components 
can be described (and hence comprehended) but global behaviours are hardly 
tractable. 
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The main reason that the processes of emergence cannot be `understood', 
as Boden contends, rests on a unique way of processing inherent in nouvelle AI, 
that the generation of patterns may undergo several changes which `are made in 
parallel'.7 Boden sees that `it is often impossible to understand' the emergence 
`even though the `explanation' is available' (ibid.). For example, the flocking 
behaviour modelled by Reynolds (1987) can be explained, because `we can see 
lucidly how it is that holistic flocking results' from the three -rule algorithms (i.e. 
distance maintenance, matching velocity to the immediately neighbouring Boids, 
moving toward the centre of Boids in the neighbourhood). Yet, the understanding 
is restricted to a single change, hence it is impossible to understand simultaneous 
changes in parallel (Boden 1995, p. 100 -3, italics original). Note that the term 
`understand' in Boden's context is to be read as `comprehend', as suggested above. 
The process of emergence indicated in nouvelle AI can be explained otherwise 
in terms of nonlinearity. Nonlinear processes of emergence are characteristic of 
complex systems, as discussed previously (page 22). Because of the nonlinearity, 
emergence is an irreducible (in the sense of not being micro -reducible) feature of 
nature, a feature with outcomes predictable as a result of computer modelling, 
which has understandable single steps of interactions between components of the 
,,\-stem. It is worth noting that the algorithms of computer modelling explain 
(via mathematics) how the modelled complex system is initiated with respect to 
the single steps of interactions. Yet, the group behaviour remains unspecified. 
The algorithms characterise the cause -effect of single steps without specifying 
which components cooperate with which others in support of which intermediate 
patterns; nor is there any information about which components would dominate 
which others in the intermediate stages. In addition, the fact that an outcome is 
desired does not bring about any information as to how the group behaviour is 
to be figured out in conception. 
Algorithms determine a single step of interaction on the basis of the con- 
tingent current states before that step, which are not entirely characterisable 
by those algorithms. When certain algorithms are characterised for a computer 
'By `parallel changes', Boden may mean global behaviour, which seems to be more adequate. 
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model, they remain to be initiated by environmental factors which will take the 
form of non -explicit input data in a complex system. Such data are permanently 
subject to a limitation - unpredictability - of humans, including the designer 
of algorithms. We humans encounter unpredictable factors in the environment, 
know that they are to be transformed in the computer model of a complex system, 
and detect certain desirable outcomes arising in the end. Yet, we remain unclear 
as to how the unpredictable factors take shape in the intermediate processes of 
transformation. This is crudely a limitation of human conceptual power. 
The process of emergence maintained by computer algorithms is certainly 
deterministic. However, it is not determined by us, but by materialistic and envi- 
ronmental factors (as seen in dynamical systems). We usually detect the regular 
patterns manifested by nature without understanding how actually nature brings 
them about. We detect the appearances without knowing the inner mechanisms. 
By the algorithms of computer modelling, we can find out which pre- conditions 
of the modelling would lead to which outcomes, but we just let the computer 
operations fill the intermediate processes, of which the global behaviour is hardly 
comprehensible. The intermediate processes of pattern transformation are driven 
and controlled by nature, in particular the materialistic and environmental fac- 
tors, which are not entirely graspable by our knowledge. 
This shows a sharp contrast between ontology and epistemology. The mech- 
anism is deterministic in an ontological sense, but not fully determined epistemi- 
cally. Such a contrast would be thoroughly conflated in design work (e.g. classical 
AI), if its theoretical basis closely reflects the reality. Yet, such a contrast turns 
up strikingly in complex systems, where their intermediate processes of pattern 
transformation are just let go of until we detect interesting patterns. Several ap- 
proaches to complex systems take advantage of such a kind of pattern generation, 
including PDP modelling8 (e.g. Cliff 1990, 1992), situated robotics (e.g. Brooks 
1991a, 1992; Braitenberg 1984; Reynolds 1987), genetic algorithms (e.g. Sims 
1991), evolutionary robotics (e.g. Cliff et al. 1993), dynamic systems modelling 
8The PDP modelling adopts the strategy of design to a high extent (Quartz 1993), but it is 
also a complex system with regard to the methodology of pattern generation. 
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(e.g. Beer 1995). 
Unpredicability. It is interesting to compare the aforementioned limitation of 
human conception with another one mentioned earlier in this section, namely a 
limitation of computer modelling, which also results from environmental unpred- 
icability. That is, although the self -organising patterns in dynamic systems can 
be theorised as outcomes of systems dynamics, certain algorithms would remain 
undetected or unexplored. Given that the exploration of computer algorithms 
would be put in the form of mathematical conceptions, the environmental unpre- 
dictability limits the coverage of conception, in both the exploration of computer 
algorithms and the understanding of computer modelling with regard to its in- 
termediate processes of information transformation. 
Trade -off. Despite the above claim made by Langton and Boden, the two as- 
pects of autonomy - mechanism and adaptability - are not always unifiable. 
Langton and Boden both present a prescriptive understanding of the mechanism - 
adaptability relationship, that adaptability must be incorporated in the mecha- 
nisms we aim to explore. Langton prescribes a goal for ALife study, while Boden 
presents the case in humans as a goal of theory or modelling. There is indeed a 
permanent trade -off between the already explored mechanisms and the expected 
adaptability. We are not yet aware of how evolution incorporates adaptability 
into autonomous mechanisms, while it is not difficult to realise that adaptability 
is a ceaseless challenge to engineers. In engineering there is no such a thing as a 
universally effective module, as is well understood in classical AI. As is pointed 
out by Pfeifer (1996), there is a well -known trade -off between generality and di- 
rect applicability. This is a matter of fact in engineering. Although evolution 
results in autonomous organisms which are capable of accomplishing open -ended 
tasks, that is indeed a challenge in engineering (Beer 1995). 
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2.2 Ecological Niche and Intelligence 
2.2.1 The Notion of Ecological Niche 
Ecological Niche. The term ecological niche refers to the functional position 
of the species in the environment, comprising the habitat it resides, the time it is 
active there, and the resources to which it has access (Allaby 1994); alternatively 
it refers to the functional role of a species in a community, consisting of its 
relationships to other organisms and the physical environment (McFarland 1992). 
Thus, the ecological niche of a species consists in the species' relationships to the 
environment's abiotic factors, its behavioural propensities within the environment 
in which it resides, and the behavioural relationships it consequently develops to 
its conspecifics or other species in the same environment. Ecological niche is 
the epistemological basis for the study of the evolution of a particular species 
regarding its evolved biological structures, functions, and psychological capacities 
on the one hand, and the principles of their emergence on the other. 
Note that the aim of the present thesis focuses on the linkage between two 
tendencies of activities, while the linkage by nature presents a merge between 
two tendencies of activities. These two tendencies are: (i) how the ecological 
niche of a species is incorporated into organismic systems in the form of cognitive 
structures and functions, and (ii) how such structures and functions are brought 
about on the basis of the self -regulating activities of the organismic physiology. 
In brief, the former approach is exogenous, while the latter is endogenous. We 
can see these two tendencies as two sides of emergence.9 
2.2.2 McFarland's Cost -based Theory 
In this subsection we introduce a theory which relates organisms' behaviour to 
its ecological niche. This is McFarland's (1992) cost -based theory of robot and 
animal behaviour, which has two central tenets. First, he claims that animal 
`'A linkage between these two sides is provided in the present thesis in the discussions centred 
around the notion of inverse ecological niche (see Section 6.5.1, page 255). 
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behaviour is governed by mechanisms which are optimised through evolution with 
respect to the real costs that are characteristic of the animal's ecological niche. 
In response to its ecological niche, an individual animal will develop a certain 
value system, an acting cost function which is an arrangement of goals subserving 
the reduction of costs. Subject to individual differences, this value system is in 
agreement with the real costs of its ecological niche. The closer the value system 
is to the real costs, the more likely the individual is to survive. 
The value system of an individual animal, according to McFarland (1992), 
consists of its optimality principles - those principles which control animal be- 
haviour. However the animal behaves it tends to obey such principles in the end, 
like the trajectory of physical objects which obeys a `least action' law by min- 
imising a particular function of kinetic and potential energy (McFarland's quote). 
the optimality principles manifested a somewhat teleological sense of behavioural 
confinement. As McFarland puts it, such principles, on the one hand, `are, in 
effect, functional explanations which describe how the animal ought to behave in 
order to attain some objective' (p. 197, emphases added). They are 'motiva- 
tional' tendencies under competition `for behavioural expression' (p. 196). The 
optimality principles also take the form of causal explanation, such as `a set of 
rules of thumb', which is `the equivalent of physical forces' (p. 197). 
Cause - effect Principles vs. Teleological Characterisation. McFarland's 
idea of optimality principles can be understood as causal laws10 according to 
which the animal behaves as if it holds certain teleological ends. Teleological 
understanding is intuitive. Certain physical phenomena can be so understood 
intuitively. For example, by analogy with the experience that humans generally 
10McFarland regards the cause -effect mechanisms of animal behaviour as the very charac- 
teristic that qualifies animals as being cost -based robots, because they manifest deterministic 
principles. For this, the mechanisms that govern animal behaviour and robots are `no different 
in principle' (McFarland (1992), p. 192). He seems, strictly speaking, to confound the cause - 
effect confinement with deterministic characterisation. Stochastic mechanisms, to put it in a 
critical case, are subject to cause -effect principles but are not deterministic. Teleological con- 
finement may take the form of deterministic rules, but does by no means conform to cause -effect 
characterisation. What really matters in McFarland's theory, crudely speaking, is the non - 
teleological characterisation, i.e. cause -effect confinement. Determination, in the comparison 
between animal behaviour and robots, is irrelevant. 
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pursue higher social status, water is understood as seeking to go downward. In 
brief, the teleological understanding can be simply taken as an analogical under- 
standing of the cause and effect relationship. 
The distinction between cause-effect principles and their teleological ana- 
logues is important in the study of animal behaviour, in which evolutionary 
explanations and ecological considerations play a central role. It is important 
not only because evolution and ecological interrelations remain fundamentally 
mechanical despite their teleological appearance, but especially because the tele- 
ological terms in consideration of evolution and ecology, quite often, disclose 
certain natural tendencies of organisms. 
The ecological niche of organisms seems to have a strong connection to the 
manifestation, in ontogeny, of their respective intentional pursuits. Because deer 
require water, for example, they develop an overt intention to seek water. Al- 
though the underlying principles of animal behaviour remain rooted in the eco- 
logical niche, as opposed to the intentional pursuits, such a strong connection 
makes sense of the teleological characterisation of animal behaviour. Accord- 
ingly. mechanicalism and teleology can be regarded as two parallel perspectives 
of understanding. This may be the reason that the teleological characterisation 
of animal behaviour is difficult to eradicate: teleological terms make sense of 
ecological niche indirectly, but informatively and accurately. 
Autonomous vs. Rational Dimensions of Value System. The second 
tenet of McFarland's theory is that cognitive systems manifest their flexibility 
not only in a fully autonomous dimension, but also in a rational dimension, 
where planning and learning may take a role. These two dimensions, McFarland 
(1992) points out, are usually present simultaneously in any single organism. 
They can be taken as a duality of cognitive capacities. Such duality also applies 
to perception. 
1. Implicit Value System Manifested in the Autonomous Properties 
of Perception. The autonomous properties of cognition, as McFarland (1992) 
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argues, provide many facilities that meet the needs of the ecological niche. They 
are effective, quick in response, subserving the primary demands of survival with 
respect to a particular ecological niche. 
2. Explicit Value System Manifested in the Rational Properties of Per- 
ception. The downside of such autonomous capacities, however, is their lack 
of flexibility in the consideration of planning activities, which generally present 
in daily -life perceptual tasks, such as going across a street and looking for a lost 
bag. In fact, the relatedness of perceptual activities to planning is a main source 
of organisms' adaptability. Organisms can accordingly manipulate perceptual 
capacities, whatever the degree of autonomous flexibility they may possess, in 
order to observe the relevant circumstances with a view to fulfilling the need of 
certain goal- oriented decision -making activities. Relative to different goals and 
local environmental conditions, the maintenance of perceptual tasks needs to be 
adaptable to different emphases of their expectations, and the degree of adapt- 
ability even need to be improved by learning. 
For example, for satisfying the expectation of safe passage in a predator 
area with certain hiding places, such as caves, prey need to make available the 
resources of attention and memory- access. To put it in the context of McFarland's 
cost -based theory, the prey have specific ecological niche, on the basis of which 
a set of cost functions is defined which accordingly reflects the evaluation of 
that ecological niche. Different prey may adopt, in fact pre -fix, different value 
systems to derive their respective strategies of survival. In an attempt to reduce 
their cost in their respective avoiding predator activities the prey must learn to 
improve their skills of escaping or the proficiency of observation, e.g. by inducing 
certain important cues of the predator's behavioural patterns in addition to their 
(the prey's) autonomous facilities. 
Note that the task of avoiding predator in a predator area assumes certain 
environmental conditions, against which the agent needs to make available cer- 
tain relevant information in memory and a high degree of attention. Also note 
that whenever the prey start to go across the envisaged area they will soon be de- 
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tected by the predator, hence what is critical to the success in avoiding predator 
behaviour in that dangerous area, apart from their respective running abilities, 
would be the competence to find out intermediate hiding places in an attempt 
to escape the predator's chase. Consequently, the prey can learn to reduce cost 
by reviewing their experiences in memory to ensure, for later use, a minimum 
requirement of time for a predator to catch them. The prey can take advantage of 
such a minimum requirement of the predator and can accordingly learn to start 
a. running effort toward a next hiding place, by ensuring beforehand that there is 
really no predator lurking around at the moment. 
This is certainly a task in need of higher adaptability than the flexibility 
manifested in the autonomous capacities. To attain such a high adaptability, 
organisms need to learn on the basis of their capacities of attention, memory, 
the calculation of speed, and the judgement of predators' presence, with a view 
to reducing the costs against the pre -fixed value system. Thus, McFarland's 
cost -based theory may well apply to the domain of perception. 
The Notion of Autonomy. Autonomy is seen by McFarland (1992) as a 
requirement of cost -based mechanisms, because an individual (real or artificial) 
organism must be able to maintain its behaviour effectively, so that it can respond 
to the challenges arising in its ecological niche with the `freedom from control' to 
a certain extent (p. 191). Specifically, the control of organism behaviour can be 
entirely subject to the self -determination maintained in the internal mechanisms 
of the individual at issue, while there is a core mechanism that can only be carried 
out by the individual organism itself. In this regard, McFarland presents the 
notion of value system, which, as we introduced previously, serves to determine 
the behaviour of an individual animal, by reducing optimally the real costs for 
the individual organism to live in its ecological niche. 
The notion of autonomy may have a strong connection to mathematical mod- 
elling. Note that the notion of real costs with regard to a particular species is a 
property of its ecological niche. The optimality of reducing costs, hence, manifests 
the greatest adaptability to its living environment. Thus, the notion of autonomy 
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includes the adaptability to the environmental challenges. The traditionally pre- 
sumed paradoxy between autonomy and adaptability is conflated with the cost 
function pertaining to particular ecological niche, depending on what species is 
in question. Also note that either the cost function or value system can be man- 
aged both qualitatively and quantitatively. Accordingly, the settlement between 
autonomy and adaptability is resolved nicely in McFarland's cost -based theory, 
in the sense that it can be cast in well- defined categories and then put into math- 
ematical modelling, with the aim of either exhibiting systematically the realities 
of the species' particular ecological niche or reflecting analytically the regarded 
individual's ways of behavioural control in that ecological niche. As a conse- 
quence, both the notions of ecological niche and individual behavioural control 
can be subject to mathematical modelling, in support of the notion of autonomy. 
This is an apparent contribution by McFarland to the notion of autonomy in the 
study of ALife. 
In sum, McFarland's cost -based theory of animal behaviour provides an eco- 
logical foundation for evolution in relation to animal behaviour, a foundation 
which serves to explain the autonomy of behavioural competence, to the extent 
that the autonomy can be implemented by mathematical modelling. 
Criticism of McFarland's Theory. McFarland's cost -based theory of animal 
behaviour has its limitations. First, each capacity of living organisms has its own 
processes of emergence; however, his theory is essentially a functional character- 
isation of a simple case and hence has no bearing on the theme of emergence. 
Although McFarland mentions the contrast between autonomy and adaptability 
which is a core issue in the consideration of emergence, that contrast can also 
be considered in the context of design, regardless of the process of emergence 
out of natural constraints. It may be because McFarland emphasises the equiv- 
alence between organisms and robots that he focuses on specification of animal 
behaviour but eschews entirely the issue of its emergence. 
Second, his theory is designed to explain bodily actions, with bomb disposal 
as the archetype of its targeted phenomenon, but it disregards the domain of 
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perception. Although the relationship between bodily actions and perception is 
central to active perception research and a recent trend of cognitive neuroscience 
(Churchland et al. 1994), the relationship of perception to bodily actions, and in 
turn to ecological niche, is left untouched in McFarland's theory. 
Third, both value system and cost function may be subject to change, but 
McFarland supposes them both to be fixed. It is not difficult to understand that 
individuals of certain species, e.g. humans, are likely to adopt successively dif- 
ferent value systems in their life time. McFarland seems to aim to characterise 
the essential factors of animal behaviour, by denying the possibility of its change 
throughout ontogeny. The previous introduction of McFarland's cost -based the- 
ory into the study of emergence would be incomplete, unless the deficiencies 
manifested in the above three problems could be addressed. 
2.3 Brooks' Subsumption Architectures 
Brooks' Situated Approach to Mobile Robotics. Brooks' situated robotics 
is the earliest version of reactive robotics (Arkin 1995). It is not intended to 
model intelligence, but to perform it. With performance as the outer aspect of 
intelligence (as opposed to internal model), this approach serves to demonstrate 
that intelligence, including avoidance, wandering, and higher -level activities, can 
be built in the style of activity- producing layers of control. This is the main 
methodology of Brooks' approach, of which the characteristics are discussed be- 
low. 
Brooks' notion of subsumption architecture is grounded on his three -layered 
robot, with details as follows. 
Layer. A layer is a single unit of activity -producing control, composing 
of a fixed (strictly speaking, pre -fixed by hand) network of certain simple finite 
state machines, as seen in Brooks' earliest two robots Allen and Herbert (Brooks 
199la). A single layer, by definition, is primarily a behaviour -based design. That 
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is, each layer necessarily serves to produce a specific activity, such as avoidance, 
wandering, catching a can -sized object (the tasks of Allen's three layers respec- 
tively), and global direction determination for finding soda -can -like objects (one 
of Herbert's tasks). 
Inter -layer Communication. Between layers, there is no central locus of 
control for inter -layer communication. 
Organism- Environment Interaction. Between a robot and the environment 
it encounters, there is no memory and no learning, and hence `no representa- 
t,ionsi11, as Brooks claims. 
Real -time Response. The situated robots must respond to their situated 
environment in real -time (e.g. within 3 seconds for Herbert - a hand- crafted 
requirement, not established by natural selection) (Brooks 1991a). 
Subsumnption Architectures. Layers are built incrementally, according to 
subsumption architectures, which requires the layers to be decomposed by spe- 
cific activities, and be combined incrementally by implementing the lowest layer 
first through debugging in the real world, then implementing the second one, also 
through debugging, and then the third, and so on. 
A Comparison between Situatedness and Embodiment. The notions of em- 
bodiment and situatedness both uphold the importance of direct contact with the 
environment, as opposed to maintaining searching on the knowledge representa- 
tions of a world model. Yet, these two notions are different: briefly, the notion of 
situatedness concerns organisms' relation to the environment, while the notion of 
embodiment concerns the effects brought about on account of organisms' bodies. 
"The T term `no representations' seems to be too strong and somewhat inappropriate, because 
the subsumption architecture actually assumes certain types of internal representations (types 
4 and 5, see Section 2.5, page 58). What Brooks really aims to argue against seems to be the 
internal representations adopted by traditional AI, which fall into the categories of type 2 and 
3. 
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Situatedness. Being situated, behaviour -based systems count on rapid con- 
tact with the various aspects of the environment without undergoing a long path 
of search over a world model. The organisms intensively contact various aspects 
of the environment, by confronting with and wandering between various situa- 
tions. As Brooks describes, such systems continuously refer to sensors rather than 
maintain searching in the internal model. Information from sensors is, and must 
be, responded to in a very short time span' (Brooks 1991b, emphasis added). 
The situated12 robots, as Brooks claims, must develop in the real environ- 
ment. 
Embodiment. Being embodied, a behaviour -based system gathers informa- 
tion based on various effects of its body which are evoked when the system contacts 
the environment: including the sensory features provided by their sensors, the 
movements of their bodies, and the new relations with the world created by their 
bodily actuators or posited by their sensory -motor actuators. In this regard, 
Brooks contends that in order to gain precise understandings of the world, `[a]ll 
the details and issues of being in the world must be faced' (ibid., p. 15). It is 
worth noting that those `details' include two remarkable unpredictabilities: the 
mechanical (without being entirely mediated by information of certain categories) 
bodily effects evoked by unpredictable environmental factors (as exemplified by 
the effects brought about by the automaton avoid), and the bodies' somewhat 
unpredictable spatial /geometric and temporal relations to various aspects of the 
environment (as maintained by the automaton wander). 
In contrast to traditional AI, no internal model is adopted to characterise 
robots' capabilities. As Brooks claims, if there must be a model resting between 
the robot and the world, `the world is its own best model' (Brooks 1991a, p. 
417, italics original), a famous aphorism of Brooksian robotics which can be re- 
phrased more clearly: the situated robots, on the basis of their reactive modules 
(such as the automata in the three- layered architectures), gain capabilities from 
'The conception of situatedness is sometimes termed as `embedment'. As a consequence, the 
situated and embodied agents are called embodied and embedded agents. 
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the reactive activities in response to various (even unpredictable) environmental 
conditions. 
On account of such reactive modules, Brooks' situated robots circumvent 
the grounding problem of internal representations (see detailed discussions in 
Appendix B, page 358), although the subsumption architectures can be regarded 
as internal representations in a certain sense (type 4, see Section 2.5). 
The Subsumption Architecture of Reactive Robots. The performance of 
Brooks' situated robots in general is reactive. The lowest layer of Allen, namely 
avoidance, is purely reactive. It consists of simple finite state automata, in order 
to detect repulsive forces, turn and move forward, or to detect a dead object in 
the way and halt. By contrast, the second layer (i.e. wandering) is somewhat 
less reactive, as Brooks admits. This layer is added on the top of the lowest layer, 
connected by certain wires between layers. 
A priority of functionality is pre -fixed with respect to these two layers: the 
upper layer is functioning only when the lower one is not busy. The function - 
ality of the wandering layer is initiated by generating a random heading every 
ten seconds or so, from a finite state machine wander (not the wandering layer, 
although their names are easily confused). To decide whether the lower layer is 
busy in avoidance, in this (second) layer a finite state machine avoid (not the 
avoidance layer) takes the heading as an attractive force and sums it with the 
repulsive force detected in the lowest layer, which was passed beforehand to the 
avoid finite state machine via a wire between layers. If the information shows 
the lowest layer is busy, the control of the robot is dominated thoroughly by 
that layer, and consequently the impulse of heading, generated by wander in the 
upper layer, is entirely ignored. Alternatively, if the information from the lowest 
layer does not show it (specifically the turn and the forward) as being busy in 
running the robot, the wander (of the second layer) remains functional and the 
result of summing modifies the heading and thereby drives the robot forward in 
a direction avoiding obstacles. 
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The functionality of this two -layered robot is still reactive, but is generally 
constrained by the connection between layers as described above, with the pre- 
fixed priority of the functionality between layers (controlled by the avoid) as the 
main constraint of the reactivity. 
The third (top) layer serves to explore objects to catch, comprising two 
automata - pathplan and integrate which subsume to a pre -fixed priority con - 
troll. There are wires connecting the top layer to the wandering layer and to the 
avoidance layer respectively. First of all, this layer suppresses the second layer 
to see whether the lowest layer is busy in avoiding obstacles. If it is not so busy, 
then it sees whether the second layer is busy in driving the robot movement. 
If not, it suppresses the wandering layer and tries to explore objects to catch, 
by the pathplan finite state machine, i.e. automaton. Simultaneously, it directs 
the information of the pathplan to the avoid finite state machine, that makes the 
lowest layer continue to function. The information from avoid is sent to pathplan, 
with the effect of modifying the direction of robot motion. The modification is 
monitored by another finite state machine integrate that sends updated estimates 
to pathplan for further exploration. 
In spite of the above constraints (note the modifications) between layers, 
the three- layered robot is still a reactive robot. Each layer has its specific ac- 
tivity to perform, and the three layers are combined by the priority constraints 
as described above. Those constraints distribute information across layers, with 
certain activities being stopped or modified, resulting in the smooth functioning 
carried out by the three - layered robot which aims to perform different activities 
(detecting obstacles, avoid, moving forward, explore objects) with the incremen- 
tally added three - layered subsumption architecture. 
Partially Reactive Robots. A mobile robot (note: not necessarily a Brook - 
sian robot) may be partially reactive, in the case where its control system com- 
prises certain representations of the external world, on the one hand, and its 
activities cannot be determined until it contacts the environment directly, on the 
other. In such circumstances, it would still make sense to understand embodied 
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robots and embedded activities. They can be understood insofar as the robot in 
question is reactive. Most mobile robots at present seem to be partially reactive. 
For example, autonomous agents fall into this category. As we show in 
this chapter with the architectures in Maes (1990b) and Steels (1990a), internal 
representations are adopted, and reinforcement learning algorithms are used to 
maintain internal models. However, the control of robot activities is not entirely 
determined by the search over internal representations such as the attempts in 
traditional AI. 
What is important for the present thesis is the fact that most, if not all, 
implementations of active perception fall into the category of partially reactive 
robots, as we will demonstrate in chapters three and four. 
To summarise, Brooks' situated robots adopt incrementally layered subsump- 
tion architectures, with the priority of functionality imposed across layers on 
various automata, resulting in reactive activities being modified and thereby the 
robots performing smoothly. 
Criticism of Brooksian Robotics. Brooksian robotics has far -reaching im- 
pact on philosophy of emergence. Several accounts of emergence (Clark 1996; 
Varela et al. 1991; Hendriks -Jansen 1993) undertake the externalist stance of 
emergence - conceiving emergence solely in terms of organism- environment in- 
teractions. They all adopt Brooksian robotics as their empirical support. 
Brooksian robotics may well support a claim of externalism, but such a philo- 
sophical account would only be tenable insofar as Brooksian robotics is applicable 
to cognitive behaviour. However, its scope of applicability is limited to reactive 
behaviours. As Aloimonos (1993) points out in the introduction of his edited 
book Active Perception, `Brooks' viewpoint that world can be used as a reposi- 
tory of information can give rise, at best, to some simple reactive behaviors' (p. 
8). Brooksian robotics, as is manifested in the notion of subsumption architec- 
ture - incremental layered control of reactive automata, has no bearing on high 
level intelligence which requires representations, memory, or learning. It is on 
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account of such internal connections that organisms gain sufficient flexibility in 
their development of non- reactive skills. In this regard, interaction with the world 
does not seem to be promising in the emergence of flexibility. 
The world is undeniably an indispensable resource of emergence, but it does 
not itself organise emergent behaviours. It is, rather, cognitive capacities and 
relating motor activities that organise, whatever the level of an emergent be- 
haviour is. They maintain subtle feedback loops between them and the world, 
and thereby organise emergent behaviours. If there is no reactive action au- 
tomata, there would be no emergent behaviour of navigation shown in Brooksian 
robotics. Similarly, there cannot be high level emergent behaviour at all, if there 
are no sufficient subtle cognitive capacities and relating motor activities to main- 
tain sufficiently informative feedback loops. 
2.4 Exploitative Control 
2.4.1 Exploration and Exploitation 
The contrast between exploration and exploitation can be understood in a broad 
context - mobile robotics - or in a narrow context - systems that change posi- 
tions to facilitate knowledge acquisition or problem -solving (henceforth active 
systems13). In the broad context (i.e. mobile robotics), they are two strate- 
gies of action manipulation. Exploration is about certain actions that drive the 
mobile robots to contact different positions /states of the environment, for collect- 
ing information or performing certain actions. Exploitation, in contrast, concerns 
setting constraints in the internal states of robots, by introducing heuristic knowl- 
edge of the collected information. In the narrow context (i.e. active systems), 
they are two different strategies of action selection. Given the limitations of space, 
the present thesis is put in the narrow context. As a consequence, we will focus 
13According to this meaning of active systems (systems that change positions to facilitate 
knowledge acquisition or problem -solving), active perception systems are active systems. Active 
perception systems, as defined in chapter 1, change the positions of bodies and sensory organs 
in order to improve the capabilities of perception. Such a meaning of active systems can apply 
to active learning, as discussed in Thrun (1995). 
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our discussions of exploration and exploitation on active systems. 
Exploration. Exploration is a strategy of action selection for active systems, 
according to which organisms inspect /explore those aspects of the environment 
most relevant to the required tasks, by arranging the action modules of the sys- 
tems in parallel or in certain serial orders. Such an understanding of exploration 
relates to two categories - the environment and action modules. Several ques- 
tions would arise. On the environment side, an active system encounters a central 
question: which aspects of the environment are most crucial for (i.e. relevant to 
and relatively sufficient for) the required task? To frame it in another way, how 
do we maximise the knowledge gain for the required task? On the side of action 
modules, the active system needs to resolve a variety of questions: in order to 
inspect the most crucial aspects of the environment, how does the active system 
manage to derive appropriate actions on the basis of the available action modules? 
Can those crucial aspects be derived at the same time, or should they be made 
clear gradually on the basis of previously derived information (i.e. `knowledge 
gain'; see Thrun 1995, in Arbib 1995, p. 381)? Can they be carried out within 
a plan of appropriate actions, or should the appropriate actions themselves be 
made available gradually on the basis of the previously performed actions. In- 
deed, it is usually the case, e.g. saccadic movements, that which aspects (of the 
environment) need to be explored cannot be determined until certain actions (the 
saccades toward certain positions of the visual scene) have already been carried 
out. 
The Focus of Exploration. Two assumptions are seen as important in theory 
for exploration with regard to learning tasks (Thrun 1995), but they can be 
extended to exploration in general. Firstly, there must be heuristics for estimating 
the knowledge gain so that the estimation is approximately correct. Secondly, 
the activities of gaining knowledge, i.e. the inspection of the environment, must 
actually contribute to the tasks in question. In other words, such activities must 
be most relevant to the tasks, given that the computational resources of organisms 
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(such as time and working memory) are constantly limited for accomplishing tasks 
in the real environment. In brief, the two requirements for exploration are the 
correct estimation of knowledge gain and the most relevant activities of gaining 
knowledge. 
These two concerns may not be achieved easily in practice, as Thrun (1995) 
reports. In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of exploration, i.e. 
bring exploration into `focus', certain `task- specific utilities' are adopted in com- 
bination with exploration (ibid., p. 382). 
Exploitation. The strategy of maintaining the aforementioned task- specific 
utilities is termed exploitation. More strictly, exploitation is the use of constraints 
in the internal states of active systems, in support of the exploratory activities in 
the environment, for promoting the effectiveness and efficiency of accomplishing 
the tasks. 
The Distinction between Exploration and Exploitation. A caveat must 
be made concerning the above account of exploration and exploitation. It would 
be a mistake to distinguish them via the categories of external -vs.- internal pro- 
cesses - that is, roughly relating exploration to external processes and attribut- 
ing exploitation to internal control. This would be a mistake for two reasons. 
First, different explorative processes may differ in their degree of internal control. 
Specifically, exploration can be either purely random, or directed under certain 
a priori heuristics that drive an active system to certain positions in the envi- 
ronment in order to collect information with optimised knowledge gain. Such 
heuristics must be implemented within a system, i.e. implemented as internal 
control. For example, explorative processes may be directed to regions with the 
largest estimated error, less explored states (such as visiting the least recently 
inspected positions), or the planning action for exploring global states (instead 
of visiting the local state with the next nearest sensations) (reported by Thrun 
(1992)). 
Second, the heuristic knowledge for exploitation may be provided externally 
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(from outside the system) or derived internally (from within the system). For ex- 
ample, the a priori knowledge for pursuit movement and the templates adopted 
in Kalman filter are externally provided. By contrast, the critical variables in 
Adept (see Section 4.2.1, page 126) for computing a route toward a target are 
hand -crafted (i.e. externally determined), but their values are computed inter- 
nally. 
A salient distinction between exploration and exploitation rests on the differ- 
ent questions they relate to. Heuristic knowledge needed for exploration concerns 
what actions to take or where to visit. In contrast, the heuristic knowledge for 
exploitation concerns intermediate control for deriving appropriate explorative 
processes, such as the heuristics for resolving the questions where the target ob- 
ject (not the active system per se) would be most likely to go, what features the 
visual object has (in Kalman filter). In other words, the heuristic knowledge for 
exploration provides a priori suggestions as to what the active system itself needs 
to do next, while that for exploitation initiates a priori indication as to what the 
object features is most likely to be, without determining any behaviour of the 
active system directly. 
A Consideration of Efficiency. An active system incorporating the combi- 
nation of exploration and exploitation, as demonstrated by Thrun (1992), runs 
much more efficiently than random exploration. In the experiment, the task is for 
the robot to navigate from a specific position, in the environment with obstacles, 
toward an envisaged (by the designer) target. As a rule of this experiment, the 
robot should return to its initial position once its crashes; that is, it should re- 
start the experiment. The difference between random exploration and the other 
is the learning (maintained by a reinforcement learning algorithm) to avoid the 
previous crashes. 
As a result, in 15,000 runs the robot with random exploration crashes 14,991 
times, while that with the combination of exploitation and directed exploration 
only crashes 4,000 times, which is relatively successful. This experiment shows 
that the selection of processes maintained by the combination of exploitation 
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and directed exploration indeed facilitates the learning of a navigation task. Al- 
though this experiment is specifically designed in the context of learning nav- 
igation, which is a particular active system, this experiment may be taken as 
evidence supporting the view that active systems can be generally facilitated by 
the combination of exploitation and directed exploration, as opposed to random 
exploration. In other words, the heuristic knowledge for exploration and exploita- 
tion facilitates the selection of processes, which in turn facilitates the performance 
of active systems. 
2.4.2 Steels' Account of Emergent Functionality 
The notion of emergent functionality is employed by Steels (1991) to explain the 
process of emergence within behaviour -based systems. This notion provides an 
explanation of two issues - the importance of organisms' adaptability and the 
part -whole (local- global) relationship in the process of emergence. 
Organisms' Adaptability Contributes to Emergence. Consider the first 
issue. The course of emergence involves the dynamics within the environment 
and the adaptability of organisms, as demonstrated by Steels' implementation 
(1990a), which demonstrates emergent foraging behaviour on the basis of ex- 
ploitive control (see Section A.1, page 343). 
According to the architectures of Steels' implementation, the environment 
is dynamic, because the food sources may be moving. The autonomous agents 
have a certain degree of adaptability, as is evident in the appropriate combination 
of many activities, which comprise the functionality of comparison between the 
immediate inputs and the expected food type at the expected food location, the 
identification of target food sources by waves of various types, and the derivation 
of routes by the emanation of gradient field. If certain obstacles are detected on 
the way toward the target, a subgoal can be setup for removing those obstacles, 
before the robot bumps into the obstacles on its way toward that target. Since 
the environment is dynamic, the autonomous agents must adapt their activities 
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against changes in the desired objects or the obstacles. It is apparent that emer- 
gent behaviours without significant adaptability to environmental changes would 
be unsatisfactory. Fortunately, the exploitative control of Steels' implementation, 
i.e. forage, presents significant adaptability in response to environmental dynam- 
ics. Hence, we find that the adaptability performed by organisms is a requirement 
of behaviour emergence. The autonomous agents must adapt themselves in the 
course of working out the emergent behaviours, to the extent that the emergent 
behaviours direct those agents to survive the environmental changes /dynamics. 
Implicit Determination of Global Behaviours. Consider the second issue 
- the part -whole (local- global) relationship in the course of emergence. An in- 
triguing issue of emergence is the question of why local activities lead to global 
behaviours, given that those global behaviours are not directly characterised in 
design. One approach is the attribution of emergent functionality (as global 
behaviour) to the instructions /scripts of implementation, which determine local 
activities in the process of emergence. The main reason behind such an approach 
is that the implementation of the concerning emergent behaviours is fully de- 
termined by those instructions. Such an account, however, is denied by Forrest 
(1991), because those instructions do not account for emergence at the global 
level. He sees those global behaviours as being determined implicitly, while the 
local activities are specified explicitly. 
A further argument against the suggested approach can be cast in terms of 
environmental conditions: the instructions of local activities do not really fully 
determine the emergent behaviours, because it is those instructions together with 
the environment that determine the emergence in question. The same set of 
instructions, when they are applied to a different niche, may lead to different 
global behaviours. As an extreme case, a robot fish would simply lie idle on land. 
Without a certain niche being fixed, a certain global behaviour would not be fully 
determined. 
These two challenges to the above attempt (the attribution of global be- 
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haviour to the instructions /scripts of implementation) seem to be adequate. Yet, 
the question of explaining emergence remains, because the ground conceptions 
'determined implicitly' and `global behaviour' are pretty vague. Such terms only 
serve to show that the local instructions do not explain the emergence. Yet, the 
argument of the above challenges is based on negative terms (i.e. `determined 
implicitly' and `non -local behaviour') without positive characterisation, because 
those terms per se do not assert any requirement to account for the question of 
how actually the emergent behaviour arises. 
Emergent Functionality. Steels' theory of emergent functionality sheds some 
light on this question. Steels (1991), like Forrest (1991), does see the function- 
ality of a single component as a sub -function of the global functionality. The 
emergent global behaviour is brought forth by the functionality of those compo- 
nents together as their `side effects' (Steels 1991, p. 454). Again, `side effect' is 
a negative term, which has no positive requirement for explaining emergence. 
Steels' theory, however, has more to say about the determination of the 
emergent functionality. He emphasises the importance of the environment, in 
mediating the emergence of the global behaviour. By introducing the mediation 
of the environment in the course of emergence, Steels holds out the possibility of 
giving a more specific account; however, this will require a clearer treatment of 
the role of the environment, as we will see. 
Steels maintains that the mobile robot operates directly on environmental 
parameters and that the different components of the robot system interact di- 
rectly; by contrast, they contribute indirectly to the emergent functionality, with 
the mediation of certain auxiliary structures (such as the growth substances - e.g. 
heat - for a growing tree) which are generated in the environment. The media- 
tion of the environment should not be overlooked in an explanation of emergent 
functionality. Such a consideration is applicable to rock collection robots and 
a wall- following robot, but tends to be inappropriate when it is applied to the 
growing tree system, which are the three examples that Steels adopts in support 
of his theory of emergent functionality (see Section 2.4.2, page 45). 
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1. Rock Collection Robots. The implementation of the rock collection robots 
(Steels 1990b) is inspired by ant colonies. The system presumes a fixed field in 
which robots are moving. The robots put down crumbs when they detect food 
samples. Between the left crumbs and their nest, they establish a zone that at- 
tracts other robots. This system is specified by the following instructions. Before 
we review these instructions, a note must be made in order to understand Steels' 
implementation more easily: the food sample may disappear, for other organisms 
may take it away without touching the previously dropped crumbs. Hence it is 
not surprising that a later -arriving robot may detect crumbs without finding the 
food sample. 
The instructions, then, are as follows: 
Random Movement. A robot in this system moves at random through 
the field. 
Obstacle Avoidance. When a robot encounters an obstacle, it stops and 
turns away from the obstacle. 
Path Attraction. When a robot detects the crumbs, it moves toward 
them. 
Sample Collection. When a food sample is detected, a robot picks it up. 
Crumb Handling. In the place where there are crumbs, if a food sample 
is gathered, two crumbs are dropped; otherwise, when no food is detected, 
pick up one crumb (which must have been left by a previous robot). 
Vehicle of Collection. When a robot stands at the vehicle for food 
collection and has gathered a food sample, drop it on the vehicle. If a robot 
encounters the border of the exploration field, it turns around. 
It is clear that the wandering robots in this system would eventually gather 
all the remaining food samples (which have been previously detected) and drop 
them on the vehicle, and consequently the task of this implementation is ac- 
complished. The accomplishment of the task in question, needless to say, relies 
45 
heavily on the previously dropped crumbs in the common field. Steels' notion 
of environmental mediation, then, is clearly applicable to this system. In this 
case, the notion of environment is clear, because basically a fixed field of robot 
movement is given beforehand. 
2. Wall -Following Robot. The notion of environmental mediation can be 
seen equally in the case of a wall following robot (Mataric 1990). Its instructions 
are specified as follows (italics added): 
Stroll. When there is no obstacle in front, move forward in a more or less 
straight motion. When the robot encounters an obstacle, stop, and follow 
the instruction of avoid. 
Avoid. When there is an obstacle in front, turn right or left. 
Align. When the distance to the object behind is shorter than the distance 
in front, turn by a small angle. 
According to Mataric (1990) (as reported in Steels 1991), the experiments 
for four runs (Mataric 1990, p. 53) show the emergence of consistent boundary 
tracing out of the above three instructions. Steels concludes that his notion of 
environmental mediation has been supported, because the data flow of robot 
interactions is clearly mediated by the environment, as is evident in the above 
italic phrases. 
What precisely the environmental spatial conditions will be depends on the 
contingent environmental conditions and the somewhat random movements of 
the robot. However, the robot activities only take advantage of the resulting 
spatial allocations, because the above italic phrases are pre- conditions of robot 
action selection. Whatever the eventual spatial relations turn out to be, and 
whatever actions a robot may take, the action must be pre -conditioned by the 
immediate spatial conditions. Given that there is one common environment, the 
notion of environmental mediation is also clear, although the ways of mediation 
are different. In this system, the environmental mediation is not realised by the 
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detection of crumbs, but is alternatively realised by the spatial relations between 
the robot and the boundary of the given field (the walls). So far, Steels' notion 
of environmental mediation remains applicable to the course of emergence. 
3. Tree Growth System. His notion, however, seems questionable in its 
application to the case of the tree growth system (Steels 1990b). The instructions 
of the tree growth system are specified as follows: 
Food Diffusion Food from the root diffuses at a certain rate across the 
cells of the tree, across the stem, left- branches and right- branches. 
Increase of Growth Substance Depending on the availability of food, 
the growth substances increase in amount. 
Generation of Cells When the amount of growth substance passes beyond 
a certain threshold, a new cell of the tree is generated. 
Inhibition Over the Further Increase of Growth Substance The 
presence of a cell, be it a cell of the stem, left - branch or a right- branch, will 
inhibit the further increase of growth substance over there. 
While the food supply continues, the increase of growth substance (and con- 
sequently the generation of cells) will not be overwhelming in a certain direction, 
but will be balanced between the left and the right branches of the stem. The 
components of the tree growth system take as inputs food and the growth sub- 
stance; in addition, they generate their own outputs, such as the increase in the 
amount of the growth substance. Notice that food is passed directly from the root 
across the tree, to the left and right branches of the stem, without the mediation 
of the external environment. Similarly, the growth substances increase, when 
they are nourished by the arriving food, without the mediation of the external 
environment. Similarly, the generation of the cells, when the amount of growth 
substance rises beyond certain thresholds, occurs without the mediation of the 
external environment. Steels contends, however, that there is communication 
between such components, and that it occurs via the environment, e.g. by the 
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presence of growth substance. At this point, Steels' claim of environmental me- 
diation does not seem to be supported, because nothing has passed through the 
environment. The only possible exception is the beginning supply of the food. 
Yet, the beginning supply is really not mediated by the environment at all. All 
further processes have no connections with the environment. We can therefore 
conclude that Steels' notion of environmental mediation does not apply to this 
case of behaviour -oriented agent implementation. 
No Mediation of the Environment Found in the Exploitive Control 
of Steels (1990a). Apart from its inapplicability to this implementation, the 
notion that emergent functionality needs the mediation of environment is also in- 
applicable to Steels' own implementation of internal representation exploitation, 
which we previously discussed (Steels 1990a). The information flow only passes 
through the two grids, which consist of purely internal representations. The ini- 
tial inputs come from the (external) environment, but there is no further contact 
with the external environment. All the representations dealt with are internal 
ones. If the notion of environmental mediation is applicable to this particular im- 
plementation, the two grids must be conceived of as internal environment, as we 
previously suggested. Crucially speaking, the environment, which mediates infor- 
mation flow, is the common arena (field) of the interacting components. Steels' 
notion of environmental mediation should accordingly be modified. 
Beyond Steels' account, the explanation of emergent functionality needs more 
further development. In this regard, the present thesis will provide some more 
explanations, as seen in chapters 6 and 7. 
2.4.3 Steels' Criticism of Reactive Systems. 
Based on reactive interactions between organisms and environment, Brooks (1991a) 
dismisses the need for internal representations in the design of intelligent agents, 
which he maintains would still be capable of evolving into full- fledged cognitive 
organisms. Those reactive interactions are local activities but may eventually 
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lead to global behaviour, as demonstrated in a broad range of behaviour -oriented 
implementations. Brooks' claim has had immense impact on views of emergence: 
the implementations in the autonomous agent approach are taken as direct evi- 
dence in support of a particular perspective on emergence - externalism: this is 
the view that emergence is determined by organism- environment interactions, in- 
stead of internal processes (Clark 1995, 1997, Hendriks- Jansen 1996, Varela et al. 
1991). However, things are not so simple, because internal representations also 
take a role in the implementation of autonomous agents. Like the reactive activ- 
ities, certain internal representations push forward local activities which lead to 
global behaviour as well (e.g. Steels 1990abc). Emergence is really determined, 
in part, by internal processes. 
Steels (1990a) criticises previous reactive systems, i.e. the implementations 
of behaviour- oriented agents without internal models /representations, on the 
grounds that their performance `will always be severely limited' (p. 71). He pro- 
vides two reasons for this claim. First, that external objects cannot be maintained 
when certain obstacles obscure the perceptual view (even if only temporarily). 
The autonomous agents, presumably, are incapable of maintaining external goals 
when they are obscured. The autonomous agents with internal models will con- 
sequently be more adaptable to environmental changes (with particular regard to 
the obstacles to maintaining perceptual view). Second, that autonomous agents 
without internal models could not maintain planning (even occasionally). They 
are, specifically, incapable of checking out the consequences of an action before 
actually carrying it out. Although they can select actions from their existing 
repertoire, they simply cannot plan. Hence we can infer that the implementation 
of internal representations (insofar as planning may promote adaptability) helps 
autonomous agents to improve adaptability. 
Criticism of Symbolic Representations. Steels tries, accordingly, to adopt 
internal representations in his implementation of autonomous agents. However, 
he realises that he must avoid the previously discovered problems with the sym- 
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bolic14 models. He notes three. First, it is uncertain as to how enough information 
can be extracted from sensors in real -time. Second, there is always a degree of 
unpredictability in the environment, due to friction, irregularities in the objects, 
and small deviations of action executed by an effector. Third, an autonomous 
agent is always likely to encounter environmental conditions which are beyond 
its designers' ingenuity. As a consequence, he sees symbolic models as being 'in- 
flexible' and `brittle' (p. 71). The internal models he envisages, of course, must 
overcome such disadvantages. 
2.4.4 Maes' Considerations of Exploitive Control 
Maes (1995) draws attention to an unresolved tension in the work on behaviour - 
oriented agents, where the architectures of autonomous agents consist basically 
in task- driven and pragmatic solutions, in contrast to general laws and principles. 
As she warns when she concludes a general review of the agent approach, the agent 
approach may end up with an `engineering' discipline, instead of a `scientific' 
discipline (p. 158). 
Scaling Problem One of the main outstanding problems of the behaviour - 
oriented approach is the difficulty of scaling up to larger networks. There are 
difficulties in action selection and the learning from experience. Such difficulties, 
for convenience, can be labelled the scaling -up problem. 
Regarding the difficulty in action selection, when the architectures in ques- 
tion involve a larger number of (possibly time- varying) goals, be they identified 
implicitly or explicitly, selection between them becomes harder to achieve. It is 
reported by Maes (1995) that for most behaviour -oriented architectures the scal- 
14The term `symbolic' is used in slightly different ways. In psychological discussions of mental 
representation, a pictorial imagery (just like a linguistic representation) is categorised as being 
symbolic representation, as opposed to distributed representation (Eysenck and Keane 1995). 
By contrast, in the context of Artificial Intelligence, symbolic representations are contrasted 
with analogical representations. Symbolic representations are shaped and connected in the 
form of syntax, while analogical representations are maintained by the physical nature of the 
representational medium, e.g. the spatial inter -relations of a map (be it printed or mental). 
Here, the term `symbolic' is understood in the context of Artificial Intelligence. 
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ing up to larger problems is a `disaster' (p. 150). In particular, few architectures 
demonstrate active perception, which she also terms `goal- driven' perception (p. 
151). 
Maes identifies an attempt to solve the problem of action selection in large 
networks which exploits dynamical systems, as in the works of Kiss (1991), Steels 
(1991), and Beer (1995). Yet, as she points out, it is unclear how to explain in 
general emergent behaviour in such dynamical networks. This question will be 
addressed in the present thesis with epistemological considerations, and the focus 
of this thesis happens to be on active perception. 
The most obvious solution to the scaling problem of action selection, as Maes 
(1995) points out, is to adapt the networks by evolving (as in Brooks (1992a)) or 
learning from experiences. However, few successes have been achieved. Indeed, 
Brooks does not seem to have provided detailed explanations as to how behaviour - 
oriented agents can gradually evolve into complicated organisms like primates. 
Regarding the difficulty of scaling -up in learning from experience, as Maes reports, 
the computational complexity of the learning systems in this approach grows 
increasingly so that they are no longer `practically useful' for building complex 
agents when they encounter various problems in the real environment (p. 157). 
Some general weak points of the behaviour- oriented approach are indicated. The 
improvement on such weak points, presumably, would provide great facilities in 
the implementation of behaviour- oriented agents. As we will see in the various 
implementations of active perception, this is indeed the case. Among the general 
weak points of the behaviour- oriented approach identified by Maes, we can find 
three of them in connection to the limited implementations of active perception 
we will survey in chapters three and four. 
The first weak point indicated by Maes (1995) is that few algorithms incor- 
porate interesting attention mechanisms. This point becomes obvious once we 
take notice of how important the attentive control of saccades is for the smooth 
functionality of gaze control (see Section 3.4, page 95). 
The second weakness involves the generalisation of sensor data. No algo- 
rithms, as Maes points out, exploit the structure and similarity of sensor data. 
Generalisation over sensor data is evidently important, as we will see in the imple- 
mentations of active perception. For example, in the pursuit mechanism of gaze 
control, the continuity of the target object is a crucial guideline (Section 3.4.5, 
beginning with page 108). In addition, in the tracking mechanism, temporal con- 
tinuity conditions and spatial invariance are both needed for the implementation 
of an Extended Kalman Filter (see Section 4.2.2, page 133, in the discussion of 
Dickmanns' autonomous car). However, the implementation of such continuity 
conditions seems unsatisfactory. Despite their importance, the above implemen- 
tations of continuity are hand -crafted, in the form of `a priori knowledge'. It 
seems, so far, to remain unclear as to how such `knowledge' can be established in 
real organisms. 
The third weak point of the behaviour -oriented approach relates to the in- 
teraction between perception and action -a central concern of active perception 
research. That is, the perceptual system does not facilitate its learning of actions 
with newly learnt perceptual capabilities. For example, behaviour -oriented 
agents lack the capacity of learning what `new features' or `categories' of percep- 
tion need to be created in order to facilitate the pursuit of goals in the environment 
(p. 157). 
This problem (the third weak point) may have been hardly discussed in 
the implementation of behaviour -oriented agents, but active perception research 
is better off in this regard. This problem is taken as important in the imple- 
mentation of active perception. For example, in Allen and Bajcsy (1985), the 
exploration of tactile processes is initiated to compensate for the shortcomings of 
visual processing in the task of surface identification (see Section D.2, page 372, 
and D.2). In brief, when visual processing encounters homogeneous regions where 
the detection of edge features or other variations is difficult, tactile exploration 
is initiated as additional support, with the effect of a curvature surface being 
eventually identified. The initiation of tactile exploration relies on a negative 
property - the detection of homogeneous (visual) regions. This means that the 
system is capable of detecting its own need for carrying out the required task. 
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More importantly, the system can support the need with the exploration of new 
features. Although the support is shaped in the form of exploration, the capa- 
bility of seeking that exploration should be attributed to internal control, i.e. 
exploitation. 
Such implemented flexibility does not seem to be the rule, however: rather, 
it represents an exception in the implementation of active perception. Two prob- 
lems can signify the general difficulties. First, the capability of seeking further 
exploration, as demonstrated in Allen and Bajcsy (1985), is hand -crafted, instead 
of taking shape by a machinery of emergence. Second, this implementation is a 
flexible integration of cross -modality information, but the task (the exploration 
of a curved surface) is quite simple and hence can be accomplished clearly. It 
remains questionable as to how to identify a negative property for every need 
encountered in the real environment during the run -time processing. Such a 
negative property can be regarded as a goal to achieve in the later processing. 
Furthermore, the link between goals is also a question. Unlike the behaviour - 
oriented approach in general, the active perception approach saliently takes the 
`need' for certain information as a central category, but it remains unclear as to 
how the wide range of subgoals link cooperatively to support the task. We will 
see resolutions of these two problems (of flexibility) in chapters three and four, 
as demonstrated by active perception systems. 
To summarise, the scaling problem is a problem of increasing complexity: 
increasing complexity is quite hard to manage in the implementation of gradually 
larger networks of behaviour- oriented agents, due to the lack of considerations 
for managing both action selection and learning from experience. 
Exploitation by the Planning of Goals. Apart from Steels (1990), the no- 
tion of emergence via exploitation can be supported by the planning of goals, 
as demonstrated by Maes (1990b). This work provides a resolution of the prob- 
lem of flexibility - how to identify (as a goal) a negative property for every need 
encountered in the real environment during the run -time processing, and how 
the wide range of subgoals link cooperatively to support the task. The resolu- 
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tion, briefly, is grounded by the notion of activation energy spreading within the 
network of goals. Specifically, a goal is identified for later pursuit when its accu- 
mulated activation energy goes beyond its threshold. The cooperation between 
goals is shaped in the form of arbitration between goals which is controlled by 
several links (successor link, predecessor link, and inhibition link). The flow of 
activation energy within the network is further controlled by certain global pa- 
rameters, such as the influence of goals (-y, see later discussion) and the influence 
of situations (0). 
In Maes (1990b), the entities to be exploited are extended to the internal 
representations of external world and explicitly represented goals. In the process 
of exploitation emergence can also be found, as demonstrated by Steels, but the 
emergence is no longer purely reactive. Instead, it is mediated by a network 
of differently weighted goals, out of which activation selection takes place. The 
action selection in such a network is subtle in that the selection itself appears 
to be an emergent behaviour of planning, which was dealt with in traditional AI 
on the basis of deliberative thinking. The emergence in Maes' implementation, 
however, need not be mediated by the external environment: in this respect it 
is like Steels (1990a) implementation but unlike Steels (1991) account (- that 
emergent functionality is mediated by the environment). For an account of the 
detailed architectures of Maes (1990b), readers can refer to the Appendix A.2 
(page 347) of this thesis. 
Externalism Reconsidered. Externalism, as we have discussed in a previous 
section, is strictly grounded on Brook's account of mobile robotics. Brooks' stance 
can be reconsidered in the context of 0 vs. -y. Externalism can be characterised 
by the control condition that the ratio of 0 over y approaches infinity, where 
global goals have no bearing on the spreading activation- energy between action 
modules. According to externalism, the influence of energy spreading cannot be 
attributed to goals or internal representations, plainly because there is no such a 
thing as internal representations or (explicit) goals in Brookian robotics. There 
is no sense in which the global parameter y can be understood. The impact of .0, 
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the impact of external situations on the current states of the implemented robot, 
become exclusively influential. 
Brooks' stance is actually an extreme in the research of autonomous agents. 
It may well be tenable in explaining emergence, insofar as the Brookian stance 
is applicable in the implementation of autonomous agents. As a matter of fact, 
that stance is an extreme in the agent approach to mobile robots. It may ex- 
plain the emergence that is based on reactive (i.e. no internal representations) 
and non -goal- oriented agents. However, emergence can certainly be based on in- 
ternal representations and goal- oriented agents, as contended by Steels (1990a) 
and Maes (1990b, 1995). Although externalism is popular (Clark 1997; Clark 
and Chalmers 1996; Hendriks- Jansen 1996; Varela et al. 1991; Pessoa et al. in 
press), it is grounded on an extreme. Their perspective of emergence is conse- 
quently biased by that extreme, which leads to their ignoring other possibilities 
of emergence. 
Externalists risk ignoring other possibilities of implementation in the agent 
approach, e.g. internal control. In consideration of the implementations based on 
internal representations and goal- oriented control, i.e. exploitation, emergence is 
by no means purely restricted to externalism. The emergence explained on the 
basis of autonomous agents may, at least, equally likely be non -externalist, insofar 
as the non -reactive agent implementations have demonstrated. 
Consider active perception research, in particular. We will see, in chapters 
three and four, that the exploitative control of robot activities is no less important 
than reactive organism- environment interactions. 
Shaping Links Between Implicit Goals. The flow of activation -energy within 
a network of explicit goals is easier to understand than that within a network of 
implicit ones. Those explicit goals are hand -crafted, by designer, in the specifi- 
cation of action modules, as is illustrated in figure A.1 (page 347). By contrast, 
goals can be implicit in an agent system, as indicated by Maes (1995). She 
contends that explicit goals are easier to identify and control. 
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The implicit goals are not necessarily bad, however. All the flexibilities 
demonstrated in Maes (1990b) can be transferred to other systems with implicit 
goals, if we can make sense of links and the activation -energy flow within them 
in such systems. 
Implicit Goals. Other goals of active perception implementations are im- 
plicitly expressed, in the sense that those goals (e.g. the tasks themselves) are not 
identified in the form of language -like representations (like those characterised 
in Maes (1990b)) but are instead recognised by the performance of perceptual 
mechanisms. That is, the perceptual mechanisms, by their performance, carry 
out certain sensory -motor or bodily -motor actions, which are not characterised 
in terms of competence /action modules but can still be conceived of as the goals 
of those mechanisms. 
Note that global goals, in Maes (1990b), are explicitly specified as actions. 
In the context of active perception, implicit global goals of active perception 
can similarly either be shaped directly in the form of motor actions (sensory - 
motor or hand actions, such as saccadic movements and the hand movement for 
haptic perception) or alternatively take the form of perceptual information as the 
guidance of bodily actions. 
In an analogy with Brooksian robotics, in Mataric's (1990) implementation, 
the sensory -motor or hand movements per se, regardless of their control, are 
driven by simple modules. Mataric's robot is supported by simple automata such 
as stroll and avoid, but the characterisation of such automata are not tantamount 
to that of the wall -following behaviour - the goal of Mataric's implementation. 
The goal is regarded as implicit because it is not explicitly characterised in the 
design but is maintained by its designer as a desired performance.15 Similarly, 
the performance of active perception, say tracking, is supported by sensory -motor 
movements, such as saccades, but such movements are not tantamount to tracking 
-a goal of active perception. 
'5The goals of decentralised systems are usually under deliberated control of their designers. 
As an example - neural network modelling, see detailed discussions in Quartz (1993). 
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Similar considerations hold for other implementations, such as Brooks' three - 
layered robot, the system of Boids, Steels' tree growth system and his rock col- 
lection robots. All such implementations have their respective goals, but they are 
conceived by their designers in the form of desired performance. Goals in such 
implementations are indeed existent, but are implicit in the design. 
The perceptual guidance of bodily actions, the other form of global goal 
in active perception implementations, is likewise an implicit goal, because the 
guidance is certainly not characterised in a language -like form. Hence, except for 
very few cases (such as Adept, as aforementioned) we can deduce that the goals 
of active perception implementations are implicit. 
An intriguing question regarding active perception is how implicit goals are 
eventually accomplished. To have a more detailed understanding than above, we 
must discuss the subgoals of autonomous agent implementations. 
Implicit Subgoals and Factorial Conditions. Note that the subgoals in 
i\'laes (1990b) are shaped in the form of functional conditions /descriptions of ac- 
tions. The subgoals in active perception implementations, by contrast, are not 
similarly shaped. The conditions of sensory -motor movements or hand move- 
ments do not necessarily take shape in the form of overt (language -like) descrip- 
tions. However, such conditions can be conceived as being alternatively shaped 
in the form of factorial conditions of (sensory -motor or hand) actions. The term 
`factorial conditions' refers to the perceptual factors caught through sensors and 
transformed via numerical computation, such as the visual contours dealt with 
under a visual filter (e.g. Kalman filter - see page 119) and the features fetched 
in the attentive mechanism of saccades. In other words, such conditions are not 
functional descriptions but numerical transformations (through various percep- 
tual mechanisms) of the perceptual features of the external world. We will have 
more detailed discussions of factorial conditions in chapter five (see Section 5.4, 
page 175), with the concept of quasi -functional and quasi- action modules. 
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Parametric Control in Active Perception. Now, consider the implementa- 
tion of active perception. Explicit representations do not seem to suit the percep- 
tual inputs and their transformations in perceptual mechanisms, as demonstrated 
by the implementations of active perception (see the detailed discussion in chap- 
ters three and four). However, the parametric control of numerical values can be 
preserved, because the goals and subgoals are basically expressed quantitatively, 
and because the influence of parameters can be found in the control parameters 
of dynamical systems. We will have detailed discussions in chapters five and six 
about the flexibility of control in the implementation of active perception. 
Concluding Remark. As a concluding remark on Maes (1990b), note that 
the flexibility of the implemented robot performance is grounded on the paramet- 
ric control of energy spreading, which is maintained via links. Specifically, the 
activation energy is distributed within the network of goals via various (to wit, 
successor, predecessor, and inhibition) links under the influence of global param- 
eters (e.g. -y and 0) and local ones - the thresholds of action modules. Such a 
control maintains the exploitation of internal representations with the mediation 
of activation- energy, which is numerical. Compared to the parametric control, 
the explicit representations do not seem to be important for flexibility. The con- 
tribution of explicit representations, as considered by Maes (1995), rests on the 
convenience of identifying goals and their pre- conditions in the implementation 
of actions. Flexibility should be attributed to the parametric control of numerical 
values. 
2.5 Definition of Internal Representations 
For the convenience of discussions about internal representations, the term `rep- 
resentations' should have a working definition, before a strict and comprehensive 
definition is built. The present thesis will only define internal representations, 
and leave external representations as a pre- theoretical category. 
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A Working Definition of Internal Representations: For a 
cognitive system, its representations consist of a collection of single 
representations, each of which is a code realised at a certain level of 
mechanical architecture, with the conditions that such a code refers 
(from a third -person perspective) to something other than the code 
itself, that it causally16 contributes to the performance of a cognitive 
behaviour (also in a third person's eye view), and that it connects to 
other codes within or across cognitive systems. 
Bearing this working definition in mind will support the discussion of internal 
representations in this thesis. 
As a note, regarding those codes that do not play a causal role in cognitive 
behaviour, they cannot be seen as representations as above defined. However, 
they can still be conceived of as representations in an another sense, e.g. the 
internal representations that implement an electric music keyboard. 
Six Types of (Cognitive) Representations. As there exist a variety of 
cognitive capacities, there are different types of representation. An analysis of 
cognitive representations must include at least the following six senses /types: 
1. Condition -action Pairs. The systems based on purely reactive control 
architectures, as indicated by 1\4ataric (1993), are based on a collection 
of condition -action pairs, which are pre -fixed by designers. Such systems 
contain minimal internal states, maintain no internal models, and perform 
no search. Their performance, which consists of sensor reading and initiated 
actions, is consequently grounded on merely `lookup and command', like the 
checking on a lookup table. Accordingly, the performance does not manifest 
any flexibility. 
Despite their inflexibility of performance, such systems can be seen as hav- 
ing certain minimal degree of internal representations built in. Because 
`''Putting causal efficacy into the foundation of internal representations is an idea raised by 
Clark (1995) (see later discussions of in this thesis, Section 7.3, page 282). 
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condition -action pairs undeniably exist in the internal states and some peo- 
ple may still see the performance grounded on such pairs as cognitive be- 
haviour, though at a very low level, those condition -action pairs can be 
regarded as a type of (internal) representation, in the sense that they drive 
cognitive behaviour. In fact, Mataric (1993) asserts that such systems `have 
so little representational power ... (p. 2)'. This can be regarded as a con- 
firmation of their being representations in a certain sense. 
In the case where some people do not accept that the performance of the 
aforementioned systems qualifies as cognitive behaviour, the dispute seems 
simply a matter of convention as to the extension of the term 'cognitive 
behaviour'. Discussions about representations should avoid being trapped 
by the ambiguity caused by such different conventions, but had better fo- 
cus on the third condition stated in the definition of representations - that 
representations mutually connect within or across cognitive systems. Ac- 
cordingly, more important than merely contending for a yes -no answer as 
to whether certain systems have internal representations is the role played 
by the aforementioned condition -action pairs in the production of `cognitive 
behaviour' and in the integration with other cognitive systems. 
2. Codes of Internal States with Within -or- Across -system Compo- 
sitionality. 
An overt sense /type of representations are the codes of internal states which 
can be understood on grounds of the compositionality of codes in the head, 
without referring to organism- environment interactions. 
Such representations can be further divided into two sub -types. The first 
sub -type of representations are explicit mental entities such as goals, pur- 
poses, beliefs, and the symbolic codes of (real or artificial) cognitive sys- 
tems. It is worth noting that the fundamental components of traditional 
AI - knowledge representations - fall into this sub -type of representations. 
The second sub -type consists of implicit procedures that can be arranged 
from inside a system, specifically re- organised within a domain with differ- 
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ent orders or modified quantitatively. Representations of this sub -type are 
exemplified by the motor dexterity of athletes, which can be re- organised 
or modified by their mutual coherence, as is most salient in motor emu- 
lation. In addition, representations of such a sub -type are manifested in 
the pianists' dexterity beyond rote procedure, which can be re- organised or 
modified quantitatively by the mutual coherence of the performed musical 
notes. 
3. Compositional Codes of Internal States with Across -systems but 
Still Within -organism Integration. The third type of representation is 
similar to those of the second type, but are arranged for integration across 
systems, although still from within organisms without recourse to organism - 
environment interactions. As an example, the dexterity of athletes may be 
re- organised or modified by the descriptive knowledge of the environment; 
in addition, the musical skills of pianists can be modified by emotions. 
4. Design Architectures. The behaviours of behaviour -based agents are 
task- specific. Such behaviours are controlled, according to design, by cer- 
tain pre -fixed architectures, such as the layer control of Brooks' three - 
layered robot - e.g. the automaton avoid and the automaton pathplan 
which implement hard -wired priority for the activities of automata at dif- 
ferent layers. The identifiable parts of such architectures can be seen as 
internal representations. Note that they are pre -fixed by designers. 
Further examples are the three sub -goals of Mataric's wall -following robot 
- moving away from the obstacles, moving toward the boundary (the wall), 
and still aligned with the boundary (Mataric 1990). These three basic 
activities are conceived of by the designer as the sub -goals of the wall - 
following robot. 
In more subtle examples, the task -specific utilities of active perception are 
built -in representations, such as the internal forms of Snake (algorithm), the 
target position of navigation learning (see Section C, page 361), the heuris- 
tics implemented in the system of pursuit movements and the heuristics 
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generally implemented in tracking systems. 
Representations of this type appear trivial, because parts of a design of 
something S would necessarily involve certain representations related to S. 
Yet, this simple fact may easily be ignored, especially when Brooks (1991a) 
advocates intelligence without representations, which refer to representa- 
tions of the second type, not those of type four. 
5. Codes that are Arranged Through Situated Activities. Slightly 
more difficult to understand are representations of a behaviour -based agent 
which emerge in the course of organism- environment interactions, on the 
basis of systems' current states and current environmental circumstances. 
Because the contingency and unpredictability of robot states and environ- 
mental circumstances must be fully taken into account, such representations 
are more difficult to comprehend than those of previous four types. Envi- 
ronmental influences on those representations (type 5) are harder to identify 
than those in traditional AI, because the representations of this type are 
parallel and distributed in view of their causal relations to robot perfor- 
mance. Yet, such representations remain subject to compositionality, in 
the sense that different control components contribute to different aspects 
of global behaviour. 
For example, the energy spreading of Maes (1990b). Although the activa- 
tion of energy spreading is controlled by pre -fixed thresholds over various 
action modules, the energy initiated by each module is spread throughout 
the network, as described by Mataric (1993). 
As a note, active perception systems adopt five (among others) remarkable 
mechanisms of code arrangement, as we will see in chapters three and four 
- the energy control in Snake, the weight of visual features in the attentive 
control of saccades, the measure of knowledge gain in Kalman filter, the 
computation of critical variables in the implementation of Adept (a navi- 
gating robot), and the values of control parameters and collective variables 
in dynamical systems. Such mechanisms allow the implemented systems to 
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gain internal representations in the course of organism- environment inter- 
actions and respond flexibly. 
Understanding the representations of this type is vitally important for the 
explanation of emergent functionality achieved by behaviour -based agents. 
It is not difficult to categorise the influences initiated by such agents as rep- 
resentations, but it is difficult to comprehend how representations of this 
type lead to emergent functionality, as demonstrated by various implemen- 
tations of behaviour -based agents. 
6. Contingent Internal States Without Record. One more type of in- 
ternal representation may be added to the previous five types - contingent 
internal states which go unrecorded, such as the internal states of a ther- 
mostat. The third layer of Brooks' three- layered robot seems to fall within 
this category, as it does not record its influence of external factors. The rep- 
resentations in this type are different from those of condition- action pairs, 
in that those internal states may present a certain degree of integration 
beyond the condition -action pairs. 
Internal states of this type can be seen as representations in a very loose 
sense, because it is hard to conceive of any machine /device responding to 
the environment without changing its internal states to a certain degree, 
according to the conception of the term `respond'. 
Among these six types of internal representations, only representations of 
types 2 and 3 are bona fide17 representations. While those of type 5 are arguable, 
those of types 1, 4 and 6 do not seem to qualify as bona fide representations. 
An interesting question is the relationship between internal representations 
and learning. What types of representations are needed for learning, and what is 
consequently learnt in connection to the representations of respective types? In 
particular, what is the difference between reinforcement learning and constructive 
learning with regard to their respectively relating representations? Such questions 
l'As an anecdote concerning the term `bona fide representations', see its use by Clark and 
Chalmers (1996). 
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seem interesting but go beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, similar 
questions may arise by replacing learning with emergence. It is intriguing to 
distinguish between different types of emergence, which can be seen as future 
research. Among them, the present thesis only discusses emergence of active 
perception at task level. 
2.6 Defining Emergence as Non -pre- determination 
An important concern in the consideration of emergence is the process of emer- 
gence, as opposed to the product of emergence. Given this, we can further con- 
sider emergence to be an opposite concept of pre- determination. That is, a certain 
capacity is, and must be, achieved via emergence if it is not pre -determined; any 
capacity would not be regarded as emergent, if it is pre- determined. Hence we 
can frame the following working definition18: 
Definition of Pre -determination. Pre -determination is a process 
of determination for producing cognitive or biological functionality, in 
which the results are derivable from (and consequently mediated by) 
a fixed set of abstractions (in the design or the genome)19, comprising 
pre -categorised data /descriptions of the target objects or events and 
pre -categorised inference mechanisms over such descriptions20, with- 
RWhile the notion of pre -determination has been used in developmental studies, the following 
formulation is a new attempt with regard to its definition. Note that the present thesis is 
aimed at developing conceptual foundations for a particular area (active perception), as opposed 
to general discussions for conceptual analysis. Philosophers can further discuss whether this 
working definition is sufficiently adequate, for a more rigorous understanding of the defined 
phenomenon. 
'9This definition is aimed to cover both autonomous agent research and developmental studies. 
Although development does not fall within the coverage of the present thesis, this definition is 
not particularly tailored for the subject matter of active perception. 
'The term pre- categorised data /descriptions means the data characterised by pre -fixed cat- 
egories, such as the categories of colours, speed, and geometric shapes. The notion of pre- 
determination specified here, which emphasises the pre- categorised data, may help us to un- 
derstand that the objectivity of Brooksian robotics is against the representations in the sense 
of symbolic abstractions of world conditions, as argued in Brooks (1991b). The automata in 
Brooks' three -layered robot do comprise internal states, which may be regarded as representa- 
tions in a certain sense (e.g. physical circuits). However, what Brooks really aims to object 
seems to be the representations as contents of the external world (in theory, including the emu- 
lation of motor skills, which can be seen as the content of motor skills). What Brooks suggests, 
alternatively, is to initiate robotic processes directly without mediating environmental influences 
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out dealing with environmental influences and intra- organism pro- 
cesses directly beyond those pre -fixed categories. 
The notion of pre- determination so defined may be understood intuitively 
in terms of the mental processes of a designer with extremely high capacity of 
attention which spreads wide and lasts long. The mental processes of the de- 
signer begin with contents, and the design is mediated by these mental processes. 
These mental processes can be analogical (i.e. not coded in language -like forms, 
although transferable to another working site with complete language -like codes) 
and yet remain pre- determined. This is because the influences of environmental 
factors are entirely absorbed in the mediation of data /contents. 
Examples. The computational results according to orthodox computation - 
alism are pre -determined, while the algorithms of the de- centralised approach 
lead to non -pre- determined outcomes. In addition, developmental traits accord- 
ing to nativist account of epigenesis are pre- determined. Developmental traits, 
such as body form, developmental procedure, or cognitive capacity, mediated 
by pre -fixed categories. As a consequence, different environmental influences end 
up with a selection by triggering different pre- fixed -category traits. By contrast, 
developmental traits conceived under constructivism depend to a certain degree 
on organisms' interactions with the environment. 
According to this definition, the determination of processes in the three 
main paradigms of computation at present, Orthodox Computationalism, PDP 
and autonomous agent research, can be made clear: 
Determination in Orthodox Computationalism. 
The computational result according to orthodox computationalism is pre- 
determined, because the environmental influences on computation must be 
completely mediated by the category of data of the external world. 
Determination in PDP. 
through the pre- fixed -category data, which are preoccupied as contents of the external world. 
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The algorithms of the de- centralised approach to computation, such as PDP, 
lead to non -pre -determined outcomes, because environmental influences are 
fashioned into direct initiation of computational processes without the in- 
volvement of explicit data, rather than entirely mediated by data before 
environmental factors have an impact on internal processes. Note that in 
PDP21 the representations of the external world (unlike in the orthodox 
computationalism) are not characterised in the form of explicit (language - 
like) data. Before representations are presented by the nodes of the outer- 
most layer (or the simply outer layer, in a three -layer network), which indi- 
cate specific contents, representations must be stored in distributed weights 
of connections.22 Environmental influences are not entirely mediated by 
pre- categorised -data, because environmental factors initiate computational 
process (i.e. parallel distributed processing) directly. The environment be- 
gins to influence the computational processes immediately when the nodes 
of the input layer are activated. Unlike those in traditional AI, computa- 
tional processes need not presume the mediation of environmental factors 
by pre -categorised data. Hence, environmental factors have direct influence 
on computational processes. 
Determination in Autonomous Agent Research. 
The computational processes in autonomous agent research, which is basi- 
cally a de- centralised approach, are not pre- determined. It can be discussed 
via two cases. 
1. Brooksian Robotics. The computational processes in Brooksian robotics 
clearly need no mediation of explicit (i.e. language -like) representa- 
tions, hence the implementation is not subject to the category of pre- 
21 Unlike the suggestion raised by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), the PDP here is not meant as 
the computational mechanism that serves as the implementation of functional specification. 
22Quartz's (1993) argument about PDP with respect to the notion innateness is not a criticism 
about the processes that are pre- determined, but about the computational outcomes which are 
envisaged in designer's mind. Hence, his criticism does not lead to the judgement of pre- 
determination. His criticism can be seen as a rebuttal of entirely confining computational 
results under design (in designer's mind). For the type of PDP implementations (of innateness) 
he criticises the outcome may be conceived of as pre- determined (in designer's mind), but the 
processes remain free from the category of pre- determination. 
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determination. 
2. Autonomous Agents with Internal Representations. 
The consideration regarding pre- determination tends to be more com- 
plicated for other implementations in the autonomous agent research, 
i.e. those with internal representations such as Maes (1990b, 1995) 
and Steels (1990a, 1991), to mention only a few. Representations are 
formed earlier than the processing over them. However, direct environ- 
mental influences remain on the computational mechanisms, because 
the influence of the environment does not end up with the availability 
of internal representations (types 2 and 3) but also serves to deter- 
mine various degrees of activation on the control processes, such as 
the energy spreading in Maes (1990b) and the interactions between 
geological agents in Steels (1990a). 
Pre- determination is a Matter of Degree. The role of pre- determination in 
development seems to be a matter of degree. Certain traits are pre -determined 
while others are not. Environmental influences in many cases are further subject 
to maturation windows, i.e. specific time periods when organism- environment in- 
teractions take effect significantly. To see it from another angle, the environmen- 
tal influence on emergent functionality (e.g. biological functions or psychological 
capacities) is a matter of degree. 
A Pervasive Origin in Emergence. According to this notion of emergence, it 
is easy to claim that everything pertaining to real organisms must be emergent if 
its ontogeny is not completely determined in genes. A stronger claim can be made 
for the phylogeny: everything of real organisms must be oriented in emergence, 
given that it is not created in its phylogenic origin. 
Modelling of AI is a little bit more complicated, given that it is necessarily 
a work of design but not everything can be pre -determined in the design. In 
particular, the design of an autonomous agent must be seen as a ground for the 
emergence of global behaviours, which by conception are not pre- determined in 
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the design. 
Conceiving Emergence as Global Behaviour. When certain behaviours are 
regarded as global behaviours, they are conceived of as something beyond the 
design. Hence, it is straightforward to see global behaviours and emergent be- 
haviours as being conceptually identical. For example, when Forrest (1991) states 
that global behaviours are side effects of local instructions, he addresses (by con- 
ception) behaviours at different levels (i.e. local and global). In contrast, it is 
arguable (as an empirical issue) whether certain phenomena /traits can be appro- 
priately regarded as being achieved from global behaviours. 
Judgement of Pre -determination is an Empirical Issue. It is an empirical 
issue whether a single particular behaviour, or trait, is pre- determined or not. For 
example, in developmental psychology, there are often disputes regarding whether 
a particular capacity is innate - i.e. pre- determined in the course of development. 
While constructivists disagree, selectionists (e.g. Gazzaniga (1992)) see developed 
capacities as innate in the course of epigenesis (as opposed to the pre- formation 
in the germ line.). That is, such capacities are pre- determined but only appear 
in the process of maturation. This is an empirical issue, rather than purely a 
matter of conceptual analysis regarding the meanings of innateness, construction, 
development, etc. 
In brief, the distinction between global and local behaviours means the con- 
ceptual difference between emergence and pre- determination, while seeing certain 
traits as resulting from global behaviours (but not derived from local instructions) 
is an empirical judgement. 
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2.7 About the Working Definition of Active Percep- 
tion 
A More Comprehensive Conception of Active Perception for Future 
Research - Extending from Sensory -motor and Bodily Actions to At- 
tention. On the above account, selection of sensory -motor or bodily actions is 
a necessary condition for active perception. Such a sense of active perception 
is not entirely intuitive, because a perceptual system that works out the needed 
perceptual information (for required tasks) and directs their attention toward 
the collected perceptual inputs without driving their (sensory -motor or bodily) 
actions would not be counted as a case of active perception. Yet, perceptual 
systems with such a capability of attention selection seem to qualify as active 
perception systems. For example, when humans stand still, think about the most 
relevant acoustic inputs for the interesting information (e.g. the sound of Snake 
moving in the grass), and pay attention to the most relevant acoustic information 
as they hear, the working acoustic capacity seems to be active. 
As a consequence, the above stated meaning of active perception is not suffi- 
ciently comprehensive, but has its emphasis: observers participate in the environ- 
ment by sensory -motor or bodily actions. This is a matter of limitation upon the 
research paradigm /methodology of the present active perception systems, which 
advocates the notion of active perception on the basis of mobile robotics, by im- 
plementing moving perceptual systems (such as computer sensors located on an 
movable arm or robot body). Internal processes serve to drive the sensors to the 
most relevant positions in the environment or to provide guidance of bodily ac- 
tions, such as navigation and grasping. By contrast, the above active perception 
on account of attention certainly goes beyond this research paradigm. Readers 
must bear in mind that the above meaning of active perception pertains to the 
current research paradigm of mobile robotics. 
Restricting the meaning (conception) of active perception has its negative 
and positive sides. On the negative side, the resulting conception of active per- 
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ception is less comprehensive than the intuitive one, which is derived from con- 
sidering all subtle capacities of organisms in the real world. On the positive 
side, the restricted meaning is easier to examine by experiments (i.e. various 
robotic implementations) and has a focus of explanation regarding what makes 
active perception systems perform satisfactorily in the real environment. As a 
balance between the negative and positive sides, relativising the notion of active 
perception to a research paradigm remains a good choice. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the understanding of active perception 
is not simply a matter of conceptual sophistication (including comprehensibility); 
rather, the successful implementation of active perception systems is much more 
important. Without successful implementation of various active perception sys- 
tems there cannot be a beginning of explanation as to what makes active percep- 
tion work well. Second, research on active perception can be gradually extended 
to different research paradigms, grounded on which the previous conception and 
explanation of active perception can be compared with and consequently be ex- 
tended. The understanding of active perception would then be likely to improve 
firmly and steadily. The present thesis will follow the above restricted meaning 
of active perception, and its extension can be left for a further research. 
Extending from Bodily Actions to All Behaviours. Intuitively, the main- 
tenance of nearly all bodily actions in the environment needs the support of active 
perception, primarily vision. Such an intuitive notion can be found in active per- 
ception research, as a branch of autonomous agent research. For example, car 
driving, hunting a bird and catching a ball are all supported by visual tracking. 
Navigation is supported by saccadic movements (in order to understand the vi- 
sual scene) and the planning of visual tasks (for the understanding of the spatial 
relations between obstacles and the target). 
Active perception can be regarded as a particular case of active behaviour, 
which is an extended stance posed by certain researchers in active perception. 
According to Colin Johnson (1996), certain researchers in active perception `base 
their work on the notion, that everything humans do - learning, cognition, per- 
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ception, recognition, etc. - is dependent on the performance of certain active 
behaviors in a certain order' (abstract, C. Johnson 1996; italic added). How- 
ever, the main trend of active perception research does not discuss all human 
behaviour, but remains limited to the relatively conservative notion, that bodily 
actions are dependent on the performance of active perception. Given the lim- 
ited space available in a thesis, the present thesis also focuses on this conservative 
notion. 
Active vs. Passive Perception. The aforementioned processes qualify per- 
ception as active, as opposed to passive, on the grounds that those processes 
enable the observers (organisms or robots) to take certain selected actions to 
contact different aspects of the environment. In other words, those processes 
enable perception to be active, in the sense that the perceptual systems have a 
certain degree of freedom in the selection of processes over perceptual inputs or 
their internal transformations in the observer -environment relationship, in favour 
of the accomplishment of the required perceptual tasks. Here, the concept of free- 
dom does not presume some non -mechanistic vital force managing selection (as 
in the notion of a homunculus); it means, rather, the possibility of maintaining 
selection over perceptual inputs or their internal transformations, as opposed to 
the pre- determined23 processes needed for fully elaborated recovery of perceptual 
content. 
In such a sense, the term `active perception' is meant as a faculty of or- 
ganisms, or of artificial systems, which consists of active perceptual processes. 
Although it is conceptually possible that certain perceptual processes do not 
serve to enable active perception (as a faculty), those processes will not make 
perception be passive, given that there exist certain other processes that enable 
active perception, as supported by neuroethological findings (mainly on gaze con- 
trol and tracking, see discussions in chapter three). In other words, the fact that 
perception is enabled as active by certain processes is a sufficient condition for 
active perception. This understanding of active perception can be seen as pro- 
23For understanding the notion of pre- determination, please refer to Section 2.6, page 64). 
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riding a definition of active perception (on the basis of the research paradigm of 
mobile robotics), as seen in chapter 1 (see Section 1.2.1, page 3). 
According to this definition, the visual system implemented on the basis of 
Marr's vision theory is not active, because the observer is stationary and hence 
his no freedom for selection over perceptual processes as above required. Systems 
on the basis of Marr's vision theory can consequently be termed passive systems. 
That is, the concept of being passive is the negative counterpart to the concept 
of being active. 
Active Perception and Emergence. The aforementioned definition of active 
perception does not exclude symbolic systems from the possibilities of active 
perception. Yet, this does not mean that a symbolic active perception system 
would consequently exhibit emergent behaviour, although the active perception 
systems studied in the present thesis do so. The emergent phenomena studied 
in the present thesis happen specifically in behaviour -based systems, but are not 
necessarily seen in all possible active perception systems. Symbolic systems can 
exhibit emergent behaviours, as in part conceived of in Cariani's (1991) thesis of 
emergence and demonstrated by Ray (1991), although the emergence of this type 
seems to be different from the type of emergence at issue in the present thesis. 
Note that emergence seems to be a group term referring to various types of 
emergent phenomena. The present thesis only addresses the task -level emergence 
presented in the current active perception systems, which are behaviour -based 
systems. The notion of emergence as non -pre- determination, which is introduced 
in this thesis, may not suit all possible emergent phenomena. Indeed, it would 
be inappropriate to expect to arrive at an all- inclusive definition of emergence 
simply by studying limited types of emergent phenomenon. What we can see 
about emergence in the present thesis is a definition of emergence particularly 
tailored to suit the current active perception systems. In future research, such 
a definition may be extended or modified to suit more types of emergence, by 
considering other kinds of emergent phenomena. 
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Various Degrees of Active Perception. Although the existence of an active 
process suffices to qualify a perception system as active, whether a perceptual 
system is active may not be so important as how it is active. That is, the property 
of being active is not a matter of yes- and -no, but comes in degrees. Adopting 
a variety of useful active processes confers a high degree of this property (active 
perception), and so would facilitate a perceptual system to perform well in the 
environment. 
It is worth noting that understandings of active perception, however a high 
degree of being active an active perception system may be, must not be so rad- 
ical as to abolish the necessity to recover the external world, from the collected 
perceptual inputs. What active perception research argues against is the full 
recovery of perceptual inputs; yet, no recovery no perception (see discussions in 
Sections 7.5.2 and 5.4.1, page 311 and 177). The issue raised by active percep- 
tion research is to maintain selective collection of perceptual inputs and partial 
recovery of the gathered information, as a reminder before we proceed to survey 
various architectures of active perception systems. 
Posing an extreme position may be easy. However, in the light of explaining 
the unity of cognitive phenomena -a main goal of this thesis - what indeed needs 
deliberations is where to stand in the middle ground, to put it metaphorically. In 
this light, various theoretical stances need to be tackled together in the middle 
ground. 
2.8 Summary 
The discussion of background considerations centres around three topics - or- 
ganisms' adaptability to environmental factors, the internal control of behaviour - 
based systems, and the definitions of three regularly used terms. For these three 
topics, this chapter provides conceptual analyses, discussions of the various de- 
sign strategies of behaviour -based systems, and discussions of a current account 
of emergence (Steels' thesis of emergent functionality). 
73 
Certain important conceptions relevant to the explanation of emergence and 
active perception are discussed. First, the notion of autonomy is analysed in rela- 
tion to the notion of adaptability, and it is established that the primary meaning 
of autonomy is self -maintenance for presenting high adaptability to environmental 
circumstances. 
Second, the notion of emergence is defined as a negative concept of pre- 
determination, which is defined in turn as pre- categorised data /descriptions and 
inference mechanisms. 
Moreover, for the understanding of organism- environment interactions, dis- 
cussions in this chapter also address the role of ecological niche, in order to 
explain the relationship between organisms and the environment, in particular 
the grounding of internal representations. 
Last, the concept of internal representations is analysed into five types, in 
order to identify clearly the various types of representations implemented in ac- 
tive perception systems. An advantage of analysing those types can be seen in 
understanding the integration of representations across types. As an example, 
the emergent functionality of gaze control relies on the integration between the 
heuristic knowledge of visual events (type 3), the different mechanisms of pur- 
suit movement and attentive control of saccades (type 4), the weight comparison 
between visual features (type 5), and the computation of overshoot distance for 
pursuit movement (type 5). 
For distinguishing between various design strategies of active perception sys- 
tems, two issues are discussed. The first is the basis of behaviour -based system 
on Brooks' subsumption architectures and the advance of internal control on ac- 
count of Steels' exploitative control and the action modules which are exemplified 
by Maes' control of energy spreading. The second issue is the relationship be- 
tween exploration and exploitation, which are two generally undertaken control 
strategies for implementing behaviour -based systems. Exploration emphasises 
robots' directions in different parts of the environment, while exploitation em- 
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phasises the planning of robot actions based on heuristic knowledge of external 
events and the computation of certain variables and their inter -connections, such 
as energy spreading (Maes (1990b)), and the differential equations maintained by 
dynamical systems. 
Discussions on Steels' account of emergent functionality argue that this ac- 
count leaves the emergent behaviours of behaviour -based systems largely unex- 
plained. In this regard, discussions in this thesis will provide several explanations 
of emergent behaviours, with a focus on active perception systems. 
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Part II 
A Case Study 
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Chapter 3 
The Nature of Active 
Perception 
In the following two chapters we will review active perception research, by dis- 
cussing its main achievements with regard to the various types of mechanisms. 
The purpose of this review is to answer the aforementioned question concerning 
activeness: what makes active perception work. What makes this topic interest- 
ing is that active perception systems are autonomous systems which work under 
real -time constraints but respond well to the real environment, which is somewhat 
unpredictable. 
In this chapter we discuss the nature of active perception. The notion of 
active perception we discuss is generalised from the notion of active vision. So 
far, the study of active vision, in respects both of the scientific exploration of 
evidence and the accompanying theorising, remains in its infancy (Churchland 
et all. 1994), let alone its generalisation to other perceptual modalities, or even 
to cross- modality systems. However, the implementations of active perception 
we will discuss are not limited to visual modality. This point is supported by 
discussions on cross -modality systems, which are listed in Appendix D. With 
that point being supported, although the following discussions are based on im- 
plementations of visual systems, the characterisations of active perception are 
not limited to a single modality. 
Such a move, from vision to perception generally, would help to extend the 
research of active properties from vision to other perceptual modalities, with two 
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ways. One, perceptual judgements are facilitated by the integration of perceptual 
information across modalities (Churchland et al. 1994; Allen and Bajcsy 1985; 
Scheier and Lambrinos 1996). Two, non -visual modalities not only stand in a 
position to support visual processing, but stand on their own as being active. 
One piece of evidence of the active perception with a non -visual modality is the 
selective attention in the processing of acoustic information (Cherry 1953). The 
system of attention directs the resources of acoustic processing to certain acoustic 
cues needed for the required tasks, with the effect of active hearing. Following 
this line of argument, in our discussion we will see the evidence supporting active 
vision also as evidence in support of active perception. Of course, there might 
be differences between modalities, regarding the strategies of active processing 
in respective modalities. Our discussion will at least provide several hypotheses 
for future research with regard to non -visual modalities. Such hypotheses will 
remain subject to falsification in the future, but at present they would tend to be 
plausible insofar as they are manifested in the evidence supporting active vision. 
3.1 The Traditional Perspective on Vision 
The computer implementation of mammalian vision was traditionally lead by 
\-Iarr (1982), who initiated the study of vision under the notion of computation, 
which can be outlined in terms of the following two assumptions: 
1. Visual Processing as Full Scene Recovery. Visual experience consists in 
a fully elaborated representation of the visual scene, with the visual representation 
corresponding to that visual scene. Visual processing serves to recover such a fully 
elaborated 3 -D (three -dimensional) representation with regard to various visual 
properties such as depth, colour, contour, position, size, motion, velocity, etc., 
from the 2 -D (two -dimensional) retinotopic maps (Tsotsos 1987; Charniak and 
McDermott 1985). Eventually, visual processing ends up with a reconstruction 
of the visual scene in the brain /mind (Churchland et al. 1994). 
Being a fully elaborated representation, the internal counterpart of a visual 
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scene is not a partial representation with limited emphases. Whatever visual 
tasks are required, there is no selection over different parts of the fixed visual 
scene and no difference in emphasis between the selected parts. In addition, 
being a correspondence to the visual scene, visual experience serves to provide 
a description (although possibly with certain interpretations)1 of the external 
world, with a neutral stance as to how much certain visual features contribute 
to bodily (motor) actions, and in turn how important certain activities of visual 
detection are for survival. In this vein, visual processing is taken to be capable of 
standing on its own as a set of independent modules without reference to anything 
about motor activities, or to their contributions to survival. 
2. Visual Processing is Hierarchical and Bottom -up. Visual processing 
is supposed to proceed from the already available retinotopic maps, then to the 
lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), and eventually to a hierarchy of visual modules 
implemented in various cortical areas, as manifested in cognitive neuroscience 
(Van Essen and Anderson 1990). Among such modules of visual processing, 
higher level processes receive inputs from the outputs of lower level ones, out of 
those inputs such higher level processes extract specific visual features. This is 
a complete sequence of visual processing. There is no need, then, for precedent 
motor activities that strive selectively to make available relevant visual features, 
nor does it need intermediate activities that serve to fetch perceptual information 
in support of the interpretation of features in the occurrent visual processing. 
Visual processing, basically, is understood as being a passive activity of data 
extraction. Even if there is a need for the interpretation of visual information2, 
the visual sub -systems only extract features and do inferences on the basis of 
the already available information. They would not make an `explanatory' or 
`predictive' inquiry over circumstances of the external world, in relation to the 
required visual tasks (Churchland et al. 1994, p. 26). 
A venerable epistemological issue is the intrinsic relationship between description and in- 
terpretation. In the present thesis, there is no space to launch discussions about this topic in 
detail. 
'Note that Marr (1982) supposes visual computation to be an activity of inference. 
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Along with the sequence of visual processes, visual processing basically con- 
sists in the extraction of increasingly specific visual features. There is no need 
to explore selectively a variety of areas in the target scene, nor do we need to fil- 
ter them out with regard to their relative importance supporting in the required 
visual tasks. In this way, visual processing follows strictly the above bottom -up 
orientation in support of a hierarchical sequence of visual processes, from early, 
via intermediate, to high level processing. There is no possibility of re- organising 
the order of the above sequence in order to make available certain information 
in response to the inquiry issued by the visual sub -systems. The perspective of 
passive computation would not consider the features of the visual scene which 
are not yet available but remain important for the completion of the required 
tasks. In particular, there is no need to make clearer certain features which are 
crucial for survival, e.g. whether the shape and velocity of certain shading signal 
the approaching of the predator. 
Visual processing is regarded as an activity of passive extraction of the avail- 
able information, without the need to maintain sensory -motor activities in order 
to address selected features in the environment. This is because the informa- 
tion received in the retinotopic maps is deemed as being sufficient for perceptual 
understanding. Perception need not identify certain goals and thereby pursue rel- 
evant perceptual features; rather, it simply receives whatever is available in the 
perceptual receptors. There would not be any arrangement in the visual systems 
for further activities that serve to fetch whatever is still needed for prediction or 
explanation about circumstances of the external world. 
3.2 The Rise of Active Perception Research 
That vision is active is first advocated by Aloimonos et al. (1988), Bajcsy (1988), 
Ballard (1991) and Ballard et al. (1993), in the study of mobile robotics. The 
general idea is that the processing of visual information is not passive but ac- 
tive. That is, visual processing is not a reconstruction of visual properties from 
the retinotopic -map which receives visual inputs passively, but is an exploitation 
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of sensory -motor processes with the effect of simplifying visual complexity and 
facilitating further perceptual processes, in order to generate visual guidance in 
support of certain bodily movements. 
In this section we discuss the characteristics of active vision. Bear in mind, 
such characteristics are not limited to visual modality. 
The Relationship between Active and Passive Vision. A landmark in 
the departure of active perception research from the traditional perspective of 
visual processing is the shift of the beginning point of visual processing, from 
the reconstruction of retinoceptive maps (as Marr (1982) puts it) to an earlier 
visual stage - gaze control. Note that gaze control is not simply supported by 
oculomotor systems, although there appears to be a direct analogue between the 
two terms `gaze -control' and `oculo -motor systems'. Specifically, gaze control 
relates more widely to bodily movements, and is mediated by central neural 
systems, specifically the LGN and a variety of cortical areas. This landmark 
implies that vision is both active and passive, if we see the traditional perspective 
of visual processing as being characterised by the reconstruction of retinotopic 
maps and consequently redefine the reconstructed visual information as non - 
active vision. 
The relation between active and passive vision can be encapsulated in Kan - 
tian terms: active vision without non -active processing is empty while non - active 
vision without the complement of active vision is blind.3 Such a relation provides 
a way of bootstrapping the relation between active and non -active vision: non - 
active vision relates to the elaboration of already available retinotopic maps into 
abundant visual experiences and the accompanying processes, while active vi- 
sion neatly serves to make available (with the support of gaze control) `sufficient' 
retinotopic maps that are required for the visual processing of certain required 
tasks. The collection of retinotopic maps would be sufficient if only the elaborated 
visual processes could provide enough, or a little more surpassed, information for 
3I11 Kant's Critique of pure reason, blind is used in the context of unguided activities. Here 
in the present thesis, the term `blind' does not really imply that nothing is detected, but that 
there is a lack of well- structured guidance. 
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the further processing of motor actions and4 visual recognition. Thus a central 
claim of the active vision perspective is that visual processing does not lead to a 
fully elaborated image of the external world but only serves to provide relevant 
information for further use.5 
3.2.1 Two Perspectives of Active Perception - AB and BC 
Two Senses Provided by Brooks. The distinction between the following 
two perspectives of active perception can be seen as originating from, but further 
specifying, the two senses that Rodney Brooks singles out in the Forward to the 
book Active Vision, edited by Blake and Yuille (1992), as the central features of 
active vision (the active perception with regard to the visual modality): 
(AB) `active operation in the world in order to change the images that are 
being collected in a way which enhances task achievement' (italics added), 
(BC) `active autonomous processes (e.g. snakes)6 which exploit the coher- 
ence of images in a sequence in order to efficiently and reliably track aspects 
of interest over time' (italics added). 
The AB perspective /sense of active perception (vision) emphasises the 
sensory -motor or even bodily activities that serve to collect (or make available) 
perceptual images (e.g. retinotopic maps) and change them. By contrast, the 
BC perspective /sense of active perception emphasises the internal autonomous 
processes that serve to bring about (not hierarchically extract) coherence in per- 
4Motor actions may happen after visual recognition, as mediated by overall planning. How- 
ever, motor actions can also happen before visual recognition, as is evident in sensory -motor 
coordination. 
5As we have stated, the use may go beyond the scope of vision, such as varying bodily actions, 
which are not limited to oculomotor control or sensory -motor coordination. This point is not 
made clear in Churchland et al. (1994), who conclude their discussion of active vision with 
the following statement: `visual systems evolved ... because visual perception can serve motor 
control, and motor control can serve vision to better serve motor control, and so on' (p. 59; 
italics added). At this point, they seem to have left out the contribution of visual information in 
bodily actions, such as running faster to catch a bus, which do not serve vision to better serve 
motor control. As a result, it is hard to say that the functionality of vision can be supported by 
the bodily movements such as foraging, fighting and fleeing. 
There may be many instances of Snake, a computational algorithm for tracking external 
(visual) targets (see detailed discussions in Section 4.1.1, page 114). 
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ceptual outputs that facilitate the efficiency or effectiveness /reliability of percep- 
tual processing. As a note, the notion of internal cohesion, that we will introduce 
in chapter six (Section 6.4.1, page 242), hinges on Brooks' terms `coherence' 
and `reliably'. In the present thesis we will provide further exposition of active 
perception, going somewhat beyond the ideas in Brooksian robotics. 
There are, so far, no generally agreed characteristics of active vision. Nonethe- 
less, certain central properties of active vision can be discerned from the ideas 
emphasised in the study of active vision, as seen in the following three groups of 
points7. 
3.2.2 Commonalities Between Two Perspectives 
(01) Relevant Points of Processing in support of Visual Explanation 
and Prediction. As a tenet of active perception research, visual processing 
does not elaborate fully a visual scene of the external world. Only relevant as- 
pects to the required tasks will be explored. The relevance to a required task 
can be manifested in the travelling path and visited areas of foveation, which is 
supported by a variety of visual subsystems. The visual systems visit and re- 
visit interesting points depending on the speciality of the required tasks (Yarbus 
1967). Agents may be entirely driven by autonomous visual sub- systems and 
consequently be attracted passively; alternatively, they can maintain attention 
on certain points intentionally. The number of visits to points in a scene is subject 
to the complexity of the tasks and the agents' familiarity with the task. What is 
intriguing is that the path of foveation manifests how the foveating sub -system, 
which is an autonomous system, seemly `strives' to `make available' the required 
visual information. It is an epistemological question how such a seemingly inten- 
tional activity is made possible in an autonomous system. 
7In these three groups of points, group AB signals the points emphasised more in the spon- 
taneous motives of behaviour -based vision, group BC relates to those emphasised more in in- 
teractive vision. The term `AB' is a mnemonic for the perspective raised by Aloimonos et al. 
(1988), and Ballard (1991). The term `BC' is a mnemonic for the perspective advocated by 
Bajcsy (1988) and Churchland et al. (1994)). By contrast, the group `O' signifies the points 
commonly emphasised in both these two approaches to active vision 
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Although they are autonomous, such visual sub -systems are by no means 
neat modules. They interact with the aim of explaining the circumstances of 
the external world or more effectively predicting those circumstances. They do 
so by foveating and re- foveating important points within the visual modality, 
and by fetching perceptual information across modalities for the integration of 
perceptual information across time (Churchland et al. 1994, p. 26). The visual 
scene is consequently made more and more vivid, in response to the required 
tasks. 
(02) Passive Sensors Employed in an Active Fashion Active perception 
is not active on account of active sensors, which transmit certain electromagnetic 
radiation (such as radar, sonar, ultrasound, microwaves) into the environment in 
order to measure the reflected signals (Bajcsy 1988; Ballard 1991). Perception is 
active due to the observers' activities. At this point, however, the AB and BC 
perspectives have different emphases, as Bajcsy (1988) suggests. 
3.2.3 The AB Perspective 
(AB1) More Processes Making the Computation Simpler. The AB per- 
spective emphasises the strategy of exploration, that the exploration of more 
processes may turn out to make the computation simpler and quicker, if those 
processes bring about needed information for the required task (Aloimonos et al. 
1988; Ballard 1991). 
(AB2) Adopting Exocentric Coordinate Frames by the Binocular Ver- 
gence System. Active vision systems can adopt exocentric coordinate frames 
(with gaze control), instead of being confined to an egocentric coordinate frame 
(i.e. viewer- centred frame). The advantage of adopting those exocentric coordi- 
nate frames is a significant reduction of complexity in the computation of visual 
information. For example, the adoption of some object- centred frames helps an 
observer to exploit details of certain objects. Furthermore, the adoption of a 
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world- centred frame8, by manipulating gaze control to keep fixating on the cen- 
tre of the frame, helps the observer to exploit the mutual relations of aforemen- 
tioned object -centred details. Furthermore, the fixation of a certain exocentric 
coordinate frame circumscribes the oculomotor control on that particular frame, 
keeping everything in it invariant when the observer moves. Thereby, such an ex- 
ocentric coordinate frame simplifies the oculomotor processes locally, regardless 
of their relation to the egocentric coordinate frame (Ballard 1991). 
(AB3) Implementing Task -specific Modules. Aloimonos (1993) re- affirms 
the importance for active perception research to take advantage of an essen- 
tial computational strategy of autonomous agent research - implementing task- 
specific modules, as opposed to general -purpose modules (such as those in Marr's 
visual systems). When such a consideration is combined with (AB1), it can be 
inferred that the needed information for simpler and quicker computation (in 
support of a perceptual task) must be made available by task -specific modules. 
(AB4) Accessing Only the Important Aspects of the Visual Field by 
the Oculomotor Activities of Foveation. Active vision systems can avoid 
blind search by accessing only the important aspects of visual field in support of 
the visual tasks. Such systems can move their visual organs (or cameras) closer to 
objects by bodily movements, and such systems can further access the important 
aspects of envisaged targets by gaze control. Specifically, they can change focus by 
their vergence systems, drive the fovea of retina to specific features by saccadic 
movements, shift fovea elsewhere to alternatively maintain pursuit movements 
on the already foveated target when the target or /and the observer is moving. 
What is more, the vergence, saccades, and pursuit, are all self -generated within 
the active vision systems. Every exploited feature, thus, can be seen as an addi- 
8Strictly speaking, the fixation on the centre of a visual scene does not lead to the fixation 
on the centre of the `world', although Ballard adopts the term `world- centred frame'. A more 
appropriate term may be `event -centred frame'. Even though the visual agents are moving and 
the world circumstances are changing, the agents' fixation on a certain object of an event would 
help to exploit that event. Thus, the visual fixation generates an event -centred frame. 
°It is circumscribed by the active vision systems with certain computational processes. For 
example, the circumscription can be achieved by limiting the computational processes on the 
region of near zero disparity produced by a binocular vergence system (Ballard 1991). 
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tional constraint on visual processing, which facilitates computational processes 
significantly (Ballard 1991). 
(AB5) The Computation of Known Parameters Provides Constraints 
in the Computation of Unknown Parameters. Aloimonos et al. (1988) 
assert that visual computation is not based on the correspondence of micro - 
features, unlike the traditional vision theory. Rather, by observers' movements 
the computation of known parameters will provide constraints for computing un- 
known parameters. Specifically, a moving visual system may take advantage of 
powerful constraints derived from the local transformation of certain parame- 
ters. Thus, when visual stimuli are rich but the known parametrization is only 
partially available, computation taking advantage of such constraints would be 
powerful. To see it from a different angle, certain visual constraints are derived 
from the computation of known parameters, i.e. from the explorative activities 
themselves. 
3.2.4 The BC Perspective 
(B C1) `Purposeful' and `Explanatory' Control. By contrast, the BC per- 
spective emphasises the strategy of control, that the control process of perception 
is made adaptive to the unpredictable environment by the goal of the required task 
and the various feedback information which comprises the top -down (i.e. `glob- 
al') information and the interactions between bottom -up (i.e. `local') processes 
(Bajcsy (1988), pp. 9 -17). Such control is expected to facilitate the judgement of 
most likely results under uncertainty. In terms of Bajcsy (1988), the strategy of 
active perception is that the perceptual organs adjust `purposefully' in order to 
make their activities `explanatory, probing, searching' (Bajcsy 1988, p. 1; italic 
added).1° 
Such terms need reconsideration from an epistemological perspective, be- 
cause they seem to presume autonomous systems to be not only intentional but 
10Such a notion can be found in Blake et al. (1992) (See Section 8, page 129). 
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also prudent. Such a presumption does not seem to be well grounded, for it 
cannot be taken for granted, yet seems hard to explain. 
(BC2) Perceptual Cues. Intrinsic to perceptual systems is the `rationale' of 
bodily actions, which guides organisms to act such that they take advantage of 
environmental cues, or react to specific environmental challenges swiftly. Percep- 
tion does not end up with pure descriptions of the external world. Instead, it 
provides a variety of heuristics that help organisms survive well in their activities 
of feeding, fleeing, travelling, fighting, or reproduction (Churchland et al. 1994, 
25)11 
For example, optical flow, as Gibson (1979) points out, provides explicit guid- 
ance for flying in the form of `affordance', by manifesting direction and relative 
speed. There are even cues for further actions. Insofar as such perceptual heuris- 
tics are available12, organisms need not achieve guidance by the computation of 
internal representations. Because further computation is waived, bodily activities 
on the basis of such heuristics tend to be swift, as in the fleeing reaction initiated 
when prey detect certain apparent cues of their predator's approach, such as an 
eagle cue manifested in the form of certain conformation of visual shades and 
shapes. Those cues are by no means descriptions of the predator's approach, but 
serve as signals of such an event. Such an ability of organisms seems to be cast 
in the form of instinct, which is, of course, determined in the course of evolution 
and is in -built in ontogeny. 
By contrast, some heuristics can be established by learning. After frequent 
encounters, the brain may eventually learn that certain patterns typically go 
11 The point of exploiting environmental cues is widely adopted in the behaviour -based imple- 
mentation of active perception systems, as seen in tracking systems and the implementation of 
pursuit movements. Yet, this point is hardly stated in theoretical discussions of the behaviour - 
based implementation of active perception systems; rather, it is stated by cognitive neuroscien- 
tists - Churchland et al. (1994) - in their summary of active perception research initiated in 
mobile robotics. Hence, the credit of identifying this theoretical point must be attributed to 
Churchland et al. (1994) 
12Gibson does not cast this caveat. He denies utterly the need for computation. Abundant 
evidence in cognitive neuroscience, however, serves to challenge such a claim (see Kandel et 
al. 1993, 1995). Despite such evidence, Churchland et al. (1994), who are three cognitive 
neuroscientists, re- affirm the utility of optical flow in providing cues for navigation, with regard 
to speed of the navigator and distance of objects (see Churchland et al. 1994, pp. 51 -52). 
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together and accordingly the number of iterations in the information flow can be 
significantly reduced (Sejnowski 1986). The quick response to letters and words 
in humans, as Churchland et al. (1994) suspect, may be subject to this type of 
learning, which they term `overlearning' because of frequent encounters (p. 51). 
As we will see in chapters five and six (see Section 6.5.1, page 255), the 
above perceptual cues of a certain species (which are non -descriptive but are 
clearly available in most cases13) manifest implicitly the particular conditions of 
its ecological niche. The swift fleeing (i.e. the quick running away of a prey), for 
example, manifests the need to escape from the chase of a certain predator. The 
optical flow which guides flying reveals the ecological niche of a flying species and 
the importance of that guidance for their survival in their particular niche. 
It should also be noted that the aforementioned cues are available (in- built) 
for use (fleeing, judging the distance, etc.), which are different from the compu- 
tational economies brought about by motor activities (e.g. bodily movements, 
or the vergence and saccades of sensory organs). As previously discussed in (lb) 
(see Introduction 1.2.1, page 4), those movements serve to make available the 
visual representations needed for completing the required tasks. The computa- 
tion of internal representations is still required, even if it is not needed in the 
circumstances of aforementioned cues. 
It also needs to be noted that evolution might provide available perceptual 
cues implicitly. This point is manifested in various visual illusions, such as the 
illusion Ames' Room. The adult looks smaller than the child when the child 
stands on the shorter side of a non- square room. Every corner of room is perceived 
as rectangular, but no single cues actually correspond to the representation of a 
rectangle. It is a global effect of a `room', established as a built -in capacity by 
evolution and consequently is presumed in our experiences. In a similar illusion, 
the concave areas of a baseball look convex when the picture of the ball is put 
upside down, and this is because the light source is presumed as being above, 
as we evolved to take advantage of the fact that sun appears this way in the 
13It remains unclear as to whether the above over -learnt reading skills are available explicitly. 
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environment. Each presumption, plausibly, manifests a certain aspect of the 
human ecological niche. 
(BC3) Integration of Perceptual Processes. The perspective of interac- 
tive vision presents a sharp alternative to the traditional (i.e. bottom -up and 
hierarchical) perspective of perceptual processing, not only because of the above 
active properties, but also on the basis of the integral connections of real neural 
networks, in contrast to cortical modules. Such connections are evident in both 
neurophysiology and psychology. On the neurophysiological side, such integral 
connections are manifested in recurrent networks: the thalamic -cortical feedback 
loops, and the concurrent brain waves functioning across cortical areas. On the 
psychological side, the integral connections can be seen in the integration of var- 
ious cognitive information (Inui 1996; Inui and McClelland 1996). Such evidence 
strongly suggests the opposite of the bottom -up and hierarchical perspective of 
perceptual processing. 
Experiences stored in memory may affect perceptual judgement (Churchland 
et all. 1994). The integration of visual information with perceptual information 
from other modalities may improve perceptual judgement significantly. Hence, 
the massive interactions across cognitive modules (or across cortical areas) must 
not be overlooked. They are likely to support the effective processing of percep- 
tual information which may previously have been entangled to various degrees. 
This is in particular true for reinforcement learning in cross -modal tasks. 
The number of processes that are involved in cross -modal tasks may be firstly 
reduced by the perceptual emphasis on relevant points discussed previously in 
(01) and (AB4). The learning tasks may be accordingly simplified significantly 
(Churchland et al. 1994, p. 54; Whitehead and Ballard 1990). However, the re- 
duced emphases may remain entangled across modalities. Without the processing 
carried out later by the networks across modules (or brain areas), it would be hard 
to disentangle the multi -modal perceptual information, and consequently organ- 
isms' response in real -time, which is required for survival, would not be feasible. 
This point is evident in sensory -motor coordination, for the organisms generate 
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lots of cross -modal associations, which would reduce the high - dimensionality of 
the high- dimensional sensory -motor space and consequently facilitate learning 
across modalities when organisms move (Pfeifer and Scheier 1997). Categori- 
sation may also be facilitated by the proprioceptive cues generated during the 
real -time cross -modal activities (Scheier and Lambrinos 1996). Thus, integration 
of information may facilitate real -time learning, actions and the reactions learnt 
on the basis of cross -modal associations. 
An Epistemological Exposition of `Explanatory' Sensory -motor Move- 
ments. The aforementioned notion of `explanatory, probing, searching activ- 
ities of sensory organs', which is raised by Bajcsy, is not entirely inadequate, 
although hardly straightforward to describe autonomous agents (i.e. behaviour - 
based systems). This notion can be better explained in our discussions of active 
perception researches. The notion of purposefulness14 can be understood as being 
manifested in the selective (over inputs data, computational processes, and even 
algorithms) and exploratory (with regard to the critical aspects of the required 
task) activities, that facilitate the computation needed for accomplishing the re- 
quired task. It is easy to realise that such activities look as if they have certain 
built -in purposes that serve to drive the selective and exploratory activities. 
A goal derived from a required task (at the time -scale of task execution), e.g. 
keeping the car on the right track without crashing, can serve to constrain the 
processes of autonomous systems, in the sense that the accomplishment of such 
a goal is facilitated by a variety of connections between various mechanisms of 
the autonomous systems, as will be made clear in the notion of intermediate con- 
formation. That goal does not serve as a purpose envisaged by the autonomous 
systems, but as an adaptive outcome which originally emerges in the course of 
evolution through gradual adaptations to the ecological niche, as we will have 
'4The adoption of intentional terms is not unusual in the active perception research. In partic- 
ular, the notion of purposefulness seems to have been adopted as a background understanding, 
apart from being used by Bajcsy (1988). For example, it is written in the introduction of the 
book Active Vision, edited by Blake and Yuille (1992), that active vision `refers ... to strate- 
gies for observation', and that `visual sensory data is analysed purposefully, in order to answer 
specific queries posed by the observer' (italics being added). 
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detailed epistemological discussions in part III (chapters five to seven). 
Those epistemological discussions about the concept of goal can be briefly 
introduced as follows. When the organisms of a certain species encounter cer- 
tain environmental challenges with certain inherently compelling tasks to accom- 
plish (e.g. detecting certain predator cues), they gradually derive (through self- 
organisation or natural selection) certain relevant goals, their supporting (spe- 
cialist) mechanisms, and the between -mechanism connections. As a consequence, 
those organisms become gradually more competent to accomplish those tasks. 
This is a process of competence generation, in which characteristics of the eco- 
logical niche of that species are gradually `reflected' in capacities of organisms. 
This point will be discussed in chapters six with the notion of inverse ecological 
niche (see Section 6.5.1, page 255). 
Similar to the concept of goal, the explanatory, probing, and searching ac- 
tivities of sensory organs are not based on the prudence of a homunculus who 
resides internally in the organism, but instead on the facilities which support 
the effectiveness or efficiency of computation. The term `effectiveness' is gen- 
erally interchangeable with another term - `reliability', which is less often used 
in the context of mobile robotics. Both terms (effectiveness or reliability), group 
together two different references - the applicability (including accuracy) and non - 
fragility of mechanisms. By contrast, the term `efficiency' means primarily the 
economy of computational resources, such as time, space (memory), and atten- 
tion. 
In our detailed discussions of the active perception researches, we will see 
the effectiveness and efficiency of computation supported by various types of pro- 
cesses, such as (1) the a priori knowledge adopted in the form of the Lagrangian 
template in support of a dynamical Kalman filter (which subserves dynamic con- 
tour tracking (see Section 4.1.3 of the present thesis, beginning at page 123)), 
(2) comparison of contours (e.g. the sideness of a contour and the free -space 
between would -be rigid objects) from various viewpoints (e.g. Adept, see Section 
4.2.1, beginning at page 126), and (3) navigation (Dickmanns' car, see Section 
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4.2.2, page 132)), and the reinforcement -learning algorithm adopted to facilitate 
the learning of navigation via situated activities (e.g. Sprite, see Section C, page 
361; e.g. the capability of categorisation implemented in the mobile robot by 
Schreier and Lambrinos (1996), see Section D.3, page 379). The above processes 
are parts of autonomous systems, where no intentions or homuncular prudence 
are presumed. Thus, the key notions adopted by Bajcsy (1988) to specify her 
active perception perspective, which she claims as a scientific paradigm, receive 
epistemological grounds. 
What Makes Active Perception be Active - Process or Product? In 
the beginning of this chapter, we raised the issue that perception could not be 
highly adaptive without small -scale sub -systems. Because their role in percep- 
tual performance is to make perception be active, we must clarify the notion of 
activeness before we set off to see its detailed mechanisms. To put it in another 
way, the question is what makes perception be active, given that the autonomous 
small- scaled sub -systems work under real -time constraints in the real environ- 
ment15. 
Real -time performance may be taken as a criterion of being active, as is 
suggested by intuition. However, this is inadequate, because such a criterion is 
but a result of the autonomous systems with certain arrangements. It is, indeed, 
the way of arrangements that makes autonomous systems be active, but the 
performance under real -time constraints is the result, not the criterion. 
Although the performance in the real environment is a goal of the active 
perception perspective, setting a goal like that is not the same as identifying the 
essential processes which underpin active perception. The process, rather than 
the performance, is still what is most important in the scientific explanation of 
active perception, because considerations of it engage with the understanding of 
active perception in all the relevant organismic constraints in the real environ- 
I "Please compare a similar but different question which we raised in the previous section: 
what makes active perception work, given that it is implemented in autonomous systems which 
work under real -time constraint in the real environment? Note that the activeness of perception 
presume the well working of its sub -systems at the three scales. Hence the present question (i.e. 
activeness) is a sub -question of the previously raised question (i.e. working). 
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Ballard (1991) emphasises: 
Selection over 
processes of organism -environment interaction 
Interaction 
Churchland et al. (1994) emphasis: 
Selection over 
internal information processes 
Figure 3.1: The AB and BC Perspectives of Active Perception. Both 
Ballard (1991) and Churchland et al. (1994) have a common concern which 
indicates the activeness of active perception: the stepwise selection of information 
which leads to the accomplishment of required tasks. Those two approaches only 
differ in their respective means of information selection, namely, one (in Ballard 
(1991)) being the data collection between an organism and the environment, 
while the other (in Churchland et al. (1994)) being data interpretation within 
the brain. 
ment. As a consequence, it is process, rather than performance, that identifies 
the activeness of active perception. 
3.3 Comparison and Integration of Two Approaches 
Ballard (1991) and Churchland et al. (1994), in their respective approaches to 
active perception, identify the selection over useful information as being essential 
to activeness. For the effective performance in the real environment, there must 
be selection over useful information, although the selection may be carried out in 
different ways. 
Comparison. Ballard (1991) and Churchland et al. (1994) hold different views 
regarding the criteria for active perception. Ballard (1991), together with most 
authors in Blake et al. (1992), emphases the adoption of economical processes 
which make available the information needed for accomplishing the required tasks. 
Such processes are typically seen in an early visual stage. They subserve data 
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collection. By contrast, Churchland et al. (1994) focus on the information pro- 
vided by the interaction of brain modules, which typically happens in a late visual 
stage. Such processes relate to interpretation of the information provided in the 
retinotopic maps. Thus, the distinction between these two approaches is clear: 
one emphasises data collection, while the other focuses on data interpretation. 
Integration. These two perspectives are not trivially related to visual stages, 
or to the positions across or beyond the skin (specifically, between an organism 
and the environment) or within the brain. They have a common concern which 
indicates, the activeness of active perception: the autonomous stepwise (thus 
gradual) selection of information, such that what a later process is to carry out 
depends on what information has been gained and what is still needed for the 
eventual accomplishment of the required task (figure 3.1). 
What distinguishes the two perspectives is their respective emphases on the 
perceptual activities, one emphasising on the collection of useful data, the other 
on the data interpretation and interconnection within the brain. However, both 
means of information selection make perceptual processing easier, and conse- 
quently facilitate active perception with regard to its real -time performance. In 
addition, both emphases presume sensory -motor activities. The processes em- 
phasised in both perspectives are not simply processes at different computational 
stages, because they both need their respective sensory -motor activities. 
Summary Active perception research considers perception to be active, as op- 
posed to the full reconstruction of a 3 -D visual scene from (2 -D) retinotopic maps 
via bottom -up and hierarchical processes. Two main lines of argument support 
this view - AB and BC perspectives of active perception. 
These two perspectives have certain commonalities, namely an understand- 
ing of the importance of task -specific facilities and observers' movements for per- 
ceptual computation, in order to gain access to more relevant perceptual features. 
Despite their commonalities, those two perspectives contain significant dif- 
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ferences in emphasis. According to the AB perspective, iterative perceptual pro- 
cesses seemingly `strive' to make available the visual information needed for the 
required visual tasks with the support of sensory -motor and bodily actions. By 
contrast, according to the BC perspective, perceptual processes constantly build 
the mutual coherency of perceptual properties, within and across modalities. 
3.4 Gaze Control 
Among the various phenomena of active perception, gaze control is an archetype. 
The performance of gaze control, as Ballard (1991) states, is vitally important 
in the paradigm of active vision, because it serves to maintain the exocentric 
coordinate frames and other required visual information. The capacity of gaze 
control in the mammal consists of a variety of autonomous visual sub -systems, 
including accommodation, aperture, binocular vergence, saccades and foveation, 
pursuit (e.g. Collewijn and Tamminga 1984; Robinson 1968, 1987; to mention 
only a few), and the cooperation between them. Similarly, artificial autonomous 
systems of vision can perform the skills of gaze control in many respects, as we 
will see briefly in this subsection. 
First, certain artificial autonomous systems, based on a variety of designs in 
(rea116) mobile robotics, have demonstrated capabilities of cooperative accommo- 
dation17 (focusing), binocular vergence, and stereopsis for surface reconstruction 
(Abbott and Ahuja 1988). Second, certain other autonomous systems demon- 
strate binocular vergence, smooth pursuit, and the cooperation between them 
(Coombs 1991). Third, still other artificial autonomous systems demonstrate the 
cooperation of accommodation, vergence, stereopsis, and foveation (Brown et al. 
1992, see our discussion below). Last, but not of least importance, an implemen- 
16That is, it is not simply simulation, although real mobile robots may use computer simulation 
to test the design before the design is implemented in real robots. 
'Accommodation in the vertebrate eye is the autonomous process of changing the curvature 
of lens. By fine -tuning and focusing the lens, the process fine -tunes and focuses the lens, which 
controls both the amount of light rays issued from a distant target and the degree of light 
refraction in the eyeball, with the effect of convexing a refracted light ray to a particular point 
on the retina. The degree of changing the curvature depends on the distance of the target object 
(Schiffman 1996, pp. 61 -63). 
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t i.t.ion of attentive control, based on the human oculomotor control described by 
Robinson (1968, 1987), directs camera saccades and foveation to perform seem- 
ingly explanatory- predictive behaviour (Clark and Ferrier 1992), an endeavour 
that we described in the previous section. 
In the following discussions we need to extract the strategies of robotic design 
and thereby construct epistemological explanations, to see why the capabilities of 
gaze control can be accomplished by the artificial autonomous visual sub -systems 
without recourse to a sort of `motionless mover' - intentional prudence. Those 
artificial autonomous sub -systems, notwithstanding, appear to be capable of per- 
forming certain activities similarly (but not actually) to intentional prudence, 
especially the seemingly explanatory -predictive endeavour which guides various 
aspects (vergence, pursuit, saccades, etc.) of the gaze. 
Due to the limitations of space, we cannot discuss the cooperation between all 
the visual sub- systems, and hence will limit the number of focuses, by disregarding 
aperture and accommodation. Thus, we will discuss vergence and pursuit, on the 
one hand, and the attentive control of saccades, on the other. These two visual 
sub- systems can be found respectively in the third and last robot autonomous 
systems mentioned above. The former (the third system) can be seen as a pre- 
condition of the latter (the last system). For the whole system of gaze control, 
vergence and pursuit can be regarded as a large -scale visual sub -system arranging 
the movements of the two cameras (`eyes'); by contrast, the sub -system of the at- 
tentive control stands alone in dealing with subtle computation over the attended 
information, with the result of providing sufficient information for arranging the 
continual saccadic movements, that is, the path of emphasised foveating visits 
and re- visits. These cooperate completely autonomously, without sacrificing the 
adaptability required in the unpredictable environment, as we will see from their 
robotic design and implementations. 
In the early stages, the human visual system must adjust its direction and 
position in order to collect stable and relevant visual information (in relation to 
certain required tasks) for the analysis carried out at later stages. The adjustment 
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for the collection of such visual information, in general, consists of six stages. 
Two of them, to wit focus and appropriate aperture, subserve the adjustment 
of internal eye (cameral$) state. Three others, namely saccades. vergence and 
pursuit, serve to adjust the interrelations between the two eyes, body (specifi- 
cally - head, shoulders, and body gestures), and the gaze target (i.e. the target 
object). The remaining stage, i.e. tracking, is to adjust the visual system in 
the brain, by adopting suitable processes for identifying the shape of the target 
object and predicting the object's trajectory, for example, in the vision of a sta- 
tionary mosquito, a running tiger, a moving missile, an approaching shark, or 
(via a microscope) a deformable cell. 
3.4.1 Focus 
The term focus (accumulation) is a category for a single eye. With a certain 
curvature of the lens, the eye brings the optical flow, through the eyeball, precisely 
to the retina cup. A focus is consequently obtained. The same point of the target 
object is reflected on a single point on the retina, neither to a point in front of 
the retina nor to a geometric point behind it. 
This function (focus) is a common feature of cameras, relating to the distance 
of the target object. A target object can be focused on, i.e. brought to the retina 
properly, if it is a certain distance away from the camera, from as little as about 
24 cm (depending on the type of lens) to infinity. While focus can be hand -crafted 
in a camera, the lens of the human eye is autonomously controlled. The process of 
focusing or defocusing consequently gives rise to depth information (i.e. distance 
of the target object) monocularly (Hwang et al. 1989; Pentland 1987), just as we 
can measure distance from a camera with hand- crafted focus function. 
'81n this chapter, we use `eye' and `camera' interchangeably. The one can be viewed as a 
metaphor for the other. The context will show which is strictly talked about. 
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3.4.2 Appropriate Aperture 
By contrast to controlling focus by its curvature, a lens controls the amount of 
light by its aperture. In addition, the size of the aperture controls the `depth 
of focus', i.e. the area in the visual field around the focused target where the 
sensitivity of depth is critical. In photography, a larger aperture makes the depth 
of focus smaller, and vice versa. As with focus, aperture is usually controlled in 
a camera by hand (i.e. externally), while in a system of active vision it is con- 
trolled autonomously. For an artificial visual system, it is important to maintain 
sufficient light levels for the image sensor (Clark and Ferrier 1992). 
3.4.3 Saccades 
Visual saccades consist of a continual sequence of single saccades, each of which 
takes a period of about 200 milliseconds, which is much longer than the duration 
of vergence and pursuit movements. The visual saccadic system consists in the 
control of two sub- systems attentive control, which determines the next posi- 
tion to foveat by a saccade movement; and oculomotor control, which converts 
the information about that next position into corresponding motor actions and 
accordingly `drives' the eyes to foveat that position. Above, we have briefly de- 
scribed the attentive control sub -system. The oculomotor control sub -system for 
saccades, in its real -time action, is closely related to the pursuit systems (Robin- 
son 1968; Brown et al. 1992; Clark and Ferrier 1992), as we will see. Both 
saccadic movement and gaze pursuit, as we will see, presume the availability 
of vergence. For this, we must provisionally set aside the interrelation between 
saccade and pursuit, and understand vergence beforehand. 
The mechanisms of saccadic movements are described as follows. The adjust- 
ment of gaze is required for both moving and stationary observers and objects, 
because the eyes need to keep on moving continually, from one location to an- 
other, in order to let each fovea (a tiny area on the retina cup which provides 
the best resolution of visual features) encounter lots of relevant target positions 
for the required task, as is evident in the saccades of eyeballs. This means that 
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a visual system cannot be completely stationary. 
Saccades consist of a continual sequence of eye movements, each of which 
is a pre- attentive stage wherein certain visual primitives (such as colour, line 
ends, spatial frequency, motion, line orientation, binocular disparity, and texture 
(Clark and Ferrier 1992)) are sampled in parallel across the visual field (Treisman 
and Gelade 1980). As is indicated by Robinson (1968) and modelled by Clark 
and Ferrier (1992), a system of attention control serves to measure such samples, 
depending on differently required tasks, by assigning those primitives different 
weights (called different `saliency'). For each assignment of weights, the system 
computes the combined weights of the sampled points, with the result being a 
'saliency map'. As a consequence, a point of maximum saliency is determined, 
which is regarded as a focus of attention - the point for the destination of the 
next saccade. With such a method of computation, changing the assignments 
of weights results in different saliency maps, and in turn different maximum 
points are determined as the subsequent destinations of the continual saccadic 
movements. 
For humans, the duration of determining each saccadic destination, i.e. the 
time interval between two saccades (which is called the latency of the human 
saccadic system), is measured to be about 200 milliseconds, so there are four to 
five saccades per second. This is less frequent than vergence or pursuit movements 
(Robinson 1968). 
As described above, the saccadic movements can foveat and re- foveat the 
most salient points in the visual field. This makes the saccade system appear to be 
clever, in support of the required visual tasks. The attention control sub -system 
seems to be capable of deliberating about the important features for a certain 
required task. However, this is not really mysterious, but is accomplished by com- 
puting the combined weights of the sampled visual primitives and re- computing 
them with the continual changes in the assignment of weights. Everything is de- 
termined autonomously, but the adaptability of the saccadic movement remains 
impressive, nonetheless. The saccadic movement, specifically, adapts to the im- 
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portant features of the required tasks, with the frequency of about 5 saccades per 
second. Intuitively, the saccadic movement appears to explore important features 
in the visual field in support of the required tasks. What is interesting is that 
the saccade system not only is autonomous, with a high degree of modularity, 
but also retains high adaptability. In this regard, the emergence of the saccade 
system is really in need of explanation, for modularity and adaptability usually 
conflict in both creatures and designed devices. This is the topic for part III 
(chapters five to seven). In fact, this is the main theme of the present thesis. 
3.4.4 Vergence 
Unlike the term focus, the term vergence is a binocular category, which denotes the 
process of fixating both eyes in opposite directions with the result of intersecting 
the optical axes of the two eyes on the target object (Figure 3.2). The intersection 
of the two optical axes is called the gaze target (Brown et al. 1992). 
A pair of binocular eyes (or cameras) of a binocular visual system has several 
degrees of freedom. First of all, a single eye presents two degrees of freedom, 
namely vertical rotation (by changing the degree of tilt) and horizontal rotation 
(by surveying along with the pan on which the eye fixes) (Figure 3.2). If both 
eye are fixed on the same pan (consequently with the same degree of tilt) and 
maintain horizontal rotation simultaneously, three further degrees of freedom 
remain. Two of them function similarly to the vertical and horizontal rotations, 
but are subject to the movement of the head, instead of the eyes. The remaining 
degree of freedom for the two eyes is the distance of their fixation point (where 
the optic axes of the two eyes intersect) from the middle point of the two eyes. 
The functionality of the vergence system is to control the respective optic axes 
to fixate at a point with the right distance - namely, the distance of the target 
object (figure 3.2). When fixation at the target object is achieved, the object 
is pictured (along with the optic axes) at the foveae of the cameras, where the 
highest degree of visual resolution can facilitate the analysis of visual information 
at the maximum rate. 
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The mid -head direction 
Targe 
An attempt of fixation target 
object\ 
A succèssful fixation 
represents the optic 
axes of the two cameras. 
represents the attempt 
of each camera to 
encounter the target 
object by its visual 
field. 
0 represents the target 
object with its white 
spot. 
Figure 3.2: Vergence. The attempt of vergence remains unsuccessful until the 
computation of the pictured object on both cameras manifests zero- disparity. 
When the condition of zero - disparity is achieved, the two cameras coincide at 
a. fixation point. Note that the vergence control system of Brown et al. (1992) 
presumes the symmetric movement of the two cameras, which simplifies the task 
of vergence. 
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Note that the target distance is exactly the depth determined by the low -level 
function of the binocular visual system. Such an identification qualifies the ver- 
gence system, in its judgement of fixation distance, to take advantage of various 
depth cues. The most direct one is binocular disparity. Other cues are motion, 
texture, shading, and anything that signals the change of the target depth, such 
as the measurement or prediction of self -motion (Brown et al. 1992). We first 
discuss the achievement of vergence by means of computing zero -disparity, and 
leave those other cues to later. 
Determining Vergence by Computing Zero - disparity. Before vergence is 
successfully achieved, the visual system is incapable of computing the distance 
of the target object. The distance is, thus, not already available. The computa- 
tion with recourse to `where' would consequently be difficult. The achievement 
of vergence cannot begin with the geometrical information of the target object. 
Instead, undertaking a `what' strategy to achieve vergence would be more fea- 
sible, in the sense that vergence is seen to be a consequence of analysing the 
morphologies of the target object on the `retinae' of the respective cameras. This 
is seen in Brown et al. (1992). In their design19, both cameras are directed by a 
feedback control system based on zero -disparity computation, by comparing the 
same visual features gathered from two angles which naturally manifest various 
degrees of disparity. The result of zero -disparity computation is that a point 
with zero degree of disparity is singled out for positioning the would -be fixation 
point.20 
The zero -disparity computation is grounded on an assumption: the fixation 
point necessarily has a stereoscopic disparity of zero, with the points nearer to 
it tending to have smaller disparities. This assumption is confirmed in the neu- 
rophysiological understanding of mammalian binocular eyes (Churchland 1995). 
19Brown et al. (1992) simplify the vergence control system by assuming symmetric vergence 
control. They acknowledge that this is not necessarily the case for vergence control. Their 
modelling of robotic vision is thus a simplification. As a consequence, their vergence control 
system cannot fixate anywhere other than those points on the line of the mid -eyes direction. To 
fixate elsewhere, the visual system must move (by translation or rotation) its head, on which 
the two cameras are fixed. 
20.k good illustration of zero -disparity computation can be found in Paul Churchland (1995). 
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Thus, the aim of vergence is to identify the fixation point via the identification 
of the point of zero -disparity. 
Notice that the achievement of vergence in Brown et al. (1992) is typical 
of a behaviour -based approach, where vergence is seen the required behaviour. 
The information needed to achieve the required task is provided by a system of 
feedback control which filters out visual information iteratively, by comparing the 
disparities of the target object pictured on both cameras and then feeding back 
the provisional result of comparing an area with a smaller stereoscopic disparity. 
With the feedback processes running iteratively, the feedback control system 
ends up with a point of zero -disparity, which is the correct position for vergence 
fixation. 
Significantly, this feedback control system achieves the required vergence in 
real -time, specifically in- between one or two frame times.21 A frame time is 33 
milliseconds, and the computation of the zero -disparity point for positioning the 
vergence fixation in the visual windows of 32 -32 pixels takes 51 milliseconds! 
A side -effect of fixation, in the imaging work of Brown et al. (1992), is the 
generation of a rough contour of the target object, specifically a stereoscopic 
outline image of the limited area near to the zero -disparity point. This can be 
seen as a basis for further achieving a stereoscopic image with various degrees 
of depth (see P. M. Churchland (1995), for the computation of three degrees of 
depth). 
With this computation, the point of zero -disparity is singled out for position- 
ing the would -be fixation point. This result is passed over to the host computer 
for the motor control of changing camera directions. The host computer converts 
the pixel disparity to angular coordinates, and then issues identical and opposite 
vergence velocity commands22 to the camera motors. 
21A frame time is the duration between two picture- taking activities with a camera. Intu- 
itively, a `frame' means an instance of picture- taking. 
"Note again that Brown et al. (1992) simplify the vergence control system by assuming 
symmetric vergence control. Thus, the vergence velocities of the two cameras are symmetric in 
opposite directions. Also note that this is not necessarily the case for vergence control, as their 
modelling of robotic vision is obviously a simplification. 
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The human vergence system, of course, does not presume symmetric move- 
ments of both eyes, and hence is capable of detecting objects aside from the 
mid -head axis. The asymmetric binocular movements have more degrees of free- 
dom. In the present thesis, due to the limitation of space, we do not intend to 
discuss how this is done. 
The vergence control system implemented in Brown et al. (1992) presents 
a counter -example to the passive perspective of vision, mainly for two reasons. 
First, visual processing does not commence at the 2 -D retinotopic maps. The 
visual system needs to take actions to make available relevant retinotopic infor- 
mation by vergence control. This is done before sufficient information is already 
available there. Second, the visual processing of vergence does not serve to re- 
construct the retinotopic maps, but aims to fixate the two optic axes by taking 
advantage of the binocular stereoscopic disparities. At this very early stage of 
visual processing, this information is not used for the reconstruction of depth 
but for the accomplishment of vergence, as we have seen. In contrast, the effect 
of vergence can be seen as a facility for maintaining the exocentric coordinate 
frames which are a characteristic of active vision. 
In our discussion so far, we have seen how the vergence system achieves a 
single instance of vergence. Now, we need to move on to discuss gaze pursuit, in 
order to see how the visual system maintains vergence in moving conditions, i.e. 
when objects and /or observers themselves move. 
3.4.5 Pursuit 
The movements of organisms, visual organs and the objects in the environment, 
lead to the target moving out of the fixation point, for reasons described below. 
During the 200ms latency of a saccade movement, a position as the destination 
of the subsequent saccade is derived by the saccade system, but the target ob- 
ject would not have been keeping stationary at that position. Instead, it moves 
elsewhere, and hence a position error occurs for saccadic movement. Such an 
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error must be compensated for in order that gaze (focus and vergence) can truly 
keep up with what is suggested by the system of attentive control. The actuator 
of the oculomotor system must not drive the saccade to the initially computed 
destination without taking account of a required compensation. 
The question is how the pursuit system does this effectively. How does 
the pursuit system `know' where the attended position has actually moved to? 
Granted that it knows, a further question arises. During its drive there in a 
certain period of time, might not the desired attended point move away again? 
Thus, the chase of an attended position would be constantly lagging behind, if the 
pursuit system (like the saccade system) works on the basis of absolute position. 
The human visual system does not try to compensate the position error (i.e. 
to re -fixate the target) from scratch. That is, it does not maintain it via the 
vergence system again, but by another system - the pursuit system, which serves 
to maintain the tracking (with respect to gaze movement) of the moving target, 
within a duration shorter than the saccadic latency. This is confirmed by Robin- 
son (1965), who shows that the pursuit system is a sampling system, like the 
saccade system, but with a sampling rate much higher than that of the saccadic 
movement, i.e. with a sampling duration much shorter than the 200 ms saccadic 
latency. It is reported that the cumulative position error may turn out to be 
compensated for by a single saccade, hence pursuit movements are not always 
smooth (Collewijn and Tamminga 1984). 
The pursuit mechanism is described in detail as follows. As we mentioned 
previously, during the latency of a saccade the moving target causes a position 
error for both focus and vergence, and this must be compensated by the pursuit 
system. Thus, a pursuit system must minimise two measures of error - (target) 
position error and (retina) velocity error (Brown et al. 1992). 
As positional error accumulates for many reasons (e.g. 'delay in the system, 
noise in the position readings, problems of robot head velocity computation') 
(ibid. p. 134), the extent of target slip increases, and the fixation location 
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gradually departs from the target object. Furthermore, an erroneous velocity, 
i.e. a velocity of the oculomotor actuator which does not cope with the velocity 
of the moving object, would also divert the gaze from the target. To keep up 
with the moving target object, then, the oculomotor actuator must take account 
of the position error and velocity error to manage compensation for the correct 
destination. 
A key notion of pursuit movement is that the visual system is not entirely 
insulated from the moving target during the saccade latency. Certain visual 
capabilities remain functioning, including measurements of the moving target 
and the internal predictions of its trajectory. 
Computation of Compensation after the Saccade Latency. This is rela- 
tively simple. If the visual system were entirely insulated from the moving target, 
then it would be impossible for it to compensate for the two kinds of errors, be- 
cause the saccade system would have no information about the (position and 
velocity) errors. 
Slightly relaxed, even a vergence system with its computational duration 
interpolated between saccade latency, as opposed to the incorporation into them, 
does not help much, either. To re -fixate a target object is surely not impossible for 
a vergence system, but the gaze might accordingly be lagging behind permanently. 
In such a circumstance, the vergence (i.e. re- fixation of both eyes) functions after 
the target object has moved away at the end of the latency period in question. 
Since vergence starts later, the vergence process takes a certain period of time in 
addition to the time of the saccade latency, despite this being a period of time 
much shorter than the 200 -milliseconds of the saccade latency. Meanwhile, the 
desired saccade destination of the moving target would have moved away from 
where it was previously determined by the attention control system. This, in 
itself, leads to both a position error and a velocity error. The difficulty remains. 
In the analysis of the question of pursuit, the two most serious problems are: 
that both the previous vergence point and the saccade destination move during 
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any period of time; and that any computational process takes time (including 
saccade latency or the duration of a vergence process), however short it can be. 
Computation of vergence after the completion of a single saccade would leave the 
pursuit movement permanently lagging behind. 
This problem arises when the vergence system computes a vergence move- 
ment after the saccade latency. A straightforward resolution of this problem is to 
compute a vergence movement during the saccade latency. This is possible since 
the vergence system and the saccade system are treated as mutually indepen- 
dent. In this case, vergence still interpolates saccades if the vergence movements 
are separate from the saccades. Alternatively, the computational result for the 
vergence movement could be incorporated into the next saccade as a modifica- 
tory amount, and the oculomotor activities would be consequently less laborious. 
From an economic point of view, this is a better resolution. 
However, the pursuit movements based on vergence control would remain 
awkward because it leaves out a variety of useful information without taking 
advantage of it, as we will see shortly. This is a fundamental difference between 
vergence control and pursuit. 
Overshoot. An alternative way of compensating for the position and velocity 
error is to provide an overshoot in the response step, as suggested in Brown et 
al. (1992). Specifically, during the saccade latency the pursuit system combines 
measurements of the target and predictions over possible states of the target in 
',fixed proportions', under certain correct assumptions about noise or the target 
state, to produce an optimal estimate of the target state (Brown et al. 1992, p. 
128; italics added). There is no need, then, to compute, with an extra period of 
time other than the saccade latency. Nor is there a need to sort out the absolute 
position or velocity errors. Provided that the assumptions are near to the actual 
target movement and that the fixed proportions have not been estimated, the 
predicted overshoot will compensate the errors to a significant extent. 
A useful assumption about a moving target is path coherence (Jain et al. 
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1995), which is also adopted in traditional computational vision in its recon- 
struction of object trajectory. That assumption can apply to active vision in 
gaze control, and specifically to pursuit movement. It states that the location of 
a given point, its scalar velocity, and the direction of motion would be mostly 
unchanged from one to the next frame time, i.e. not changing instantaneously. 
In brief, movement of a physical object has `inertia' (ibid., p. 443). 
A similar assumption is the internal constancy of a target object, and this 
is widely adopted in tracking (e.g. Harris 1992; Terzopoulos and Szeliski 1992). 
Here, it is assumed that the physical principles of the target object remain the 
same. For a rigid object, it is straightforward. For deformable objects, such 
as fingers, the internal constraints of fingers and hand remain useful for the 
prediction of spatial properties, such as shape, location and velocity (Terzopoulos 
1987). 
With either of these two assumptions, a later movement (which leads to the 
position and velocity errors) can be predicted from its previous trajectory in a 
duration as short as a single frame time (33 milliseconds, for the vergence system 
we previously discussed). If it is along this line of reasoning, it is straightforward 
to derive that the amount of an overshoot for computer vision needs the accu- 
mulation of position and velocity errors for 6 to 7 (i.e. 200/33) frame times. By 
contrast, it is reported that the human pursuit system is a continual sampling 
system, or at least a system with a sampling rate much higher then the saccadic 
system (Robinson 1965). During the saccade latency, there would be sufficient 
times of sampling for the pursuit system to accumulate position and velocity 
errors, in exchange for an overshoot. 
Compensation on the Basis of Stereoscopic Disparity. An alternative 
to compensation on the basis of overshoot is the compensation of errors on the 
basis of zero -disparity. Certain methods of the pursuit control can be built on 
the basis of the cumulative stereoscopic disparities of the target in the retina, 
to estimate the position and velocity errors (Clark and Ferrier 1992). In a sam- 
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pling period, the binocular disparity of the target23 can be computed; for more 
sampling times, such disparities can be accumulated to trace the position error. 
In addition, the change of those disparities can be computed to signal the mag- 
nitude of the velocity error. The high rate sampling of the pursuit system can 
compute by comparing the gradually sampled data, the cumulative disparities 
and the trajectory of their change, with regard to the positional change, and the 
change in scale velocity and directions. Thus, the cumulative position error and 
velocity error can be transformed into oculomotor activities, and added to the 
oculomotor movement of a saccade, to compensate for the position and velocity 
errors during the saccade latency. 
3.4.6 Tracking 
Pursuing an object can also be termed the 'tracking' of that object. This term 
`tracking' is somewhat ambiguous, however. It can be understood in a broad and 
in a narrow sense. According to the broad sense, tracking means the maintenance 
of gaze on the moving target. In this sense it is similar to pursuit movements. 
According to the narrow sense, tracking an object additionally requires the iden- 
tification of its shapes. In the context of active perception research the term 
`tracking systems' is understood in the narrow sense. This sense of tracking is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
3.4.7 Summary 
The control of gaze is a combinational outcome of six movements - focus, appro- 
priate aperture, saccades, vergence, pursuit, and tracking (in the broad sense) 
- each of which is implemented by a sub- system of gaze control. Among those 
six sub -systems, two are repeatedly referred to in the building of the conceptual 
foundations of task -level emergence - attentive control of saccades and the con- 
trol of pursuit movements. Discussion has shown that they are active systems, in 
23The target can be detected across the different sampling times, because the main features 
of the target object remain constant during the saccade latency. 
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that the sensory organs move in order to gather information step by step for the 
required tasks. In addition, both of them take advantage of pre -fixed exploitative 
heuristics of visual features and motions. However, the course of computation is 
shown to be incrementally affected by previous judgements which are affected by 
unpredictable environmental factors. 
The computation at issue is largely contingent, for the following three rea- 
sons. First, the determination of a next process depends on the previously gath- 
ered information in comparison with the information still needed for the required 
tasks. Second, both the weights of visual features and the measured position 
and velocity errors of motion trajectories are not pre- categorised values. Third, 
such weights and errors are affected by various environmental and within -system 
factors which both arise contingently. 
3.5 An Epistemological Framework for Active Per- 
ception. 
The active perception systems studied in these two chapters (three and four) can 
be largely understood on the basis of a general epistemological framework, as 
sketched below. 
A capability to be implemented in support of a required task must24 set- 
tle two extremes of an emergent trait - adaptability and modularity (which 
makes possible the autonomy in active perception systems). The contrast be- 
tween modularity and adaptability may take various forms, e.g. between stiffness 
and flexibility, between template and uncertainly, between prior knowledge and 
modification, between continuity and local conditions, between model -based and 
stochastic approaches. Because the implementation of a capacity may be subject 
to those different forms of settlement, a particular mechanism of implementa- 
"`Notice the prescriptive nature of epistemology in this statement. It explains why a robotic 
implementation can be endowed with a capability on the basis of autonomous systems. Our 
envisaged epistemological framework will not serve to describe the state of art of the present 





Situated Activities, which lead to 
Iterative modification of robot states 
Modularity 
The required task 
Figure 3.3: The Epistemological Framework of Gaze Control. The sub- 
systems of active perception settle adaptation and modularity by situated ac- 
tivities which modify iteratively the robot states, with the effect of carrying out 
the required tasks. Note that certain sub -systems serve to capture pre- formed 
knowledge, while certain others serve to respond to random factors. The dot box 
indicates that gaze control is grounded on the interactions of various sub -systems. 
tion must reflect the settlement of contrasts with a particular form shown above 
(Figure 3.3). 
The sub -systems of active perception accomplish this by situated activities 
which modify iteratively the robot's states, with regard to their architectures 
and weight of valued information parameters, with the effect of carrying out the 
required tasks (as shown in Figure 3.3). 
To put it in another way, the iterative modification can be analysed from the 
point of view of various processes on three scales. At the smallest scale, single 
sub- systems of active perception - e.g. the attentive control of saccades - select 
information stepwise on the grounds of what has been done and what remains 
to be done in order to carry out a requisite stage of the required task.25 At 
the intermediate scale, the iterative activities of those sub -systems will support 
a capability /capacity, e.g. gaze control. At the largest scale, the cooperation of 
a variety of systems, such as gaze control, tracking, and the planning of focus 
attention, leads to the performance of required tasks, such as navigation. 
251t can be said that the selection is grounded on the history of the agent's previous situated 
activities. 
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The difference in scope between these three scales is not trivial, as we will see 
in the following two chapters. It reflects the sophistication of nature with regard 
to the emergence of perceptual capacities: the two extremes of an emergent trait 
(i.e. modularity and adaptability) are accomplished simultaneously by linking a 
variety of small -scaled sub- systems. This sophistication can be seen in two subtle 
arrangements of emergence. 
The first of these is that small -scale sub- systems are themselves both modular 
and adaptive to certain specific aspects of the real environment. Each sub -system 
seems to have its specific purpose, for it facilitates perception by capturing certain 
aspects of the perceptual target in the real environment. Certain sub- systems 
serve to capture pre- formed knowledge, while others serve to respond to random 
factors. It is a small autonomous system (a module), and is small in the sense 
that it carries out effectively a very specific aspect of perceptual performance in 
the real environment. 
For small systems, in contrast to large ones, it is comparatively easy to be 
autonomous and adaptive simultaneously. Of course, the overall performance 
arising out of these small -scale sub -systems is dependent on the challenge of mu- 
tual coherence between those sub -systems. This (mutual coherence) is the second 
subtle arrangement of emergence, which is accomplished with recourse to a series 
of adaptational processes - the gradual adaptation from simple to complicated 
organisations through both internal dynamics and the situated activities in spe- 
cific ecological niche. The process of gradual adaptation is of vital importance in 
explaining the emergence of active perception, as we will argue, largely because 
it sheds light on the linking problem of those highly differentiated sub -systems, 
by explaining the interconnections between those sub -systems in terms of grad- 
ual differentiation, where the differentiated sub -systems can be consequently seen 
as being inherently well -aligned in the process of differentiating each single sub- 
system. This topic will be fully discussed in chapter five. 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of active perception, comprising its main the- 
oretical perspectives, an archetype (gaze control), and an epistemological frame- 




Implementation of Tracking 
and Visual Planning 
4.1 Tracking 
Tracking of a target object has two main goals, namely holding gaze on it and 
identifying its contour. The former goal is a matter of gaze control, which we 
have discussed in full previously. For the latter goal the task of tracking may 
take various forms, including: tracking an object with a rigid shape; tracking a 
moving target; and tracking a target with elastic shapes, such as fingers, lips, 
and amoebae (note their changing shapes). As we will see, a variety of mech- 
anisms are needed but commonly have the requirement of compromise between 
modularity and adaptability. regardless of how the compromise is reached. How- 
ever, the compromise may take various forms, as we mentioned previously (see 
Section 3.5, page 110) - namely, balancing stiffness and flexibility, template and 
uncertainty, prior knowledge and modification, continuity and local conditions, 
or alternatively model -based and stochastic approaches. 
4.1.1 Snake 
Snake is introduced by Kass et al. (1988) and Terzopoulos (1987) (see Terzopoulos 
and Szeliski (1992), p.4), an algorithm for tracking contours, on the basis of 





Figure 4.1: Some Basic Forms of Spline - Quadratic and Cubic Splines. 
It is re -drawn with configuration from Curwen and Blake (1992) table 3.1, p. 49. 
Splines (figure 4.1) in the snake algorithm (Snake, henceforth) are controlled 
by an energy- minimising function which responds to three sources of forces - 
internal, image, and external forces. Each source of forces has its particular 
role in determining the settling shape of the snake, and the forces of different 
sources are complementary in the process of the determination. The internal 
forces of the spline impose piecemeal smoothness constraints to maintain local 
continuity of the spline; the image forces drag the spline to settle locally in the 
forms of certain salient image features such as edge, line, termination point, 
and even subjective contours. By contrast, external constraint forces (such as a 
pulling force manipulated by a user, by an attention mechanism, or by a high - 
level interpretation) do not serve to determine the shape of the spline but instead 
push the not yet formed splines near to a local minimum (Kass et al. 1988). 
Forces of different sources are aligned in the determination of a single spline 
by simple addition: 
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ELake - ./O1 E.snake(v(s)) dx = Jp 
1 
Eint(v(s)) dx-i-J 1 Eimage(v(s)) dx- f 1 Econ(v(s)) dx 
o 
(4.1) 
where Eint represents the internal energy of the spline, Eimage gives rise to 
the image forces, and Econ influences the external constraint forces (Kass et al. 
1988, p. 323). These three forces interact and thereby determine the eventual 
shape combined by splines. 
Single sources of forces can be decomposed in a similar way. For example 
the energy function of image forces is determined by the energy of line, edge and 
terminal, which are combined by addition: 
Eimage = WlineEline + WedgeEedge + WtermEterm (4.2) 
where Eline is the energy function determining lines, and wline is the weight as- 
signed to the energy in the distinction between light or dark lines, while wedge, 
Eddge, wterm, and Eterm can be understood in a similar way. Note the interconnec- 
tion between weight and energy by multiplication and the further interconnection 
by addition, which determines the interactions between those components. The 
interactions with various component forces lead to slithering movements of the 
snake contour while the energy functions are minimising their energy, which is 
why the envisaged algorithm is termed `Snake'. An interaction of image and 
external forces is illustrated in figure 4.2. 
The Snake can be applied to tracking subjective contours, as illustrated in 
figure 4.3. 
Furthermore, as Kass et al. (1988) demonstrate, the snake algorithm can 
serve to track the stereo match of two graphs, by supplementing the existing 
Snake with a certain additional energy function. In another demonstration, with 
another additional energy function it can track slow motion such as the move- 
ments of lips, specifically with the rate of eight frames within two seconds (Kass 
et all. 1988, p. 329). 
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Figure 4.2: The Interaction between an Image (in Particular, an Edge) 
and an External Force. The series of four graphs show two snakes, one with 
the shape of a pear and the other with shape of a potato. Upper -left: the pear 
snake is pulled by the user away from the original edge. From 2 to 4, we can see 
the effect of shape change after the user let go of the snake: the snake gradually 
returns to its original position. Re -drawn with configuration from Kass et al. 
(1988), figure 3, p. 325. 
As indicated above, the power of Snake is demonstrated in the tracking of 
interactive specification of image contours. Because of its capabilities of balancing 
different forces (such as edge, external pulling force, internal continuity, binocular 
images, and motion), Snake can perform the tracking of objects, be they rigid or 
elastic, stationary or moving. The elegance played by the Snake is the expression 
of interactions between component forces in terms of addition. 
By an additional energy function, Snake maintains the balance between var- 
ious forces, and a local minimum will be eventually accomplished. Hence, when 
an additional energy function is incorporated, the resulting snake algorithm is 
capable of determining a certain additional function, such as the tracking of mo- 
tion and binocular match. The functionality of the snake algorithm, thus, can be 
realised in incremental snake algorithms. Based on the increment of energy func- 
tions in Snake, the processing of visual features can interact with higher levels of 
processing. 
Snake is versatile in an epistemological sense in four ways. Firstly, it is a me- 
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chanical module but displays a certain extent of flexibility, because of the internal 
continuity of a spline. An irregular shape can be firmly and regularly tracked on 
the basis of different types of images (such as line, edge and termination point), 
and simultaneously be smoothly linked because of the force of internal continuity. 
Thus, the modularity of a capability does not cause the lack of adaptiveness, and 
the flexibility does not lead to the deficiency of regular forms. 
Secondly, Snake appears to be an algorithm with the capability of universal 
shapes and indefinite levels of processing, but each module of a certain visual 
processing, such as edge or motion, needs to be characterised by pre- formed 
knowledge with regard to that particular feature. As a consequence, the snake 
algorithm can be highly adaptive to a variety of visual features at different lev- 
els of processing (e.g. edge, line, subjective contour, binocular matching, and 
motion), with good interactions between those features. The characterisation of 
pre- formed knowledge does not prevent the tracking contour displayed by Snake 
from integrating smoothly different visual features. 
Thirdly, the processing at different levels of organisation (such as edge, binoc- 
ular match, and subjective contour) is not necessarily sequential in temporal or- 
der, but is integrated in parallel. The interaction of processes across different 
levels of organisation can thus be synchronised. 
Lastly, although Snake claims to offer active vision (Kass et al. 1988, p. 
322), it is not in itself sufficiently so, without further support, such as by the 
Kalman filter (see below). 
If Snake is to be seen as an active system it is straightforward to ask about 
its required tasks, which relate to the perceptual guidance it provides (by the 
selection of perceptual information) in support of certain bodily actions. Like 
other systems of visual tracking discussed later, Snake maintains smooth links 
between basic perceptual images with the effect of generating smoothly and flex- 
ibly integrated contours, which are significantly informative guidance of tracking 
and further bodily actions such as catching and hunting. The task of Snake is to 
provide those integral contours in real -time response. 
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Figure 4.3: An Example of Tracking Subjective Contour Illusion. Right: 
the standard subjective contour illusion. Left: The tracking of the subjective 
contour by the Edge /termination snake. Redrawn with configuration from figure 
5, Kass et al. (1988), p. 327. 
Further on the negative side, the snake algorithm will be downplayed to 
a certain extent when we have further epistemological considerations about its 
robustness and self -sufficiency. The determination of a local minimum is not suf- 
ficiently robust, for it is over- sensitive to noise. In addition, Snake tends to be less 
adaptive than expected, when motion and shape - changing of the tracked target 
are fast. To improve the snake algorithm in the above two regards (noise and 
speed), the snake algorithm needs two supplementary algorithms - the Kalman 
filter and dynamical systems. 
4.1.2 Kalman Filter 
The Kalman filter is a linear algorithm introduced by Gelb (1974) to filter out 
various types of noise with a view to obtaining from measurement an expected 
value a of the target object. A general form of the Kalman filter algorithm is as 
follows: 
âk = äk-i + Kkq (4.3) 
where ak is a vector expressing the kth estimate of the expected state vector 
a (e.g. an elastic shape), q is the innovation vector (new information detected 
at the ak estimate), and Kk is the Kalman gain (or knowledge gain - the gain 
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matrix expressing the `propositionality factor') (Haykin 1995; Ayache 1991, p. 
178). Note that the estimation is computed recursively on the basis of a previous 
estimate ak_1 and the innovation q. Also note that the value â may be ultimately 
nonlinear, while the Kalman filter is basically a linear equation. Because of its 
linearity, the Kalman filter serve as a convenient tool to approximate nonlinear 
values (Ayache 1991). 
Note that a particular instance of the Kalman filter presumes particular 
knowledge of limited areas, as reported by Haykin (1995) (in Arbib (1995) (ed.), 
p. 83). Perceptual inputs are consequently transformed into perceptual features 
which are relevant to the current situations. 
The filtering out of noise and the tracking of fast - moving objects, presumably, 
will improve the adaptability of the mechanism subserved by the Kalman filter. 
However, the Kalman filter algorithm has its limitations, which must be rectified 
by specific technical improvements. Some of these are: 
1. Iterated Kalman Filter: For Reducing Error. The linear approxima- 
tion provided by the Kalman filter is no longer accurate once an estimate ?Li has 
already gone too far away from the expected value a, which may be nonlinear. 
This problem can be obviated by the iterated Kalman filter, where the incre- 
mented error is adjusted to the error of the earliest estimate, with the following 
details. The recursive process is initiated by ao (an a priori estimate) and So 
(the covariance matrix associated with the error in the estimate). For a later 
step of the recursive process, the covariance matrix Sk associated with the error 
in the estimate becomes incrementally higher, and consequently the approxima- 
tion becomes farther and farther away from accuracy. Re- initiating the recursive 
process of the Kalman filter, by adjusting the covariance matrix Sk to So, would 
reduce the incremented error and hence bring the recursive process closer to the 
expected accuracy (Ayache 1991). 
2. Adaptive Kalman Filter: For Catching an Evolving Target. In 
the above discussion the target tracked by the Kalman filter is assumed to be 
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stationary; that is, the expected value a is assumed to be constant. However, the 
target of tracking may be itself evolving, e.g. by elastic deformations, or through 
the kinematics of certain motions. This problem can be recovered mathematically 
by incorporating into each iteration of the iterated Kalman filter a Gauss -Markov 
equation (for details, see Ayache 1991, pp. 186 -187). The key mathematical 
equations that implement the dynamical Kalman filter will be listed below, in 
order to show that dynamical systems really apply to the Kalman filter, and that 
those dynamical equations (as the mathematical forms indicate) indeed stem from 
the general form of The Kalman filter algorithm ((4.3)) as it extension. 
As an alternative to the Gauss -Markov equation, the algorithms of dynamical 
systems theory can be incorporated into the Kalman filter, which leads to a 
different kind of adaptive Kalman filter. This is done by first establishing a 
continuous Kalman filter, which assumes a systems model: 
d 
dtu 
= Fu + q (4.4) 
where F is the system matrix, u is the abbreviation of state variable u(t) (the 
previous a), and q is a white Gaussian noise process with covariance Q (for details, 
see Terzopoulos and Szeliski (1992), p. 15 -16). 
Then, transform the equation 4.3 into the formation of dynamical systems, 
as follows: 
û = Fîr, + S-1 HT R-1(d - Hû) (4.5) 
where S- 1HTR -1 is the Kalman filter gain matrix (for details, see Terzopoulos 
and Szeliski (1992), pp. 15 -16), and (d - Hû) is the residual error (i.e. the 
innovation). In addition, the covariance matrix S, together with its coupling 
with the Kalman filter gain matrix HT R -1H, can be updated over time (see 
Terzopoulos and Szeliski (1992)1, pp. 15 -16): 
= -SF -FTS-SQS+HTR-1H. (4.6) 
'Terzopoulos and Szeliski (1992) state that equation (4.6) is derived from the standard matrix 
Riccati equation from Gelb (1974), p. 122, using simple matrix algebra. 
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The resulting dynamical Kalman filter is far more flexible than the Kalman 
filter in the form of (4.3), because it has incorporated the capability of the dy- 
namical systems. Notice that the mechanism of dynamical systems, like the snake 
algorithm, is a highly adaptive module. 
3. Kalman Snake. Terzopoulos and Szeliski (1992) integrate a Snake with the 
Kalman filter by identifying the system model of the continuous Kalman filter in 
the equation (4.4) with a snake model of motion. Such a design takes advantage of 
the aforementioned dynamical Kalman filter, because their snake model of motion 
is put in the form of Lagrangian dynamics, an equation of dynamical systems (for 
details, see Terzopoulos and Szeliski (1992), pp. 5 -18). The resulting Kalman 
filter is then presenting the characters of both the dynamical Kalman filter and 
Snake. 
4.1.3 Dynamical Templates 
Taking Advantage of Templates. Templates are presumably helpful for 
tracking when the sensory inputs and the stored templates match closely. As 
an example - tracking a dish with edges and corners, the dynamical contour 
tracking along the flow of edges and corners; when more assumptions are added, 
the tracking performance neatly attaches only to the edges, one after another 
(Curwen and Blake 1992, p. 45). The problem is that the sensory inputs are 
usually distracted by certain factors, such as foreshortened length or different 
lighting conditions (Yuille and Hallinan 1992). The following discussion shows 
that the application of templates is not stringently limited, because between tem- 
plates there can be fine tuning. Even if there is noise, which leads to uncertainty, 
templates can be supported with a Kalman filter to filter out noise. As a con- 
sequence, the problem is to ensure the flexibility of the fine tuning between the 
parameters of the templates. 
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Lagrangian dynamics. As mentioned previously, a pre- requisite (though not 
stated in definition) of active perception system is to perform the required task in 
real -time, on the one hand, and to ensure the accuracy of perceptual judgement 
in the changing environment in support of the required task, on the other. These 
two poles of the same requisite seem to be heading toward different directions, 
and hence become a challenge to the modelling of active perception. 
An expedient resolution of the above two poles in the same model is to ap- 
ply dynamical templates to the imaging inputs in support of the tracking of the 
consequent contour. Being templates, they provide prior assumptions to catch 
expediently the unclear imaging inputs with certain accuracy. The contour would 
consequently be `frozen' in the form of a given template. Being dynamical, those 
templates respond to a number of parameters of the changing imaging inputs, 
by combining such parameters interdependently in terms of dynamical systems 
theory, as evident in Lagrangian formulation. Such parameters can be exploited 
by 'modal analysis' of geometrical contours, in consideration of the properties of 
contour in motion, such as various properties of rigid translation, elasticity and 
viscosity of geometrical contours in motion, (Curwen and Blake 1992, pp. 46 -52). 
The modal analysis gives rise to a variety of modes (i.e. parameters), as illus- 
trated in figure 4.1. Such modes demonstrate the possible configurations of simple 
splines, in association with different respective eigenvalues and eigenvectors. 
In the context of Lagrangian dynamics, the aforementioned parameters are 
viewed as independent 'second order' control systems, each of which determines 
how the template is relaxed (i.e. a fixed value is replaced by a variable) with 
respect to a certain parameter in view of higher accuracy of tracking (Curwen 
and Blake 1992, pp. 40, 45 -46). A tracking task may take advantage of the 
tuning across parameters, and consequently constrains the tracking performance 
effectively and efficiently. 
Note that such parameters are interdependent in the Lagrangian formulation, 
a model of dynamical systems. The stable states of the deformable contour can 
be derived from the equilibrium states of the Lagrangian dynamics, where those 
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parameters serve as controlling forces in response to the influences of the changing 
environment. In addition, grounded on the dynamics of those parameters (i.e. 
tight coupling of those parameters under the control of differential equations), the 
deformable contour may well serve to predict the contour of tracking, with regard 
to either the changing contour within a single template, or the gradient across 
templates (pp. 46, 48). The activity of tracking, thus, not only responds swiftly 
to catch the imaging inputs, but also settles flexibly on certain equilibrial states 
with relatively high accuracy. As a consequence, dynamical systems modelling 
takes a role in the design of dynamic tracking, in relation to the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the tracking contour and its trajectories within or across general 
templates. 
Also note that the recognition of a deformable contour is not supported by 
the reconstruction based on hierarchical processes, but by the self- organisation 
of systems dynamics. There are no built -in modules of information extraction. 
Systems dynamics facilitates the effective recognition of deformable contours in 
real -time. Although the systems dynamics does not in itself lead to iterative re- 
quests for further perceptual information for performing the required task (which 
we do find in gaze control), it can be seen as an important component in ac- 
tive perception because of its generic mechanism for feature generation and its 
effective response in real -time. 
Lagrangian Template cf. Snake. The adoption of templates (i.e. prior 
knowledge) facilitates tracking significantly. The snake algorithm has a lower 
rate of effectiveness and efficiency if not supported by prior knowledge. When 
the source of stimuli is switched off, Snake loses its shape, if no further support 
is available from a Kalman filter (Terzopoulos and Szeliski 1992, pp. 19 -20), 
which presumes certain amount of priori knowledge (Haykin 1995). In general, 
templates lead the tracking contour to certain fixed tracks when no sufficient 
information is gained. The contour is 'stiffened' by coupling its shape to a tem- 
plate spline (Curwen and Blake 1992, p. 50), while those without support from 
templates would have no available track to follow. Furthermore, the template 
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adopted in the Lagrangian dynamics constitutes a firm ground for fine tuning of 
various parameters pertaining to the template, which leads to effectiveness and 
efficiency of tracking. 
In this regard, Snake, even when supported by the Kalman filter, has no way 
of capturing rapidly evolving objects efficiently. According to what we mentioned 
previously, a Kalman filter presumes certain prior knowledge for filtering out 
noise, but this is not tantamount to a capability of searching for close contours. 
The prior knowledge embedded in the Kalman filter does not serve to suggest 
evolving shapes, except insofar as this results from the support of dynamical 
systems, which provide the tight coupling of shape parameters2. 
Dynamical contours on the basis of Lagrangian templates are similar to 
Snake, in the sense that both of them can be incorporated into Kalman fil- 
ter, where uncertainty can be reduced significantly. Yet, dynamical contours, 
despite their use on templates, work more flexibly than Snake. Flexibility, in 
fact can be achieved significantly by the fine tuning of parameters. This is be- 
cause the dynamical coupling of contours provides a firm basis for fine tuning 
across modes /shapes, be they (contours) performing within or across single tem- 
plates. The dynamical contours consequently gain control over motion effectively. 
Specifically, they provide flexible control with regard to the properties of rigid 
translation, elasticity and viscosity (Curwen and Blake 1992, pp. 40, 47). 
By contrast, Snake can only take account of forces, external or internal, that 
affect the adoption of shape components (e.g. edge, line, termination point) and 
the internal continuity between those components. Without the aid of templates, 
the tracking begins from scratch. No contours are made available to support 
tracking, let along the fine tuning between various modes /shapes (of contours) 
supported by dynamical template. In brief, Snake is less effective and efficient in 
tracking than dynamical contours. 
2It is unclear as to whether a Snake supported by an adaptive Kalman filter performs equal 
to the Lagrangian dynamical contour, which can be further supported with Kalman filter, too. 
To evaluate the performance of tracking mechanisms with various types of hybrid needs direct 
experimental evidence over the hybrid types. 
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4.2 Planning of Tracking Procedures. 
Planning is a core topic in traditional AI. However, it is not its exclusive privi- 
lege. As we will see in the following discussions, oculomotor activities require the 
planning of an agent's motion; and this planning is active. The reasons are that 
the planning task is carried out in real -time on the basis of continual organism - 
environment interactions, and that the agent moves to exploit the unmodelled 
environment in support of a planning task which is satisfactory on account of 
its motor performance. In the following discussions we will see two models of 
planning in support of active vision - Adept (a robot) and Dickmanns' car. 
4.2.1 Adept - Detecting Obstacles and Moving Forward Through 
Free -space 
Gaze control, as an autonomous system, not only subserves the tracking of single 
objects, as we have seen, but also serves to avoid obstacles and then guides 
an agent to move along through the free -space between objects /obstacles for 
facilitating robot's travelling. The latter capability is demonstrated by Adept, a 
mobile robot designed by Blake et al. (1992). It can detect un- modelled obstacles 
standing in the environment and pass over them with the effect3 of reaching a pre - 
specified goal, and return to the its starting point. Note that the task of reaching 
a goal by passing over obstacles beforehand is more challenging than the task 
of simply avoiding an obstacle. Although the goal is pre- specified, it lies behind 
certain obstacles in an unpredictable environment. A robot, as guided by its 
visual system, may successfully avoid a particular obstacle by a swift movement 
of withdrawal but consequently collide with another obstacle (see Section 4.2.1, 
page 126). When the mobile robot encounters certain obstacles, it must avoid 
them and simultaneously ensure a free -space to traverse. Such considerations 
circumscribe the task of motion planning for Adept. 
3As is seen from its capabilities, Adept may look as if that it intends to reach the pre -specified 
goal. To highlight the functionality of its autonomous mechanism, the term `with the effect of' 
appears to be more neutral, for it implies non -intentional activities. 
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Adept is a visual system with a camera mounted on a movable arm. It 
identifies a free -space by (1) detecting from a certain vantage point the surface 
shape of an encountered obstacle (i.e. a rigid object), (2) determining the sideness 
of that shape - which side is free -space and so navigable, and then (3) managing to 
determine from various vantage points the range of this free -space - the free -space 
confined by the extremal boundary of another obstacle. With such a free -space 
identified, it is then straightforward for a robot to pass over the unmodelled 
obstacles, to `conquer' other obstacles, and eventually to reach the pre- specified 
goal. 
Detecting the Surface Shape of an Encountered Rigid Body from a 
certain vantage point. The free -space circumscribed by rigid bodies may be 
close to that needed, hence their surface shapes are critical for the success of 
passing through. The shape may not always be as simple as a plane, but may 
very likely be curvy to various degrees4. The surface shape of a rigid body, as 
viewed from a moving camera along a certain horizontal plane, can be determined 
in two main steps (see the detailed technical discussions in Blake et al. (1992), 
pp. 176 -181). 
First, Adept computes certain useful values for the four critical variables - 
(i) the unit vector T viewed from a certain vantage point that is directed to a 
given point r on the surface, (ii) the curve normal N of the surface viewed from 
the above vantage point, (iii) the normal curvature ,cn, and the geodesic torsion 
T9. In the second step Adept computes the geodesic path of the surface, with its 
one end connecting to the camera (i.e. the surface sensor), on the one hand, and 
the other end connecting to the goal, on the other. Given the above four values, 
as indicated by Blake et al. (1992), a unique geodesic path would be determined. 
The importance of this geodesic path is that it determines a curve section of a 
4As an extreme condition, the surface of a cylinder may be taken as a particular case of a 
curvy surface - with the curvature of zero degree. Similarly, a plane surface is a surface with 
the geodesic torsion (see later discussions) of zero degree. In addition, the curve normal N of 
the given point r is the degree of curvature of the envisaged surface at the point r, expressed 
as a vector perpendicular to the surface. The normal curvature n refers to the curvature of 
the curve- section on the plane determined by T and N. The geodesic torsion r9 is the degree of 
torsion of the would -be geodesic section that connects to both the camera and the goal. 
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parallel surface along which the agent can move in order to avoid the rigid body 
(i.e. the obstacle). 
It is worth noting that the design of Adept uses differential geometry in the 
computation of the above four values. No tightly coupled differential equations 
are adopted. Like the finite state machine in Brooks (1986, 1991a), such as the 
simple automaton wander of the robot Allen, the determination of a geodesic 
path constitutes a baseline of Adept's architectures. 
Determining the Sideness of Surface Shape by Scanning Horizontally. 
The visual system of Adept determines the sideness of an obstacle on the basis 
of two subgoals. First, lock the gaze on the obstacle, which must be a close body 
with certain mutually convergent contours. This is done by a dynamic contour 
tracker, as mentioned previously in the discussion of tracking (see Section 4.1.3, 
page 122). Because the subgoal of this stage is to direct the gaze toward an 
object, not to depict its accurate contour, a tracker running at coarse scale would 
suffice. For the second subgoal, Adept exploits the locked arca by scanning it 
horizontally at a fine scale with the dynamic contour tracker, in an attempt to 
work out the estimated normal curvature nn. Blake et al. (1992) must presume 
that an obstacle has a `non- concave' shapes. With this presumption, the value 
of normal curvature nn can serve to identify the non - concave part of the fixated 
target, which is presumed to be the obstacle. In this horizontal plane, the internal 
side6 of the non -concave area, either at the right -hand side or at the left -hand 
side of the horizontal plane, can be identified as the position where the obstacle 
rests. Note that no properties of rigidity are taken into account. This is not a 
proprioceptive system, but a visual system.? 
5As admitted in the exposition of their Figure 11.4, Blake et al. (1992) put the consideration 
of geodesic path in the context of non -concave obstacle (p. 179). 
6The horizontal scan should be maintained broadly, for an obstacle may have a locally concave 
area surrounded by convex areas, as showed in Figure 4.4. Such a consideration, however, is 
not reported in Blake et al. (1992), but it must not be left out, for a successful identification of 
single obstacles. 
7The mixture of proprioceptive and visual information may be the way in which biological 
organisms undertake to identify obstacles. This is because additional perceptual modalities are 
likely to facilitate the identification of object properties. 
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Figure 4.4: An Obstacle Encountered by Adept. An obstacle may have a 
locally concave area surrounded by two convex areas. 
Crudely speaking, Adept is an active visual system, for the property of side - 
ness is neither pre- determined nor selective from various readily available pos- 
sibilities. Rather, such a property is determined gradually by the exploitation 
of motor activities (i.e. scanning horizontally), which make available the needed 
information (the sideness, at this stage) for the required task - passing through 
obstacles and getting the target object back. 
Determining a Free- space. Now, Adept stands in a position to identify the 
free -space between obstacles, so that it can pass through the free -space to reach 
the pre- determined goal. The question is how to determine which obstacle is the 
nearest one ready to pass through. Furthermore, although the sideness of one 
obstacle has already been identified, the free -space is yet to be determined. The 
present task is to pass through free -space across unmodelled obstacles and reach 
the distant object. For the robot to reach the distant goal, such a task involves 
several cycles of the following three component activities: determining sideness of 
single obstacles8; (from a particular viewpoint) ensuring a free -space and passing 
8Blake et al. (1992) regard the previous motor activities, which lead to the determination 
of sideness of single obstacles, as explanatory motion, without explaining why it is explanatory. 
At least, they need to state what those activities explain, and how they explain. Note that 
Churchland (et al. 1994) also take saccadic movements as being predictive and explanatory. 
Possibly, this is a general character of active vision, as characterised previously (BC1) (see 
Section 3.2.4, page 86). Such motor activities must be highly selective and useful for the required 
task. This needs to explain, as to what is needed and how they support the required task. Thus, 
it is not difficult to make sense of the explanatory motion, which can be accordingly taken as a 
general character of active vision. 
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through it; and moving to a new viewpoint for the next observation. 
Given that the first of the three components has been described previously, 
now Adept needs to work out a free -space beside the side (i.e. an extremal 
boundary of an obstacle) already detected. The robot moves to detect the other 
side of the free -space, which is an extremal boundary of another obstacle. To 
ensure that the area between these two sides is really a free- space, the mobile 
robot is required to ensure that there is no further obstacle standing in between 
those two sides. 
Notice that the robot need not strive to detect the extremal boundary of a 
side until it ensures that there is no nearer would -be obstacle. That is, Adept 
needs to identify the nearest obstacle before its extremal boundary is specifically 
depicted. This can be done by the robot motion approaching the detected tar- 
get. That target can be recognised as the nearest obstacle, if the robot motion 
approaching closely to it does not trigger an occlusion event (figure 4.5). An oc- 
cluding feature, as Blake et al. (1992) point out (pp. 183 -184), can be detected by 
the Kalman filter discussed in Rao (1992) and Bar -Shalom & Fortmann (1988). 
Whenever an occlusion event turns up, there must be a nearer obstacle, and 
Adept needs to swift its gaze on it to ensure that there is no further nearer ob- 
stacle standing in between. When the nearest obstacle is eventually determined, 
Adept can move to exploit its extremal boundary, by determining the sideness 
discussed previously. As a consequence, a free -space between two obstacles is de- 
termined. With this information, Adept quickly passes through. Later, it works 
out another free -space in its way to the goal, and passes through. By repetitive 
processes of passing through a free- space, the mobile robot will eventually reach 
the goal. 
Of course, the environment of Adept may be changing, where obstacles may 
move. The computation of free -space therefore must be responding quickly in 
real -time. Adept is promising in this regard, because exploitation of its motor 
activities is limited to useful information step by step, for the required task. This 
is a basic requirement of the active vision approach. The mobile robot accordingly 
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Figure 4.5: An Occlusion Event. When a robot (Adept) holds its `gaze' on the 
target and moves around, an interposed object /obstacle would incur an occlusion. 
This is termed an occlusion event. If the robot approaches closely to an object 
without triggering an occlusion event, it thereby can recognise that between it 
and this object there are no obstacles. 
looks adaptive to the changing environment. 
If, unfortunately, Adept moves to a certain narrow free -space which is too 
narrow for it to pass through, or simply moves to a dead end, then it is trapped 
there. It must backtrack to a previous position. 
The mobile robot needs to move back. Even if it has never been thus trapped, 
Adept's task requires it to move back to its starting point eventually. This is 
important for navigation, in order to identify the home of navigation. As Blake 
et al. (1992) indicate (p. 183), this can be done by learning its location, from the 
beginning of exploiting the free -space, using the `Epipolar Plane Image' (EPI) 
explored in Bolles et al. (1987). 
Summary. To summarise, Adept can pass through obstacles, execute a plan- 
ning task to reach a goal in real -time, and move back, by its motor motion toward 
a single obstacle to exploit its extremal boundary, and by working out the free - 
space between the two nearest obstacles. Note that the planning task is gradually 
accomplished during the mobile robot moves to exploit the spatial properties of an 
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extremal boundary and a free -space, and during the system learns the locations 
of itself and the obstacles. 
4.2.2 Dickmanns' Car - Navigation with Dynamical Scene Un- 
derstanding 
Scene understanding is important for navigation, because a vehicle needs to iden- 
tify traffic lanes, edges to the road, surface conditions, other vehicles, and obsta- 
cles. Identification of such objects is different from, but presumes, the process 
of active already discussed. Previously we dealt with sensory processes. They 
conform to the notion of active vision raised by Ballard (1991), where the active 
process serves to make available the visual information needed for the visual tasks. 
By contrast, visual understanding is a high -level process, relating to perceptual 
recognition. Despite such a difference in levels, the visual processes remain active, 
in the sense that processes at different levels interact, and these visual processes 
still subserve motor activities, e.g. navigation. Active vision in this sense con- 
forms to the notion of interactive vision advocated by Churchland et al. (1994). 
Dickmanns (1992) presents a combinatory approach to navigation - the 4 -D 
approach to dynamic machine vision, which is supported by multiple processes of 
active vision. The task is the navigation of an autonomous car. His car plays a 
variety of traffic skills, including lane keeping on road, speed adjustment to road 
curvature, driving at night, detecting obstacles, stopping in front of an obsta- 
cle, convoying (driving behind another vehicle), stop- and -go behind a preceding 
vehicle, and the lane changes triggered by a human operator in order to avoid 
other vehicles in the neighbouring lanes. As we will see, Dickmanns' car involves 
active vision in both the senses of Ballard's and Churchland et al.'s. 
Dickmanns' Strategy of Information Processing - a priori Knowledge 
as Constraint. How is his autonomous car capable of playing those traffic 
skills? The basic idea of Dickmanns' is a combination of parallel models, par- 
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allel processes, and the interaction of signal inputs and internal models. The 
models comprise feature extraction, road recognition, obstacle recognition, con- 
trolling geometric position, identifying lateral vehicle states, and the control of 
ego- motion. Despite the complicated combination, what makes his vehicle active 
is only the third component - the interaction of signal inputs and internal mod- 
els. Dickmanns sees signal inputs as being dealt with by `signal driven' processes 
and internal models as being maintained by `model driven' processes (Dickmanns 
1992, p. 314). 
As mentioned in Sections 2.7 and 3.2 (page 73 and 81), active processes 
are not necessarily incompatible with reconstructionist processes. One possibility 
of their compatibility is to circumscribe active vision to early processes; thereby, 
the early vision makes available needed information for the higher level process- 
ing, which is maintained by passive vision. Dickmanns' approach is different: 
the signal driven processes provide certain candidates for visual recognition and 
the model driven processes constrain them recursively, until a best solution is 
achieved. Without adopting those model driven processes, the visual processes 
would become purely reconstructionist, and it would then be difficult to maintain 
the recognition tasks in real -time. 
What those model driven processes provide is the a priori knowledge en- 
coded in the models, namely the spatial invariance of rigid objects with regard 
to their 3 -D shapes, and `the temporal continuity conditions in finite motion pro- 
cesses for specific task domains' (p. 309, italics added). As Dickmanns views it - 
the spatial invariance as `laws of perspective projection' and the temporal conti- 
nuity as the `Gestalt' property of moving objects - the a priori knowledge is not 
seen as passive knowledge to be explored, but as active constraints which serve 
to reduce the workload of computation, as laws and gestalt properties usually do 
for the economy of cognitive processing. As Dickmanns admits, these two compo- 
nents of a priori knowledge ground his 4 -D approach to the scene understanding 
in navigation (p. 309). 
The contribution of such a priori knowledge to machine vision can be con- 
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ceived (as Dickmanns indicates) in the context of Extended Kalman Filters (EKF) 
(Ivlaybeck 1979), an extended version of Kalman filter for non -linear systems. 
Such a priori knowledge qualifies Dickmanns' 4-D approach as a further exten- 
sion of the EKF. As he explains, the Kalman filter algorithm in general deals with 
measurement under noise recursively, in order to obtain the best estimates of dy- 
namic behaviours in the visual scene, and thereby introduces useful knowledge 
about those dynamic behaviours. By contrast, his 4 -D approach, by adopting 
3 -D shape properties and the motion constraints provided by dynamical° models, 
not only does this but also utilises the EKF with the continual conditions of the 
spatio- temporally represented objects in 3 -D space and time. 
Modifying Hypotheses with the Constraints Maintained by Dynamical 
Systems. The role of the a priori knowledge, as we mentioned previously, is 
to provide constraints over the candidate hypotheses of object states that are 
derived from signal inputs. What is worth noting is the tight coupling of pa- 
rameters in a dynamical model, say a model of obstacles (of which the shapes 
may be detected as being changing when a car is moving), during the vehicle 
training in the road environment. The training process leads to the instantiated 
values feeding forward to those parameters (of the candidate object hypotheses). 
Like the generation of deformable contours on the basis of dynamical models 
(see Section 4.1.3, page 122), the dynamical constraints of parameters in object 
hypotheses are effective in real -time control. In addition, the tight coupling of pa- 
rameters may be supported by different dynamical models, which are tantamount 
to different trajectories of moving objects (obstacles, specifically), until salient 
outcomes of object hypothesis are derived. As Dickmanns indicates, modification 
is firstly maintained over the parameters in object hypotheses. If the prediction 
errors of object hypotheses remain large, then those hypotheses will be adjusted 
by relating to different dynamical models, which manifest different trajectories 
Note the two similar terms in this paragraph - `dynamic' and `dynamical'. Note that the 
present thesis treats them differently: the former refers to any dynamics, while the latter is 
reserved for dynamical systems, as characterised by dynamic systems theory, be they stochastic 
or not. Regarding the first term - `dynamic' - the Kalman filter is a linear process, which conse- 
quently does not presuppose dynamic systems theory. Regarding the second term - 'dynamical' 
- Dickmanns specifically adopts the dynamic systems theory in his 4 -D approach to navigation. 
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Figure 4.6: Dickmanns' Car, Controlled by Parallel Dynamical Models. 
The architectures of Dickmanns' car consist of various tracking sub -systems. Each 
sub -system is a dynamical system, with its parameters and the generic model of 
the sub- system being modifiable. The processes of these tracking sub -systems are 
arranged by generic control procedures. 
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of moving obstacles. Accordingly, this implementation is indeed an autonomous 
design sensitive period by a variety of dynamical systems. 
The performance of Dickmanns' car is facilitated by the parallel dynamical 
models, which are separately operating under real -time constraints. The per- 
formance would not have been successful, yet, if it is not the feedback or feed 
forward controls which transform the respective measures of the aforementioned 
dynamical models into generic control procedures, such as lane keeping (by feed - 
back control) or lane change (by feed forward control). All generic controls are 
outputted to both the real vehicle systems and the aforementioned dynamical 
models. The outputs to the dynamical models, understandably, serve to provide 
updated information of car motion to update those models. 
To summarise, the successful performance of Dickmanns' car is maintained 
by (1) the recursive estimation made respectively by parallel dynamical mod- 
els, and (2) generic (real car) control procedures which are outputted to those 
dynamical models. 
'Without any action being predetermined, Dickmanns' car eventually becomes 
capable of navigating safely in real road environment with real -time response, 
with the aforementioned traffic skills being demonstrated. This is, apparently an 
instance of emergence. 
Two Senses of Active Processes. Note that the emergence is brought about 
by the dynamical models tightly coupled with spatial (3 -D) invariance of rigid 
objects and the temporal continuity of moving objects. Those dynamical models 
lead to active processes in two senses, as follows. 
On the one hand, the ego- motion of the car makes available the moving con- 
ditions in the scene, which initiate the aforementioned various dynamical models 
with the effect of facilitating (by providing additional constraints) the signal - 
driven object hypotheses, in support of scene understanding. The active vision 
in this sense conforms to Ballard (1991), who focuses on the sensorimotor activ- 
ities 
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which make available the needed information for the required task. 
On the other, there is interaction across levels of processing, in that the signal 
driven processes provide certain candidates for visual recognition and the model 
driven processes constrain them recursively until a best resolution is gained. Such 
visual processes eventually support the motor activities of navigation. The active 
vision in this sense conforms to Churchland et al. (1994), who highlight the 
interaction across levels and behaviour -based vision. 
The emergence supported by active vision in these two senses is intriguing, 
because this strategy of emergence supports a new paradigm of emergence, as we 
will discuss in Part III (chapters five to seven). 
4.2.3 The Role of Prior Knowledge in Tracking Deformable Con- 
tours and Navigation 
For an organism, a real -time response to various environmental challenges, which 
normally needs to be quick, can be facilitated by making available pertinent 
prior knowledge of its environment. Indeed, such knowledge can be seen as a 
characteristic of the organism's ecological niche. The environment will remain 
roughly the same throughout generations. Freshwater fish, for example, need not 
be equipped with the salt filter system which is instead required for marine fish.10 
A prey will be permanently alert with regard to a particular type of predators, by 
taking special notice on certain perceptual cues in the environment which signal 
the predators' approaching. 
The pertinent prior knowledge of a particular species can be seen by its sur- 
face value as an instinct. The question is where such pertinent prior knowledge 
resides in the organisms. It seems to be a matter of interpretation and evalu- 
ation, rather than a particular property of sensors (Habert and Purski 1997). 
In consideration of navigation, such pertinent prior knowledge may be seen as 
being virtually a map. Provided that such a map is readily available, a quick 
10Freshwater fish are not equipped with the salt filter system. By contrast, such a system is 
indeed required for marine fish (Ruppert and Barnes 1994). 
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and accurate response can be derived on the basis of incremental observations 
and modifications, as Habert and Purski (1997) demonstrate. They show that 
the in -built pertinent prior knowledge in an autonomous navigation system can 
be modified by reducing the encountered uncertainties or by altering planned 
activities in real -time. 
In their design, a point is worth noting in relation to active vision. Apart 
from the pertinent prior knowledge, no hierarchical internal processes are re- 
quired. That is to say, daily activities on the basis of the pertinent prior knowl- 
edge suffice to refine such knowledge, with the effect of increasing adaptiveness 
to the environment. Note that the prior knowledge of a species does not im- 
pede, but increases, its adaptability to the changing environment. Modularity 
and adaptability turn out not to be subject to a trade -off relation. Hence, the 
pertinent prior knowledge can be seen as a good facility in support of active vi- 
sion in the task of navigation. The needed information for the task of navigation 
can be gradually incorporated into the navigating robot, in the form of gradually 
modified pertinent prior knowledge. 
As demonstrated in Curwen and Blake (1992) and Habert and Purski (1997), 
the adoption of prior knowledge can facilitate the implementation of active vision, 
for it does not impede but indeed increases the adaptability of robotic system in 
accomplishing their required tasks. 
4.3 Summary 
Tracking Two implementations of active tracking systems are discussed - Snake 
(algorithm) and the dynamical Kalman filter - the latter of which is exemplified 
by Dickmanns' car, a system consisting of several sub -systems for tracking differ- 
ent features. All sub -systems are dynamical Kalman filters (hence active) with 
between -(sub- )systems cooperation. Discussion of such systems points to inten- 
sive explorative processes. The tracking systems are active, for they move toward 
the targets to gather information, rapidly predict the trajectories and maintain 
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the predictions iteratively. Different from gaze control, Snake and the dynamical 
Kalman filter presents clearer mechanisms of explorative control, as manifested 
in the energy control of Snake, the templates adopted in Dickmanns' car, and the 
flexibility maintained by dynamical systems. 
The cooperation between the sub- systems of Dickmanns' car is grounded by 
the flexibility of single sub -systems. Notwithstanding, the global behaviour of 
Dickmanns' car goes beyond its component sub -systems. This is because the 
current circumstances of the generic control procedures are recursively fed back 
to each sub- system (a dynamical Kalman filter) with the capabilities of changing 
the predictions previously made in the sub -systems, by changing certain control 
parameters or even completely shifting to a new dynamical Kalman filter, which 
are all radical changes. The manifested cooperation, despite the possibility of 
radical change, is successfully maintained in real -time. The current state of each 
sub -system is dynamical, which is certainly not pre -categorised. As a conse- 
quence, the maintenance of cooperation can be seen as run -time planning, which 
is also not pre -categorised. 
Run -time Planning The run -time planning in searching for a pre -specified 
goal /target is an important property of active perception, which is implemented 
in Adept, as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Adept is a navigating system with its tar- 
get surrounded by random obstacles. The performance of Adept can be seen as 
visual planning because the path of navigation is entirely guided by visual mech- 
anisms, which work out a route toward the target across obstacles, by stepwise 
computation of the relevant features of obstacles in relation to the target, and 
identification of the free -space sufficient for navigation. The analysis of Adept's 
architecture highlights the stepwise determination of the most relevant critical 
variables for figuring out a navigable path. The determination of those control 
variables manifests a serial order, in which each step of navigation leads to the 
nearest route toward the envisaged target. Because of the computation for work- 






The Exploitative Control of 
Active Perception Systems 
The topic of this chapter is the nature of internal control in active perception 
systems. Many questions need to be resolved. The discussion will divide roughly 
in two, one part concerning systems, the other concerning modules. 
The first three sections of the chapter discuss the nature of systems, and 
the following questions are asked. First, what are the tasks of active perception, 
in contrast to the tasks of other behaviour -based systems (discussed in Section 
5.1)? Second, how are such tasks identified by active perception systems, which 
are behaviour -based systems without intentions (Section 5.2)? Third, how should 
the processes be arranged, i.e. what principles should govern the architecture of 
intra- system processes and the connections between sub -systems (Section 5.3)? 
Later sections address the nature of modules. Analysis shows that the mod- 
ules of active perception systems differ from other behaviour -based systems. Ac- 
tive perception systems consist of quasi - functional modules and quasi -action mod- 
ules (abbreviated as `quasi -form modules'). Centred around this understanding, 
consideration points to the relationship between activeness and the internal con- 
trol of active perception. To elucidate this relationship we address two inquiries: 
first, how such quasi -form modules contribute to active perception (beyond au- 
tonomous agents in general); second, why the internal control of active perception 
needs to take shape in the form of quasi -form modules. 
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5.1 Tasks: Introductory Remarks 
The epistemological issues in active perception research can be encapsulated by 
the following question: how can an autonomous agent respond to a required task 
by identifying certain goals which reflect the information required /needed for 
that task, and be capable of collecting such information successfully on the basis 
of autonomous machinery, as opposed to a vital force, or homunculus? That is, 
within this question, the environment sub- questions are: why is an autonomous 
agent capable of seeking the remaining information needed for a required task, 
how can it manage to schedule subgoals of perceptual exploration in support of 
that task, and how can it eventually accomplish the task? 
A straightforward but unsatisfactory answer is that everything about task 
and goal be hand -set by the programmer, i.e. the designer. This is true for 
most research in behaviour- oriented agents, where a mobile robot or a simulation 
must be built up by designers. The task is identified in the designers' minds and 
the goals are assigned by them, be the goals cast implicitly or explicitly in the 
design. The programming of active perception presumes a designer, by necessity; 
however, active perception as a capacity of real organisms cannot. 
Central Themes and Notions. Of central importance in active perception 
systems is that they be capable of identifying a required task, the derivation 
of goals (i.e. needed perceptual data), the achievement of those goals, and the 
subsequent derivation of further goals or subgoals, in support of the identified 
task. Ideally, this is accomplished in real -time by autonomous programming. 
It would be helpful for future behaviour -based research, if we could establish 
an epistemological point of view to see how such features can be accomplished. 
Discussions in the following two chapters respond to this request, specifically 
by introducing the notions of operation -specialist systems, quasi -form modules, 
dynamic small modules, internal cohesion, and inverse ecological niche. 
Consideration of the above questions must begin with the following two ex- 
plananda. 
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 Task Identification. Explaining the identification of tasks, specifically 
the initiation of appropriate processes leading to the envisaged tasks, on 
the basis of the limited Architectures of autonomous systems; 
Process Arrangement. Explaining the arrangement of internal processes 
in serial orders, specifically the continuation of processes with the serial 
orders leading to the envisaged tasks, (also) on the basis of the limited 
architectures of the implemented autonomous system. 
These two explananda are discussed below. 
First Explanandum: Whence Comes the Identification of Tasks and 
Goals? It is claimed in active perception research that perceiving (living) agents 
are active, and that the the active perception research successfully implements 
active perception systems. The former claim seems to be well grounded, given 
the evidence in cognitive neuroscience, such as the attentive control of saccades. 
The latter claim appears to be supported by the robotic implementations of 
active perception in real environments, and we have seen in the previous two 
chapters that many robotic implementations really gain active capabilities in 
various forms. However, there seems to be, as yet, no explanation as to how 
the tasks or goals can be identified on the basis of autonomous machinery, be 
those agents real organisms or behaviour -oriented robots. As yet, it remains too 
early to claim that autonomous machinery can serve to identify tasks and goals 
in the environment. It seems to be the programmer, not the mobile robot (here, 
the implemented behaviour -oriented agent), that knows where there is a need to 
satisfy. 
Second explanandum: Whence Comes Arrangement of Processes for 
Collecting the Required Information. The second explanandum concerns 
the question of how active perception systems can schedule their stepwise activi- 
ties to fetch the needed information for the required tasks. Scheduling activities 
seem to have a flavour of planning, which needs explanation on the basis of robotic 
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architectures. 
Although it is not the case that everything needed for a task is pre- programmed 
like a function in traditional AI, it is partially determined. On the one hand, 
the needed information is collected in the course of organism- environment in- 
teractions which are carried out by the behaviour -oriented agents depending on 
the contingent environmental circumstances and the somewhat contingent robot 
activities (see Hendriks- Jansen 1996). Exactly what information is needed to 
achieve the pre -programmed goals is contingent, on environmental circumstances. 
The behaviour- oriented agents will `endeavour' to achieve their goals in the some- 
what unpredictable environment. On the other, the algorithms are determined 
in the sense of `innateness' criticised by Quartz (1993). 
Quartz (1993) states that certain results of (neural) network programming 
are borne in the minds of programmers and realised by special- purpose algo- 
rithms. He consequently challenges the programmers of neural networks, that 
a constructive neural network should be capable of responding to the environ- 
ment by the modification of previously built up networks. In other words, the 
constructive neural networks must be adaptive to the environment to a certain 
extent. In the implementations of active perception, the mobile robot (given a 
task pre -programmed by the designer) can hardly identify a need (for a required 
task) by the modification of certain predetermined robotic processes, i.e. by run- 
time `reprogramming'. In fact, as reported by Maes (1995), this is generally a 
difficulty for the current implementation of behaviour -oriented agents (p. 151), 
which we previously termed the scaling -up difficulty (Section 2.4.4, page 50). 
Insofar as we have surveyed, two exceptions in the implementation of active 
perception have been seen to be the attentive control of saccades and the dynamic 
Kalman filter. The attentive control of saccades determines the next important 
point to foveat by means of a comprehensive pre- attentive record of salient visual 
features, a record comprising an exhaustive survey and comparison. By contrast, 
the dynamic Kalman filter can cope with evolving target objects by Lagrangian 
dynamics, an instance of dynamical systems. Such success is by no means a 
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rule, but an exception. Note that the exception is not really attribable to the 
behaviour -based approach; the credit must be in part attributed to the dynamical 
systems approach. The behaviour -based approach per se still suffers from the 
scaling -up problem identified in Maes (1995). 
An important aspect of activeness is the shift of control between the various 
sub -systems, which are separately implemented in different behaviour -oriented 
research. If the shift of control is again manipulated by hand -set design, rather 
than programmed autonomously, then the implementation of activeness in this 
regard is also unsatisfactory. Fortunately, we have one convincing implementa- 
tion of this aspect of activeness in Dickmanns' car, where the implementation 
of needed processes is controlled by dynamical systems (see 135). Whether the 
adoption of dynamical systems can lead to pervasive facilities to control vari- 
ous needs, however, remains an open question. It (the adoption of dynamical 
systems) may well be highly useful, but it remains unclear what kinds of dy- 
namical process should be introduced to support a particular circumstance of 
behaviour- oriented agent implementation, such as the circumstance of lacking vi- 
sual information mentioned in our previous discussion of the scaling -up problem 
(Section 2.4.4, page 52). 
5.2 The Identification of Tasks. 
Existing discussions of active perception adopt certain confusing concepts, each 
of which must be critically reconsidered before we set off to seek epistemological 
explanations of activeness. 
5.2.1 Analysis of Task Identification 
Intentional Description. Two central notions of the active perception per- 
spective - required task and needed information - are intentional concepts. In- 
tention can serve to motivate an agent to accomplish a task, but autonomous 
agents do not have built -in intentions. They can be configurated to fetch certain 
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types of information or execute certain specific activities (e.g. reflexes), but they 
are not really driven by intentions. The adoption of those intentional concepts 
seems to be incompatible with the behaviour -oriented approach, to which the ac- 
tive perception perspectives belong. It is an intriguing epistemological question 
how a behaviour -based (autonomous) system can realise the existence of certain 
intentions and proceed to satisfy them. 
Tasks, Global Goals and Subgoals. The concepts of tasks, global goals, 
and subgoals are relative, depending on the respective questions they relate to 
in the systems of active perception. A task concerns what perceptual guidance a 
particular perceptual system must provide in support of certain bodily actions. 
Relating to a task, global goals concern the question what perceptual guidance the 
systems of active perception provide in support of a (perceptual) task. By con- 
trast, subgoals concern the question how that guidance is generated on grounds 
of the basic components of such systems. 
For example, for a hunter in the jungle a task is to keep track of a moving 
target, say a moving object hidden behind trees. To keep tracking this target 
the perceptual systems of the hunter must identify the relevant global goals, such 
as holding gaze on the moving target, relating the gathered visual inputs to the 
most likely body shapes, and foreseeing the trajectory of the target movement. 
Within such general goals, the goal of gaze control can be seen as a task of 
certain sub- systems, such as vergence, pursuit, and saccade control, of which the 
mechanism of attentive control can be regarded as a further sub -system. 
For a certain global goal, e.g. the attentive control of saccades, there are 
certain subgoals, such as calculating the relative importance of almost all the 
features in the present visual scene, and deriving the most important one from 
among them. As another example, the identification of objects is maintained by 
a particular tracking mechanism, such as Snake, with the subgoals of identifying 
component perceptual features (lines, curve, etc.), linking them smoothly with 
internal continuity, and modifying the smooth contour on the basis of external 
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forces. Note that the subgoals are already implemented in particular mechanisms 
(e.g. attentive control of saccade) or systems (e.g. the tracking maintained by 
Snake) of active perception. 
Task as Guidance. The task of active perception is perceptual guidance that 
subserves bodily actions. That is, a designer's envisaged tasks (i.e. the required 
tasks) are fulfilled when a system of active perception effectively supports the 
related bodily actions as envisaged by its designer. 
For real organisms, tasks of active perception are also cast in the form of 
guidance in support of bodily actions. However, they are not envisaged by any 
intentional being. They can be understood in the context of survival, for which 
a task of a system /organisation is advantageous performance in response to a 
certain challenge. The performance of active perceptual systems is not bodily 
action but perceptual guidance in support of bodily actions. 
Notice that in the definition of active perception (see Section 1.2.1, page 4) 
there are no constraints imposed on the nature of its tasks. An active percep- 
tion system provides perceptual guidance as a direct consequence of its domain 
perception, as opposed to motor actions, attention, memory, and language. 
According to the definition, the guidance provided by active perception could 
support something other than bodily actions. However, current research in ac- 
tive perception, including the research in neuroscience, such as Churchland et al. 
(1994), has found that the fundamental role of active perception is to provide 
perceptual guidance in support of bodily actions. It is very likely that this is a 
general consequence of evolution. That is, active perception found on Earth is 
so, while the systems of active perception elsewhere (in other possible worlds) 
may well have as their tasks the supporting of other activities in other domains 
- attention, memory, language, or even perception itself. However, in the further 
discussions we respect empirical findings. Hence, the task of active perception 
remains seen as the production of guidance in support of bodily actions. 
One may disagree about the interpretation of an empirical fact and argue 
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that the guidance provided by active perception is actually not limited to the 
support of bodily actions. The guidance can support language or thoughts, too. 
For example, the tasks of perceptual systems may be perceptual experiences in 
support of language understanding or thinking (e.g. thoughts derived from read- 
ing a history book). However, these represent tasks of perception, not specifically 
the tasks of active perception. This challenge is consequently met. It remains 
true. on this earth, that active perception, as a particular case of perception, 
lias a narrower range of tasks - providing guidance for bodily actions. Systems 
of active perception have been found as those that provide guidance to support 
bodily actions. 
According to the definition of active perception, it is the processes of a per- 
ceptual system, not its produced information (i.e. guidance), that makes the 
perceptual system active. The products of a perceptual system (i.e. perceptual 
guidance) may subserve an active system, while the perceptual system per se 
remains non -active. In the above argument about perceptual experiences and 
language, it may be further contended that the tasks of perception may be the 
production of guidance to support active language interactions and hence active 
perception can support language - something beyond bodily actions. The reply 
is straightforward, that the language interaction may well be seen as active but 
the perception does not consequently qualify as active. One system being active, 
i.e. driven by active (language) processes, does not make the other system also 
driven by active (perceptual) processes. 
Identification by Run -time Self -programming. If an autonomous agent 
qualifies as completely active. it must be capable of identifying the task from 
among lots of possible tasks within the niche. Indeed, this must be the case 
for real organisms, however low level they are, to be able to carry out specific 
tasks in the real environment. When they come across certain aspects of the 
niche, they effectively identify the task to perform, and hence they survive. The 
identification of the task in question is determined by the specific aspects of 
the niche they encounter together with their autonomous internal control, not 
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by the deliberation of an external designer /programmer. The implementation of 
active perception, as a branch of robotics, may well begin with a programmer's 
deliberation, but if so it does not explain the biological reality. For behaviour - 
oriented agents to be really active, the programming itself must be autonomous 
to a high degree, no matter whether the capability of self -programming results 
from evolution (as Brooks claims), development, or learning. 
It is as yet unclear as to how the aforementioned identification of tasks 
is accomplished. We can term this problem the problem of completely active 
identification of tasks. In the present thesis we consider this problem and work 
out sufficient conceptual foundations for its resolution. 
We can see this problem as an instance of the scaling -up problem. The 
organisms (even low level ones) living in their respective ecological niches may 
encounter a variety of environmental circumstances, which must be identified 
and certain appropriate motor actuators subsequently be selected to take effect 
in those circumstances. The scaling -up problem will arise because the ecological 
niche of organisms is complex compared to the deliberation needed for imple- 
menting a single capability in single behaviour -oriented agents. 
Desiderata of Needed Information. The derivation of the needed informa- 
tion (which can be seen as the process of pursuing an implicit subgoal) for a 
required task is important for the implementation of active perception, because 
in real environments the implemented agents can only collect the needed informa- 
tion sparingly. That is, they arrange their activities to gather information only 
for the need of the required task. How can the behaviour -oriented agents know 
to maintain the economy of the tasks they encounter? The maintenance of that 
economy during information collection appears to be intentional, because these 
agents effectively and efficiently manage to prevent anything irrelevant to the 
required tasks. However, as yet it still seems difficult to explain this seemingly 
intentional behaviour of active systems in the context of autonomous systems. We 
can term this difficulty the problem of completely active arrangement of needed 
information. 
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The architectures of autonomous systems, of course, cannot presume the 
functionality of an internal vital person who has sufficient wisdom to manage 
the needed information. Yet, such wisdom is still needed. If the repertoire of 
responding activities is pre -fixed explicitly', that wisdom can be explained in 
terms of links between actions, thresholds of action modules, energy spreading 
and parametric control, as Maes (1990b) suggests. The problem of completely 
active arrangement of needed information will consequently be resolved. However, 
this problem seems to be more difficult for systems of active perception, because 
most of them may shape their responding activities in terms of implicit goals (see 
discussions in Section 2.4.4, page 55). As we will discuss later (see Section 5.4), 
this is actually the case for most implementations of active perception. For these 
systems, the aforementioned problem of completely active arrangement, would 
be difficult to resolve. 
In the present thesis we consider this problem and introduce sufficient con- 
ceptual foundations for its resolution. 
Again, the economy in gathering the needed information, regarding the im- 
plementations of active systems, is usually implemented by programmers in virtue 
of their intentions and wisdom. What is needed and how to respond, in respect 
of economy, depends on the programmers' strategies of maintenance. Thus, the 
same problem arises as we discussed previously: if an autonomous system is com- 
pletely active, it must be capable of selecting and arranging activities from among 
many possible activities autonomously, effectively and efficiently, in response to 
the challenges in the niche in which it resides. Hence, to see behaviour- oriented 
agents as being completely autonomous and active, rather than being entirely 
reliant on an external programmer, we must explain the notion of needed infor- 
mation in terms of two sources of information, namely their internal control and 
the specific aspects of the niche encountered by organisms. Also, we can see this 
problem as an instance of scaling -up problem. 
Examples of itemised economy can be found in a task - oriented research, Ikeuchi & Hebert 
(1991). In addition, within active perception research, Rimey & Brown (1992) is such a case, 
where a task is achieved by itemised task- specific actions. Such actions are scheduled by Bayesian 
reasoning. 
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5.2.2 Two Types of Task Identification 
The analysis of tasks would be seriously incomplete if the status of tasks in 
the autonomous systems were not analysed. The latter analysis is important 
because intuitively it is hard to figure out how it is possible that a task envis- 
aged by a designer with her intentionality can be identified successfully by an 
autonomous system. The identification of tasks by autonomous systems sounds 
like a category mistake. However, autonomous systems do perform certain tasks, 
as demonstrated by the implementations of mobile robotics. It is not simply a 
scientific fiction, but an experimental result. When we inquire into the machinery 
in autonomous systems that support their performance, the capability of carrying 
out tasks should not be attributed to intentionality, because the problem of how 
to explain the intentionality2 in autonomous systems is exactly in question (if 
they can be interpreted as having intentionality). We humans can interpret that 
the mobile robots are capable of maintaining task identification, on the basis of 
their architectures and performance. As a matter of analysis, task identification 
can he classified into two types: one on the basis of representations and the other 
on the basis of performance. 
Type One: Tasks Identified in the Form of Representations. Certain 
tasks are identified in the form of representations, which serve as `guideposts' (i.e. 
goals of performance) for the designer to gradually work out perceptual guidance 
in her designed robots. The task identification is based on representations, in 
the sense that tasks are realised in behaviour -based systems on the basis of those 
representations. Specifically, identical representations lead to the same capability 
of carrying out the same task, and a change in representations leads to a change 
of task. 
The representations may be language -like, distributed, or even basic com- 
ponents of autonomous agents (e.g. Maes (1990b), Steels (1990a)). In order to 
2By intentionality here is meant the inner drive of maintaining intentions. Humans, of course 
including designers, identify and carry out tasks not at random but by their intentions. At this 
point, intentionality is not meant as the capability of referring to others from symbols /codes. 
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identify perceptual representations, in the PDP such representations must be as- 
sociated with nodes; however, representations are not maintained by nodes per 
se but by the patterns of connections between nodes. For the autonomous sys- 
tems with internal representations, those representations significantly manifest 
(although do not completely characterise) the tasks envisaged by the designer.3 
Adept is a good example of this. The target is represented in a global map, 
which shows the target as the final position of Adept's movements among ob- 
stacles. The task is to reach that target. While the target is directly coded in 
representations (in the map), the task is not completely identified by those codes. 
It also needs the computation of critical variables concerning the surrounding 
obstacles and the comparison between the computed values (about the shapes of 
the obstacles and the distance of the open space between two obstacles) and the 
target position in the map. It is the mechanisms of computation and the repre- 
sentations in Adept together - the target position, shapes of obstacles and the 
distance of the open space between obstacles - that identifies the task envisaged 
by the designer. Those representations can be seen as necessary conditions of 
task identification. 
Another example is the attentive control of saccadic movement in humans. 
A request for visual information may arise from human intentionality, as the task 
of saccadic movements, and later the pre- attentive mechanism surveys the whole 
visual scene to determine a single most important feature in relation to that 
request. Alternatively, no requests are raised in attention, but the pre- attentive 
mechanism surveys the visual scene to find an request from memory for further 
saccadic movements.4 The arising request is represented in the attentive control 
of saccades in the form of weighted visual features (please refer to Robinson (1968, 
1987), see Section 3.4.3, page 98), which serve to determine the target position 
for the next saccade. 
3For further understanding, please refer to Section A.2, page 347, and Section 2.4.3, page 49. 
`According to Mumford (1991), certain hypotheses abut the visual scene are generated in 
the visual cortex, passed through corticogeniculate pathway to the LGN (a part of the thalamus), 
stored, filtered /gated and updated there (in the LGN). This is evidence showing that the brain 
(specifically, the visual cortex) raises enquiries about the visual scene, in the form of generating 
relevant hypotheses and corroborating the raised hypotheses filtered in the thalamus. 
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Notice that the aforementioned tasks are not directly characterised (by the 
visual systems) in the category of purpose /intention. In these two examples 
(Adept and the attentive control of saccades), those tasks are mediated by the 
representations of the target position (in a global map) and weighted features (in 
a selection mechanism). Observers (including the designer), as intentional beings, 
evaluate the performance of the above two autonomous systems (with regard to 
their goals of performance) by considering the consequences of these two systems' 
activities in support of the relating tasks, as the designer intended. 
By contrast, the above representations per se (as opposed to observers' con- 
siderations) do not fall into the category of intention. The architectures of au- 
tonomous agents need not presume the existence of intention, but such agents 
remain capable of carrying out tasks. For the above two systems of active per- 
ception, the tasks take the form of perceptual guidance, in response to certain 
enquiries. Thus, the tasks can be seen as being indirectly represented in selection 
mechanisms - the selection over movements toward the target (in Adept) or the 
selection over weighted features (in attentive control of saccades). 
Type Two: Tasks Identified Purely on the Basis of Performance. Other 
tasks of autonomous agents are not supported by representations, not even in 
Maes (1990b) where (global and sub -) goals are represented explicitly. While 
tasks are envisaged by their designers, they can only be understood purely on 
the basis of their performance. Observers (of course, including the designers 
themselves) inquire as to whether certain envisaged tasks are successfully carried 
out in implementation. 
When a task is fully predicted by its designer it would not consequently 
pertain to type one task identification. The behaviour of the wall -following 
robot in Mataric (1990), for example, might have been fully predicted by its 
encounter, but no representations are adopted to represent the task. The envis- 
aged tasks of autonomous systems, anyway, must be predicted by the designer, 
for both types of task identification. In contrast, when a robot performs an unpre- 
dicted /unexpected task, which is possible although unusual, observers (of course, 
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including the designer who later finds the robot perform previously unpredicted 
tasks) can identify the tasks purely on the basis of the robot's performance, 
without knowing anything about the architecture which manifests its designer's 
attempt (i.e. predicted /expected tasks). 
Remarks on Task Identification: Both Types are Essential to Active 
Perception. Both types of task identification are essential to any active per- 
ception system. Although not undertaken in Brooksian robotics, type one task 
identification is essential to active perception. As previously discussed, a task of 
active perception must be assigned from the outside. An assigned task is not di- 
rected coded in the form of tasks, but is represented indirectly, e.g. by weights in 
attentive control of saccades and the global map in Adept. By contrast, type two 
task identification is also essential, because task identification in the autonomous 
agent approach is intrinsically subject to the examination of performance. 
One might contend that the task identification in Brooksian robotics is not 
intrinsic to the design but simply important practically (like the design in tradi- 
tional AI), because a robot may be built by an extremely clever designer without 
undergoing the process of debug and modification. The task can in principle be 
fully envisaged and implemented if the designer is sufficiently clear. As a reply, 
there might really exist such a genius, but her success must take account of envi- 
ronmental factors which are seen as complex and somewhat unpredictable. The 
engineers in traditional AI, by contrast, can ensure success fully through relating 
theories and guidance written in the manual, with only very rough understand- 
ing of the environmental factors (which can even be acquired from books and 
the manual). For ensuring the expected tasks in autonomous systems, the les- 
son is that environmental factors cannot be completely manifested without the 
performance of the particular implemented systems. Hence, we can say that the 
performance of the implemented system is an intrinsic part of the design. 
For the active perception systems in real organisms, the type two task iden- 
tification remains intrinsic. From a phylogenic point of view, the satisfactory 
identification of a task is an outcome of gradual modification, which is imposed 
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on the systems' performance. Then task identification consequently falls into 
the category of type two. From a task -level point of view, a task is carried 
out stepwise and in each step the collected information must be compared with 
the indirectly represented task. The collected information is an achievement in 
performance (on the basis of organism- environment interactions), while the com- 
parison (which happens later) is an activity of identifying the task at the next 
step. In other words, to carry out a task the active perception system must iden- 
tify it iteratively in each step. In each step, the aforementioned comparison takes 
place and consequently certain values of the collected information are taken into 
account. Those values result from the task identification performed at a previous 
step. Hence, type two task identification really takes a role. 
Combining the Two Types of Task Identification. Since both types are 
essential for each active perception system, task identification must be under- 
stood in terms of their combination. In this regard an example may help. The 
identification of a task for an active perception system is like (though not en- 
tirely identical to) a traveller in a historic town, who can only remember street 
circumstances very locally, making their way toward a monument. Suppose this 
traveller has a map; she still needs to identify her route regularly in order to 
approach the monument. This travellers' systems of intention render the task 
(finding the monument) to all the systems related to navigation, with the task 
being shaped into certain representations in perceptual systems. In each step 
of route- seeking the perceptual systems need to re -affirm the task, not only for 
confirming the previous performance of route -seeking activity but also for further 
identifying the task under different circumstances, that is, in different streets. 
This example reveals several forms of task identification in active perception 
systems, such as attentive control of saccades, pursuit, tracking by Kalman filter, 
route planning demonstrated by Adept. Any of these examples can be taken as 
the context of the following analysis. 
A task is identified by an organism in four forms. The task is originally 
identified with an intention outside perceptual systems. Later, this intention 
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is transformed into certain relating representations (i.e. perceptual features) in 
perceptual systems. Third, the task is attempted in each step of computation and 
the result of performance in this step is evaluated. Last, the evaluated result is 
compared with the above representations and then the systems again attempt to 
accomplish the task, by guiding sensory -motor movements so that the further step 
of computation may approach `nearer' to the accomplishment of the task, when 
the task is attempted again. Thus, task identification takes place in each step of 
computation. In other words, a task needs to be identified iteratively in each 
step when further processes are arranged. Task identification is not completed 
once for all, but goes step by step with process arrangement, which is a topic of 
this section. 
To summarise, task is identified in four steps: intention which is assigned 
from outside the perceptual systems, perceptual representations, evaluation of 
collected information needed for the task, and iterative comparison of the above 
information with the task for approaching nearer to the accomplishment of the 
task. 
An Epistemological Gap. An epistemological gap needs be bridged: how 
can an autonomous system ensure something (S) on the basis of its architectures 
and processes, where S is basically understood from observers' point of view? 
The question, in a nutshell, is how the autonomous architectures can eventually 
ensure the externally assigned task (i.e. S) without directly encoding it? 
Remember from a previous discussion that a task of an autonomous agent 
(robot) is externally assigned by the designer. The above epistemological question 
thus concerns the derivation of certain global behaviour in response to an enquiry 
assigned from outside the active perception system. 
A Pragmatist Consideration. To answer this series of questions, we should 
notice the role of the designer. In the design of autonomous systems the designer 
is the necessary observer. The observer converges on the adequate architectures 
and processes by assessing the robots' performance. Accordingly, it is reasonable 
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to say that the notion of task identification intrinsically involves a pragmatist 
consideration - that the confirmation of right architectures and processes (about 
task identification) must (among other things) refer to the robots' performance. 
Those that successfully lead to the envisaged task are the right architectures and 
processes for that specific task. Thus, task identification can be understood as 
the initiation of `right' processes with `right' architectures, which are confirmed 
by performance from the designer's point of view. With such an understand- 
ing. discussions of task identification can be focused on the initiation of `right' 
processes on the basis of `right' architectures (right in the above sense). 
Given all this, we can further discuss the question of how the identified tasks 
in an active perception system are eventually accomplished. Consideration of 
this question goes beyond the category of task identification, which concerns the 
initiation of appropriate processes (as previously mentioned), but instead falls 
into the category of process arrangement, which concerns the continuation of 
processes leading to the envisaged tasks. 
5.3 The Arrangement of Processes 
The concept of process arrangement refers to the arrangement of processes in the 
implemented autonomous system from the initiation of certain processes for an 
envisaged task, through continual (or continuous) processes with certain serial 
orders, to the accomplishment of that task. 
Good performance of a robot is by no means guaranteed in random archi- 
tectures. The process of task performance may possibly get stuck at a certain 
stage. The satisfactory performance of autonomous agents needs to be ensured by 
deliberately maintained arrangement. How is this accomplished by autonomous 
systems, given that no homunculus exists to arrange relating processes for the 
desirable performance? Apparently, consideration of resolutions points to the 
design of autonomous agents. 
Satisfactory performance in a full design with a blueprint, such as a clock or 
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a TV, is understood in terms of conceptual connections of cause -effect linkage. 
However, there is no full design in autonomous systems. The complex and unpre- 
dictable environment cannot be fully described in any highly elaborate blueprint, 
given that autonomous agents must maintain real -time responses. 
In the context of active perception, this question can be reshaped: why 
does the stepwise evaluation of saccadic movements lead to sufficient perceptual 
understanding? How can the Kalman filter provide satisfactory contours of the 
moving target? How can Snake keep track of the moving lips (see Section 4.1.1, 
page 114)? For any system of active perception these questions would arise and 
demand resolutions. 
5.3.1 Analysis of Process Arrangement 
Some analyses will make clearer the conception of process arrangement, and 
hopefully provide more clues as to how such questions can be worked out. 
Autonomous System under Design. The process arrangement in autonomous 
agent research is not maintained on the basis of functional specification. Rather, 
designers should implement certain modules which carry out the envisaged tasks 
by organism- environment interactions and /or the interactions between these mod- 
ules. Designers can deliberate about the architectures of the autonomous systems; 
however, the satisfactory effects of the aforementioned interactions must be con- 
firmed by the performance of implemented systems. The unpredictability of the 
real environment in which autonomous agents are tested can only be manifested 
by its performance. Like task identification, the performance in the real environ- 
ment (as opposed to designers' deliberation) is consequently an intrinsic part of 
design, although it cannot be fully foreseen by designers in their deliberations. 
Both the designer's expectation and environmental unpredictability should be 
taken account of in the design of autonomous systems. 
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Process Arrangement with Exploitative Control. The process arrangement 
in Brooksian robotics is behaviour- based, if the notion of process arrangement 
makes sense there. By contrast, the process arrangement with recourse to internal 
processes and representations needs exploitative control, i.e. control over such 
internal processes and representations. It is not hard to understand that the 
control is different between exploration and exploitation while between them 
there may be cooperation. 
Three Requirements of Process Arrangement. Process arrangement may 
be not easy to understand in terms of sufficient conditions. Below we discuss 
certain important requirements of process arrangement. 
Process Arrangement as Emergence. Given the indispensable involvement 
of the designer's (debugging and) modification (based on performance), the ma- 
chinery of the implemented autonomous system, and the aforementioned interac- 
tions under environmental unpredictability, the arrangement of processes seems 
not a matter of fully local functional control. Instead, the process arrangement 
is very likely to be a matter of emergence, i.e. global behaviour on the basis 
of local activities. If the architectures of the implemented autonomous system 
consist of different types of emergence (as argued in Clark (1996)), e.g. that of 
Brooksian simple automata, or that of the internal representations adopted in 
Macs (1990b) (also in Steels (1990a)), understanding the above emergence would 
need consideration of the interlock across different accounts of emergence (recall 
the notion of inter -paradigms interlock in Clark (1996)). 
Process Arrangement as Autonomous Planning. The process arrangement 
supported by autonomous machinery can largely be understood in terms of au- 
tonomous planning discussed previously (in Section 2.4.4, page 53), although 
the nature of the components in systems of active perception and that in Maes 
(1990b) may be different.5 
5As will be seen in later discussions, the components in systems of active perception are 
quasi- functional modules and quasi-action modules, which are different from the components in 
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Iterative Process Arrangement that Shifts Processes between Goals. The 
process arrangement for a certain task may shift back to the stage of task iden- 
tification and subsequently opt for another task. Remember that the concepts 
of task and goal are relative (see Section 5.2.1, page 146). If we interpret such 
tasks as goals in relation to a hidden task at a global level, the above statement 
can be seen from a different angle: an autonomous system may carry out a task 
by shifting between goals. 
Shifting between goals is a phenomenon particularly seen in Maes (1990b) 
in the notion of autonomous planning under the circumstances of high 0 and low 
-y. high sensitivity to current internal states and low sensitivity to the previously 
assigned goals (see Section 2.4.4, page 53). As previously discussed, organisms 
may accordingly be highly opportunistic (as opposed to goal- oriented) and adap- 
tive to current situations (i.e. not sticking to on -going plans6). Because the basic 
components of active perception may be different from those in Maes (1990b) 
(i.e. competence /action modules), the autonomous planning between them may 
consequently be subject to different types of control. As seen in chapters three 
and four, energy spreading seems to be adopted (in Snake) but apart from this 
there are a variety of control - such as attentive control of saccades, dynamical 
systems (in Dickmanns' car and the dynamic Kalman filter), and any other ex- 
ploitative control. 
Given the above discussions about the nature of process arrangement, the 
following discussions provide more detailed understandings of its machinery. 
5.3.2 The Machinery of Process Arrangement 
Operation -specialist Systems of Active Perception. The machinery of 
process arrangement can be extremely complicated if its processes are maintained 
Maes (1990b) (competence /action modules). 
°Although the relation implemented in Maes (1990b) can maintain autonomous planning, 
the task is pre -fixed, without considering the complexity of autonomous task identification. The 
implementation simplifies task identification (by pre- fixation) in exchange for a focus on process 
arrangement (by autonomous planning). 
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by a long chain of mechanisms and certain of those mechanisms are huge. For a 
single sub- system of active perception, such as the pursuit system7, nature seems 
to opt for a small repertoire of capabilities which consists of simple modules, as 
seen in the six sub -systems of gaze control. Each sub -system addresses a specific 
control, e.g. the control of pursuit movements. 
This seems to be also the case in design. For example, Adept is itself an 
operation- specialist system - for exploring free -space - and it comprises a small 
repertoire of simple modules, such as modules that serve to compute various 
critical variables (see Section 4.2.1, page 126). The modules in this repertoire are 
numbered about five, each of which only serves to compute the value of a certain 
critical variable, such as curvature or distance. 
For convenience of discussion, certain terms used in the present thesis are 
somewhat subject to convention. According to everyday language, simple mod- 
ules can be seen as small modules, and a small repertoire of capabilities is itself 
simple to a certain extent (i.e. not complicated). However, later discussions will 
term them small repertoire and simple modules, although `small' and `simple' (in 
the context of describing modules) seem interchangeable. In addition, a system 
will be said to have a repertoire of capabilities, while a capability in this context 
only consists of a simple module, the mechanism of overshoot maintained by the 
control of pursuit movements. 
The following discussions focus on the nature of single systems, such as 
7The distinction between a system and a sub -system is relative, as evidenced by the litera- 
ture of active perception. A system of active perception, such as a pursuit system, rigorously 
speaking, is a perceptual sub -system, when it is compared with a global perceptual system, such 
as the active perception of humans. However, it can be independently called a pursuit system, 
for the sake of convenience. Furthermore, even the distinction between systems and sub- systems 
is not complete. There are yet other systems standing between them, such as the system of gaze 
control, which itself consists of a number of sub -systems - i.e. focus, vergence, appropriate aper- 
ture, pursuit, the attentive control of saccades, and the gaze movement for tracking (as opposed 
to the grasp of deformable contour - e.g. Snake) (see Section 3.4, page 95). Still, a tracking 
system can indeed be divided into several sub -systems, such as a Kalman filter which tracks a 
deformable contour and dynamical systems which keep track of moving targets. Further, the 
perceptual system in Dickmanns' car stands in the middle range between a tracking system and 
a whole perceptual system of an organism, for it consists of many tracking systems, but ends 
up with a simple perceptual system, compared to the perceptual systems of real organisms. Ac- 
cording to above analyses, the framework of perceptual systems does seem to be divided neatly 
into three scales - system, sub -systems, and modules. Hence, discussions must be careful about 
such relative divisions, in order to avoid confusion. 
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Adept, the dynamical Kalman filter (as a single tracking system), and saccadic 
control. The emphasis is on the relationship between their architectures and func- 
tionality. Each such system can be regarded /defined as an operation- specialist 
system of active perception, given that it serves to maintain a specific type of op- 
eration fors achieving perceptual functionality, such as pursuit or saccadic control. 
In addition, subsequent discussions address the relationship between such single 
systems and the further global systems they play a role in, such as gaze control 
and Dickmanns' car. Each of such semi -global systems maintains a somewhat 
complicated combination of perceptual functions. The aim of the following dis- 
cussions about such operation- specialist systems is to argue for a small repertoire 
of capabilities on the basis of the relationship between their functionality and 
architectures. 
The Matter of Inter -connections in Brooksian Robotics. In the context 
of autonomous agents in general, including the systems of active perception, the 
size of the repertoire seems to matter for the maintenance of specialist opera- 
tions and the related functionality. By analogy with the small systems in active 
perception, Mataric's wall -following robot (Mataric 1990) can be regarded as 
an operation -specialist system. The repertoire of its capabilities is very small, 
containing only three automata Stroll, Avoid and Align, so that it is good at 
wall -following but cannot respond to visual contours at all. 
The size of this system seems to manifest certain constraints for the main- 
tenance of its functionality. Between these three automata, according to its ar- 
chitecture, there are strict interactions specified within the instructions for single 
automata. Remember the architecture (see Section 2.4.2, page 46): 
Stroll. When there is no obstacle in front, move forward in a more or less 
8Three caveats must be entered with this definition. First, such operation -specialist systems 
are not a particular case of specialist systems in traditional AI. Secondly, like the aforemen- 
tioned concept of sub -system, the concept of specific type is relative. It is relative to the 
degree of specificity. Because of different degrees of specificity, either the attentive control of 
saccades (as opposed to the reflexive mechanism of saccades) or gaze control (as opposed to 
the grasp /understanding of target contour) can be seen as control of a specific type, depend- 
ing on the range of specificity concerning the type in question. Thirdly, the term `for' means 
contributing -to, which has no teleological implication. 
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Figure 5.1: A Brief Sketch of the Relationship Between Simple Modules 
and Sub -systems. A sub -system of active perception, such as Adept, saccadic 
control, or the dynamical Kalman filter, consists of a repertoire of capabilities, 
each of which further comprises a variety of simple modules for computing spe- 
cific perceptual features. Each of such sub -systems can be seen as an operation - 
specialist system of active perception. 
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straight motion. When the robot encounters an obstacle, stop, and follow 
the instruction of avoid. 
Avoid. When there is an obstacle in front, turn right or left. 
Align. When the distance to the object behind is shorter than the distance 
in front, turn by a small angle. 
The combination of its simple modules, i.e. the three automata, is by no 
means trivial. Between such simple modules there are inter -connections for mu- 
tual coherence. Firstly, they are well connected. The initiation of the automaton 
Avoid is stated in the instruction of another automaton Stroll, which concerns 
the existence of an object in front - which is taken as an obstacle. The initiation 
of yet another automaton Align depends on the comparison of distance between 
an object behind and one in front. Secondly, the conditions of initiation for each 
of these three automata must be well connected, in the sense that they are mu- 
tually exclusive (so that a decision can be singled out), complete (so that the 
robot will not entirely sit idle and fall out of control), and linked smoothly (so 
that the robot's `decision flow' can respond to various environmental conditions 
without being trapped in a single state). Thus, the incorporation of an additional 
automaton would not be a matter of trivial combination, because it will affect 
the previously established mutual connections by conditioning the additional au- 
tomaton in the previously established inter -connections. 
The inter -connections of Brooks' three -layered robot is also not trivial, for 
the layer control is not so simple as the single automata. This is not hard to see 
if we examine the architecture of the third (top) layer (see Section 2.3, page 32). 
This layer serves to produce a pathplan. This is controlled by an automaton 
integrate, which maintains a rigorous priority control (see page 36) to integrate 
the initiation of automata within these three layers. The priority control, on 
account of the conditions of suppression and modification between automata, is 
by no means as simple as the automata in previous two layers, in view of its 
conditions of initiation. 
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The incorporation of further layers is very likely to generate further degrees 
of complexity in between -layer connections /control. However, gradually evolving 
more- layered robots on the basis of previously achieved layers remains less com- 
plex than a blend of modules without layer control. Although evolving layers 
to previous robots is a challenge to Brooksian robotics, the attempt at building 
a robot beginning with a large repertoire would be unnecessarily complicated 
and difficult. Such a robot would be tantamount to an attempt without suffi- 
cient layer control. Brooks' conception of layer control, as a requirement of the 
subsumption architecture, indeed manifests the importance of keeping the archi- 
tecture of an operation -specialist system (as manifested in a single layer) small. 
The inter -connections under such control would make the implementation of the 
robot's functionality less complex. 
The Ease of Engineering and Intrinsic System Complexity. The re- 
quirement of subsumption architecture, i.e. the gradual implementation of layers, 
stands both as a concern for the ease of engineering and a consideration of sys- 
tem complexity. This requirement may not only be unique to Brooksian robotics 
but may be extended to other de- centred approaches to computation. Here the 
subsumption architecture serves as the initiation of discussions. 
Regarding the ease of engineering, the layered- control is necessary for the 
maintenance of robot implementation, in order to circumvent unnecessary com- 
plication in implementation. Simple systems would be easier to maintain than 
complicated ones. This is a requirement grounded on practical consideration. 
By contrast, the consideration of system complexity leads to a stronger re- 
quirement, which is instead a theoretical reason. That is, a system may have 
an intrinsic limitation in its complexity. Two examples serve to make this point 
clear. First, while linear systems manifest a variety of linear properties, the com- 
plexity of non -linear systems would increase exponentially with the size of that 
system. Although nature is possibly to have an exponential degree of complexity 
(the impossibility itself may be hard to prove), the generation and maintenance 
of a system manifesting such complexity would less likely to succeed. 
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Second, neural networks with larger architectures would take a much longer 
time than the required to generate a novel capability (e.g. understanding a novel 
language feature), because the complexity involving in the compartmentalisa - 
tion of state space would consequently rise. The limitation in this case will be 
discussed later. 
The theoretical reason for incorporating limited components and state space 
in a de- centred system may need more studies before it is fully justified, or mod - 
ifified. If nothing goes awry within a system (a design or natural system), it is 
basically hard to prove (or even hard to conceive) that the complexity of the 
system has risen up to a level that a system itself risks collapsing. However, 
the above two points indicate the likelihood of complexity limitation intrinsic to 
de- centred systems. 
The Size of an Operation- specialist System of Active Perception. The 
implementations of active perception normally consist of one or only a few operation - 
specialist systems, each of which has a limited repertoire. For example, saccadic 
control consists of two operation- specialist systems. One is the attentive con- 
trol of saccades, while the other serves to transform the produced guidance into 
the motor commands for head and sensory -motor movements (Clark and Fer- 
rier 1992). In addition, as surveyed in chapters three and four, the number of 
modules is also limited in other operation- specialist systems - Adept (for moving 
away from obstacles toward target), the dynamical Kalman filter (for keeping 
track of the target and grasping its contour), the pursuit system (for the pursuit 
of moving target), etc. 
The reason for keeping the size of an operation -specialist system small, with- 
out grouping larger sized features together in the same system, is very likely to 
be similar to that given in the previous discussion regarding Brooksian robotics - 
i.e. for making simpler the inter -connections of its architecture (of the operation - 
specialist system in question), which in turn facilitates the robot's functionality. 
An example suffices to make this point clear - Dickmanns' car, for which the task 
is to drive adaptively in the motorway. 
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The perceptual inputs are gated by certain parallel small -size modules which 
present different operation -specialist mechanisms of process selection, such as lane 
keeping on road, speed adjustment to road curvature, driving at night, detecting 
obstacles, stopping in front of an obstacle, convoying (driving behind another 
vehicle), stop- and -go behind a preceding vehicle, and the lane changes triggered 
by a human operator in order to avoid other vehicles in the neighbouring lanes 
(Dickmanns 1992; see discussion in Section 4.2.2, page 132). Each module main- 
tains a specific mechanism of process selection, which provides certain specific 
performances once certain relevant sensory inputs (to that mechanism) are dealt 
with and certain intra- mechanism processes are subsequently initiated. Other- 
wise, it would be difficult for an autonomous car to maintain a variety of tracking 
tasks (as shown above) without the design of such parallel modules. Consider 
the circumstance where all operation -specialist systems in Dickmanns' car are 
conflated into a single system. Then, a difficulty would arise immediately, that 
all the control parameters of each previous operation- specialist systems join to- 
gether in a single system. This would be a difficulty for the implementation of 
dynamical systems: finding out the regularities of control parameters in a single 
system is practically difficult, and hence it would much more difficult to extract 
regularities from a blended system than from the simple tracking systems, for 
reasons as follows. 
The practical difficulty for finding out the regularities of a dynamical systems 
cannot be overlooked, because it is a bottleneck for dynamical systems modelling. 
This difficulty is reported by Thelen and Smith (1994), as a general difficulty 
for dynamical systems modelling. The difficulty is also confirmed by Grossberg 
(1995) in the establishment of differential equations for his model. This difficulty 
is even seen, by Eliasmith (1996), as the main difficulty of the dynamical systems 
approach to cognition. 
A good strategy of avoiding such a difficulty is to organise a dynamical 
system with recourse to parallel or heterarchical structures, as demonstrated in 
the implementation of Dickmanns' car. Without such parallel or heterarchical 
structures, the implementation of dynamical systems would be less feasible. 
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Keeping the Architecture of a Module Small. In general, the architectures 
of a module should be small for behaviour -based systems, as previously mentioned 
(see Section 1.2.2, page 9). The accomplishment of tasks in behaviour -based 
systems is determined by both built -in task -specific facilities /utilities and on -line 
computation. As regards on -line computation, the current states and goals are 
maintained by a variety of modules, depending on the tasks and the environment. 
It is worth noting that the control of a behaviour -based system is distributed, 
which may result in high complexity, as Mataric (1993) indicates, unless the inter - 
module dependence and computation is minimised. 
A General Consideration of Size in Developmental Psychology. Con- 
sideration of small -size systems seems to have its roots in developmental psy- 
chology. As reported by Elman (1993) and Elman et al. (1996) on the basis of 
certain connectionist simulations, development of neural networks must `begin 
with small' (architectures). Development of neural networks must follow a pro- 
cess of gradual expansion of the previously developed networks. Otherwise, the 
learning beginning from large may end up not learning the required task. 
Specifically, Elman et al. (1996) explain the importance of two modes of 
incrementation - incremental learning and incremental adding of architectures. 
Because the considerations of small -size systems concerns the size of the reper- 
toire of capabilities, not the size of architectures, our argument only relates to 
the former mode of incrementation - incremental learning. Elman argues for 
the importance of incremental learning, i.e. learning the (specifically, language 
grammar) features of increasingly degrees of complexity, with the argument being 
grounded on the complexity involving in the compartmentalisation of state space. 
Briefly, the compartmentalisation of state space (which is not identical with the 
compartmentalisation of hidden layers) is successful only when the learning fea- 
tures are very limited, even if there are sufficiently largely architectures available. 
°The phrase `begin with small' appears as a slogan of Elman et al. (1996). Specifically, they 
argue for small architectures. 
10Too limited architectures might be not enough for learning complex features, as is easy to 
realise intuitively: Sentences with increasingly more complex features need increasingly more 
architectural resources. 
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This does not mean that neural networks cannot learn complex features at all, 
but means that such features cannot be leant simultaneously. A sentence with 
complex features, say `girls who chases dogs hits [a] cat', can actually be learnt, 
but it only happens after the neural networks have already learnt some of their 
related simpler features, such as `girls chase dogs'. Adding to the previously 
learnt capabilities, the neural networks in question only need to deal with a small 
number of features at each step of learning, such as the additional `who' clues, 
which is certainly small in size compared to the whole sentence. The complexity 
of learning features is consequently reduced, hence the compartmentalisation of 
state space is more likely to be successful. 
The previous argument about incremental learning underpins the point that 
learning of cognitive features in connectionist computation must be grounded on 
a small repertoire of capacities. for easy compartmentalisation of state space at 
each step of learning. The lesson for our argument about a small repertoire of 
capabilities, is that within a single operation -specialist system there must be 
incremental structures of compartmentalisation in `place', in order to reduce 
the complexity of computation in a de- centred approach. Thus, it seems very 
likely that the implementation of capabilities in a single operation- specialist sys- 
tem. although it conforms to another de- centred approach to computation, must 
maintain the incremental structures of compartmentalisation for the computa- 
tion. The hierarchical structure implemented in Dickmanns' car is an example, 
in which the compartment of the `state space' (for computation) is not realised in 
the incremental steps of learning, but in the hierarchical structures between com- 
ponent tracking modules /sub -systems. Despite the difference in their respective 
de- centred approaches to computation (between PDP and autonomous agents), 
the notion of `incremental compartmentalisation of state space for reducing com- 
putational complexity' seems to be also applicable to active perception systems, 
provided that the conception of incremental compartmentalisation is not simply 
understood in the dimension of time but in the dimension of design connections. 
Apart from the hierarchical structures of Dickmanns' car, another example is 
Brooks' three - layered subsumption architecture. 
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Process Arrangement in an Operation -specialist System on the Basis 
of Small State Space. If we see a neural network as a system with specific 
functionality, then it can be regarded as an operation -specialist system. The re- 
port by Elman et al. (1996) can be seen as a support for the previously discussed 
requirement for small repertoires in operation- specialist systems. The compart- 
mentalisation of state space for an operation -specialist system should be small for 
the generation of a novel capability. A system with a large number of capacities 
must develop gradually, by development within a small compartment of state 
space and then slightly expanding the architecturesil for the further implemen- 
tation /development of capabilities. 
Keeping the state space small can be understood as keeping the within - 
system inter -connections reasonably simple. The generation of novel capaci- 
ties /capabilities in a operation -specialist system, as a consequence, has a basis in 
the maintenance of limited inter -connections within the system. 
Growth into a System with a Larger Repertoire of Capabilities. The 
argument for small networks made by Elman et al. (1996) indicates not only the 
need for small within- system inter -connections in maintaining single operation - 
specialist systems, but also the conditions of network /system growth for generat- 
ing novel capabilities /capacities. Like the expansion of neural networks previously 
mentioned, the development of more capabilities by a system must be grounded 
on previously established small operation -specialist systems, and the growth of a 
novel capability takes only a limited amount of additional architectural compo- 
ii Expanding the architectures would naturally lead to the expansion of state space. However, 
what directly matters for the generation of a novel capability is not the architectures per se, but 
their consequence for the compartmentalisation of state space. If sufficient compartmentalisa - 
tion of state space can be provided without changing the architectures, the generation of novel 
capabilities would be equally successful. This is point is exemplified by Joyce (1996), where the 
expansion of state space for compartmentalisation is carried out by implementation of certain 
specific noise which fails action potentials of axons but leads to higher degree of distribution be- 
tween connections of the neural networks. The effect for computation is that the state space for 
compartmentalisation extends, and the learning of novel complex features is still demonstrated, 
which was previously exemplified in Elman (1993) and Elman et al. (1996) by gradually ex- 
panding architectures. The architectures per se in Joyce's experiment are left unchanged, yet 
the generation of novel capabilities is shown to be equally successful. As a lesson from Joyce's 
experiment, the extension of state space for compartment is more primarily more important 
than the expansion of architectures. 
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rents (such as the nodes and connections in a neural network). This is to ensure 
limited inter -connections among components of a single system. 
A Concluding Remark on Limiting the Size of Operation -specialist 
Systems. The limitation of size for the implementation of operation -specialist 
systems were previously supported with three examples: the control of behaviour - 
based systems (simple automata, as Mataric (1993) indicates), the subsumption 
architectures of Brooks' three -layered robots, and the architectures of neural net- 
works in developmental psychology (starting small, as Elman (1993) and Elman 
et al. (1996) contend). 
The limitations imposed on such architectures can be underpinned by prac- 
tical and theoretical reasons. From the practical point of view, keeping the size of 
a repertoire small facilitates the ease of engineering. This point is evident in the 
implementation of the above -mentioned systems. From the theoretical point of 
view, the small -sized architectures have been insisted on for the feasible control 
of two kinds of systems: behaviour -based systems and connectionist modelling of 
cognitive development. 
Without understanding the above considerations of size, it would be difficult 
to explain systems with large repertoires. If operation- specialist systems must be 
permanently small, two questions would naturally arise: one, how is it possible 
that nature evolves large repertoires for higher organisms? Two, how is it pos- 
sible to implement a system of active perception which has a large repertoire of 
capabilities? 
The first question is reserved for chapter six, where the role of the environ- 
ment in shaping systems of active perception will be addressed. Here discussions 
focus on the second question. Systems of active perception certainly can have 
large repertoires, as demonstrated by Dickmanns' car (which is a blend of tracking 
sub -systems) and the system of gaze control in humans, which are both operation - 
specialist systems - i.e. systems with a specific set of operations for achieving 
perceptual functionality. The question, in a nutshell, rests on the maintenance of 
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inter- connections in a operation- specialist system. As a matter of analysis, the 
maintenance of such large repertoire of modules in an operation- specialist system 
can generally take shape in two ways, among others: 
1. Maintenance Through Certain Links Between Different Operation- specialist 
Systems. Given that the concept of operation -specialist system is relative, de- 
pending on the range of specificity concerning the type in question, an operation - 
specialist system with many component modules can be divided into many sys- 
tems which still qualify as operation -specialist systems. If the large repertoire 
of capabilities are first grouped separately into different operation- specialist sys- 
tems, then the question, in turn, becomes a matter of links between operation - 
specialist systems. An example is Dickmanns' car, as previously mentioned. Be- 
tween various tracking systems (each of which is a dynamical model /system) a 
link is maintained by generic control procedures (see Section 4.2.2, page 132). 
2. Maintenance Through Within- system Relational Structures. It is con- 
ceivable that a variety of elements within a system can be ordered by certain 
within- system relational structures, as opposed to random ordering of those ele- 
ments. Such relational structures are found in the ordering of perceptual objects 
(as opposed to number or language terms) maintained by primates, as reported 
by McGonigle and Chalmers (in press). A variety of shapes (up to nine) with 
random colours and orders are presented to monkeys, who are trained to identify 
those shapes in a certain serial order. Eventually these monkeys learn the task 
(while pigeons do not). With certain related experiments the above authors find 
that the monkeys in question do not maintain the envisaged seriation directly by 
a linear serial order, but maintain it indirectly by a hierarchical structure, under 
which the small number of each pattern makes easier the seriation of the object in 
that pattern. Further on, between the previous patterns a higher -order relational 
structure is maintained, etc., which leads to the complete seriation of all objects. 
The establishment of relational structures is based on patterns of compo- 
nent objects. Each pattern consists of a limited number of component objects. 
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Figure 5.2: The Hierarchical Structure of Gaze Control. A hierarchical 
structure is seen with four vertical layers. 
Can the organisation of a large repertoire of capabilities for active perception also 
be supported by certain patterns and similar relational structures between them? 
Certain implementations confirm this - Dickmanns' car and gaze control. Regard- 
ing Dickmanns' car, the generic control procedures for ordering different tracking 
systems can be seen as being supported by relational structures, otherwise there 
is no control at all. Regarding gaze control, there are relational structures be- 
tween its six component sub -systems (see Section 3.4, page 95): firstly there are 
both focus and appropriate aperture, then vergence between two foveae, later 
the attentive control of saccades, still later pursuit, and lastly tracking (optional, 
only for larger scale movements than pursuit); further on, iterative cycles of the 
latter threel2 processes push forward the complete route of gaze. A hierarchical 
structure is seen with four vertical layers: focus and appropriate aperture to- 
gether, vergence, the other three components, and the iteration of the third layer 
(attentive control of saccades, pursuit, and tracking) or (when gaze undergoes a 
sudden jump) the iteration of all these three layers. Notice that each component 
is itself an independent13 operation -specialist system while between such systems 
there are no further operation -specialist systems. Thus, a hierarchical structure 
is found in the processes of gaze control. 
According to the above analysis, the above two categories (inter- system links 
'2If a distant strong stimulus suddenly appears in visual scene, gaze would be attracted toward 
it, meanwhile a new cycle of six processes may begin, from focus or /and appropriate aperture. 
"Although the computational results of the three third -layer systems manifest a serial order, 
such systems maintain their respective operations independently (somewhat in parallel). 
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and intra- system relational structures) can be combined, as manifested in the 
processes of gaze control, where each component is itself an operation -specialist 
system. A tougher question arises about the system of active perception as a 
whole (such as the system of active perception in humans): can the process 
arrangement of active perception be explained in terms of either category, or the 
combination of these two categories? 
This question will be considered in later discussions in this thesis. 
A Concluding Remark about the Machinery of Process Arrangement. 
The above discussions indicate that the machinery of process arrangement for an 
operation- specialist system must be based on small architectures. An operation - 
specialist system with a large repertoire should expand from small operation - 
specialist systems, on the basis of two categories - inter -system links or intra- 
system relational structures. This is a requirement for understanding process 
arrangement, but not a sufficient condition. Subsequent discussions should ad- 
dress additional questions as to how the task emergence of active perception on 
the basis of small architectures can be explained more fully. 
5.3.3 Summary of 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 
To summarise, the above three sections consider a fundamental question of this 
thesis - how active perception systems (as behaviour -based systems) can respond 
to environmental challenges - with regard to the task identification and process 
arrangement of active perception systems. 
Regarding task identification, the task of active perception is to provide 
perceptual guidance of bodily actions. It is contended that the tasks of active 
perception arise either externally from intention systems, or internally from ex- 
ploitative cues, which are shaped as built -in heuristics. For either of them, the 
successful identification of a task in an active perception system requires both the 
implementation of certain representations and the modification of the system's 
architectures through its performance. 
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Regarding process arrangement, discussion (page 174) indicates two require- 
ments about the machinery of process arrangement. First, the machinery of pro- 
cess arrangement for an operation -specialist system must be based on small ar- 
chitectures. Second, an operation- specialist system with a large repertoire should 
expand from small operation -specialist systems, on the basis of two categories - 
intra- system relational structures and /or inter- system links. 
5.4 Quasi -functional Modules and Quasi -action Mod- 
ules 
A fundamental difference between the implementation of autonomous agents and 
that of active perception, as manifested in the implementations discussed in chap- 
ters three and four, lies in their respective basic components. The implementation 
of autonomous agents, as demonstrated in Brooks (1986, 1991a), Steels (1990a) 
and Maes (1990b), presumes explicit action modules, each of which specifies a 
particular spatial action or motion. Such action modules carry out certain ac- 
tivities in contact with the environment, with the effect of detecting or changing 
environmental conditions, or giving or receiving influences from other action mod- 
ules. 
Active perception is implemented in autonomous systems. However, they are 
not autonomous agents, because such systems do not consist of action modules. 
The basic components of those systems, as seen in chapters three and four, are 
sensory -motor movements, and the computation that serves to derive certain 
critical variables for the control of sensory -motor or bodily movements. 
Sensory -motor Activities. The sensory -motor movements differ from the 
spatial movements carried out action modules by only detecting environmental 
conditions without changing them, and by only receiving influences from other 
action modules without influencing them. The sensory -motor activities, like ac- 
tion modules, can be characterised explicitly. However, the spatial control of 
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sensory -motor activities is vastly more subtle than that of action modules. 
5.4.1 Basic Components of Active Perception Systems 
Computation of Critical Variables. The control of sensory -motor activities 
is managed by the computation of critical variables, such as the derivation of T, 
r, N, sn, TJ in Adept for deriving certain geographical paths (see Section 4.2.1, 
page 126). Furthermore, tracking also needs the subtle computation of various 
critical variables concerning object shapes (see Section 4.1.3, page 122). By con- 
trast, the control of action modules basically takes the form of simple automata 
which directly manage organism- environment interactions without recourse to the 
computation of such variables. Even if those simple automata are further subject 
to internal control, such as the parametric control (e.g. -y and 0) indicated in 
IVlaes (1990b), no computation of critical variables is required. 
Implicit Goals Realised by Quasi - functional Modules and Quasi- action Modules. 
We contended previously, in chapter two (see Section 2.4.4, page 55), that both 
the global goals and subgoals of the systems of active perception are implicit. We 
describe the implicit subgoals with the term `factorial conditions' (of sensory - 
motor or hand actions), which denotes the perceptual factors gathered through 
sensors and transformed via numerical computation, such as the visual contours 
dealt with under visual filters (e.g. the Kalman filter - see page 119) and the fea- 
tures fetched in the attentive mechanism of saccades (see Section 3.4.3, page 98). 
Such conditions are not functional descriptions (see previous discussions in Sec- 
tion 2.4.4, page 57), but are numerical transformations (through various percep- 
tual mechanisms) of the perceptual features emanating from the external world. 
The factorial conditions within active perception implementations, despite 
not being functional conditions, still have a bearing on the resulting functional 
control, as is evident by their contribution to the designer's envisaged tasks. Such 
factorial conditions do not in themselves describe the external world (see the 
descriptions in Maes (1990b)), nor do they constrain actions directly (see again 
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the above descriptions and the geographical agents in Steels (1990a)). However, 
they may be seen as productions of quasi - functional modules, in the sense that 
such factorial conditions contribute indirectly to ,functional descriptions (see our 
previous discussions in Section 2.4.4, page 57). 
Providing Functional Descriptions. The sensory inputs of active vision sys- 
tems are gradually transformed into functional (visual) features, as evident in a 
variety of active perception implementation. The attentive control of saccades 
serves to gather interesting visual features, which take shape in the form of func- 
tional descriptions. Regarding tracking systems, Snake presents various images 
(see Section 4.1.1, page 114), while the dynamical Kalman filter provides judge- 
ment about visual inputs and presents them in form of various visual features. 
In addition, the computation of critical variables maintained by Adept (see Sec- 
tion 4.2.1, page 126) gives rise to visual features. For example, the curve normal 
N indicates the degree of curvature of the envisaged surface at a certain point. 
The normal curvature km refers to the curvature of a certain curve- section. 
The visual features indicated in the above examples show that active vision 
systems partially recover the external world, by providing visual descriptions 
(recall Section 2.7, page 73, and see Section 7.5.2, page 311). 
The Subordinate Status of Functional Descriptions. Note that the afore- 
mentioned visual features are partial functional descriptions. For an active per- 
ception system, the modules subserving the recovery of functional descriptions do 
not provide full descriptions of the external world. Rather, only the perceptual 
features that relate to required tasks are derived and presented in the percep- 
tual scene. Such modules do not purely serve to provide functional description, 
but are primarily constrained by their consequences for certain bodily actions, 
depending on the emphasises of the required tasks. In short, only the percep- 
tual features which are relevant to the required tasks can be processed. For such 
modules, the production of functional descriptions seems to be subordinate to 
the bodily actions which relate to the required tasks. Functional descriptions 
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are not provided simply because perceptual systems serve to provide perceptual 
features. Rather, they are produced insofar as they are needed for guiding cer- 
tain bodily actions. Given their subordinate status, such modules are termed 
quasi- functional modules. 
Quasi- action Modules. Some other factorial conditions may be regarded as 
productions provided by quasi -action modules, in the sense that such conditions 
contribute indirectly to motor actions. Specifically, those factorial conditions 
constitute action control of sensory -motor movements, without directly driving 
motor actions. In other words, quasi- action modules provide perceptual guidance 
for bodily actions, but such guidance is neither bodily actions themselves nor the 
control pertaining to motor systems. 
For example, the computation of critical variables (as in Adept) leads to 
certain guidance of sensory -motor movements, but such guidance is insufficient 
to specify sensory -motor actions, unlike the specification of actions in Brook - 
sian robotics (e.g. automata such as avoid in Brooks' three -layered robot), in 
Steels' exploitation (e.g. the `agents' with geographical representations in Steels 
(1990a)), or in Maes (1990b) (e.g. the action module PICK -UP- SANDER, which 
produces a motor action). Without guidance sensory -motor activities are blind, 
but without actuator mechanisms guidance cannot lead to actions. 
The attentive control of saccades, for example, provides guidance that directs 
the fovea to certain important features in the visual scene. However, the guidance 
is not tantamount to the mechanism of a (sensory- )motor action. The saccades 
are driven by features but not by their locations (see Section 3.4.3, page 98). To 
actually move toward the locations with those features, the sensory -motor systems 
need to be further controlled by motor systems which serve to identify certain 
locations for sensory -motor movements and derive the motor actions toward those 
locations. 
As a further example, the mechanism of visual pursuit brings about certain 
confinement and modification of saccadic movements, by controlling the saccadic 
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direction and range of a saccadic `overshoot' (see Section 3.4.5, page 107). Nev- 
erthelss, the computation of the direction and range of overshoot does not in 
itself constitute an action module. The computational result serves to provide 
guidance for the saccadic movements of the fovea, by modifying those movements. 
Without the saccadic movements, that guidance per se cannot move. 
One might contend that the guidance provided by quasi- action modules 
shows that such modules (despite not being action modules) are indeed functional 
modules because guidance consists of functions. This argument is grounded on a 
confusion, namely that guidance consists of information and accordingly is neces- 
sarily subject to functional specification. This is very unlikely. The guidance does 
not aim to provide perceptual functions, but concerns the direction and range of 
the movements in question (i.e. saccades). The movements are apparently not 
tantamount to the perceptual functions. The guidance, as a consequence, is 
supported neither by an action module nor by a functional module. 
The motor actions controlled by factorial conditions are not limited to sensory - 
motor movements. It is worth noting that the computation of critical variables 
in Adept not only guides Adept's sensory -motor movements but also its bodily 
movements. By the computation of critical variables, Adept (as a robot) not 
only directs its sensors to relevant target areas but also moves itself. The bodily 
movements are eventually guided to a pre -fixed target position - its destination. 
Examples of Systems which Include Both Quasi -functional Modules 
and Quasi- action Modules Simultaneously. Quasi -functional modules and 
quasi -action modules are not mutually exclusive. A single mechanism can provide 
both of them simultaneously. 
The mechanisms of computing critical variables in Adept fall into this cat- 
egory. Such mechanisms are quasi- functional modules because the functional 
descriptions to be generated are subordinate to the requirements of the task, and 
because they still lead to representations of location which are compared in the 
pre -fixed map with the location of the target. They are quasi -action modules 
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because they provide guidance for Adept to move. 
In addition, the dynamical Kalman filter comprises both quasi- functional 
modules and quasi- action modules. The transformations of perceptual features 
are produced by quasi- functional modules. By contrast, the incorporated a pri- 
ori knowledge serves as guidance for the evolving target in the next moment, 
regarding its most likely positions in motion and its most probably shapes. 
5.4.2 A Comparison between Quasi- action Modules of Active 
perception and the Action Modules in Brooksian Robotics 
Different Types of Modules. In systems of active perception, quasi -functional 
modules differ from quasi -action modules in that these two types of modules are 
realised by different computational algorithms and subserve different tasks. In 
later discussions we will given an account of how these two types of modules 
differ. Briefly, the quasi -functional modules (such as Snake and the Kalman fil- 
ter) subserve systems of tracking, while quasi -action modules (such as Adept) 
subserve planning. 
However, such a distinction is not entirely clear -cut, because of their mutual 
support. On the one hand, fast tracking can facilitate planning. For example, 
the dynamical Kalman filter adopted in Dickmanns' car is basically a module for 
tracking; but, the effective and efficient tracking of different perceptual features 
make it practically possible to maintain planning across a variety of perceptual 
features. On the other hand, planning may support tracking. For example, the 
attentive control of saccades is basically a module for the planning of saccadic 
movements, which is a component of gaze control. Because gaze control subserves 
tracking, the planning of the attentive control of saccades, in turn, contributes 
to tracking. 
Basic Components of Active Perception cf. Those of Brooksian Robotics. 
Note that both the quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules are basic 
components of the active perception implementations. Here, it is worth compar- 
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ing the basic components of the active perception implementations with those 
of Brooksian robotics. The automata wander and avoid in Brooks' three -layered 
robot and the automata Stroll, Avoid, Align in Mataric (1990), are action mod- 
ules, as we previously discussed (see Section A.2, page 348). The difference 
between the quasi- action modules and action modules rests on the computation 
of factorial conditions, be they critical variables in Adept, iterative (numerical) 
transformations of perceptual inputs in tracking mechanisms, visual features in 
attentive control of saccades, or visual features in the pursuit mechanism. By 
contrast, the initiation of the above Brooksian robotics action modules need not 
be further subject to the computation of certain variables, but is caused directly 
during robots' situated activities. At this point we can see the action control of 
active perception, compared to the control in Brooksian robotics, as being more 
highly differentiated and more subtly manipulated. 
One might inquire as to whether there are also quasi- action modules built 
into Brooks' three -layered robot. The answer at first appears to be `Yes', because 
the priority control in Brooks' three - layered robot - the functionality of the third 
layer - seems to consist of quasi- action modules, as is evident in its two automata 
integrate and pathplan (see Section 2.3, page 32). Like the quasi- action modules 
previously discussed, those automata do not in themselves give rise to motor 
actions but serve to control actions produced by the lower two layers. 
The true answer to this question, however, is `No'. The main reason is simply 
that those two automata do not manage the computation of certain variables. In- 
stead, they serve to suppress a certain layer and consequently push another layer 
to continue its operations. The suppression and the `sanction' for continuation 
consists of modifications over the `likelihood' of initiating different layers, ac- 
cording to the pre -fixed priority over the functionality of different layers. The 
functionality of the third layer may be conceived of as a pre -fixed priority over the 
tendency of executing different layers. It is a matter of distribution over directly 
initiated values. There is no computation of any variable. Hence, the third layer 
in Brooks' three -layered robot does not in fact consist of quasi- action modules. 
To understand it intuitively, the control in Brooksian robotics is neither highly 
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differentiated nor subtly manipulated as would be expected in the quasi -action 
modules of active perception implementations. 
on the basis of the foregoing discussions we can identify the basic components 
in the designs of active perception implementations in terms of quasi- functional 
modules and quasi- action modules. These two types of module have a far -reaching 
impact on the understanding of emergence in autonomous agent research, as 
we will see. In later discussions, we will compare the basic components within 
different strategies of autonomous agent implementation, specifically: Brooksian 
situated robotics, Steels' exploitation control, Maes' exploitation control, and 
active perception. 
5.4.3 Exploitation on the basis of Quasi- functional Modules and 
Quasi- action Modules 
Exploration and Exploitation. Exploration and exploitation, as we previ- 
ously discussed (see Section 2.4.1, page 38), are two strategies of action selection 
for active systems. Regarding exploration, organisms inspect /explore the aspects 
of the environment most relevant to the required tasks, by arranging the action 
modules of the systems in parallel or with certain serial orders. Exploitation, 
by contrast, is needed for bringing explorative activities into focus, in the sense 
that those activities thereby become highly relevant to the required tasks, with 
the effect of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of those activities. As a 
consequence, exploitation takes the form of task- specific utilities that serve as 
constraints in the internal states of active systems in support of the explorative 
activities in the environment. 
Four Types of Exploitation. Four types of exploitation were previously 
found in the implementation of active perception. They can be seen as task - 
specific utilities. First, mechanisms of making judgement under uncertainty, such 
as the Kalman filter, as adopted in tracking systems. Second, various templates 
of object activities, which are constraints on the spatial invariance and tempo- 
182 
ral continuity of certain object activities, are incorporated into tracking systems; 
visual pursuit, in particular, is consequently effective and efficient. Third, dy- 
namical systems incorporated into tracking systems, with the effect of enhancing 
the capabilities of tracking fast moving targets efficiently. Fourth, the automatic 
planning of explorative activities, such as the route planning of Adept and sac- 
cadic movements. Explanatory exploration, demonstrated by Allen and Bajcsy 
(1985), is an interesting case of autonomic planning. The explorative activities 
are controlled for detecting the need of complementary information, which may 
even be information across modalities, in support of the required task. 
We can see the quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules as mod- 
ules that give rise to aforementioned task- specific utilities. Each such modules 
may serve to accomplish several tasks, but such modules are by no means task - 
neutral (general -purpose) modules. This point is not hard to appreciate, for 
those quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules do not serve to give 
rise to functional descriptions but relate closely to certain specific (perceptual) 
tasks. For example, the Kalman filter subserves visual tracking, attentive con- 
trol of saccades serves to give rise to guidance for saccadic movements, and the 
computation of critical variables in Adept serves to bring about guidance for the 
robot to approach the target gradually. Each quasi -functional module or quasi - 
action module is dedicated to providing task -specific utilities that facilitate the 
accomplishment of certain specific tasks. 
5.5 The Relationship Between Quasi -form Modules 
and the Exploitative Control of Active Perception 
5.5.1 Two Enquiries 
Given that the basic components of active perception implementations /systems 
are quasi- functional modules and quasi -action modules, a straightforward ques- 
tion arises: 
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A General Question about the Merit of Quasi -form Mod- 
ules - by identifying task -specific utilities. What specific com- 
putational advantage do quasi -form modules provide, as opposed to 
functional modules and action modules? 
Note that the aforementioned quasi -form modules are components of active 
perception systems, as opposed to other behaviour -based systems. To answer 
the above question we need first to draw a distinction between active perception 
systems and other behaviour -based systems. 
Autonomous Agents are Necessarily Active Systems but May Not be 
Perceptual Systems. Note that both the autonomous systems in Maes (1990b) 
and those in Steels (1990a) are active systems for carrying out tasks of bodily ac- 
tions, basically because such systems interact with the real environment by bodily 
actions and maintain exploration and exploitation - two strategies of action se- 
lection (see previous discussions in Section 2.4.1, page 38). In these systems the 
availability of perceptual information is presumed. There is no need to arrange 
further perceptual activities to make available the information needed for certain 
required tasks. Hence they are not systems of active perception. The tasks of 
such systems, unlike the tasks of active perception systems, are to carry out bod- 
ily actions, not to provide perceptual guidance for bodily actions. On this point, 
syst ems of active perception differ from other systems of autonomous agents. 
In the light of the above -mentioned difference, the general question posed 
above can be re- shaped as: how do the quasi -form modules contribute to active- 
ness? Specifically, the question is how the quasi -form modules make systems of 
active perception work, as opposed to the control strategies of other behaviour - 
based systems? The focus of discussion is on resolution of the question: how 
do the active systems differ from other autonomous agents in their respective 
maintenance of exploration and exploitation. 
184 
Two Enquiries. It is not difficult to see that the general question about quasi - 
form modules (how do the quasi -form modules make systems of active perception 
work, as opposed to the systems of autonomous agent in general ?) concerns 
explanation of the relationship between quasi -form modules, task- specific utilities, 
and activeness, as opposed to further description of present active perception 
implementations. This relationship can be encapsulated in two enquiries: 
First Enquiry. How can quasi -functional modules and quasi- action 
modules, by means of providing those four types of task -specific utili- 
ties, serve to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of active systems? 
Relating to this question, we can consider a corresponding question: 
Second Enquiry - Concerning the Reason for the Form of 
Quasi -form Modules. Why does the improvement of effectiveness 
and efficiency in systems of active perception, which is facilitated by 
the four types of task -specific utilities, take shape in the form of quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules? 
Resolutions of these two enquiries (about the relationship between quasi -form 
modules and task -specific utilities) together constitute the explanation of quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules with regard to their contribution 
to activeness. 
5.5.2 First Enquiry: How Quasi -functional Modules and Quasi - 
action Modules Contribute to Active Perception. 
Let us begin by dealing with the first enquiry about the quasi -form modules 
and the four types of task -specific utilities, and their contribution to activeness: 
specifically, how do those four types of task -specific utilities help to answer the 
question of what makes active perception systems work? 
Here, we must enter a caveat: mere task- specific utilities do not suffice to 
bring about activeness. Rather, they stand as facilities for exploratory modules, 
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which are necessary conditions of activeness. For example, the attentive control 
of saccades facilitates saccadic movements by providing their guidance, while the 
motor capabilities of saccades must be available beforehand. For gaze control, 
the mechanisms of binocular vergence are also necessary. 
The status of the aforementioned task -specific utilities is not hard to appre- 
ciate from a conceptual perspective. As mentioned previously (see Section 2.4.1, 
page 40), exploitation presumes the implementation of exploration, because ex- 
ploitation serves to make use of constraints in the internal states of active systems, 
in support of the explorative activities in the environment. Those task -specific 
utilities serve as constraints on explorative activities. The constraints per se are 
not the necessary conditions of activeness. 
The contribution of the aforementioned four types of task -specific utilities 
to activeness can be understood via the idea of: guidance for fetching further 
needed information in support of the required task. Without such guidance, the 
explorative activities would be pointless and the required task would consequently 
be difficult to accomplish. On the basis of this idea, the aforementioned four types 
of task -specific utilities can be further understood in terms of their consequences 
for providing guidance. 
Judgement under Uncertainty. It is obvious that making judgements under 
uncertainty is necessary for real -time response in a tracking system. Note that 
successful tracking needs the selection of sensory -motor activities in a serial tem- 
poral order. Because of the serial order, as soon as the tracking system fails to 
respond promptly to keep track of its target, it may consequently lose that target 
permanently. 
There is no spare time for judgement, yet the tracking system must provide 
perceptual information about the target to derive the needed information for 
its tracking at the next moment. For example, a rapid judgement of a possible 
shape can facilitate the derivation of relating predictions by seeking support from 
relating templates. The rapid judgement provides appropriate guidance for a real- 
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time response, so that the tracking system can have the needed time to direct 
sensory organs toward the likely location at the next moment. 
Using Templates. The incorporation of templates in tracking mechanisms 
reflects the spatial invariance and temporal continuity of certain particular target 
movements. The tracking mechanisms, such as the control of the pursuit move- 
ment (see Section 3.4.5, page 104), take advantage of such templates by easily 
moving the fovea to the foreseen position of the target at a short period of time 
later. The tracking mechanisms would not lose track of the target and can thus 
more easily fetch the perceptual information at the next moment. Not only the 
position at the next time moment, but also the shapes of deformable targets (such 
as a cell or fingers), can be foreseen. Those templates provide the tracking mech- 
anisms with many facilities to arrange their internal states in order to simulate 
the tracked targets at the next moment, and consequently such mechanisms can 
respond promptly to continue their tracking of the target. 
Given the above, the templates of a tracking system serve as guidance for 
making it easier to fetch perceptual inputs at the anticipated locations: the 
needed information at a later moment. 
Using Dynamical Systems. The incorporation of dynamical systems in a 
tracking system, as in the implementation of the dynamical Kalman filter in 
Dickmanns' car, makes the tracking systems respond promptly and the system 
of active perception can thus have enough time to manage further processes. 
The impact is similar to the judgement under uncertainty and the adoption 
of templates. The incorporation of dynamical systems facilitates the tracking 
system by providing guidance for promptly fetching the needed information for 
further tracking at a next moment (e.g. at the next frame time). Different 
guidance will be provided in different circumstances, and thus the required task 
can be carried out smoothly. 
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Planning of Actions. Serial order is no less important than tracking in the 
tasks of planning. The effective computation of critical variables, such as T, r, N, 
determines that Adept can derive certain geographical paths step -by -step. 
The computation of a certain variable is important for deriving the appropriate 
geographical path that Adept needs in its particular circumstances. 
The planning is stepwise, and hence specific guidance is needed for Adept 
in specific circumstances. If this guidance is not provided promptly, the robot 
would need to seek another route; otherwise it would be stuck. The computa- 
tion of those critical variables at the right time can ensure the availability of a 
previously planned route. The effective and efficient computation of a certain 
critical variable can ensure the computation of the further needed critical vari- 
ables for maintaining the same route. A certain module would serve as guidance 
for fetching further needed information and computing further needed critical 
variables. 
As another example, the detection of the need for complementary informa- 
tion in Allen and Bajcsy (1985) also serves as guidance for pushing forward the 
computation of relevant features of the targeted object. If the robot does not shift 
its control from visual computation to seeking haptic information, it would be 
pointless for the robot to recognise the curvature of the transparent surface. The 
robot would be likely to get stuck, and consequently the recognition of the target 
object would be impossible. Detecting the need for complementary information, 
hence, is a crucial guide for fetching the further needed information. 
It is worth noting that Adept does not derive the aforementioned guidance 
on account of a pre- specified detailed world model of relations between the target, 
the obstacles and the robot itself. Rather, its derivation of guidance is subject to 
the spatial and temporal unpredictability of obstacles (see Section 4.2.1, page 126; 
see also the theoretical background in Section 2.3, page 34). Despite this unpre- 
dictability, Adept can still provide guidance as to where lies the freespace leading 
to the target, by taking advantage of the occlude effect detected in the direction 
toward the target (see Figure 4.5). This example suggests that the guidance pro- 
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\Tided by quasi -form modules has taken account of environmental unpredictability, 
and hence the active perception systems can respond to the circumstances of the 
real environment. 
The above discussion shows that the quasi -form modules contribute to ac- 
tiveness by providing guidance for the information needed for the required tasks 
(hence answering activeness), as manifested in the four types of task- specific util- 
ities. Thus, the discussion answers the aforementioned first request as to the 
relationship between quasi -form modules, task- specific utilities, and activeness. 
The second enquiry about this relationship will be discussed in the next 
section. 
5.5.3 Second Enquiry: Why does Active Perception Need Quasi - 
functional Modules and Quasi- action Modules 
Here, we begin to consider the second enquiry, which concerns the aforementioned 
relationship: 
Why does the improvement of effectiveness and efficiency in sys- 
tems of active perception take shape specifically in the form of quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules? 
What sort of Answers do We Expect? The topic here is not evolutionary 
explanation, consequently we will not consider the evolutionary processes that 
lead to quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules, in contrast to func- 
tional modules and action modules. Nor will we seek empirical explanations as 
to why evolution ends up with the current quasi- functional modules and quasi - 
action modules, as opposed to other quasi- functional modules and quasi- action 
modules. Rather, we seek comparative conceptual explanations as to why it is 
quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules that suit active perception. 
Why it is not, alternatively, the functional modules in Marr's theory of vision 
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or the action modules in autonomous agent research that suit active perception? 
An intuitive answer can be neatly shaped in the form of an exclusive demand - 
that activeness (i.e. what makes active perception work) needs quasi -functional 
modules and quasi- action modules. 
We need not maintain that it is impossible to accomplish activeness without 
those quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules. The action modules 
in autonomous agent research may well accomplish activeness, from a theoretical 
point of view. However, evolution opts for relatively optimal solutions among 
candidates. We only need, hence, to show that quasi- functional modules and 
quasi- action modules are better suited to activeness, compared to other modules. 
Intuitively, it can be expected that those quasi- functional modules and quasi - 
action modules are better than the alternatives because of certain outstanding 
properties, which satisfy certain crucial requirements of active perception. 
From Requirements in Ethology to Requirements in Computational 
Machinery. Compared to behaviour -based systems in general, active percep- 
tion systems require subtler control of perceptual organs /devices. In autonomous 
agents the sensory systems need not be active. They are usually simple con- 
nections to the action modules, as we have seen in Brooks' three- layered robot, 
Mataric (1990), Maes (1990b), Steels' rock collection robots (1990b) and his robot 
with the control of geographical representations (1990a). In other words, the 
availability of perceptual data for the required tasks is presumed. Yet, this is the 
very topic for the systems of active perception. Unlike other autonomous agents, 
the robots with active perception systems do not simply deal with the randomly 
available perceptual inputs which are collected in their bodily interactions with 
the environment. Rather, they must estimate the needed information for their 
perceptual tasks in support of their bodily activities in the real environment. 
The most salient bodily activities are those for survival, as is argued in 
ethology. For such salient bodily activities, relevant perceptual information must 
be collected, such as that supporting the foraging activities of predators, and 
that needed for prey to flee swiftly. These perceptual systems, presumably, need 
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to maintain tracking, scene understanding, categorisation, and the learning of 
all the above perceptual abilities. An important question about these ethological 
requirements is their connection to the machinery of perceptual systems - whether 
such ethological requirements impose certain constraints on the construction of 
the machinery of perceptual systems. Three requirements on the machinery in 
question can be derived from the above characteristics of survival in the real 
environment. 
1. Stepwise and Iterative Processing. An intriguing phenomenon of per- 
ception has been listed as one of two requirements of task identification: the 
stepwise and iterative processing of perception, such as the attentive control 
of saccadic movements. That is, the foveae must be directed iteratively and 
promptly toward important features, which are not made available simul- 
taneously as batch information, but are derived stepwise, i.e. information 
at a later step depending on what has been made available and evaluated 
in earlier steps. 
2. Prompt Response. In addition, the perceptual processing in real -time 
is typically necessary for survival. Perceptual processing must be highly 
flexible. Animals, for survival, must compete for speed. At this point, time 
is very critical. Perceptual systems need to collect data sparsely, given their 
limited computational resources, and make judgement under uncertainty. 
3. Accurate Recognition of Fast -changing Shapes. Furthermore, for 
accurate responses in foraging behaviour, fighting and fleeing, animals must 
also be able to recognise fast - changing shapes accurately. 
Above are three positive requirements, while below is a negative requirement. 
4. Not Entirely Reliant on Pre -programming, Because of the Com- 
plex and Unpredictable Environment. 
Bear in mind that the environment is highly complex and somewhat 
unpredictable. The machinery in question, consequently, must re- 
spond well to environmental complexity and unpredictability. Given 
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that the computational resources are sparse, it would be pointless for 
perceptual systems to pre -programme (on the basis of functional spec- 
ification) all possible perceptual shapes and categories and the conse- 
quently required sensory -motor and bodily movements, as is gradually 
realised in mobile robotics. The lesson, in general, is that the envi- 
ronmental complexities are hard to tackle, and too much time spent 
in searching huge databases makes the design futile. 
In the complex and unpredictable environment, it is also pointless to 
pre- determine the information needed in every circumstance for car- 
rying out a specific task. For example, there is no entirely fixed route 
for the saccadic movements of similar tasks in various circumstances. 
There is also no fixed arrangement of operations for controlling a car 
in the vehicle. 
Requirements of Task Identification and Process Arrangement. Dis- 
cussion in this chapter so far has derived several requirements. Apart from the 
recent three positive and one negative requirements, previous sections about task 
identification and process arrangement also worked out certain requirements, 
briefly listed as follows: 
Two Requirements for Task Identification. As previously discussed 
(page 156), the machinery of task identification must address the tasks 
provided either by intention systems outside the perceptual system, or by 
the exploitative cues within active perception systems, such as the prey's 
cues for swift fleeing. In addition, tasks are identified gradually by active 
perception systems through iterative exploitative control. 
Two Requirements for Process Arrangement. Previous discussions 
(page 160) indicate two requirements about the machinery of process ar- 
rangement. First, the machinery of process arrangement for an operation - 
specialist system must be based on small architectures. Second, a com- 
binatory operation -specialist system should expand from small operation- 
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specialist (sub -)systems, on the basis of two categories: inter -system links 
or within- system relational structures. 
An Analysis about the Connections between these Requirements and 
the Nature of Quasi -form Modules. Do the requirements derived so far 
connect somehow to quasi -functional modules and quasi - action nodules? Specif- 
ically, this question seems to relate closely to another question: can the above 
requirements of active perception be fulfilled exclusively by quasi -functional mod- 
ules and quasi- action modules, but not by functional modules or action modules? 
This question specifically relates to a further consideration about the nature 
of quasi -form modules: does the nature of quasi -form modules make them exclu- 
sively suited to the above requirements? This question concerns how that specific 
nature can make the quasi -form modules exclusively suit the above requirements. 
According to previous discussions, the nature of those quasi -form modules 
comprise (1) the indirect contribution to functional descriptions and to the control 
of bodily actions (see Section 5.4.1, page 176), and (2) the production of guid- 
ance for fetching further needed information in support of the required tasks (see 
Section 5.5.2, page 186). The above `how' question can accordingly be re- shaped 
briefly as follows: does the fulfilment of the above requirements (of active percep- 
tion) need to take advantage of these two characteristics of quasi -form modules 
(i.e. (1) and (2))? This question is tantamount to an inquiry about whether 
activeness must be grounded on the above characteristics (1) and (2). 
The argument in the next section will show that activeness must be so 
grounded. When this is confirmed, it is straightforward to confirm also that 
active perception must take the form of quasi -form modules. 
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5.6 Bridging Activeness and Quasi -action Modules with 
Dynamic Small Modules 
This section argues for an affirmative answer to the last point (hypothesis) drawn 
in the last section - thus, it is argued that activeness must be grounded on the 
aforementioned characteristics (1) and (2) of quasi -form modules. The argument 
will straightforwardly lead to an answer to the second enquiry raised previously, 
which was a request for providing explanation as to the form of quasi -form mod- 
ules. 
The general strategy of argument is as follows. The argument begins with 
a novel notion - dynamic small modules - which serves to encapsulate all the 
requirements of active perception listed in the previous section. With this notion, 
we then argue that this notion is grounded on the above two characteristics (1) 
and (2). 
Defining the Notion of Dynamic Small Modules. The requirements of 
active perception listed in the previous section can be summarised with the no- 
tion of dynamic small modules, which means the simple modules with dynamic 
combination in single small operation- specialist systems that have the following 
two additional characteristics: (a) such modules maintain stepwise and iterative 
processing to confirm gradually the external enquiries (i.e. perceptual tasks) in 
the real environmental conditions; (b) such modules can grasp and keep track of 
fast - changing shapes accurately. 
The following two subsections argue respective that quasi -form modules can 
fulfil the notion of dynamic small modules, on the one hand, and that functional 
modules and action modules cannot do that, on the other. To put it briefly, 
the notion of dynamic small modules (which has characteristics (a) and (b)) is 
exclusively grounded on quasi -form modules (which have characteristics (1) and 
(2)). 
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A Conceptual Analysis. Before we discuss this statement, we must resolve 
a worry, that dynamic small modules and the quasi -form modules (i.e. quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules) seem to be conceptually identical. 
If so, then dynamic small modules are neither functional modules nor action mod - 
ules for an a priori reason: quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules 
are defined as being neither functional nor action modules. Our discussions would 
consequently be trivial. 
However, dynamic small modules and quasi -form modules are conceptually 
different. The concept of dynamic small modules is well specified via five char- 
acteristics - namely, basic perceptual features, dynamical combination of mod- 
ules, various specialist sensory movements which are situational, stepwise sensory- 
motor movements with evaluation in each step, and the generation of perceptual 
capabilities in situations. In contrast, the concept of quasi -functional modules 
and quasi- action modules is a negative conception about modules - modules that 
contribute to functional descriptions indirectly and those that provide guidance 
of sensory -motor movements without being identical to (sensory -motor) actions. 
The concept of quasi -functional modules is exemplified by the Kalman filter 
and Snake, which manifest certain characteristics of dynamic small modules, 
such as flexible and quick mechanisms of feature integration. However, such 
characteristics are not included in the concept of quasi- functional modules. In 
addition, the concept of quasi- action modules is exemplified by the computation 
of critical variables in Adept, which manifests certain characteristics of dynamic 
small modules, such as the stepwise movements with evaluation in each step. 
Yet, such characteristics are not tantamount to the leading concept of quasi - 
action modules - perceptual guidance of sensory -motor movements. Within the 
conception of perceptual guidance, there is basically no constraint about what 
guidance there should be and how to work out the guidance. Yet, the conception 
of dynamic small modules strongly circumscribe what guidance there should be 
for active perception. Thus, the concepts of dynamic small modules and quasi - 
form modules are distinct. 
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One might raise a further objection by contending that drawing a distinction 
between dynamic small modules quasi -functional modules and quasi- action mod- 
ules is trivial because the supposedly different concepts might end up the same. 
These two notions may be ultimately identical, like two concepts of triangle - 
three-sided polygon and three - angled polygon. If this objection is tenable than 
the current plan of argument would end with reformulation of the concept of 
quasi -form modules. 
The notion of dynamic small modules is indeed not simply a reformulation 
of the quasi -form modules, as evident in two points. First, the proof that two 
geometrical notions are equivalent is usually not trivial. Although these those 
two notions may indeed be equivalent, it may be hard to realise. In fact, a 
proof may need significant intellectual efforts. Second, the sources of these two 
notions are different, as previously argued. One arises from the requirements 
of active perception, as a psychological capacity /faculty, while the other arises 
from the descriptions of its actual implementations. Strictly speaking, neither 
of these two notions is simply a reformulation of the other. Even the most 
obvious overlap between these two notions - stepwise and iterative processing 
(as manifested in the attentive control of saccades) - is not a mere conceptual 
reappearance: the emphasis of it in the definition of quasi- functional modules is 
not to highlight stepwise and iterative processing per se (which is a requirement 
of dynamic small modules) but to stress the importance of the transformation of 
values for providing guidance. Any success really needs substantial understanding 
as to the linkage between psychological capacities and computational paradigms. 
This is also the case for the following argument. 
5.6.1 Quasi -form Modules Can Fulfil the Notion of Dynamic Small 
Modules. 
A Reminder about the Modules with the `Quasi -' form. Now, we are 
about to consider whether the notion of dynamic small modules can be realised 
in the form of quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules. Before we 
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discuss this topic, it would be useful to recall our definitions of quasi -functional 
modules and quasi- action modules (see Section 5.4.1, page 176). 
The quasi- functional modules are understood as modules that do not in 
themselves produce functional features of perception but still have a bearing on 
the resulting functional control: the factorial conditions contribute indirectly to 
functional descriptions (see our previous discussions in Section 2.4.4, page 57). 
Specifically, those factorial conditions substantiate the iterative (numerical) trans- 
formations of perceptual inputs (as is evident in tracking systems, such as Snake 
and the dynamical Kalman filter). 
By contrast, quasi- action modules are defined as modules that provide other 
kinds of factorial condition, namely guidance of sensory -motor movements; thereby, 
such modules contribute indirectly to (sensory -)motor actions because guidance 
is not tantamount to actions. Specifically, such factorial conditions constitute 
action control (i.e. guidance) of sensory -motor movements, without specifying 
exactly what such motor actions are. 
In Section 5.4.1 (page 176), we provided three examples of quasi- action mod- 
ules: the computation of critical variables (as in Adept), the computation main- 
tained in the attentive control of saccades, and the mechanism of visual pursuit. 
All of these three examples relate to the guidance of sensory -motor movements, 
but none of them alone is sufficient to specify a mechanism of (sensory- )motor 
action. 
Requirements on a Legitimate Argument. Here, we argue that the notion 
of dynamic small modules can be realised in the form of quasi- functional modules 
and quasi- action modules. Note that the dynamic small modules are requirements 
of activeness, while we have contended that quasi -functional modules and quasi - 
action modules (as opposed to functional modules and action modules) are the 
very mechanisms underlying the present active perception implementation. Ac- 
cordingly, the following arguments are required to show two points regarding the 
relationship between that above ideal notion and the underlying mechanisms. 
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The first is that the notion of dynamic small modules as characterisation of 
active perception can be realised in the form of quasi- functional modules and 
quasi- action modules. 
This point must be discussed. If the notion of dynamic small modules, as 
requirements of active perception, cannot be realised by quasi -functional modules 
and quasi- action modules - the mechanisms that we see as underlying active 
perception - then such requirements cannot be realised at all. Consequently, it 
means that such requirements may be purely theoretical, in that no mechanisms 
insofar as we know can realise it. Fortunately, we will show that the dynamic 
small modules can actually be realised by the mechanisms that we interpret as 
being the underlying mechanisms of active perception - quasi -functional modules 
and quasi- action modules. 
The second point is that quasi- functional modules and quasi- action mod- 
ules suffice to realise that ideal notion. The second point needs to be discussed 
apart from the first point, because the quasi -functional modules and quasi- action 
modules may simply be necessary conditions of carrying out the ideal notion in 
question without being sufficient conditions as well. That is to say, there might 
be certain modules of another type which are needed for the realisation of that 
ideal notion. 
When we have achieved these two points, we can infer that the dynamic 
small modules (as an ideal notion of active perception) must take shape in quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules (as the mechanisms that we inter- 
pret as the underlying mechanisms of active perception). In later discussions we 
will show that such an ideal notion cannot take shape in other types of modules, 
which are the types of modules attended to so far in relation to the perception - 
action relationship. Accordingly, if the dynamic small modules can be realised in 
the form of quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules, then they must 
be realised in this way. 
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The Dynamic Small Modules Realised in Quasi -functional Modules and 
Quasi- action Modules. According to previous discussions, quasi -functional 
modules, in short, are modules whose production of functional descriptions is 
subordinate to the bodily actions which relate to the required tasks. Functional 
descriptions are not provided simply because perceptual systems serve to pro- 
vide perceptual features, but are produced insofar as they are needed for guiding 
certain bodily actions. 
By contrast, quasi- action modules are those that provide guidance (in the 
form of perceptual information) for sensory -motor movements, while that guid- 
ance per se is not tantamount to a mechanism of movements /actions. For the 
effectiveness and flexibility of that guidance, there are basically no constraints 
imposed on it. Anything needed to guide sensory -motor movements can be com- 
puted by appropriate (specialist) mechanisms, such as the mechanism for the 
attentive control of saccades. In particular, the guidance can be stepwise with 
evaluation in each step, as demonstrated by the attentive control of saccades 
and the gradual movements of Adept between obstacles toward the target behind 
those obstacles. 
On the basis of the quasi -functional modules described above, the notion 
of dynamic small modules (see Section 5.3.2, page 161) can be fully realised, 
as shown in the following discussions about the itemised five requirements of 
the dynamic small modules. Notice that we aim to show that quasi -functional 
modules and quasi- action modules not only can but also suffice to realise the 
notion of dynamic small modules. 
Simple Modules with Dynamic Combination in Single Small Operation- specialist 
Systems. Quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules can be organised 
into operation- specialist systems, as already demonstrated in the implementa- 
tions surveyed in chapters three and four. All the implementations we surveyed 
consist of quasi -form modules, on the one hand, and all such implementations 
are operation- specialist systems, on the other. 
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In addition, it is also the case that the quasi -form modules in those im- 
plementations can be combined by dynamic mechanisms, as demonstrated by 
three dynamic mechanisms - the energy control of Snake, the dynamical systems 
in the dynamical Kalman filter, and the dynamical systems in Dickmanns' car. 
Dynamical systems serve as dynamic combinations of quasi -form modules. 
Those dynamic mechanisms contribute to the generation of perceptual fea- 
tures only indirectly, but they indeed serve to manage the dynamic combination, 
for quick and flexible combination. 
Additional Characteristic (a) - maintaining stepwise and iterative process- 
ing to gradually satisfy the enquiries raised from outside perceptual systems. It 
is required in the notion of dynamic small modules that the determination of 
sensory -motor movements must be stepwise with evaluation in each step, to por- 
vide a flexible response to current situations in the unpredictable environment. 
This is generally not difficult for quasi -action modules, which provide guid- 
ance for sensory -motor movements. As just mentioned, there are no constraints 
imposed on such guidance. Like the computation of critical variables, the step- 
wise control with evaluation in each step can be seen as a particular means of 
guidance, which can be made available by a specialist mechanism. For example, 
the saccadic movement is maintained by the attentive control of saccades, which 
is a specialist mechanism. 
With such stepwise and interactive processing, the external enquiries can 
be gradually supported by relevant perceptual information which is collected 
by comparing the information already made available and the information still 
needed for satisfing those enquiries. 
Additional Characteristic (b) - Grasp and Keep Track of Fast -changing Shapes 
Accurately. As the notion of dynamic small modules requires, the basic percep- 
tual features must reflect the most important (relevant to tasks) constituents 
of perceptual experience, such as lines and curves. Note that such features are 
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usually managed under time pressure for the required tasks, hence they must be 
highly selective. 
Such basic perceptual features can he provided by quasi-functional modules, 
for the computation of the quasi-functional modules is highly selective of what is 
needed for the current situations. Specifically, those perceptual features can be 
provided by the computation of critical variables, which is indeed highly selective, 
as exemplified by Adept, which only computes the variables needed for moving 
(via a relatively short path) toward the target. Alternatively, the perceptual 
features can be obtained via the transformations made available by the Kalman 
filter. which provides the relevant features to the perceptual situations. Note 
that a particular algorithm of the Kalman filter presumes limited knowledge (see 
Section 4.1.2, page 119). Perceptual inputs are consequently transformed into 
perceptual features which are relevant to the current situations. 
Furthermore, quasi-functional modules and quasi-action modules can grasp 
and keep track of fast-changing shapes accurately, as demonstrated by the dy- 
namical Kalman filter (see Section 4.1.3, page 122) and Dickmarms car (see 
Section 4.2.2, page 132). Although tracking is subject. to serious time pressure, 
thanks to dynamical systems the above implementations are successful. 
5.6.2 Functional Modules and Action Modules Cannot Fulfil the 
Notion of Dynamic Small Modules. 
In contrast to the above argument. the next step in the overall argument is to 
show that the notion of dynamical small modules cannot be realised by functional 
modules (like those in Man's theory of vision) or action modules (like those in 
Brooksian robotics and Maes (1990b)) (pages 175-183). Notice that the following 
argument concerns the sufficient conditions for implementing active perception. 
The aim is to show that the implementation of active perception would not he 
complete without quasi-form modules. Accordingly,, the adoption of functional 
modules or action/competence modules itself will not cause a problem. if apart 
from that certain quasi-form modules are also adopted to implement active per- 
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ception. 
Dynamic Small Modules Cannot be Functional Modules or Action 
modules. The reason is intuitive, namely that neither functional nor action 
modules manifest the characteristics of dynamic small modules, while the quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules do actually manifest those charac- 
teristics. The notion of dynamic small modules, accordingly, must be realised in 
the form of quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules. In the follow- 
ing discussions we see support for such an argument in different computational 
methodologies: the Marrian theory of vision, Brooksian robotics, Steels' exploita- 
tion, and the control of energy spreading in Ma es (1990b). 
Functional Modules in Marrian Theory of Vision. The functional modules 
characterised in Marrian theory of vision extract perceptual properties via a non- 
dynamic hierarchical order of information processing, without any dynamic pro- 
cesses. Hence, the combination between modules is apparently not dynamic. 
Furthermore, those functional modules are not the small modules we previously 
defined, because they do not generate perceptual categories in situations, but in- 
stead pre -determine them. Hence, the dynamic small modules cannot be realised 
in the form of such functional modules. 
Action Modules in Brooksian Robotics. The dynamic small modules cannot 
be shaped in the action modules in Brooksian robotics, either. This is because 
Brooksian robotics does not have memory for internal representations (be they 
language -like or distributed) and consequently does not encode categories. In 
addition, although sensory -motor connections, in principle, can be implemented 
on the basis of Brooksian robotics, such connections do not suffice to maintain 
the internal computation of active perception. For example, it is unclear how 
the basic features, such as lines and curves, can be provided directly by sensors 
without the mediation of computation, as seen in the computation of various 
kinds of Kalman filter. 
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Furthermore, even if those basic perceptual features can be made available, 
the smooth combination between perceptual features remains a difficulty for the 
subsumption architecture of Brooksian robotics. For example, the internal con- 
tinuity of Snake does not seem to be simply a matter of suppression between 
simple automata, which is maintained by the top layer of Brooks' three -layered 
robot. Hence, the action modules in Brooksian robotics do not suffice to realise 
the notion of dynamic small modules. 
Action Modules in Steels' Exploitative control (1990a). The action modules 
in Steels' exploitative control, as introduced in Section 2.4.3 (page 49) seem to 
be the software simulation of Brooksian robotics in terms of geographical repre- 
sentations. We can see those representations as being `upgraded' from Brooksian 
simple automata (such as avoid and wander): `upgraded' because such inter- 
nal representations function like reactive agents14 without mentioning dynamic 
combination between modules - e.g. situational modifications of goals. This is 
because there are basically no control mechanisms responsible for modifications. 
Furthermore, there is no ground in Steels' (1990a) to realise the stepwise con- 
trol of sensory -motor movements with evaluation in each step. The interactions 
between those geographical representations are based on strict counterparts of the 
external world. That is, there is no further evaluation of the relative importance 
of those representations, nor is there any transformation between the readily en- 
coded geographical representations (such as the transformation in Snake and the 
Kalman filter). Because there is neither evaluation nor transformation, Steels 
(1990a) does not suffice to realise the notion of dynamic small modules. 
Action Modules and Functional Descriptions in Maes (1990b). The ex- 
ploitation of internal representations maintained in Maes (1990b), as previously 
discussed in Section 2.4.4 (page 53), includes subtle control over action modules, 
which is substantiated by links between goals, energy spreading via links, thresh- 
"In fact, Steels (1990a) describes the implemented modules, which carry out the geographical 
representations, in terms of `agents'. 
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olds of action modules, and global parameters (such as 'y and cß). Such a style of 
exploitation seems to be likely to fit the description of dynamic small modules, 
because the exploitation is flexible. Specifically, evaluation between global goals 
(i.e. the actions specified in those action modules) is maintained by responding 
to current situations, and those global goals are subject to modifications (over 
their activation energy). Thus, Maes' exploitative control seems to be promising 
in performing the dynamic combination between action modules. 
An apparent problem is that the aforementioned action modules are all pre - 
specified, i.e. encoded by hand. In addition, they are qualitative language- 
like representations.15 Such qualitative representations do not seem to suit the 
factorial conditions of perceptual features, as shown in the Kalman filter. 
Perceptual features might be shaped in the form of analogical representa- 
tions, as Steels suggests. They can also be shaped with iterative transformations, 
sud. as those found in the Kalman filter. However, the (qualitative) language -like 
representations are a long way from appropriate representations. 
An objection might be raised by contending that the competence /action 
modules in Maes (1990b) do not purely serve to represent perceptual features, but 
indeed serve as action control, especially the dynamic combination between ac- 
tion modules. However, this type of action control does not help the competence 
modules to suit the notion of dynamic small modules, because sensory -motor 
movements (which can be seen as actions) seem more likely to be controlled in 
the form of factorial conditions (which are numerical) than in language -like repre- 
sentations. It would be pointless to implement the attentive control of saccades in 
language -like representations, because the evaluation of fine -grained perceptual 
features and the comparison between such evaluations is a matter of numerical 
control. Furthermore, the stepwise computation of (perceptual) critical variables, 
15It is arguable that numerical representations can be seen as language -like representations 
because numerical codes can squarely be translated into (language -like) propositions. Yes, they 
can be so translated, but the contrast between numerical and language -like representations in 
this sense is trivial. The term `language -like representations' used in the following argument is 
not referred to the propositions in this sense. They are, instead, meant as qualitative representa- 
tions of non -numerical representations, as demonstrated by the descriptions in the condition -list 
`(hand- empty, sander -on- table)' (see Section A.2, page 347). 
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as needed by Adept which is designed for the planning of bodily actions that sup- 
port sensory -motor movements, cannot be supported in Maes' exploitative con- 
trol. No (numerical) computation of such variables is feasible with language -like 
representations, let alone the stepwise control over the computed values. Thus, 
when the computation of (perceptual) critical variables is needed for sensory - 
motor movements, it stands as a difficulty for the control seen in Maes (1990b). 
Reconsideration of the Contrast between Numerical and Language -like Repre- 
sentations. A further objection may be raised, that perceptual representations 
can in principle be transformed into language -like representations'6, and thus 
the language -like representations do not in themselves constitute a deficiency in 
implementation. 
Three replies: First, the previous argument about the inappropriateness of 
non -quasi -form modules is about the necessity of numerical representations, not 
about the deficiency of language -like representations. The problem of the rep- 
resentations in Maes (1990b) is that they (as language -like) could not carry out 
numerical computation -a requirement for computing factorial conditions. Ana- 
logical representations may well be transformed into language -like representations 
and thereby be computed. However, it is generally not wise to make transfor- 
mations on certain representations and consequently fail a certain requirement 
of the computation. If numerical representations work well, there seems to be no 
reason to transform them into less suitable ones. 
Second, numerical representations are not tantamount to analogical repre- 
sentations. There is a clear distinction between them. The computation carried 
out by the Kalman filter is numerical, but there is no guarantee that the compu- 
tation is based on analogical reasoning. Indeed, it happens not to be so based. It 
computes on the basis of the comparison between current knowledge gains and 
previous expectations (see Section 4.1.2, page 119). There is no indication that 
such comparison is grounded on analogical reasoning. 
151n the debate about the nature of visual imagery between Kosslyn and Pylyshyn in the 
1970s -80s, Pylyshyn maintained that analogical representations can in principle be transformed 
into language -like representations and thereby be computed (Tye 1991; Kosslyn 1994) 
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Last, transformations between representations (such as those between language - 
like and connectionist representations) are usually grounded on a shift to a differ- 
ent paradigm of implementation (see discussions in Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988)). 
This is theoretically interesting but may consequently compromise the efficiency 
of computation. Connectionist representations can be implemented by language - 
like representations, and vice versa. For example, connectionist computation is 
mostly implemented in digital machines, where certain language -like representa- 
tions are necessary. Conversely, the PDP can in principle serve as an implemen- 
tation of the computation based on language -like representations, as suggested 
by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). The problem is that the computation may con- 
sequently be carried out less efficiently, which is certainly not appreciated. This 
point has been contended by Churchland and Sejnowski (1992), two connection - 
ists, that if certain tasks are implemented most appropriately by a machine with 
language -like codes, why bother to transform them into a connectionist machine? 
The transformation may be theoretically interesting, but the efficiency of com- 
putation may be accordingly lost.17 
In brief, the numerical computation of factorial conditions is not appropri- 
ately carried out by language -like representations, hence the language -like repre- 
sentations in Maes (1990b) do not suit a requirement of dynamic small modules, 
namely computing the perceptual inputs on the basis of factorial conditions. 
5.6.3 Summary of 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 
In these three sections we strive to understand the internal control of active 
perception. Analysis of internal control indicates that the internal control of 
active perception is maintained by quasi -form modules and that such control 
is ultimately based on four types of exploitative control, in fact four types of 
task- specific utilities: judgement under uncertainty, using templates, using dy- 
namical systems, and planning of actions. Thereby, the relationship between 
activeness and the internal control of active perception consists of resolutions of 
`Remember that a previous point - the transformation of numerical representations into 
language -like representations which are less suitable in view of efficiency - is sadly such a case. 
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two enquiries: first, how such quasi -form modules contribute to active perception 
(beyond autonomous agents in general); second, why the internal control of active 
perception needs to take shape in the form of quasi -form modules. 
The first enquiry is answered by the following two -step argument. First, 
these quasi -form modules provide the aforementioned four types of task -specific 
utilities. Second, such task -specific utilities serve to work out the guidance for 
fetching further needed information in support of the required tasks. With these 
two steps together, the quasi -form modules lead to the accomplishment of re- 
quired tasks, and consequently the first enquiry is answered. 
In order to resolve the second enquiry, one additional notion is introduced, 
namely dynamic small modules, which characterises the requirements for the 
mechanisms of active perception. The general strategy of resolving this enquiry 
is: active perception requires dynamic small modules, and such modules must be 
realised by quasi -form modules. Argument shows that quasi -form modules can 
satisfy the requirements of dynamic small modules, while functional modules and 
action modules cannot. Thus, the second enquiry is resolved. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter answers the question of how the control of active perception systems 
manages to accomplish the required tasks. Analysis shows that the basic compo- 
nents of active perception systems are quasi -functional modules and quasi- action 
modules. Unlike the components of other behaviour -based systems, these quasi - 
form modules provide perceptual guidance which leads to the accomplishment of 
required tasks, as manifested in four types of task -specific utilities for exploita- 
tion: judgement under uncertainty, using templates, using dynamical systems, 
and planning of actions. 
The relationship between the control of active perception and the above - 
mentioned quasi -form modules is clarified in the statement that the control /mechanisms 
of active perception must take shape in the form of the above quasi -form mod- 
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ules. Argument justifies this statement by showing that only quasi -form modules 
can satisfy all the requirements for such mechanisms, including: the requirements 
for task identification and process arrangement, and the four characteristics of 
the above control asserted in the notion of dynamic small modules. The re- 
quirements for task identification and process arrangement are: identifying tasks 
through iterative processes, and organising a simple or combinatory system on 
the basis of inter - (sub -)system links or within- system relational structures. The 
four characteristics of the control of active perception are: stepwise and iterative 
processing, prompt response, accurate recognition of fast - changing shapes, and 
no entire reliance on pre- programming (because of the complex and unpredictable 
environment). With the consideration of so many requirements, argument of this 
chapter has justified the above statement. 
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Chapter 6 
Principles of Task -level 
Emergence 
This chapter considers the task -level emergence of active perception from three 
perspectives. Firstly, the understanding of task -level emergence needs certain 
principles to address different emergent phenomena, from the simple to the com- 
plicated: specifically, from the emergence of processes in a simple single operation - 
specialist system, that seek the accomplishment of tasks, to the emergence of 
control happening in a combinatory system. Those principles are not to be cre- 
ated from scratch, but instead will be extracted from four present models of life 
origin, which is the archetype of emergent phenomena. 
Secondly, the serial order of stepwise computation manifested in active per- 
ception is addressed via the notion of internal cohesion. This notion answers the 
question of why the quasi -form modules can respond to unpredictable environ- 
mental factors, on the one hand, but still maintain effective serial orders between 
various processes of active perception, on the other. 
The third aspect of task -level emergence concerns the relationship between 
the environment and the functionality of a cognitive system, a relationship cur- 
rently explained by the philosophical accounts of externalism which emphasise 
the substantial mediation of the environment, as manifested by Brooks' slogan: 
the environment is the best model of the world. This chapter considers an alter- 
native perspective, by introducing a notion - inverse ecological niche - according 
to which the functionality of cognitive systems should reflect the characteris- 
209 
tics of organisms' ecological niches in order to support organisms' survival and 
well- living in their respective ecological niches. 
The discussion of this chapter begins with the distinction between task -level 
emergence and other kinds of emergence. 
6.1 Task -level Emergence 
The Notion of Task -level Emergence. Emergence is usually understood to 
occur at larger time scales than that of the task level; for example, ontogenic or 
phylogenic time. The study of active perception will first add to the understand- 
ing of emergence by considering emergence at task- level. 
The Existence of Task -level Emergence. Since there are no complete blueprints 
ill place for autonomous systems, the maintenance of factorial conditions (includ- 
ing transformations of perceptual inputs and values of critical variables) and the 
stepwise guidance of sensory -motor movements cannot be entirely explained in 
terms of pre- determination. This holds for the stepwise computation of active 
perception. Given that emergence is understood as the opposite concept to that 
of pre -determination (see Section 2.6, page 64), it follows directly that the ac- 
complishment of tasks in active perception is a matter of emergence. 
It is worth noting that certain phenomena of active perception emerge at the 
task level - i.e. as events at the time scale of task accomplishment - because the 
accomplishment of tasks takes place without input from learning or anything else 
gained beyond the task time (e.g. phylogeny). In fact, the implementations we 
reviewed in chapters three and four can be understood independently of learning 
with regard to their respective strategies of accomplishing the required tasks. 
The derivation of guidance in support of bodily actions is entirely maintained at 
the task level. The emergence of that guidance, thus, is an event at run -time. 
Hence, it is clear that the emergence of adequate guidance for accomplishing the 
required tasks of active perception occurs at the task level. 
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The Context of Emergence is Needed. If we are completely attached to the 
context of pre- determination, the derivation of adequate guidance in active per- 
ception would become difficult to explain, because perceptual processes depend 
significantly on unpredictable environmental factors. 
Note that the accomplishment of required tasks is not simply a matter of gen- 
erating percepts. Rather, what matters for accomplishing the (required /envisaged) 
tasks is the derivation of perceptual guidance which is needed for bodily actions, 
according to the understanding of active perception (see Section 1.2.1, page 3). 
The derivation of such guidance, maintained by the processes of active per- 
ception, reacts to the unpredictable factors of the complex environment directly 
without using a model of world conditions. The stepwise evaluation of com- 
puted features and the determination of sensory -motor activities are generally 
embodied because they take account of three kinds of contingent factors: current 
environmental conditions, organisms' current positions and the already collected 
information. Because the explanation of route selection needs to take account of 
organisms' embodied response to unpredictable environmental factors, the deriva- 
tion of adequate guidance maintained by active perception systems is by no means 
pre -determined. Hence, the explanation of active perception must be put in the 
context of emergence. 
In the context of emergence, the adequate guidance of sensory -motor move- 
ments can straightforwardly be regarded as an outcome of global behaviour, be- 
yond the direct effects of individual instructions which are stipulated in the al- 
gorithms of active perception implementations. Such a discussion seems to have 
moved to a point which itself does not serve as a ground of explanation, but in- 
stead as a target to be explained. This appears to be a retrograde step, because 
the discussion does not lead to a more familiar ground but conversely incurs fur- 
ther needs for explanation. This is partially correct. On the one hand, there does 
seem to be regression, because unpredictable factors and global behaviour is not 
specified in the algorithms of implementations. But on the other hand, there is 
progress in understanding the question, because the generation of the envisaged 
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adequate guidance is put in an appropriate context of discussion - emergence - 
which itself has potential for substantive explanation, clearly distinguished from 
pre- determination. 
6.2 Principles of Emergence 
Emergence may have common principles applicable to all emergent phenomena, 
and specific principles pertaining to specific emergent subject matters. The origin 
of life is the archetype of emergence. In order to explain the origin of life four 
classical models have been entertained. These four models' might reveal certain 
common principles of emergence, which may help us to understand emergence in 
active perception. Yet, a caveat must be made. None of these four models pro- 
vides sufficient conditions on the origin of life. Instead, each one provides at best 
salient requirements on attempts to circumscribe certain aspects of emergence 
which contribute to understanding the subject matter in question - the origin of 
life. 
6.2.1 I. Rosen's model - The (M,R)- system 
Rosen introduced his model - (M,R)- system - on the basis of the conception 
of metabolic networks, according to Morán et al. (1997). The production of 
M -units constitutes the baseline of life phenomena. Some of such units can be 
repaired, by R- units, while some others - at least one - cannot. Because of that 
`non- re- establishable' element, organisms are mortal, a general feature2 of life. 
The origin of life is explained in terms of the maintenance of those M -units by 
reparation, which presumes the existence of metabolic nets. 
1The exposition of three of the models is based on the introduction made by Morán et al. 
(1997). The exposition of Kauffman's autocatalytical network is mainly based on Kauffman 
(1995). 
2It would be wrong to say that this is an essence of life, because permanent life would clearly 
be a case of life. 
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Re- appearance of Basic Patterns at a Higher Level and the Change 
There. As is easy to understand, the more such non -re- establishable M -units 
are produced the less would be the severity of the damage, when some of them are 
destroyed. Life emerges in a (M,R)- system, as characterised below. The (M,R)- 
system can be seen as a catalytically -mediated metabolic net, in which M -units 
are produced3 under a recursive structure - certain reparation relations /patterns 
(between R -units and M- units) at one level can re- appear in the next higher level. 
In the course of life elaboration, substrate molecules at all levels remain the same 
but the re- appearing reparation patterns undergo change at the higher level. 
Above is a minimum (M,R)- system, from which the recursive structures for 
reparation relations /patterns can extend (to more patterns) via new genomes. 
Specifically, new recursive structures can be generated in the genome by the 
generation of new machinery which produces the required catalysts of reparation. 
The details of generation are beyond the scope of the present thesis (for detailed 
discussions, see Morán et al. (1997), and Rosen's original texts - (1958, 1959, 
1963, 1966, 1967)). 
A Principle of Emergence - Modifying Basic Patterns Iteratively at a 
Higher Level. In the above discussions, what particularly concerns us is the 
extraction of a novel idea of emergence from Rosen's (M,R)- system. It would not 
be difficult to realise that a novel idea has been suggested - the maintenance of 
reparation within metabolic nets with more patterns of such maintenance (i.e. 
reparation). In particular, the aforementioned recursive structures of reparation 
may suggest an essential aspect of emergence - iteration with modification - 
especially for understanding the processes which lead to elaborate life phenomena. 
In the case of life origin, as a particular subject matter of emergence, what is 
modified is the catalytic4 structures (in the metabolic nets) at a higher level. 
That is, the patterns of production and reparation can re- appear at a higher 
3Here, reparation can be regarded as a particular way of production. 
`Reaction and diffusion are interpreted by Morán et al. (1997) as the two most fundamental 
types of biochemical interactions. Catalysis, as he states, can be seen as a special case of 
reaction. 
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level and then undergo change there. In other words, patterns of production and 
reparation extend recursively into the higher levels. This principle can be seen as 
a common requirement of emergent phenomena. 
In contrast to above discussions, the reparation in the metabolic net may be a 
particular property pertaining to the subject matter concerned - (biological) life - 
as opposed to cognition. It must be noticed that the discussions of emergence in a 
different context, e.g. in active perception, would need to consider the particular 
properties pertaining to that new context. 
In addition, Rosen's (M,R)- system draws a contrast between the baseline of 
emergent life and elaborate structures of life. The baseline of emergent life, from 
mere molecule structures, is the maintenance of reparation within a metabolic net; 
furthermore, the emergence of more elaborate life is understood as the generation 
of more relations /patterns of reparation in the recursive metabolic nets. 
As a lesson for a general understanding of emergence, three principles /requirements 
can be extracted from Rosen's exposition of the most primordial characteristics 
of the subject matter- life: 
1. Baseline and Elaborate Patterns. Emergent phenomena in a particular 
subject matter, be it life or active perception, need the distinction between 
a baseline and elaborate patterns of emergent phenomena. 
2. Iteration with Modification. It is iteration with modification, such as 
the aforementioned recursive relations, that leads the process of emergence 
to elaborate emergent phenomena. 
3. Fundamental Structures of a Particular Subject matter. Emer- 
gence must appear in a particular subject matter, in which the process of 
emergence must be grounded on the fundamental structures of that subject 
matter, such as the aforementioned metabolic nets and its two fundamental 
types of interactions - reactions and catalysis. 
Of course, the interest of this thesis is not the origin of life. The discussion of 
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the origin of life, yet, is not useless. In later discussions, these three requirements 
will be alternatively considered in the context of active perception, in order to 
help us to extract principles of task -level emergence. 
6.2.2 II. Kauffman's model - The Autocatalytical Network 
Kauffman (1993, 1995) explains the origin of life with a model called the autocat- 
alytic network /system, which is a self -propelling loop maintained by self -produced 
catalysts (see figure 6.1), in contrast to the model of self -complementarity of nu- 
cleotide pairs suggested in Watson -Crick pairing rule.5 Kauffman's idea is to 
draw attention to the more primordial role of catalysts in the origin of life, as 
opposed to template replication of genetic information. 
As Kauffman suggests, the basic elements of a self -propelling loop are two 
simple monomers A and B, which are `food' molecules. When energy is supplied 
from the outside, these two simple monomers compose dimers AB and BA, which 
serve as two catalysts for producing BA and AB respectively. This network 
maintains iterative production of catalysts (AB and BA) which are needed for 
the production of food molecules As and Bs - this loop sustains itself Hence, 
this network is autocatalytic. 
Considering the three requirements derived from Rosen's (M,R)- system, Kauff- 
man's model focuses on baseline phenomena of life, without aiming to account 
for elaborate forms of life. The iteration, as a consequence, is not accompanied 
with modification. To address the particular aspect of life origin which Kauff- 
man considers most primordial, this model particularly concerns the availability 
of catalysts, which is fundamentally important for biochemical production. 
Kauffman's model suggests a novel approach to emergence: the baseline of 
5The Watson -Crick pairing rule, briefly, suggests an intuitive model of gene maintenance, 
in which the parts of one helix of the gene that have undergone mutational degradation can 
resume themselves by the template replication of same information from the nucleotide pairs of 
the other helix of the same gene. Given that there are only two nucleotide pairs in genes, A -T 
and C -G (i.e. adenine -thymine and cytosin- guanine), the lost nucleotides in a section position 
of the helix can be recovered by complimented replication of the other nucleotide of its pair, say 
T. The lost nucleotide must be A, hence an A is replicated in the position of lost information. 





Figure 6.1: A Simple Illustration of Kauffman's Model of Autocatalytic 
Network. Two types of dimer are produced in this network. One type of dimer 
- AB - catalyses the reaction Rba that joins As and Bs to produce BA. Similarly, 
the other type of dimer - BA - catalyses the reaction Rab that joins As and 
Bs to produce AB. Because of this autocatalytic network - the network that 
maintains iterative production of catalysts (AB and BA) which are needed for 
the production of food molecules As and Bs - this loop sustains itself. Re -drawn 
from Kauffman (1995), p. 49, Figure 3.1. 
life phenomena as the production of needed biochemical materials (catalysts) for 
the self-sustenance of biochemical organisations /systems6, while such organisa- 
tions /systems are simply exemplified by the autocatalytic network. The self - 
sustenance considered by Kauffman can be understood as a minimally stable and 
continuing collective phenomenon (i.e. autocatalytic network) composed of ba- 
sic components (i.e. monomers). The maintenance of such a network can be 
regarded as the baseline, i.e. origin in the simplest case, of emergence. 
Recall that Rosen's (M,R)- system presumes the existence of metabolic nets, 
which needs to be explained in the first place. Because the self -sustenance7 of 
biochemical organisations/systems can be seen as a central characteristic of life 
origin, Kauffman's model serves as an exposition of a most primordial character- 
istic of life, as distinct from other characteristics (such as template replication at 
6According to Varela and Maturana (1973), an organism must have clear identification of 
biochemical structures, while this requirement is relaxed (i.e. need not be strictly followed) in 
considering its functional organisation. In the present discussions, the identification of particular 
biological structures is not important. Hence, there is not much difference between organisations 
and systems, nor is there a significant difference between network and system. 
' It is important not to confuse self -sustenance with the self -supplying of energy, which is im- 
possible for living organisms. The energy for the autocatalytic network, as previously mentioned, 
must be supplied from outside the organism. 
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gene level). Like Rosen's idea of emergence in his (M,R)- system, a requirement 
of task -level emergence is to maintain a most primordial characteristic of active 
perception. Hence, the discussion so far derives a requirement on emergence, 
additional to the previous three requirements: 
4. The Baseline of Emergent Phenomena as the Self -sustenance 
of the basic organisations /systems of the subject matter. The 
baseline phenomenon of emergence, as suggested in Kauffman's idea 
of autocatalytic network, is the maintenance of a minimally stable 
and continuing collective phenomenon (e.g. autocatalytic network) of 
basic structures (e.g. monomers). 
This requirement on emergence will contribute to explaining emergence in 
the context of active perception (see Section 6.2). 
6.2.3 III. Eigen's Model of Hypercycle 
Eigen (1971) proposes a model of evolving RNA strands, as described by Morán 
et al. (1997). Single RNA strands themselves are incapable of evolution, because 
they are per se too simple. The single autocatalytic cycles of different RNA 
strands, on the basis of the aforementioned Watson -Crick pairing rule (i.e. the 
maintenance of template replication with A -T pair and C -G pair), will end up 
with the production of single enzymes. At this level, no further organisations are 
seen. 
The Generation of a Hypercycle. Evolving autocatalytic systems need the 
connections between the above autocatalytic cycles, connections that lead to a 
global cycle. Specifically, a connection is maintained in the global cycle when 
the enzymes produced in one autocatalytic cycle serve to catalyse the template 
replication of a neighbouring autocatalytic cycle. When such connections of au- 
tocatalytic cycle themselves constitute a cycle, a hypercycle is generated. 
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Stability of a Hypercycle. A hypercycle can be more stable than its com- 
ponent autocatalytic cycles. Once the above connections are maintained across 
autocatalytic cycles, the functional properties of this hypercycle are preserved. 
This still happens, even if some of the component autocatalytic cycles undergo 
fatal mutation. Mutation may give rise to a catastrophe in the process of self - 
reproduction. However, if sorne other reliable components still push forward the 
production of enzymes to catalyse neighbouring autocatalytic cycles, the func- 
tional properties of the whole hypercycle are preserved. As a consequence, whole 
hypercycle is robust, and more reliable than its component autocatalytic cycles. 
Illustrating a Hypercycle -A Cycle at a Higher Level, Not a Mov- 
ing Component Cycle. A figure may help to understand the generation of 
a hypercycle on grounds of component autocatalytic cycles. When a certain au- 
tocatalytic cycle ACi produces the enzyme Ei +i needed for pushing forward a 
neighbouring autocatalytic cycle ACi +i and ACii +i is actually so catalysed, a. 
connection is formed between ACi and ACi +i. When AC,, is connected, in this 
way, back to ACi, a hypercycle is formed. Notice that a hypercycle presumes 
that all its component autocatalytic cycles continue sustaining. 
A Principle of Emergence -A Global Autocatalytic Cycle of Compo- 
nent Autocatalytic Cycles. A principle of emergence can be extracted from 
Eigen's hypercycle model of life origin, to support the discussions of emergence 
in the present thesis. Eigen's hypercycle model of life origin, as we have seen, 
apparently concerns the elaboration of life phenomena, in contrast to Kauffman's 
baseline model of life origin. However, the elaboration of life phenomena dis- 
cussed in Eigen's model, unlike that in Rosen's (AMR)- system, is not based on 
recursive structures /patterns of repair. Rather, it (the elaborate life) consists of 
the catalytic connections between component autocatalytic cycles, if only those 
connections (between component autocatalytic cycles) themselves constitute a 
cycle. 





Figure 6.2: A Hypercycle is Itself a Cycle, but takes place at a Higher 
Level. A hypercycle consists of the catalysts connecting a series of autocat- 
alytic cycles. Figure (a) shows that the enzymes produced in one autocatalytic 
cycle catalyse a neighbouring autocatalytic cycle. When such connections of au- 
tocatalytic cycles themselves constitute a cycle, i.e. the last cycle produces the 
enzymes needed for the maintenance of the beginning cycle, a hypercycle is gen- 
erated. Notice that catalysed cycles will not stop sustaining when they produce 
certain enzymes for the next component cycle in this hypercycle. All component 
autocatalytic cycles persist when the hypercycle is capable of sustaining itself. 
While figure (b) is tantamount to a seemingly moving `point' across component 
cycles, figure (c) illustrates a real cycle. Figure (b) is a wrong model of hypercy- 
cle, whereas figure (c) is a correct one. Among these three figures, (a) is re -drawn 
(with an interpretation) from Morán et al. (1997), Figure 2, p. 258. 
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cycles - take place at a global level. A cycle, by nature, can sustain itself, 
thus fulfilling the baseline requirement of life origin. Along with the connections 
in a hypercycle, the functionality of a previous component autocatalytic cycle 
will reinforce the functionality of a later component autocatalytic cycle. The 
functionality of the hypercycle accordingly differs from that of any component 
autocatalytic cycle, given that the self -sustenance of the hypercycle is based on 
catalytic connections across various RNA strands while the maintenance of each 
component autocatalytic cycle consists in the template replication within the 
sanie RNA strand. 
Note that the notion of hypercycle falls into the previous categories of 'itera- 
tion and modification'. A cycle itself iterates the catalytic connections between its 
components. The modification takes place at the jump of levels from components 
(local) to the global level. A principle of emergence, thus, can be extracted: 
5. The Hypercycle of Component Cycles. A hypercycle emerges 
whenever the connections between its component cycles themselves 
constitute a cycle (of course at a different operational level), where 
a cycle is understood as an organisation /system which somehow sus- 
tains itself. In other words, self -sustenance at an operationally global 
level leads to emergence. 
6.2.4 IV. Maturana and Varela's Autopoietic Model of Life Ori- 
gin 
Apart from the previous three models, the subject matter of life origin is also ex- 
plained in the model of autopoiesis8 proposed by Maturana and Varela (in Varela 
et al. (1974)). The model of autopoiesis, as described by Morán et al. (1997), 
consists in two requirements on a self -maintaining network /system at different 
spatial scales - continuing reproduction of components and the maintenance of 
the network /system itself as a concrete unity in real space and time. To put it 
another way, a living system needs to self -maintain (i) the availability of all its 
8Autopoiesis is Greek word, which roughly means self -production (see Varela et al. (1974)). 
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components and (more essentially) (ii) the organisation of such components into 
a unity distinguishable in real space and time from its surroundings. 
The model can be applied to different subject areas, such as biology, cogni- 
tive science, and mathematical logic, if only those two requirements are fulfilled. 
As an archetypal example, a biological system must evolve (specifically, via the 
polymerization of substrates by catalysts) a spatially closed membrane to dis- 
tinguish it from its surroundings. 
Processes of Interaction Within the Autopoietic Unity. Not discussed 
in Morán et al. (1997), but intrinsic to the notion of autopoiesis, are the pro- 
cesses that realise the operationally (but not necessarily spatially) separable unity 
from the background. Those processes constitute a network of interactions be- 
tween components, which are exemplified by the generation of a (spatially closed) 
membrane. The membrane has a clear spatial boundary, but the processes of in- 
teraction need not. Why can there be constant invariant organisation (i.e. the 
autopoietic unity) out of such interactions? 
The membrane per se does not explain the operationally separable unity in 
question. As an example given by Varela et al. (1974), a crystal is a system 
with fixed spatial relations, but is not an autopoietic unity, because there are no 
processes of interaction that establish the autopoietic unity. As explicitly char- 
acterised in the six criteria of autopoietic unity, boundaries themselves do not 
characterise an autopoietic unity. What is essential to the notion of autopoietic 
unity is not the boundaries per se, but the `preferential neighbourhood relations 
and interactions between [components]' which realise the boundaries. They re- 
alise boundaries hence they are more primordially important than the boundaries 
per se. Even if the boundaries break, the autopoietic unity can be re- gained on 
the basis of the above neighbourhood relations and interactions, as demonstrated 
in the second global behaviour of the computer simulation described below. 
9Polymerization is the process leading to polymers. Polymers are compound large molecules 
made up of linked monomers, simple repeated units of the same types, such as proteins and 
nucleic acids. 
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To see boundaries from another angle, the autopoietic unity of a cell may 
reveal the difference between membrane per se and the processes that lead to 
the boundaries of autopoietic unity. Note that membranes are not themselves 
boundaries, because those boundaries are understood on account of their pro- 
cesses /operations, which go beyond spatial relations. Hence, the autopoietic 
unity of a cell is not grounded on its membrane per se, but on the metabolic 
closure maintained by the interacting processes between the within- membrane 
cellular substrates. 
A Simple Example of Living System by a Computer Simulation. In 
Varela et al. (1974) the above notion is exemplified by a computer simulation 
with three instructions. 
[1] Composition (linking): * + 20 -* * + 
[2] Concatenation (bonding): ... - - E D - -ED-FED - 
n+1 
n=1,2,3,... 
[3] Disintegration: ® 20 
The first instruction10 concerns composition, stating that two substrates sup- 
ported by a catalyst lead to a linked substrate, with that catalyst still being there. 
The second instruction states that n bonded" substrates interacting with another 
substrate lead to n + 1 bonded substrates. Note that this is a recursive rule of 
bond generation. It means that the emergence of longer links is grounded on 
recursive processes. The third instruction concerns the disintegration of bonded 
substrates, which may be caused by collision between substrates or the natural 
decay of bonded substrates. 
The simulation system begins with a two -dimensional quadratic grid which 
consists of substrates with one catalyst in between. With these three instructions, 
1DThe symbols are somewhat different from those in Varela et al. (1974), but this does not 
affect the understanding of this computer simulation. 
11Biochemical 
links and bonds need not be strictly realised by spatially neighbouring links, 
because lots of messengers can travel across limited space and interact with remote molecules. 
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the result of simulation demonstrates two salient global behaviours. Firstly, a 
chain of bonded linked -substrates e eventually forms an enclosure for the cata- 
lyst, which is tantamount to the spontaneous generation of an autopoietic unity. 
Secondly, the chain of bonded linked- substrates ® sometimes breaks, while on- 
going production manifests compensation of bonds in the broken area, which 
reestablishes the autopoietic unity. 
A comment about this simulation is made by Varela et al. (1974), that 
the autopoietic unity is neither represented not embodied in the scheme of those 
three instructions per se, nor is it identical to its components. This is seen in 
their statement: `in general no organisation is represented or embodied in the 
properties that realize it (p. 191)'. In other words, Varela et al. (1974) see 
the generation of autopoietic unity as an emergent phenomenon (i.e. a global 
behaviour), which is not tantamount to its components and the interacting ac- 
tivities, in the sense of non -transparently reducible12 to the mere combination of 
those components. This attitude echoes the original motivation in emphasising 
the essential importance of autopoictic unity: reproduction of components does 
not explain the underlying unity of living organisms, as proclaimed by Varela et 
al. (1974) in the introduction to their paper. In addition, they indicate that the 
12A network /system is non -transparently reducible to the mere combination of components 
when, and only when, the combination of components presents phenomena beyond transpar- 
ent reduction. The notion of transparent reduction means the explanation of a combination 
completely on grounds of its components, which may take the form of computational processes 
specified by the instructions of algorithms. For example, most learning in the PDP is not trans- 
parently reducible, in that the learnt functionality cannot be fully described in terms of the 
behaviour of particular nodes, the weights of particular connections, and the single changes 
controlled by the instructions of algorithms. Despite the difference between PDP and physi- 
cal systems (as opposed to chemical systems), the notion of transparent reduction is similar 
to another notion - micro -reduction (Oppenheim and Putnam 1958) - that the behaviour of a 
physical system can be fully explained on the basis of the behaviours of its components, the basic 
physical entities such as particles, velocity and mass. Common to these two notions is a general 
principle that the whole can be fully explained on the basis of its components. Contrasted to 
the notion of transparent reduction is a perspective which maintains a looser sense of reduction: 
the behaviour of any system (even a neural network with non -linear connections) is in principle 
(necessarily) understandable on the basis of the behaviours of its components. If only the under- 
standing of the behaviour of the whole system takes account, at bottom, of the behaviours of its 
components, the whole system can be seen as reducible in terms of its components. Accordingly, 
even a non -transparently reducible system must still be in principle reducible to its components. 
Thus, the notions of transparent reduction, on the one hand, and reducibility in principle, on 
the other, can be seen as subject to different emphasises of explanation. The former emphasises 
on the generation of behaviours which are not directly describable in terms of behaviours of 
single components, by contrast, the latter on whether additional components or descriptions of 
them are needed to explain the whole system. 
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same components of an autopoietic unity can be allopoietic, i.e. leading to a dif- 
ferent product from the original organism. It is, rather, the network of interacting 
processes (of the components) that leads to that underlying unity. 
It is worth noting that the generation of such a network can be seen as 
emergence, despite the three language -like instructions. This shows that the 
instructions of an emergent system may well be language -like rules. This simu- 
lation of emergence exemplifies our previous definition of emergence as non-pre- 
determination, where there is nothing mentioned about language -like rules (see 
Section 2.6, page 64). What matters for emergence (i.e. non -pre- determination) 
is that interacting processes do not begin with pre- categorised data but can be 
directly affected by factors in the environment. This is shown in the above sim- 
ulation, where the components in the environment (i.e. the two -dimensional 
quadratic grid) interact directly without being mediated by (the trigger of) pre - 
categorised data. 
A Principle of Emergence in connection to Autopoiesis. An autopoietic 
unity differs from a hypercycle, although both of them are global behaviours. 
A hypercycle is not an autopoietic unity, for two reasons. Firstly, a hypercycle 
presumes many component cycles, while an autopoietic unity need not. To see 
this from another angle, a hypercycle must have component cycles, while an 
autopoietic unity need not have further component autopoietic unities. Secondly, 
autopoiesis is a process of producing component biochemical structures. Yet, a 
hypercycle presumes its component cycles without producing them. A single 
component cycle must have certain fundamental biochemical structures before 
it is pushed forward by certain catalysts issued from another component cycle. 
Such catalysts do not amount to a single component cycle. The hypercycle is a 
global phenomenon in which an existing component cycle serves to facilitate the 
continuity of another existing component cycle. 
Autopoiesis differs from Kauffman's autocatalytic cycle, although they both 
concern self -sustenance (of a living system). Autopoiesis concerns the unity of 
all living organisms, while the autocatalytic cycle has a specific focus on the 
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self-sustenance of a minimal network. Autopoiesis does not simply apply to 
a minimum requirement of a living system, but also to the recovery or even 
reproduction13 of itself. It even applies to a hypercycle, given that a hypercycle 
needs an autopoietic unity. 
Accordingly, the notion of an autocatalytic cycle is more sharply focused than 
the notion of autopoiesis, regarding the kinds of living systems it applies to. This 
is probably because Kauffman's notion (autocatalytic cycle) was published much 
later, by about two decades. Kauffman does say something beyond the notion 
of autopoietic unity, given that Maturana and Varela do not specifically address 
the minimum network of life and explain it in terms of the auto catalytic cycle 
(as opposed to other mechanisms, such as the aforementioned gene maintenance 
according to the Watson -Crick pairing rule). However, Kauffman's notion has its 
sharper focus at the expense of a narrower coverage in the application to living 
systems. 
The processes leading to autopoietic unity are basically iterative local trans- 
formations of substrates in the environment. Whenever such transformations (as 
a global behaviour) lead to an operational closure14, an autopoietic unity emerges. 
The emergence of an autopoietic unity, briefly, can be characterised as the pro- 
cesses of an organism that lead to the re- production of itself, which is evident in 
the presence of their operational closure. The emphasis is not on self - sustenance, 
but on the re- production of components with operational closure, i.e. iterative 
generation from parts to whole. 
6. The Emergence of Identical Systems. For a living system, the 
emergence of another operationally identical system can be grounded 
on three stages of emergence - re- producing its components, iterative 
transformations of such components, and operational closure of such 
transformations. 
13The above computer simulation demonstrates the recovery of an autopoietic unity. Self - 
reproduction requires autopoiesis. As it is written: `self -reproduction must take place during 
autopoiesis' (p. 101). 
14An autopoietic unity can be characterised in terms of operational closure. It is actually so 
characterised in Varela et al. (1991), p. 157. 
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Above, six common principles of emergence are derived from explaining the 
origin of life, which are extracted from four models of life origin - I. Rosen's 
(M,R)- system, II. Kauffman's autocatalytic cycle, III. Eigen's hypercycle, and 
IV. Maturana and Varela's autopoiesis. These six principles will be applied to 
another subject area - active perception - in order to derive the basic principles 
for explaining its emergence. As a reminder, such principles do not complete the 
understanding of emergence, but serve as common requirements on emergence, 
although they are derived from a specific subject area (the origin of life). 
6.3 Requirements on Task -level Emergence. 
This section concerns requirements on task -level emergence. Before we set off 
to build principles of task -level emergence, let us briefly organise the relations 
between the previous four models of life origin and the various stages of task - 
level emergence. 
6.3.1 An Outline of Principle Extraction. 
To see the aforementioned relations clearly, they are arranged in the form of a 
table: 
This table provides a general outline of the various stages of task -level emer- 
gence, which correspond to different principles extracted from the previously 
discussed four models of life origin. 
Corresponding to Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoietic unity is the 
core characteristic of all active perception systems: at a given step of computation, 
a system should maintain both the comparison of achieved information and the 
needed information for accomplishing the required task, on the one hand, and the 
actual derivation of information to guide the next step of computation (which 
may begins with sensory -motor movement), on the other. If an active perception 
system is capable of maintaining these two jobs (comparison and derivation) in 
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of Four Models of Life Origin and Their Respec- 
tive Relations to Different Emergent Phenomena in Active Perception. 
From four models of life origin we can extract principles of task -level emergence 
to explain various stages of task -level emergence, from single simple systems to 
elaborate systems. 
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task (by deriving certain perceptual guidance which fulfils that task). Hence, it 
makes no difference whether we interpret autopoietic unity as the comparison 
in a single step of computation or interpret it as the comparison leading to the 
actual accomplishment of a required task within a single system. 
Kauffman's notion of autocatalytic cycles suggests the baseline of task -level 
emergence, the stepwise computation maintained in a simple single active per- 
ception system, such as the attentive control of saccades. 
Rosen's (M,R)- system indicates a difference between baseline and elaborate 
patterns of emergence, and thereby suggests a distinction between a simple system 
and a combinatory system. The latter system, as exemplified by Dickmanns' car, 
consists of many sub -systems which are organised in (parallel or heterarchical) 
relational structures. 
In this table, notice that the processes of internal cohesion are located in 
two positions. Such an allocation indicates that emergent processes take place 
at two levels: lower and higher. Those at the lower level concern the task -level 
emergence of a single system, such as attentive control of saccades or Adept; by 
contrast, those processes at the higher level concern the task -level emergence of a 
large system, such as Dickmanns' car, gaze control, tracking capacity /capability, 
or even the combination of all these systems. The processes that maintain internal 
cohesion at the lower level lead to the computation of information within a single 
small system. The computation at this level corresponds to Rosen's baseline pat- 
terns of emergence phenomena and Kauffman's notion of autocatalytic cycles. In 
contrast, those maintaining internal cohesion at the higher level lead to compu- 
tation across systems (such as gaze control, tracking, or Dickmanns' car), which 
corresponds to both Rosen's conception of elaborate patterns of emergence and 
Eigen's notion of hypercycle. 
6.3.2 Fundamental Structures of Active Perception 
Below are detailed discussions that extract principles of emergence from models 
of life origin. Discussions begin with the six requirements on emergence derived 
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from the four models of life origin (see Section 6.2 page 212). The emphasis, 
however, is on the consideration of them in the context of our subject matter 
- active perception. Although those six requirements are common principles of 
emergence, they really arose in a context different from ours. As a consequence, 
the first step in the following discussions is to isolate the fundamental structures of 
active perception, as opposed to the metabolic nets and its two (among others) 
fundamental types of interactions - reactions and catalysis. This is explicitly 
required in the third principle derived from the previous discussions on Rosen's 
(M,R.)- system. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the task of active perception is to provide 
guidance of bodily actions. More precisely, a requirement can be derived: 
Principle 1. The Context Of Task -level Emergence - Compu- 
tation for Deriving Guidance of Sensory -motor Movements 
and Bodily Actions. The fundamental structures of active per- 
ception are the iterative computational processes of perceptual inputs 
based on the most fundamental type of interaction - process selection 
- with the effect of deriving guidance for sensory -motor movements, 
and such iterative computation eventually leads to the fulfilment of 
the required tasks - providing guidance for bodily actions. 
This principle indicates two salient differences between task -level emergence 
and the origin of life - (1) computation that leads to (2) the accomplishment 
of tasks. Regarding point (1), systems of active perception do not maintain 
biochemical processes, but maintain computation over information. Regarding 
Point (2), the aim of active perception systems is not self -sustenance but the 
accomplishment of the required tasks. 
Bringing these two points together, the computation for accomplishing tasks, 
in a nutshell, needs the comparison between three sources of information - (a) 
the previously achieved information initiated by sensors, (b) the tasks imposed 
from outside the active perception systems (e.g. from intentions) which can be 
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fulfilled by active perception systems with perceptual guidance (in support of 
bodily actions), (c) the needed information for the next step of computation 
indicated by these systems in the light of accomplishing the required tasks. The 
derivation of point (c) stands as the leading characteristic of all active perception 
systems. 
Note that the computation of an active perception system may be inter- 
rupted but such a system should basically be capable of carrying out the whole 
cycle of computation leading to the derivation of the perceptual guidance that 
fulfils the required tasks. For example, tracking a moving ball may be inter- 
rupted /distracted by a sudden sound. However, in the circumstances where no 
interruption arise, a tracking system should be capable of providing perceptual 
guidance for catching that ball. 
After considering the first principle, discussions of task -level emergence should 
address the baseline requirement of active perception, i.e. what constitutes a 
minimum system of active perception. 
Kauffman's model of autocatalytic network (see Section 6.2.2, page 215) 
suggests a requirement for understanding the task -level emergence of active per- 
ception. 
6.3.3 The Baseline of Emergent Phenomena as the Stable and 
Continuing Processing of Single Systems of Active Percep- 
tion 
Considering the subject matter of active perception, the baseline phenomenon 
of emergence (which is exemplified in Kauffman's model by the autocatalytic 
network /system for the maintenance of biochemical organisations) would be the 
self-sustenance of the simplest organisations /systems of active perception: that 
is, the (minimal stable) continuation of those systems' functionality simply by 
re -using their own outputs as inputs. Despite this general feature, there seems to 
be no single answer as to what exactly a baseline phenomenon of task -level emer- 
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gence is like. The baseline phenomenon of active perception seems to be multiply 
realised, as evident in many systems of active perception each of which provides 
a particular characteristic of active perception. That is, every implementation of 
single phenomenon (of active perception) can be seen as a baseline phenomenon 
of emergence. 
For example, a simple model for the attentive control of saccades explains 
the self- sustenance of selection over saccades, specifically as follows: 
Principle 2.1. The Baseline Emergence of Attentive Control 
of Saccades. The baseline emergence of attentive control of saccades 
can be explained as the stable and continuing collective phenomenon 
of selection over basic components (compared with monomers in Kauff- 
man's models) of visual perception - the roughly attended features 
gathered from the visual inputs. 
As another example, Snake (as a general algorithm) captures the phenomenon 
of internal configuration of component images, to- 
gether the images of line, angle, curve, etc., under the influences of different 
degrees of forces imposed on such component images.ls Within Snake self - 
sustenance must be achieved. That is, the system of Snake must run stably 
and continually. While the self -sustenance in the context of life origin is ex- 
plained by the notion of autocatalytic cycle -a characteristic of life origin - the 
self -sustenance here is explained as follows: 
Principle 2.2. The Baseline Emergence of Tracking by Snake. 
Snake provides a baseline understanding of tracking (apart from the 
Kalman filter), under the notion of smoothly linking together compo- 
nent images under the influences of the different (degrees of) forces 
imposed on such component images. 
There remain more examples, such as the Kalman filter, Adept, and pursuit. 
15What component images are implemented depends on what basic components are actually 
in -built in the particular Snake. 
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In fact, insofar as we have surveyed, the implementations of active perception 
almost all are dedicated to single simple phenomena (of active perception), ex- 
cept for Dickmanns' car. The implementation of each single phenomenon would 
provide a particular characteristic of the emergence in question - task -level emer- 
gence. 
6.3.4 The Emergence of Elaborate Systems - Iterative Modifica- 
tion of a Combinatory System at a Higher Level 
Having discussed the baseline phenomena of emergence, we need to turn to 
the elaborate phenomena of emergence. As suggested in previous discussions 
of Rosen's (M,R)- system (see Section 6.2.1, page 212), emergent systems may 
undergo elaboration, in which the basic patterns undergo change /modification 
iteratively at a higher level. Notice that in the context of Rosen's (M,R)-system 
the notion of level refers to recursive biochemical structures; yet, in the context 
of active perception, the notion of level may not mean that. 
In the task -level emergence of active perception, the conception of iteration - 
i.e. iterative levels16 - may refer to the iterative cycles of computation at run -time, 
in which the basic structure is not biochemical connection but process selection, 
such as the computation of next target position of saccadic movement. In the 
next cycle of computation, the process selection is maintained by comparing (the 
weights of the attended features, in the case of attentive control of saccades) the 
previously achieved features and the needed features for the required tasks. 
Consider the computation for the next cycle in Dickmanns' car, gaze con- 
trol, and tracking capacity /capability, which may be conceived as combinatory 
systems. When the computational process of a sub- system /small system (such 
as the attentive control of saccades, as a component sub -system of gaze control) 
proceeds to a next level /cycle /step, the computation may need to take account 
160bviously, one must not literally identify the term `level' here with the term `level' in `task - 
level emergence'. In fact, the term `level' has a variety of references, but one will be singled 
out according to its context. At least three kinds of level are distinguished in Churchland and 
Sejnowski (1992) - level of organisation, level of spatial scale, level as processing stage. 
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of influences from other sub- systems (such as pursuit system). Information from 
other sub -systems is needed, because gaze control must make corrections over cer- 
tain errors resulting from the computational time or otherwise (see Section 3.4.5, 
page 104). The gaze control consequently becomes elaborate (than simply the 
attentive control of saccades). If we regard the attentive control of saccades as a 
sub- system of guidance at a lower level, then the influences can be seen as taking 
place at a higher level of gaze control. At a higher level the gaze control can be 
seen as undergoing iterative modification. Thus, a principle can be framed as to 
the task -level emergence of elaborate systems: 
Principle 3. System Elaboration Through Iterative Mod- 
ification at a Higher Level. An active perception system can 
have its computation elaborated when the computation proceeds to a 
next step. A next step can be seen as a higher level of computation. 
Through iterative computation at a higher level, elaboration takes 
place, in the sense that the computation proceeds nearer and nearer 
toward the required task. 
The application of Rosen's notion of iterative modification at a higher level is 
not limited to gaze control. It can also be applied to Dickmanns' car and tracking 
capacity /capability, and any combinatory system. All of them consist of iterative 
processes with later steps of computation enhanced by other sub -systems in the 
same combinatory system. Eventually the computation of a combinatory system 
proceeds nearer and nearer to the required tasks. 
6.3.5 The Autopoietic Unity of an Active Perception System. 
The explanation of task -level emergence can be further supported by another 
model of life origin: Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoietic unity (see 
Section 6.2.4, page 220). The above discussions are inspired by Rosen's notion 
of re- appearance and change at a higher level. However, the basic conception 
of a computational cycle as such was presumed and needs further explanation. 
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In this regard, a explanation can be inspired by Maturana and Varela's notion 
of autopoietic unity. Specifically, the notion of a computational cycle, and the 
notion of generating a new cycle of computation need explanations regarding 
their autopoietic unity. 
In the context of computational cycles, the notion of autopoietic unity can be 
understood as an operationally identical system, with three stages of emergence 
- the generation of component perceptual features or routes of sensory -motor 
movements, iterative transformations of them, and, most important, the opera- 
tional closure of such transformations. In the context of active perception, the 
notion of operational closure can be interpreted as the completion of computa- 
tional processes under the same mechanisms before the re- initiation of continuing 
computational processes under those mechanisms. 
With this interpretation, understanding a cycle of attentive control of sac- 
cades is focused on the completion of computational processes under the mech- 
anisms of the above attentive control. The completion of certain computational 
processes must happen before the re- initiation of another cycle of those processes. 
The aforementioned three models of emergence have different emphases. Rosen's 
principles of emergence emphasise the re- appearance and change at a higher level, 
and Kauffman's principle emphasises the self -sustenance (stable and continuing 
self-maintenance) of an elementary system. By contrast, Maturana and Varela's 
principles of emergence focus on the completion of the generational processes as- 
sociated with a single system. Accordingly, the iterative computation of active 
perception not only needs to address novel perceptual features and useful internal 
transformations but also is required to complete the computation in each cycle. 
As it happens, the completion of a single cycle is insured by the compari- 
son of the already gained computational achievements with the information still 
needed for the required tasks. Neither novel features nor useful transformations 
suffice to explain task -level emergence without considering that comparison. The 
completion of a cycle must be ensured by that comparison before the initiation 
of the next cycle. Thus, the task -level emergence of active perception does not 
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entirely consist in the collection of novel features and the derivation of useful 
transformations, but also in the computational activity that insures the previous 
outcome will really contribute to the required tasks. Without insuring this con- 
tribution, the computational processes, however subtle they are, cannot qualify 
as a cycle of active perception. 
Like the closure of operational processes which is claimed to be essential to 
a living system in Maturana and Varela's notion of emergence, the concern of 
accomplishing the required tasks (as evident in the aforementioned activity of 
comparison) is what is essential to active perception, rather than the computa- 
tional processes that serve to make available and transform perceptual informa- 
tion. That is, the processes of active perception are essentially the computational 
processes that insure the contribution of collected information to the need for an 
externally required task. A principle of task -level emergence can consequently be 
derived: 
Principle 4. The Autopoietic Unity of an Active Perception 
System - Insuring the Contribution to Tasks. What is essential 
to systems of active perception is not the computational processes 
for information collection and their internal transformations, but the 
processes for insuring their contribution to the required tasks. 
Task -level emergence, as a consequence, is intrinsically grounded on the com- 
putation concerning the contribution of information collection to the externally 
imposed tasks. 
An Inherent Pragmatist Stance in Active Perception. The above discussions 
about the contribution of collected information to tasks imply that the function - 
ality of autonomous systems ends up with the support of their use: deriving the 
needed information in support of the externally imposed tasks. This signifies 
a philosophical interpretation of active perception, that the systems of active 
perception are ultimately pragmatist systems, in the sense that what perceptual 
information is to be collected at the next step of sensory -motor movement de- 
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pends on the contribution (consequences) of the would -be collected information to 
the currently required task. In other words, the computation of what an optimal 
next step of sensory -motor movement would be does not depend on properties of 
that would -be step per se, but instead on its consequences /contributions (to the 
currently required task). As a result, the content of a perceptual scene (i.e. the 
perceptual understanding) needs to be organised on the basis of its consequences 
- specifically, the contributions of its ingredients to the required task. It is, there- 
fore, not illegitimate to say that task -level emergence essentially presumes certain 
pragmatist features. 
Autopoietic Unity as the Autonomy of an Autonomous System. The au- 
topoietic unity of a living system is regarded by Maturana and Varela as its 
autonomy. Similarly, the computational processes that insure the contribution of 
collected information to the need of an externally required task can be seen as the 
autonomy of an active perception system. Somewhat surprisingly, the autonomy 
of an autonomous system has a pragmatist basis. This point will be continued in 
later discussions in the present thesis. 
6.3.6 Understanding of Task -level Emergence in Terms of Eigen's 
Notion of Hypercycle. 
The notion of single cycles in the context of active perception having been dis- 
cussed, we can proceed to discuss Eigen's notion of hypercycle, which is a global 
phenomenon on the basis of component cycles. The understanding of task -level 
emergence would be incomplete, without understanding the global phenomenon 
of components' cycles, which refers to the global behaviour of component single 
cycles in active perception systems, as exemplified by the accomplishment of any 
active perception system, including a relatively complicated case - Dickmanns' 
car. 
In the context of active perception, a hypercycle can be identified with a 
combinatory system plus a requirement: the system carries out a series of corn- 
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putational processes (leading to the accomplishment of a required task) on the 
basis of the mutual support provided by the computational results of sub -systems. 
The Global Behaviour Manifested in a Hypercycle. A hypercycle refers 
to the series of computational processes /steps /cycles leading to the accomplish- 
ment of a single task. The importance of a hypercycle beyond its component 
cycles can be seen from the mutual connections of those component cycles. In 
other words, no task of a combinatory system can be accomplished without the 
mutual support of the sub -systems. The completion of a task is a global phe- 
nomenon of component cycles, which may pertain to different sub- systems. This 
is because the completion of a task results from the mutual support between 
those sub -systems, which is not transparently reducible to the mere combination 
of the cycles provided by all sub -systems (see Section 12, page 223). The global 
behaviour of task accomplishment, as suggested in the notion of hypercycle, con- 
sists of the connections of computational processes leading to the accomplishment 
of the required tasks. Furthermore, the end of the hypercycle is also a beginning 
for another hypercycle; likewise, the accomplishment of a single task constitutes 
the beginning of another task. 
A note should make to clarify the nature of a hypercycle. A hypercycle 
is a series of computational processes in a combinatory system, as above de- 
fined. Two confusions should be avoided. First, a combinatory system is not 
itself tantamount to a hypercycle, but can be conceived of as its bearer. A hy- 
percycle, accordingly, corresponds to a single task, which is supported by the 
non -transparently reducible combination of all the sub -systems. Second, when 
the computational processes are running, in the sense that various sub -systems 
`take turns' to control the combinatory system, the sub -systems may continue 
their respective computation, without stopping and waiting for their `turn'. To 
use an analogy, a hypercycle is itself a cycle, not a moving point (see Section 6.2, 
page 219). 
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Hypercycle and Activeness. Discussions of task -level emergence must ex- 
plain how a hypercycle emerges from its component cycles. It is not hard to 
realise that the how question addressed here is exactly the question of explain- 
ing activeness previously discussed. The answer, unlike previous discussions on 
grounds of models of life origin, is not derivable directly from the notion of hyper- 
cycle. Here, this notion only serves as a requirement on active perception, that 
the task accomplishment must be explained as global behaviour of component 
cycles of computation. There is no further indication as to what exactly are the 
computational processes that lead to the envisaged global behaviour. The notion 
of hypercycle may be multiply realised, on the basis of different ways of mutual 
support between sub -systems, as demonstrated by the differences between gaze 
control, Dickmanns' car, and other tracking capacities /capabilities. 
At this point, discussions in the present thesis must develop an explanation 
of the hypercycle in active perception systems. This explanation must be consid- 
ered to be an underlying principle common to all kinds of hypercycle (in active 
perception systems). This is seen in part in the topic of the next section, a newly 
proposed notion - internal cohesion. 
6.3.7 Summary 
The task -level emergence of active perception can be understood on the basis of 
four principles which are extracted from four models of life origin. 
The first model is Rosen's (M,R)- system, in relation to which two points of 
task -level emergence can be established. One, while the fundamental struc- 
tures of life origin are biochemical structures, the fundamental structures of 
active perception may refer to the stepwise computation of perceptual inputs 
leading to the guidance of bodily actions. The other point is that the task -level 
emergence grows from baseline to elaborate patterns of emergent phenomena, 
specifically from several small operation -specialist systems to a combinatory sys- 
tem, as exemplified by gaze control and Dickmanns' car. 
The second model of life origin is Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoietic 
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unity, which emphasises the importance of operational closure in understanding 
life phenomena. Related to this principle is that the basic computational cycle 
of task -level emergence consists in the comparison between collected information 
and the needed information which insures the previous outcome will really con- 
tribute to the required tasks. A striking point derived from this principle is that 
the systems of active perception are ultimately pragmatist systems. 
The third model that gives hints toward the understanding of task -level emer- 
gence is Kauffman's autocatalytic network, which emphasises the requirement of 
self-sustenance for a minimal living system. Corresponding to this principle is a 
principle of task -level emergence, namely that the stepwise computation of ac- 
tive perception is grounded on the stable and continuing processing leading to 
the completion of a single step of information comparison, between the already 
collected information and the information needed for accomplishing a required 
task. 
The last model is Eigen's model of hypercycle, which is an autocatalytic cycle 
generated from the connection of several component autocatalytic cycles. Similar 
to the generation of a hypercycle is the stepwise computation of a combinatory 
system on the basis of its sub -systems, such as the computation of Dickmanns' 
car based on the mutual support between several particular tracking sub -systems, 
as manifested in the control of generic schedules which link to each tracking sub- 
system by feedback loops. 
6.4 Emergence as Internal Cohesion 
This section discusses the generation of adequate guidance (for the required tasks) 
from the viewpoint of emergence. 
As previously mentioned (see Section 6.3, page 227), the processes of internal 
cohesion take place at two levels - lower and higher. Those at the lower level 
concern the task -level emergence of a single system, such as attentive control of 
saccades or Adept. By contrast, those processes at the higher level concern the 
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task -level emergence of a large system, such as Dickmanns' car, gaze control, 
tracking capacity /capability, or even the combination of all these systems. The 
processes that maintain internal cohesion at the lower level lead to the computa- 
tion within a single small system. The computation at this level corresponds to 
Rosen's baseline patterns of emergent phenomena and Kauffman's notion of au- 
tocatalytic cycles. In contrast, those maintaining internal cohesion at the higher 
level lead to computation across systems (such as gaze control, tracking, or Dick - 
manns' car), which corresponds to both Rosen's conception of elaborate patterns 
of emergence and Eigen's notion of hypercycle. 
The discussion in the previous chapter explained activeness - what makes 
active perception work - on the basis of exploitative control. Sections 5.2 and 
5.3 discussed task identification and the arrangement of processes leading to de- 
signers' envisaged tasks. The discussions highlight the importance of small -sized 
operation- specialist systems, whose nature is discussed in Section 5.4 via the no- 
tion of quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules (as opposed to func- 
tional and action modules). Such quasi -form modules are vitally important for the 
implementation of active perception, as previous arguments show, because they 
alone can fulfil the four main characteristics of active perception. Such modules 
contribute to active perception by providing four types of exploitative utilities, 
which together serve as the guidance for fetching further needed information in 
support of the required tasks. 
It is not yet clear, however, as to how adequate guidance can be made avail- 
able (by quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules) in support of task 
identification and the arrangement of processes which leads to the accomplish- 
ment of the designer's envisaged tasks. The question, specifically, rests on the 
competence of generating adequate guidance in autonomous systems, which have 
neither built -in blueprints not inherent intention. A system with quasi- functional 
modules and quasi- action modules may well produce certain guidance, but it 
needs to explain as to why an autonomous system with such a repertoire can 
produce the adequate guidance leading to the (designer's) envisaged tasks. If it 
is neither a built -in blueprint nor inherent intention, what is it ultimately that 
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constitutes the basis of that adequate guidance? 
The previous efforts toward explaining this adequate guidance will be seen 
in a new light when they are considered in the context of emergence. Emergent 
phenomena need neither blueprints nor intentions. In addition, the previous es- 
tablished principles of emergence may shed some light on our present discussions. 
The above question may consequently receive a plausible answer when it is put 
in the context of emergence. 
The course of emergence is by no means magical, however. There seems to 
be no such a thing as a first principle of emergence which is so comprehensive that 
from within it every useful notion can be derived. Conversely, additional subject 
areas may serve to elaborate our knowledge of emergence. The understanding 
of emergence may be topic dependent to a certain extent: that is, although 
there may be commonalities between the emergence of biological traits and that 
of cognitive capacities, there may also be differences. Previous understanding of 
emergence in biology may be elaborated by the knowledge of emergence developed 
from different subject areas. 
Active perception can be seen as one of these subject areas. The distinctive 
nature of active perception, as manifested in the adequate guidance of task iden- 
tification and process arrangement which leads to the required tasks, suggests the 
notion of internal cohesion as a ground notion of emergence, as we will see. To see 
it from another perspective, when we are in the process of deriving such a notion, 
the above question about adequate guidance will be understood in the context of 
emergence, which is a more feasible ground (than the discussions in previous two 
sections) for understanding generation in autonomous systems. Such a ground 
can be shaped as follows: the guidance for the required task is considered as 
adequate when, and only when, it is heading in the direction of the required task, 
and this is done by maintaining the effect of internal cohesion between various 
factorial conditions (including transformations of perceptual inputs and values of 
critical variables) and the stepwise guidance of sensory -motor movements. 
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6.4.1 Explaining the Emergence of Active Perception in terms 
of Internal Cohesion 
Emergence and Cooperation. Global behaviour is generally conceived of as 
the cooperation of the components in a system in which emergence takes place 
(e.g. Forrest 1991). The cooperation, in turn, is subject to different princi- 
ples depending on the related algorithms /mechanisms of emergence. However, 
the emergence with recourse to both dynamical systems and situated activities, 
which are subject to different mechanical principles, are commonly understood 
in terms of cooperation. The concept of cooperation seems to have been taken 
as the polar opposite to the concept of the instructions specified in the algo- 
rithms for characterising local activities. It is consequently merely a concept, 
without specifying exactly the mechanical principles or the conceptual exposition 
of emergence. 
The emergence of active perception (at task -level), by conception, certainly 
falls into the category of cooperation. However, the discussions here are commit- 
ted to further conceptual exposition, and we consequently introduce a notion - 
internal cohesion. 
Internal Cohesion. 
A Novel Notion. The term `internal cohesion' in the present thesis can be 
defined as follows. 
Definition of Internal Cohesion. Internal cohesion is meant as 
the act of effectively composing all the forces relating to a particular 
system within an (artificial or real) organism which controls sensory - 
motor movements or bodily actions, such that those forces serve to 
arrange the serial steps of computation (in the derivation of guidance) 
in a way that reflects the various internal emphases of a given task. 
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To put it in the context of active perception, the notion of internal cohesion 
largely relates to two types of task - gaze control and tracking. 
This definition needs elucidation by examples of different tasks of active per- 
ception. Regarding the tasks of gaze control, the relevant forces are the stepwise 
evaluation of visual inputs and the consequently derived guidance of sensory - 
motor movements. Relative to such forces, internal cohesion specifically refers 
to the act of a perceptual system that arranges the stepwise evaluation of facto- 
rial conditions, and consequently derives guidance of sensory -motor movements, 
with the effect that the needed information /guidance in support of certain bod- 
ily actions is properly collected. In the course of computation, the serial steps of 
evaluation manifest the emphases of the task engaged with, such as important 
visual features relating to that task. 
Regarding the tasks of tracking, the relevant forces are the perceptual images 
under transformation and further linkage. Here, internal cohesion particularly 
refers to the transformation and integration of the factorial conditions in the 
perceptual inputs, for identifying concrete bodies quickly, with a view to keeping 
track of the targets and recognising them. In such a context, internal cohesion 
(as an act of composing forces) provides two kinds of guidance - the prediction 
of subsequent contours for further tracking and the transformation of the current 
target contours into corresponding bodily movements in support of catching the 
target. The ingredients of these two kinds of guidance are the emphases of the 
task here - tracking. 
The Non- intentional Origin of Global Behaviour in Active Perception. Of 
course, internal cohesion as an act is not maintained as an effect of an intentional 
being, such as an homunculus. It is an effect of global behaviour between vari- 
ous computational mechanisms within the perceptual system concerned, such as 
the stepwise evaluation of visual features maintained by the attentive control of 
saccadic movements together with the subsequent pursuit movements. 
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Not a Conceptual Analysis. The above definition of internal cohesion is not 
simply a conceptual analysis imposed on the concept of cooperation (in con- 
nection to emergence). If the definition of internal cohesion resulted from the 
conceptual analysis of cooperation, then the concept of internal cohesion would 
simply re -state what was already known about the cooperative processes in rela- 
tion to emergence. In addition, the cooperative processes relating to the task -level 
emergence of active perception would then necessarily fall into the category of 
internal cohesion, and consequently it would be impossible to have conceptual 
alternatives to cooperative processes. 
Internal cohesion does not seem to result from the conceptual analysis of 
cooperation, for two reasons. First, the connotations of internal cohesion outstrip 
the concept of cooperation, because internal cohesion can be regarded as a further 
exposition of cooperation. As manifested in the definition of internal cohesion, 
internal cohesion is an act of effective composition of certain forces within an 
organism, and such an act is not an element of the concept of cooperation. 
Second, there are indeed certain conceptual alternatives to task -level emer- 
gence related to the understanding of active perception, although they might be 
less plausible than the account of internal cohesion. 
An attempt at explaining the task -level emergence in question is Steels' ac- 
count of emergent functionality, according to which it is the organism- environment 
interactions that account for emergence, not the act of composing forces within 
an organism. These two accounts might not be incompatible, but they are indeed 
not conceptually identical. 
Another example is the self -organisation grounded by dynamical systems 
theory, according to which emergence is brought about by the tightly coupling 
interactions between certain number of control parameters. Again, this is a differ- 
ent account, because the intra- organism forces in internal cohesion are not control 
parameters, and because the processes of composing forces may be different (and 
indeed are usually different17) from the differential equations characterised in 
17Certain implementations of active perception do not adopt dynamical systems, such as 
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dynamical systems theory. 
Therefore, the account of internal cohesion provides new understanding of 
emergence beyond the conception of cooperation. Internal cohesion can be di- 
vided into two types, corresponding to different active perception systems: gaze 
control and tracking. 
Type One Internal Cohesion - Gaze Control. The actual paths of saccadic 
and pursuit movements depend on the contingency of the visual scene, but the 
underlying mechanisms are fixed. Both kinds of movements have their respective 
control mechanisms, which are fixed, and a saccade is always followed by a pursuit 
movement -a fixed order. For a given task in different environmental conditions, 
the foveae are not directed to the same features in saccadic movements, nor 
are the resulting paths pre -determined, but the underlying mechanisms manifest 
fixed orders between the saccade and the pursuit, and between single saccadic 
movements. It is the computation involved that maintains the composition of the 
ordered processes. Specifically, the maintenance of order should be attributed 
to the stepwise evaluation of visual features maintained by attentive control of 
saccade and the stepwise comparison between expected features and the actual 
foveated features maintained by the pursuit. In the end, the ordered processes 
lead to the accomplishment of tasks. There is no intentional being, but only 
computational mechanisms, which serve to maintain the order. 
As another example, in Adept (see Section 4.2.1, page 126), it is the compu- 
tation of critical variables that manages to identify a free -space and lead Adept 
away from obstacles toward the target. A variety of critical variables are in- 
volved, such as the unit vector T viewed from a certain vantage point, the degree 
of curvature of the envisaged surface, and the curvature of the curve -section on 
the plane determined by T and the curve normal N of the given point r. The 
computation is subject to a serial order, which consists of three stages (1) detect- 
Adept, and the attentive control of saccadic movements. For those that do adopt dynamical 
systems, such as Dickmanns' car (see Section 4.2.2, page 132), dynamical systems theory is not 
the only mechanism subserving them, as the generic schedule of procedures is actually another 
implemented mechanism. 
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ing the surface shape of an encountered obstacle, (2) determining the free -space 
around this obstacle, and then (3) managing to determine the free -space between 
obstacles (figure 4.5). The serial order is clearly manifested. With a free -space 
identified, it is then straightforward for Adept to pass over the unmodelled ob- 
stacles and eventually reach the pre- specified goal. The computed values of those 
critical variables are available to further computation at later stages, with the 
effect of bringing about guidance toward the pre -fixed target. 
Like saccadic and pursuit movements, the actual paths of Adept toward 
the target are subject to the contingency of environmental conditions. However, 
there are fixed serial orders of guidance (toward that target), which is not pre- 
determined but consists of the computed variables at different stages. 
Type Two Internal Cohesion - Tracking. The internal cohesion in the con- 
text of tracking is exemplified by Snake and the Kalman filter. Snake is a system 
of tracking that puts together various basic images (such as line, curve, angle) 
smoothly and quickly via an internal energy- minimising function, which is an au- 
tonomous mechanism. Between those basic images the energy- minimising func- 
tion maintains linkage with smooth and continuous splines, for which even those 
basic images need to be slightly modified. 
The result is the identification of concrete (rigid or elastic, stationary or mov- 
ing) bodies for the targets, which are consequently identified in the surrounding 
objects. Because of the continuity between shapes, the identification of those 
concrete objects at one moment helps the identification of the same targets at 
the next moment. In addition, the identification of objects does not end up with a 
visual display, but contributes to bodily movements. Specifically, the perceptual 
information of target identification can be transformed into corresponding bodily 
actions in a serial order, in view of catching the target somehow (by grasping, 
how and arrow, even by a missile -a more complicated case). 
In brief, the internal cohesion in relation to Snake is maintained by an au- 
tonomous mechanism (i.e. the energy- minimising function), which provides both 
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the contours of concrete bodies (for the current and next moments) and the trans- 
formation into corresponding bodily movements in the light of catching the target 
objects. 
Similarly, the Kalman filter is a system of tracking that serves to provide 
concrete contours for the target objects at current and next moments, and it can 
be connected to mechanisms that transform the identified contours into corre- 
sponding bodily movements in view of catching the targets. A salient difference 
between the Kalman filter and Snake rests on the process of contour identifica- 
tion. While that of Snake is a synchronic function of a variety of basic images, 
the process of the Kalman filter is a diachronic function of certain external states, 
specifically a recursive function for stepwise evaluation of the computed values 
and comparison between those values and the previous estimate. 
Such a difference between time orders does not affect the Kalman filter's 
maintenance of internal cohesion. The internal cohesion remains maintained by 
an autonomous mechanism, and the result is concrete objects in the visual states. 
As discussed previously (in Section 4.1.3 page 122), the Kalman filter is, in fact, 
more powerful and flexible than Snake, because the various forms of the Kalman 
filter subserve the tracking of more elastic and faster moving targets. 
Three Characteristics of Internal Cohesion. In all the above examples, the 
actual paths of the gaze and actual contours under tracking are directed by the 
derived processes of the systems concerned, which respond to the unpredictable 
environmental factors. The emergence of those processes is maintained by a com- 
putation with the following three characteristics. The computation constitutes 
the internal cohesion of the system in question, in which appropriate guidance 
is brought about (a) at various stages (b) with different factorial conditions. 
Also the internal cohesion is (c) grounded in the stepwise computation of critical 
variables (or estimated features and knowledge gains in the Kalman filter), the 
evaluation and comparison between expected and actually achieved values. 
Snake seems to be an exception, because its mechanism is a synchronic (hence 
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not stepwise) function, to which the above three characteristics do not seem to 
be relevant. This may affect the applicability of these three characteristics, but 
this problem can be easily resolved. Remember that Snake becomes more flexible 
when it is realised in the form of the Kalman Snake, an instance of the dynamical 
Kalman filter (see Section 4.1.2, page 122), which is a stepwise function. When 
we talk about those three characteristics in connection with Snake, we specifically 
refer to the Kalman Snake. Yet, note that Snake itself remains an instance of 
internal cohesion. 
Thus, the internal cohesion is neither controlled by an intentional being or 
designed on the basis of pre- determination, but is maintained by the underlying 
mechanisms in the perceptual systems concerned, with the above three charac- 
teristics (a) (b) (c). 
Having defined the notion of internal cohesion, we have a firm ground from 
which to look again at the previously discussed issues about emergence and cer- 
tain important properties of active perception. 
6.4.2 Internal Cohesion as Exploitative Control 
Activeness. In the previous discussions, the term `activeness' is meant as what 
makes active perception work. Now, in the context of emergence, the notion of 
activeness is explained by reference to internal cohesion. Active perception is 
maintained by task -level emergence, as opposed to pre- determination or inten- 
tions, and that task -level emergence can specifically be explained in terms of 
internal cohesion. This point has already been demonstrated in the previous dis- 
cussions about saccadic and pursuit movements, Adept, Snake and the Kalman 
filter. Since these are all the cases of task -level emergence (as opposed to learn- 
ing) considered in the present thesis, the notion of internal cohesion is applicable 
to active perception in general. 
Task Identification and Processes Arrangement Maintained by Inter- 
nal Cohesion. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 the argument concluded with the state- 
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ment: both the identification of the required tasks and the arrangement of the 
needed information for those required tasks can be explained by reference to small 
architectures, on the one hand, and within -system relational structures and /or 
inter -system links, on the other. The emphasis in those sections rests on the small 
architectures. It is not yet explained, however, how adequate guidance can be 
achieved on the basis of those small architectures. This question can be answered 
now in terms of internal cohesion. 
What was left unexplained mainly concerns relevance. Specifically, it was 
presumed that a limited repertoire of capabilities will naturally support the detec- 
tion of relevant perceptual inputs and the derivation of relevant processes. How- 
ever, the question how that relevance is achieved has really been left untouched. 
Given that this question must be resolved by appeal to neither pre- determination 
nor intention, the explanation of that relevance would be a difficulty without be- 
ing put into the context of emergence. 
The notion of internal cohesion can now serve to explain the aforementioned 
relevance. As analysed in the previous chapter, systems of active perception are 
subject to two types of task identification. Type one is mediated by represen- 
tations in selection mechanisms, while type two falls into the category of per- 
formance. Task identification of these two types comprise both the detection of 
relevant perceptual inputs and the initiation of relevant processes, both of which 
need a small repertoire of capabilities. At this point, the relevance can be further 
explained in terms of the act of effective composition of all the forces relating to 
a particular system. The mechanisms of the system in question first circumscribe 
the range of the relating forces, and then we focus on those mechanisms, which 
serve to compose the related forces. In systems of active perception, the act of 
`composition' happens ío18 be realised in the stepwise computation maintained 
by those mechanisms, as discussed in the examples and the three characteristics 
of internal cohesion. 
18The act of internal cohesion in different systems may be realised by different strategies of 
computation. It is an empirical issue as to what actually are the processes undertaken by the 
act of internal cohesion. That act is a general concept to be realised in particular systems. 
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Apart from task identification, the notion of internal cohesion also applies to 
the arrangement of appropriate processes leading to the performance of the de- 
signer's envisaged tasks. Again, the small repertoire of capabilities circumscribes 
the related forces of the system (of active perception) in question. The stepwise 
computation maintained by the mechanisms of that system serves to arrange the 
processes leading to the required tasks. 
One might raise an inquiry as to why the mechanisms pertaining to the sys- 
tems of active perception happen to maintain the stepwise computation leading 
to the required tasks. This is somewhat similar to the question why the V1 area 
of human cortex together with the extrastriate visual areas happens to be largely 
capable of maintaining the computation of visual forms (including colour, shape 
and motion), which must be seen as a contingent outcome of evolution. The 
answer would be: a result of evolution, those cortical areas just happen to do so. 
The resolutions of these issues, however, would require extended discussion, and 
are indeed beyond the scope of the present thesis. The next chapter will further 
consider the relations between those mechanisms of active perception and the 
environment. The discussions, in particular, will relate to the learning of certain 
capabilities of active perception. The issue of evolution will remain untouched, 
clue to the limited scope of the present thesis. 
The above widely ranging resolutions may be taken as topics of further re- 
searches, but here we are ready to discuss a particular topic - the relationship 
between internal cohesion and quasi -functional modules and quasi- action mod- 
ules. 
Quasi -functional Modules and Quasi -action Modules. Section 5.4 con- 
tends that active perception (as understood in terms of the four requirements 
stipulated by the notion of dynamic small modules) must be carried out by quasi- 
functional modules and quasi- action modules. Having introduced the notion of 
internal cohesion, the relationship between dynamic small modules and the quasi - 
form modules can be further understood, by seeing internal cohesion as a process 
of emergence mediating those two sides. The mediation at issue can specifically 
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be understood with regard to its two sides. On one side, the task -level emergence 
of active perception (as characterised by the notion of dynamic small modules) 
must19 take shape in the form of internal cohesion. On the other side, internal 
cohesion (as an act) is most likely supported by quasi -functional modules and 
quasi- action modules, as opposed to functional modules and action modules (i.e. 
competence modules - in Maes (1995)). 
Side One: The Emergence of Dynamic Small Modules Must Take the Form 
of Internal Cohesion. Remember that the four requirements of dynamic small 
modules (see Section 5.3.2, page 161) are 1. presenting basic perceptual fea- 
tures, 2. dynamical combination of modules, 3. situational sensory movements, 
4. stepwise sensory -motor movements with evaluation in each step. Because the 
requirements 2. and 4. concern the control within systems, the above four require- 
ments apparently need the exploitative control of active perception, on the top 
of explorative control. Hence, the attempt to explain the task -level emergence of 
active perception must take shape in terms of processes within the systems of ac- 
tive perception. In addition, the stepwise sensory -motor movements must emerge 
from the act of composing the relevant processes, given that it is done neither 
by pre -determination nor by intentions. Regarding requirement 2 - dynamical 
combination of modules - the self -organisation of internal processes on the basis 
of dynamical systems, as demonstrated in Dickmanns' car, can be conceived as 
subserving the maintenance of effective composition of the within- system control 
forces. Thus, the task -level emergence of active perception must be fashioned in 
the form of internal cohesion. 
Side Two: Internal Cohesion is Most Likely to be Supported by Quasi -form 
Modules. Quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules seem to be more 
supportive than functional modules and action modules in explaining internal 
cohesion, as we will see. 
L°Notice that our claim is weaker than the claim that the task -level emergence must exclusively 
take shape in the form of internal cohesion. According to our claim, it remains an open question 
whether there are other forms of emergence applicable to the emergence of active perception. 
Indeed, there is, as manifested in the self -organisation maintained by dynamical systems. 
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Remember that quasi- functional modules provide iterative (numerical) trans- 
formations of perceptual inputs (as is evident in the tracking systems, such as 
Snake and the dynamical Kalman filter), and the computation of critical variables 
(e.g. Adept). By contrast, quasi- action modules provide guidance for sensory - 
motor movements. 
Also remember that internal cohesion is an act operating on the forces re- 
lating to a particular system which controls sensory -motor movements or bodily 
actions. In particular, within the systems of active perception such forces are 
operating on factorial conditions - i.e. the perceptual factors caught through 
sensors and transformed via numerical computation. The operation on such fac- 
torial conditions seem to be the privilege of quasi -form modules, as opposed to 
functional modules and action modules. Hence, internal cohesion is most likely to 
be supported by quasi -form modules. Accordingly, our discussions justify the pre- 
vious claim - that the task -level emergence of active perception must take shape 
in the form of internal cohesion, and internal cohesion is most likely supported 
by quasi- functional modules and quasi -action modules. 
6.4.3 Summary 
The establishment of the above four principles account for several aspects of task - 
level emergence, but a core question of task -level emergence remains unanswered 
- why stepwise computation can lead to the accomplishment of a required task. 
The resolution of this question is fundamentally important for the explanation of 
activeness, which needs explanation via a novel notion - internal cohesion. 
The notion of internal cohesion is introduced in this section in order to ex- 
plain the task -level emergence of active perception. Internal cohesion is defined 
as the act effectively composing the forces within the systems of an organism, 
forces which operate on factorial conditions. Because such within- system forces 
are managed with orders, internal cohesion relates to exploitative control. As is 
demonstrated, this notion applies to all typical mechanisms adopted for imple- 
menting active perception (insofar as we review in the present thesis). 
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Previous discussions justify a central claim of the present thesis: that the 
notion of internal cohesion explains the task -level emergence of active percep- 
tion. The justification needs to take account of two important aspects of active 
perception, as shown below. 
First, the notion of internal cohesion explains task identification and pro- 
cess arrangement which leads to the production of guidance for bodily actions. 
Task identification of two types (i.e. by representations and by performance) 
loth comprise the detection of relevant perceptual inputs and the initiation of 
relevant processes. The relevance can be explained in terms of the act of effec- 
tively composing all the forces relating to a particular system. The arrangement 
of processes leading to the production of guidance can similarly be explained, 
by identifying the arrangement of relevant processes with the act of effectively 
composing all the related forces, which is supported by the three characteris- 
tics of internal cohesion: appropriate guidance is brought about (a) at various 
stages (b) with different factorial conditions, and (c) is grounded by the stepwise 
computation of factorial conditions. 
Second, the notion of internal cohesion explains how active perception is 
realised by quasi -form modules: the task -level emergence of active perception 
must take shape in the form of internal cohesion, and internal cohesion is most 
likely to be supported by quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules. 
6.5 The Role of Environment in Task -level Emergence 
There cannot be a perceptual system without an environment. This point is 
obvious, because a perceptual system by nature is a system to perceive the envi- 
ronment. However, it is not so obvious that there cannot be an active perception 
system without an environment. A non -straightforward rationale of this latter 
point is that the environment stands as a seemingly covert `organiser' of the 
active perception system. The environment is covert, ironically, because it is ev- 
erywhere for any system performing in it, and is thus the nature underlying any 
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machinery whatsoever. In addition, the environment can be seen metaphorically 
as an organiser, for a simple reason from the perspective of Brooksian robotics, 
namely that the environment is the world model - indeed the only model - of 
intelligence generation. A stronger reason, which is less widely noticed but may 
be more important, is that the environment stands as the reason to explain what 
a system feature subserves, even without posing an adaptationist stance. 
If a system feature, e.g. the high resolution of foveae, is considered according 
to an adaptationist stance20, a reason for the system's application in the envi- 
ronment would be drawn by consideration of the system's advantage for survival 
- i.e. the reason that the system arose in evolution. The adaptationist stance is 
controversial, however, as previously mentioned when we discussed the probable 
use of thalamic -cortical feedback loops of the LGN (see the footnote in page 152). 
A non -adaptationist reason can be drawn, however, to explain not why a 
system feature arose in the course of evolution but about what it turns out to 
subserve, i.e. its current use in the environment. The difference between such a 
reason and an adaptationist account can be seen clearly in the current mechanical 
role of an evolutionary side- effect. Although the reason that it originally arose in 
evolutionary history is unclear, its current use may be evident. In a certain evo- 
lutionary time, organisms took advantage of that system feature, as manifested 
by its role in the present system. In this light (the current use of a system feature 
in the environment), understanding of an active perception system can take into 
account the role of the environment. 
An important consideration is the impact of use on the understanding of 
emergence, according to the previous discussion of the inherent pragmatist stance 
of emergence (see Section 6.3.5, page 235), namely that the use of autonomous 
systems is essential to the understanding of (task -level) emergence. Hence, discus- 
sion of the use of an autonomous system (or the use of one of its system features) 
in the environment would contribute to the understanding of emergence. 
20For a detailed exposition of the adaptationist stance, please see Sober (1993). 
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6.5.1 The Notion of Inverse Ecological Niche 
The use of a system feature can be understood through a novel notion to be intro- 
duced below: inverse ecological niche. With this notion this subsection introduces 
a new perspective to consider the relationship between the environment and the 
task -level emergence of active perception. This notion is defined as follows: 
Definition of Inverse Ecological Niche: The functionality of 
cognitive systems that supports organisms' survival and well living 
in their respective ecological niches, in particular the functionality of 
active perception systems that facilitates organisms in generating the 
perceptual guidance of bodily actions in support of their survival and 
well living in their ecological niches. 
Given this notion, the considerations of environment are mediated by, and 
accordingly expressed in, the conception of ecological niche (see Section 2.2.1, 
page 26). So mediated, the notion of environment is put in the context of ethology 
and thereby enriched with various considerations regarding the use of perceptual 
systems, as discussed previously in Section 2.2.1. Specifically, via the notion 
of ecological niche, the environment of a species is understood in terms of its 
behavioural relationship with other organisms and the physical properties relating 
to its survival (comprising the habitat it resides in, the time it is active there, 
and the resources it attains there). In particular, this notion concerns a species' 
needs for perceptual guidance in its ecological niche. The functionality of active 
perception systems is thus connected to ethology, by considering how a species' 
survival advantages in its ecological niche are facilitated by the production of 
perceptual guidance, which is maintained by the explorative and exploitative 
control of those active perception systems. 
To put the above analyses in intuitive terms, the notion of inverse ecological 
niche is introduced to explain how the active perception systems of a species 
tune up to survive effectively in its ecological niche. Such systems tune up in the 
sense that the emerging explorative and exploitative control serves to facilitate 
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(by producing various perceptual guidance) the species' survival in its ecological 
niche. The discussions of this section, thus, will centre around the facilities 
brought about (as outcomes of task -level emergence) by such explorative and 
exploitative control in support of the species' survival in its ecological niche. In 
brief, this notion refers to the emerging facilities that support survival and well 
living in the ecological niche. 
Explaining Inverse Ecological Niche. Above is the definition and relating 
conceptual analyses of the newly introduced notion - inverse ecological niche. 
The following discussions concern explanations as to how the species' survival 
and well living in the ecological niche is facilitated by the functionality of active 
perception, as manifested in its component sub -systems (such as the Kalman filter 
and the attentive control of saccades) and the internal cohesion of the processes 
maintained by such sub -systems. 
6.5.2 Explaining Facilities that Support Survival and Well Living 
in the Ecological Niche 
The above `how' question mainly relates to three themes - 1. what tasks would 
be likely to arise, 2. what systems of active perception there would be, and 3. 
what information remains needed at a certain stage of computation. All these 
three questions connect respectively to a further why question, e.g. why those 
tasks are most likely to arise, etc. 
1. Tasks and Ecological Niche. Only a limited number of tasks would arise, 
for any species in its ecological niche. This is generally because organisms must 
address the tasks which are highly relevant to their survival and well living in 
their respective ecological niches. Organisms would not waste their time pursuing 
the tasks that are hardly relevant to their survival or well living. 
In addition, tasks seem to be subject to priority. Organisms might collect a 
great deal of perceptual information without actually initiating any task. For such 
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roughly collected perceptual information, lots of tasks are possible, but only a 
few deserve actually to be pursued. The more important a task is for the survival 
or well living in the ecological niche the more likely it (this task) would actually 
be passed to the active perception systems. Consider the example of prey. The 
tasks of top priority are those which respond to the suspicious perceptual cues 
of their predators. The constantly interesting tasks (see Section 5.5.3, page 190) 
seem to fall into this category - those which are most likely to arise. They arise 
easily, without being mediated by intention or conscious attention. 
For the tasks arising from intention, it seems reasonable to say that such 
tasks are also subject to priority. The more important an enquiry is for an 
organism living in its ecological niche the more likely it is to arise. Given the 
above, the pursuit of tasks seems to have strong roots /reasons in organisms' 
respective ecological niches. 
2. Particular Systems and Ecological Niche. Every single active percep- 
tion system seems to have its reasons in connection to its ecological niche. The 
reasons behind this point are discussed as follows: 
Attentive Control of Saccades - For Directing Foveae to Important Visual 
Features. Foveae, as widely understood, are two tiny areas in the retinae of 
binocular vision with very high degree of resolution, which is clearly an advan- 
tage of vision. To take full advantage of this property, organisms need saccadic 
movements and their accompanying attentive control. 
Because a large number of positions must be visited, saccades must be quick 
and computation of collected visual information must be stepwise. In addition, 
in order to collect exactly the needed information for the required tasks, neither 
too little nor too much, comparison must be maintained along with the gradually 
collected information. Addressing the most important visual features for the 
required tasks would definitely facilitate an organism's survival and well living in 
its ecological niche. 
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Pursuit Movement. The control maintained by pursuit movement can be 
seen as a facility which supports saccadic movements. As previously discussed 
(see Section 3.4.5, page 104), the computation of attentive control of saccades 
takes time, during which the target may have moved elsewhere, and consequently 
the saccadic movements lag behind the features expected by the attentive control 
of saccades. Apart from this factor, errors in the system of saccadic movements 
would make it difficult for the visual system to successfully gather the information 
expected by the attentive control of saccades. 
Pursuit movements serve to cover the above problems of lagging behind and 
various errors. Hence, pursuit movement serves as a complement to the attentive 
control of saccades, in order to make the fovea really reach the expected visual 
features under real -time constraints. In other words, the functionality of the 
pursuit sub -system is to facilitate the saccadic movements to accurately reach the 
visual features expected by the attentive control of saccades. The accuracy of 
saccadic movements is very important for organisms to fetch interesting visual 
features, which would certainly help an organism to survive and live well in its 
ecological niche. 
Four Types of Task- specific Utilities to Activeness Provided by Quasi functional 
Modules and Quasi- action Modules. Each of the four types of task -specific util- 
ities to activeness - judgement under uncertainly, using templates, using dynam- 
ical systems, and planning of actions - confers certain advantages of survival in 
the ecological niche. 
The characteristics of ecological niche highlight the advantages of these four 
types of task -specific utilities. Without the harsh time pressure in the ecological 
niche, organisms need not undertake uncertain judgements which risk mistakes. 
It is reasonable to assume that without the need for quick guesses in the ecological 
niche (especially for pursuit movement and tracking) templates and dynamical 
systems might not be singled out in th e course of natural selection. 
Judgement under uncertainty presumes a certain specific time scale which 
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constrains quick judgement. The time scales of subsequent movements (such as 
saccades and pursuit) must be subject to mutual cohesion between these two 
mechanisms. However, what exactly are the scales for these two mechanisms ul- 
timately depends on the respective processes carried out in the ecological niche, 
particularly depending on how fine -grained the adopted heuristic knowledge is. 
Considerations cannot take too fine -grained heuristics because the judgement 
would consequently be deferred. By contrast, considerations also cannot take too 
course- grained heuristics because the judgement would accordingly risk inaccu- 
racy. What exactly the right -grained heuristic knowledge is depends indeed upon 
how exactly and how quickly the most important characteristics of the ecological 
niche need to be taken into account in the relevant active perception systems. 
Hence, the characteristics of ecological niche have a substantial impact on the 
mechanisms of active perception. 
In addition, the processes of planning have their roots in the characteristics 
of the ecological niche. For example, the critical variables manifested in the 
implementation of Adept, such as T, r, N, ich, r9, serve to determine geographical 
paths step by step, which can be understood from a geometrical point of view (see 
Section 4.2.1, page 126): they are the variables concerning curve and rigid objects. 
The computation of these specific variables is critical for Adept to navigate in its 
ecological niche. 
Additionally, for a robot fish to navigate in its ecological niche - water - 
the critical variables for maintaining navigation must include variables of aquatic 
conditions. The lesson is that the critical variables to be chosen for different 
organisms depend on the characteristics of their respective ecological niches. 
Given the above, the four types of task -specific utilities serve to facilitate an 
organism to survive and live well in its ecological niche. 
3. The Cooperation between Sub -systems. The cooperation between sub- 
systems is vitally important for the maintenance of active perception, as is mani- 
fested in various active perception systems, e.g. the cooperation between various 
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tracking sub -systems of Dickmanns' car, and the cooperation between attentive 
control of saccades and the control of pursuit movements. Different sub -systems 
serve to capture different characteristics of the ecological niche. 
Different tracking sub -systems of Dickmanns' car address different tasks (e.g. 
lane keeping, avoiding obstacles, etc.) that happen in its ecological niche - the 
traffic. Those sub -systems cooperate by the generic control of various parallel 
tracking processes. 
The saccadic movements are followed by pursuit movements, which serve 
as a complement to fine -tune against accumulated errors. These two systems 
have different emphases. The former system (the attentive control of saccades) 
focuses on the computation of important /interesting visual features, while the 
latter (pursuit movement) serves to recover accuracy from various errors. 
For both tracking and gaze control, various sub -systems are needed for cap- 
turing different characteristics of the ecological niche. However, the manners of 
cooperation in these two systems are realised differently. The difference can be 
attributed to the different characteristics of ecological niche addressed in different 
systems. What is needed for Dickmanns' car is the generic control of various par- 
allel tracking processes, while the gaze control needs to maintain the serial order 
of pursuit following saccades, with the latter fine- tuning the previous errors. It is 
reasonable to propose that the different manners of cooperation depend on differ- 
ent active perception sub -systems, which in turn reflect different characteristics 
of the ecological niche. Thus, the cooperation between component sub -systems 
has its root in the ecological niche. 
Note that the processes mentioned in the above three points facilitate the 
task -level emergence of active perception. The emphasis in this section is that 
the facilities which support the task -level emergence of active perception have 
roots in the ecological niche. Thus, argument justifies the previously proposed 
relationship between the environment and the functionality of active perception 
systems proposed, as stated in the notion of inverse ecological niche. 
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6.5.3 Summary 
Apart from Brooks' idea that the environment is the best world model (via the 
situated and embodied activities of organisms), this section introduces a novel 
perspective - inverse ecological niche - to consider the relationship between the 
environment and the functionality of cognitive systems In the context of active 
perception, inverse ecological niche denotes the functionality of active perception 
systems that facilitates organisms generating the perceptual guidance of bodily 
actions in support of their survival and well living in their ecological niches. 
The above perspective is justified by three points. First, organisms only seek 
to carry out the tasks that are relevant to their respective ecological niches. In 
addition, the more important a task is for the survival or well living of an organism 
in its ecological niche the more likely that task would actually be passed to the 
active perception systems. 
Second, it is argued that the control of single active perception systems 
responds to the characteristics of ecological niches. Evidence can be found in the 
attentive control of saccades and the control of pursuit movements, which serve 
accurately to direct foveae to the important visual features of the ecological niche, 
and consequently facilitate the organisms' survival and well living in the ecological 
niches. In addition, it has been shown that the four types of task -specific utilities 
(judgement under uncertainly, using templates, using dynamical systems, and 
planning of actions) all have their roots in the characteristics of the ecological 
niche. In particular, organisms need to make judgements under uncertainty, and 
need templates of visual events, because of occasional harsh time pressure in the 
ecological niche. Moreover, the computation of certain specific critical variables 
reflects the specific characteristics of a species' ecological niche, as seen in the 
aquatic conditions of fish. 
Third, as demonstrated by Dickmanns' car and the cooperation between 
saccadic and pursuit movements, different manners of cooperation depend on dif- 
ferent active perception sub -systems, which in turn reflect different characteristics 
of the ecological niche. 
261 
The above three points together suggest that the functionality of active per- 
ception systems reflects various characteristics of an organism's ecological niche, 
and consequently facilitates the organism's survival and well living in its ecolog- 
ical niche. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter considers the task -level emergence of active perception from three 
aspects. First, the discussion extracts several principles of emergence from models 
of origin of life for explaining the task -level emergence of active perception. The 
task -level emergence, according to the extracted principles, is understood by con- 
sidering different emergent phenomena, from a minimal emergent phenomenon 
- the stable and continuing processing manifested in a step of information com- 
parison - to a emergent combinatory system, which is supported by cooperation 
between different sub -systems. 
Second, the serial order of various processes in an active perception system 
is addressed in the notion of internal cohesion, which proposes that the quasi - 
form modules respond to unpredictable environmental factors but still maintain 
effective serial orders between various processes of active perception. The vari- 
ous phenomena of internal cohesion are explained on grounds of the particular 
properties of sub -systems that cooperate. 
Third, the notion of inverse ecological niche presents a novel philosophical 
explanation as to the relationship between environment and the functionality of 
a cognitive system. Within the context of active perception, argument justifies 




Philosophical Explanations of 
Emergence 
This chapter concerns the philosophical implications of the conceptual founda- 
tions of task -level emergence which are derived in previous chapters. The focus 
of this chapter is on deriving philosophical understanding from those conceptual 
foundations, but not on seeking further philosophical expositions of the concepts 
currently in play, such as the definition of pre- determination, the distinction be- 
tween general and task- specific models, and the attribution of being active to a 
variety of computer systems. Like the concept of life in artificial life study, such 
concepts may be very provocative for philosophical discussions and worthy of hot 
debate. However, due to the focus of the present thesis, further discussions along 
these lines can be rendered as avenues for further research. 
The previous two chapters explain the task -level emergence of active percep- 
tion through a variety of foundational concepts (or termed `conceptual founda- 
tions'). This chapter aims to gather those foundational concepts together with 
philosophical notions, in order to provide a conceptual framework for understand- 
ing task -level emergence, with emphases on both the unity of emergence and the 
multi -fold emergent phenomena. 
The discussion of this chapter begins with four salient philosophical accounts 
of emergence in connection to behaviour -based systems - Clark's explanatory in- 
terlock of emergence, the externalism maintained by Clark and Chalmers (1998), 
the role of internal representations highlighted by Clark (1995), and the enactive 
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approach to emergence advocated by Varela et al. (1991). Discussion of these 
four philosophical accounts have two purposes - reviewing philosophical accounts 
relating to task -level emergence, on the one hand, and criticising those accounts 
on the basis of the understandings of active perception achieved in previous chap- 
ters, on the other. 
Certain useful philosophical conceptions are extracted from those philosoph- 
ical accounts and further developed to account for the envisaged unity of task - 
level emergence. Thus, based on Clark's conception of explanatory interlock two 
philosophical notions are developed: the multiple aspects of emergent phenomena 
and the understanding of explanatory interlock in terms of several links between 
knowledge sources. With these links, this thesis accounts for the integrity of 
multiple aspects of emergence phenomena. 
The present thesis concludes with a discussion of the interdisciplinary study 
of cognition, specifically considering how to gain the unity of cognition through 
cooperation between scientific theories and philosophical explanations. The sug- 
gestion is that these two disciplines are mediated by certain common conceptual 
foundations. 
7.1 Clark's Account of Emergence: Trinity of Emer- 
gence and Explanatory Interlock. 
It is argued by Clark (1996, 1997) that emergence must be explained from a 
variety of perspectives, between which there must be explanatory interlock. At 
present he seems to be more or less alone in advocating the need for maintaining 
multiple stances in the explanation of emergence. Despite its being rarely advo- 
cated, the maintenance of multiple stances of emergence is a valuable endeavour 
for explaining the unity of emergent phenomena, the description of which is cur- 
rently divided between many disciplines. This section discusses Clark's idea of 
maintaining multiple stances of emergence. 
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7.1.1 The Philosophy of Emergence 
Three Explanatory Stances on Emergence. Three main perspectives are 
regarded as indispensable in understanding emergence. First, reductionism con- 
tributes to the understanding of a complex system from its components, as seen 
in the neuroscientific research on cortical areas, as manifested in the hypothesis of 
convergence zone discussed in Damasio and Damasio (1994). By reduction Clark 
does not mean Paul Churchland's notion of inter -theoretical reduction (Church - 
land 1981), but means the explanation of high -level phenomena via low -level 
phenomena, with the emphasis on the establishment of detailed understandings 
which specify components and their inter -relations. 
Second, the active exploitation of the opportunities presented in the environ- 
ment contributes to visual processing, in opposition to Marr's (1982) view. Clark 
refers to Ballard's (1991) example of personalised cues for efficient visual search. 
Such cues may be an outstanding colour (e.g. yellow) or a large object accom- 
panying the target object (e.g. a table on which keys are left). Such cues link 
the target objects to other visual properties for easier detection. In addition, he 
also refers to an archetypal example of active perception - the attentive control 
of saccades - in order to emphasise the capacity of gaze control over a variety of 
visual cues. Clark's point is that the cues in the environment contribute to pro- 
moting successful problem -solving activity, hence visual processing is not purely 
a matter of transformation between internal images. 
Third, the emergence can be supported by the embedded and embodied ap- 
proach to mobile robotics, which was proclaimed by Rodney Brooks to be the 
implementation of intelligence without representations or internal models, as op- 
posed to the understanding of intelligence in traditional AI. Robotics implemen- 
tations in this approach demonstrate that global behaviour arises not from the 
search through an internal model but from tightly coupled organism- environment 
interactions. 
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The Trinity of Emergence and Explanatory Interlock. With the notion 
of trinity, Clark sees each of these three stances as forming a part of a com- 
plete and plausible account of emergence. That is, each of them is only plausible 
insofar as it is supported by its evidence, but none can be neglected in the un- 
derstanding of emergence. Each stance is appropriate to a certain aspect of the 
explanation of emergence. The most plausible strategy for understanding emer- 
gence, he contends, is not to bet on a single stance, but to combine all three 
stances by `explanatory interlock', by which the relationship between them can 
be somehow explained. 
Clark's Conviction of the Importance of Multiple Explanatory Stances. 
Clark's standpoint on emergence is rooted in his attitude toward doing research 
in cognitive science. He sees each stance as helpful for the understanding of 
cognition, given its complexities. He regards different stances of explanation as 
different tools in cognitive scientists' tool kit. As he states: `we will find ourselves 
adding new tools to cognitive science's tool kit, refining and reconfiguring but 
not abandoning those we already posses[s]' (Clark 1997, p. 175). A multitude of 
explanatory stances reflects various perspectives of understanding which help us 
to approach those complexities. 
Different stances seem to have been treated as competing, by the academics, 
but this does not seem appropriate, especially for understanding the adaptive role 
of cognition. Research on the adaptive role of cognition brings to the foreground 
the fact that complexities reside intrinsically in the nature of cognition. When 
we do research in cognition, as Clark contends, different explanatory stances lift 
us to a vantage point, from which `we will see a rather delicate and cooperative 
coevolution between multiple types of analysis and insight'. Without taking ac- 
count of those complexities altogether we may be `blind' to the `adaptive success' 
of organisms. An anonymous aphorism he cites makes this vivid: `if the brain 
were so simple that a single approach could unlock its secrets, we would be so 
simple that we couldn't do the job!' (ibid., italics Clark's). In other words, given 
the complexities of cognition, multiple stances of explanation would not be a 
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deficiency of human understanding, but conversely a merit of accounting for its 
adaptive role. 
Multiplism and Various Aspects of Cognition. Clark's notion of trinity 
and explanatory interlock, in the discussion of emergence, reveals an important 
property of cognitive complexities, that the various stances of emergence manifest 
several aspects of cognition. Unlike eclecticism, here it is not the case that var- 
ious principles of cognition (such as functional specification, parallel distributed 
processing, active exploitation of environmental cues, and Brooks' embedded and 
embodied approach to robotics) apply to the same subject matter and stand in 
a relation of competition where certain principles are applicable while others are 
not. Rather, different types of emergence address various cognitive phenomena, 
which represent different aspects of cognition. 
A notion of various aspects of cognition can be generalised from Clark's 
notion of trinity of emergence. This notion can be characterised below: 
Definition: Various Aspects of Cognition. Although cognition 
can be conceived as a unity with a certain degree of integrity, particu- 
lar cognitive phenomena actually occur in a variety of forms, because 
of the heterogeneous particularities inherent in human experiences, 
perceptual modalities, domain knowledge, research methodologies, 
and study disciplines. Given the above, such cognitive phenomena 
are conceived as various aspects of cognition. 
According to this definition, the notion of various aspects of cognition can be un- 
derstood separately from the considerations of emergence. However, this notion 
can be regarded as a theoretical property of emergence: the various cognitive 
phenomena emerge in the course of evolution, in which organisms encounter var- 
ious environmental challenges of survival and conquer such challenges when the 
cognitive features or capacities relevant to those challenges are configurated with 
the effect of generating effective and efficient responses to them. In this pas- 
sage, the various aspects of cognition are put into the context of evolution, as 
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the emergent phenomena resulting from the configuration of cognitive features or 
capacities in response to various forms of environmental challenges. 
7.1.2 Multiplism vs. Eclecticism. 
As Clark considers, the multiple explanatory stances need not stand in a position 
of competition, but can cooperate together. Although they are indeed shaped in 
different fashion they may be thoroughly compatible. He suggests that we aim 
to find interlock between different explanatory stances. 
Eclecticism. Compared to his trinity explanation of emergence, Clark does not 
seem to present equally well in his notion of explanatory interlock, which is needed 
to support the three accounts of emergence, however. Without the explanation of 
interlock a difficulty for Clark's conviction in multiple explanatory stance would 
unavoidably arise: the envisaged interlock may not be graspable by humans at 
all.' That is, the complexities of cognition may actually prevent the envisaged 
interlock. If so, the adoption of a single explanatory stance would at least have 
the advantage of scientific unity. 
Alternatively, as a weaker challenge a worry may arise when there is yet no 
interlock established between multiple explanatory stances, which seems to be 
currently the case. To wit, Clark's conviction might seem merely eclecticism -a 
standpoint simply gathering a multitude of different principles without account- 
ing for their inter -relations. 
Interdisciplinary Study. We may discuss the latter challenge first, for a 
weaker challenge is easier to meet. Philosophy may well go before scientific re- 
search as a light of scientific discovery. The expected interlock may be found 
easier, if it is really envisaged in scientific activity with the support of philoso- 
phy. Otherwise, we may persistently strive to bet on single explanatory stances 
'Concerning the biological understanding of consciousness, Colin McGinn (1993) contends 
that the relationship between consciousness and its biological nature is permanently baffling to 
human understanding. 
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and consequently leave the envisaged cognitive integrity in vain, given the intrin- 
sic complexities of cognition. 
By contrast, the former challenge can be met when certain inter -relations 
between the multiple stances are gradually achieved. However, this again seems 
to be a difficulty in philosophy. Philosophy stands at a high level and accordingly 
is hardly likely to answer the question how multiple stances converge. If scientists 
look forward to seeing an explanatory account of cognition from philosophy and 
simultaneously philosophers expect to interpret scientific evidence of cognitive 
integrity from scientific theories2, then the endeavour for resolutions would likely 
to fall into the trap of chick- and -egg problem. This is a question left with the 
interdisciplinary study of cognition -a banner of cognitive science. 
Multiplism and Various Aspects of Cognition. According to the afore- 
mentioned multiplism and the notion of various aspects of cognition, different 
stances on emergence can be seen as different explanations suitable for different 
aspects of cognition, which manifest different configurations of cognitive features 
or capacities in response to different environmental challenges. Such stances are 
compatible because they basically deal with different aspects of cognition. It 
might thereby be conjectured that different cognitive phenomena arise in organ- 
isms to facilitate their survival in different environmental circumstances. We may 
consequently name Clark's notion of trinity and explanatory interlock as multi - 
plism, as opposed to eclecticism. Cognition is multiple because it is a solution 
to many different evolutionary problems. In analogy with clothes, people wear 
different clothes in different environmental (natural and social) circumstances. 
The complexities of cognition manifest various aspects of cognition that facilitate 
cognitive activity in a variety of environmental circumstances. 
'Notice that the collection of scientific evidence needs the guidance of scientific hypothesis, 
which in turn presumes insightful understanding of the subject matter. Scientists may hold an 
inquiry as to how the present multiple stances of emergence can be unified in support of their 
scientific discovery. They may seek support from inter -theoretic reduction, find no satisfactory 
resolutions, and then leave the question hanging unsolved, simply because it is basically difficult 
to figure out how to raise a hypothesis of cognitive integrity between diverse stances. 
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Multiplism, Explanatory Interlock, and Conceptual Foundations. The 
above argument for multiplism does not mean that different aspects of cognition 
are ultimately independent and consequently no interlock is needed at all. The 
reason is simple: different aspects of cognition support mutually the organism's 
maintenance of adaptability. Given that different stances of emergence explain 
different aspect of cognition, the interlock between multiple stances of emergence 
can be understood in a new light as the cooperation between different aspects 
of cognition. In order to ensure survival, organisms need the cooperation of 
various capacities, including organism- environment interactions, exploitation of 
environmental cues, parallel distributed processing and functional specification. 
The remaining question, about the interlock of different explanatory stances, 
concerns how a variety of cognitive capacities integrate, i.e. cooperate together. 
Resolutions of this question can be pursued extensively at a small scale in various 
scientific proposals, as exemplified by Inui and McClelland (1996) (eds.), where 
the integration of cognitive capacities is well targeted within the same paradigm 
- connectionism - between different strategies of simulation. 
At a large scale, it remains mostly a demanding issue as to how there can be 
explanatory interlock across computational paradigms, as shown above (page 265) 
between the reduction in Clark's sense, active exploitation of environmental cues, 
and Brooks' embedded and embodied approach to robotics. At this point, the 
demanded interlock may need discussion at the level of conceptual foundations of 
particular subject areas, such as active perception, as discussed in the introduc- 
tion. 
The multiplism introduced in this section can be seen as a philosophical 
framework for allocating a further developed conception - the links between dif- 
ferent `knowledge sources' - as will be discussed later (Section 7.5.2, page 305). 
The importance of such links is manifested in the comprehensibility of the unity 
of cognition, by accessing different aspects of cognition. 
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7.1.3 Summary 
Section 7.1 introduces Clark's advocacy of the explanatory interlock of emergence: 
various aspects of emergence must be linked although they tend to be hard to 
bring together. Discussion shows that Clark's advocacy of interlock between 
various aspects of emergence can be understood as multiplism, as opposed to 
pluralism. Multiplism means different parts working together but allows that 
their links may unfold along with the process of emergence. In contrast, pluralism 
simply means different principles working together, which might be confused with 
eclecticism -a philosophy which does not address the links between various parts. 
Clark's notion of explanatory interlock can be conceived with the framework of 
multiplism, which suggests that the interlock of various emergent phenomena 
may unfold along with the process of emergence. 
7.2 Externalism 
7.2.1 The Origin of Externalism In Brooksian Robotics 
Externalism Arises. Externalism mainly arises from the idea of intelligence 
without representations initiated by Brooks (1991a), an idea supported by the 
successful implementation of Brooksian situated robots. As a reaction against 
the computational paradigm adopted in traditional AI - orthodox computation - 
alism - Brooksian robotics starts out with neither knowledge representations nor 
central symbolic processing (both adopted in traditional AI) but still succeeds in 
implementing a certain degree of intelligence (see Section 2.3, page 32). 
A Conceptual Analysis. Externalism3 has strong and mild versions. The 
strong version largely proposes that intelligence needs no support from internal 
3The term `Externalism' is brought by Clark and Chalmers (1998), from Putnam and Burge's 
arguments about the truth -conditions of thoughts, into considerations about Brooksian situated 
robotics. Strictly speaking, what Clark and Chalmers (1998) coin is an abbreviation of `active 
externalism', in contrast to the externalism maintained by Putnam and Burge. However, in the 
present thesis we use the abbreviation, because the Externalism of Putnam and Burge is not 
discussed at all. There should be no confusion. 
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representations (types 2 and 3) of world conditions. Rather, the embodied and 
embedded activities alone (see Section 2.3, page 34) suffice (to produce intelli- 
gence). This is held by Brooks (1991a) (in robotics) and Pessoa et al. (to appear) 
(in philosophy). The mild version states that intelligence to certain extent can 
solely arise from embodied and embedded activities while in certain circumstances 
internal representations may be needed. Most theorists and philosophers main- 
tain this version of externalism, including Maes (1990b), Steels (1990a), Clark 
(1997), Clark and Chalmers (1998), and Varela et al. (1991). 
Due to its background in Brooksian robotics, the term externalism does not 
strictly reflect its literal meaning, which would be a stance maintaining that in- 
telligence is entirely established /shaped by external factors, as demonstrated by 
Gibsonian ecological approach to cognition by emphasising the external avail- 
ability of visual guidance. Rather, it proposes that intelligence is grounded on 
organism- environment interactions, which specifically refer to embodied and em- 
bedded activities. In brief, the external in the context of externalism does not 
mean external factors but means external interactions. The reason that the lit- 
eral meaning of the `external' is not strictly followed is probably because the 
basic motivation of externalism is to stand as a challenge to cognitivism, which 
regards cognitive functionality as entirely taking place internally. Like Gibson's 
ecological approach to cognition, externalism sees the source of explaining cog- 
nitive functionality as outside the brain, as opposed to cognitivism. However, 
the discussions in this section are not simply limited to the sources (of cognitive 
functionality), but extend to the processes. 
From Organism -environment Interactions to Emergence. The aforementioned 
success of Brooksian robotics sheds a new light on the understanding of intelli- 
gence, that intelligence is grounded not on elaborate task analysis by designers 
(as maintained in traditional AI), but instead on organism -environment interac- 
tions. More importantly, a previously untouched issue in traditional AI - emer- 
gence - seems to consequently gain an explanatory foundation: the real world 
inputs serve to determine directly the activation and inhibition of robots' internal 
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states, through the situated and embodied robot control, without being mediated 
by pre- categorised data (as exemplified by the knowledge representations studied 
in traditional AI).4 
The Explanatory Role of the Environment. Brooksian robotics has had an- 
other far -reaching impact - shifting the focus of discussions of intelligent pro- 
cesses from the search in internal models to organism- environment interactions. 
As Brooks conceives, if there must be a model lying between the robot and the 
world, `the world is its own best model' (Brooks 1991a, p. 417, italics original). 
Such a conception can be seen as the resumption of Gibson's ecological approach 
to studying cognition (especially perception) (see Gibson 1979), as is most evident 
in the research done by McFarland (1992), Horsewill (1992), and McFarland and 
Bösser (1993). Thus, a fashion in favour of the explanatory role of environment 
seems to arise, which is strengthened by the philosophical endorsement made by 
Varela et al. (1991), Clark (1997), and Clark and Chalmers (1998), as we will 
discuss later in this chapter. 
Further Support from Dynamic Systems Theory. The idea of intelligence 
without representations (types 2 and 3) and the emphasis on organism- environment 
interactions are additionally supported, both in modelling and in theory, by the 
modelling of motor skills and motion perception on the basis of dynamic sys- 
tems theory (Thelen and Smith 1994; van Geert 1994; Beer 1995; Kelso 1995; 
Port and van Gelder (1995) (eds.); van Gelder 1995, to appear; Buchanan et al. 
1997). Such an approach is a computational paradigm different from orthodox 
computationalism, and distinct from Brooksian robotics.5 
The following discussions focus on the philosophical conceptions which aim 
to explain organism- environment interactions. Regarding the strong and mild 
4Recall our discussions on the notion of emergence as opposed to pre- determination (see 
Section 2.6, page 64). In addition, a hard problem for traditional AI in explaining symbol 
grounding is accordingly easily waived, as Brooks claims. 
''Together with PDP, Brooksian robotics and dynamic systems theory commonly consti- 
tute a computational reaction against orthodox computationalism, with regard to its notion of 
central processing. These three computational methodologies are consequently grouped as a 
de- centralised approach to cognition. 
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versions of externalism, if it is confirmed that internal representations (types 2 
and 3) really play a role in the determination of cognitive functionality, the strong 
version of externalism is directly challenged. Discussion in the current chapter 
aims (among other goals) to confirm the existence of internal representations 
(types 2 and 3), and consequently further discussion only addresses the mild 
version of externalism. 
7.2.2 Clark and Chalmers' Active Externalism. 
The externalism of Clark and Chalmers (1998) is the view that certain organism - 
environment interactions qualify as cognitive processes, in addition to those taking 
place in the brain. Their goal is to claim that cognitive processes extend to parts 
of the environment and consequently the boundary of skin and skull cannot be 
taken as a criterion to distinguish between cognitive and non -cognitive processes. 
Such a claim is grounded on the argument that cognitive activities can be 
enriched by manipulating situated activities or operational accessories, such as 
pencils and notebooks, spoken language, written words, graphs, calculators, com- 
puters, or anything in the environment that can be manipulated by the body (e.g. 
human limbs or even fish tail). To put it briefly, the body can exploit the envi- 
ronment to help the brain, with the effect of enriching cognitive processes. This 
stance is specifically termed active externalism because organisms must manipu- 
late their bodies (necessarily in the environment) to initiate cognitive processes. 
This stance, as they described it, seems largely plausible; however, the claim 
needs to be tempered and the argument needs augmenting, as we shall discuss. A 
worry is that the externalism in question seems to have been bought too cheaply. 
The following discussions will refine the claim to make it more acceptable, and 
will provide complements on the basis of our previous understandings of active 
perception. 
The Argument on Account of Coupling. The argument is based on the 
notion of coupling which refers to the interaction between organisms and the 
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environment in connection to cognitive processes. The archetype of a coupling 
relation is the embodied activities of situated robots. However, the argument 
of Clark and Chalmers' is derived not only from those activities, but relies on 
the manipulation of the aforementioned operational accessories (i.e. pencils and 
notebooks, spoken language, written words, graphs, calculators, etc.). Given this, 
their argument seems to be that even non -situated external processes can qualify 
as cognitive. Such an externalist position sounds striking, but has its difficulties, 
as we will see. Their argument can be roughly formulated as follows. 
(i) External processes employing accessories can run equally well (be- 
ing portable and reliably accessible, i.e. non- detachable) as internal 
cognitive processes, and thus the external processes qualify as cog- 
nitive processes; accordingly, the external processes employing acces- 
sories are substantially cognitive. 
(ii) As a stronger claim, organisms can exploit environmental con- 
tingencies by situated activities; the consequently initiated external 
processes the ongoing internal processes and thereby 
shape the on -board cognitive routines. 
Are Operational Accessories Really Substantially Cognitive? Consider 
point (i). True, if they are used properly, accessories can significantly help the 
brain to carry out cognitive processes. Otherwise, they would not be taken as 
accessories of cognitive processes. Accessories allow cognitive processes be more 
tractable, and consequently more complicated computation or communication 
can be maintained equally well, even more accurately and efficiently than what 
barely maintained in the brain without the aid of accessories. It can be granted 
that the detachability of operational accessories can be smoothly resolved. Along 
with the development of technology, it even can be granted that it is practically 
possible to significantly enhance the human - machine interface, to the extent that 
lots of machine utilities can be simultaneously managed as smoothly as those 
that happen in the brain. It is conceivable that someday the simultaneous use 
of various accessories could even be as parallel and distributed as human neural 
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networks. This is a point Clark and Chalmers (1998) seem hesitant to raise, 
but can be granted. Even so, it still seems too hasty to jump to the claim that 
the external processes in connection to the use of accessories are substantially 
cognitive, as we shall argue. 
Relating to this term - substantially cognitive -a misunderstanding might 
arise, that the external processes per se, without considering involving internal 
cognitive processes, can stand on their own to present the cognitive properties of 
the internal processes. This is a misunderstanding because external processes on 
their own, i.e. beyond the involving internal cognitive functionality, are merely 
motor manipulations of accessories, which can hardly be seen as substantially 
cognitive. 
To consider it more specifically, external processes are cognitive only on 
account of the cognitive functionality of internal processes. Basically, external 
processes serve to support users by enhancing (e.g. in drawing pictures), retaining 
(e.g. in reading a book), or partially skipping (e.g. in running a computer 
program) the functionality of internal processes beyond what a user's brain itself 
can do. Without being used, accessories cannot function at all. There is hardly a 
sense in which the external processes without supporting internal processes can 
stand on their own and qualify as substantially cognitive. Hence, it might seem 
redundant to say that the functionality of internal processes further supported 
by accessories counts as substantially cognitive. 
Strictly speaking, the internal processes involving in the use of accessories 
suffice to qualify those external processes as substantially cognitive. It is unde- 
niably that operational accessories `plus' internal processes are necessarily cog- 
nitive, and would perform no less perfectly than the internal processes without 
such a support. 
By contrast, external processes on their own, i.e. beyond internal cognitive 
functionality, seem to be bare motor or sensory -motor manipulations of acces- 
sories, which can hardly be seen as substantially cognitive. The manipulation of 
external processes in this sense would be reading without understanding, moving 
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a colour pen without actually drawing a meaning figure, and typing a keyboard 
without deliberating anything cognitive. This is certainly not what is meant 
by external processes. `External processes' means organism- environment inter- 
actions, and certainly involve natural cognitive processes. Then, the question is 
in what sense can the claim `external processes are substantially cognitive' be 
understood? There seems to be hardly a proper sense of understanding turning 
up to qualify the external processes of a user's as in themselves cognitive. 
Some people may contend that the communication between a computer user 
and a computer program goes beyond the aforementioned non -cognitive activi- 
ties. There seem to be abundant computer programs which exemplify this point, 
such as expert systems and the Latex compiler. The users of such programs 
simply type in certain simple codes, but the machine feeds back with seemingly 
clever indications or nice text editing. As one would argues, there must be cer- 
tain processes responsible for the computer's feedback, which are indeed external 
processes (beyond the users) yet substantially cognitive. 
Yes, the aforementioned processes are substantially cognitive, but do not 
seem to be purely external. A computer program itself is endowed with its de- 
signers' knowledge which should be attributed to their internal cognitive pro- 
cesses. Hence, beyond internal cognitive processes there are still no substantial 
cognitive processes. The aforementioned conceptual difficulty remains: it is hard 
to understand in what sense external processes can qualify as cognitive. 
Perhaps, it would be better to choose a more conservative stance than di- 
rectly assigning the label of cognitivity to external processes. To wit, the external 
processes of using operational accessories serve to support users by enhancing, re- 
taining, or partially skipping the functionality of internal processes beyond what 
a user's brain itself can do. The cognitivity of external processes can be un- 
derstood in this sense. External processes are indispensable in helping users to 
extend cognitive processes to the outside. In this sense external processes can 
qualify as a source of knowledge generation. 
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Does the Environment Drive or Shape Internal Processes? Consider 
the point (ii) (page 275). To argue for the importance of environmental factors 
in cognitive behaviour, Clark and Chalmers (1998) adopt certain analogical terms 
- `shape', `build', and `drive'. But this provides their argument with only a little 
support, because those terms do not seem to explain much about the relationship 
between external processes and internal ones - specifically the effects of organism - 
environment interactions on internal processes. 
To maintain their argument, they state that `the plastic human brain will 
surely come to treat such structures as a reliable resource to be factored into 
the shaping of on -board cognitive routines' (pp. 9 -10, italics added). The term 
`such structures', according to the context, refers to the surroundings of words 
for a reader. In addition, they raise the example of fish swimming to emphasise 
the role of environmental factors in the development of swimming capacities. 
They state that `the fish swims by building these externally occurring processes 
into the very heart of its locomotion routines', and that `where the fish flaps its 
tail to set up the eddies and vortices it subsequently exploits ... creating local 
structures and disturbances whose reliable presence drives our [its ?] ongoing 
internal processes' (ibid., italics added). In the argument the analogical terms 
refer to animate activities, but a difficulty will consequently arise: who are the 
driver(s) or the artist(s) that shape? It is certain that the authors would not 
really mean to explain the role of environmental factors in terms of the activities 
carried out by certain single persons (animals, or even vital forces), as the term 
`drivers' or `artists' literally implies. Rather, they seem deliberately aiming to 
explain that role in terms of the effects on internal processes brought forth by 
organism- environment interactions. Using the terms `drive' or `shape' is very 
likely to blur the real target of explanation. 
The most specific explanations, in Clark and Chalmers (1998), are seen in two 
attempts. First, they assert that the brain develops in a way that `complements' 
external structures and `learns to play its role with the confines of a unified, 
densely coupled system'. So far, this is plausible. Further on, they claim that the 
environment constrains the way that a cognitive system evolves and develops, 
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and this too is the case. Based on such reasons, they move on to claim that 
`extended cognitive is no simple add -on extra, but a core cognitive process (p. 
9)'. The problem is that there seems no other direct explanation as to how the 
environmental factors influence the making of internal cognitive processes. 
Insofar as such a limited argument can reach we can try to extract two main 
explanations. 
1. Coupling is a Substantial Cognitive Process. The external processes 
constitute a unified, densely coupled system, which is substantially cogni- 
tive. 
2. Organisms Exploit Environmental Factors. Environmental factors 
can constrain the development (or evolution) of brain structures and inter- 
nal processes because organisms learn to exploit such external factors and 
consequently circumscribe the external -internal coupled system. 
The main thrust of the argument maintained by Clark and Chalmers (1995) is 
that organisms exploit environmental factors and thereby circumscribe the devel- 
opment of brain structures and internal processes. Roughly speaking, such an 
argument successfully relates internal processes to environmental factors, which 
is not seen in cognitivism. Unlike the previous argument about accessories, the 
argument here suggests a different role for external processes - that they are not 
optional but intrinsic to the functionality of internal processes. If organisms are 
isolated from their niche, their internal cognitive processes (as they are at present) 
may not arise at all. However, despite the intrinsic role of the environment, it 
remains hard to figure out what that intrinsic role is, and hence more specific 
explanations seem still required. At this point, our previous discussions on the 
role of the environment in the making of intelligent behaviour (see Sections 6.5.1, 
6.5.2, pages 255, 256), can serve as these demanded complements. The argument 
we established in that previous chapter can be summarised in the following point: 
Organism- environment Interactions and Characteristics of Ecological Niche 
are Intrinsic Parts of Internal Processes. External processes - the embodied and 
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embedded activities - are substantially mediated by the environment. Unlike what 
accessories subserve, they do not merely serve to initiate and retaining internal 
processes. Such processes, hence, are not mere a record of internal processes. 
Furthermore, through the external processes the ecological niche has a sub- 
stantial impact on the characteristics of internal processes, as discussed in the 
notion of inverse ecological niche (see Section 6.5.1, page 255). A variety of 
mechanisms reflect various characteristics of this organism's ecological niche. In 
addition, the stepwise computation of the needed information for the required 
tasks manifests the organism's `strategy' of carrying out those tasks in its eco- 
logical niche. 
Both the mediation of the environment and the impact of the ecological 
niche on the characteristics of internal processes indicate that the organism - 
environment interactions must play a pivotal role in the making /emergence of 
novel capabilities /capacities. Roughly speaking, in the course of evolution and 
development characteristics of the ecological niche are reflected in the character- 
istics of internal processes through organism- environment interactions. 
Organisms Interacting with Various Environmental Circumstances Through 
both Exploration and Exploitation (of the Environment). The argument of Clark 
and Chalmers maintains that organisms promote the functionality of internal 
processes because they exploit environmental factors. The term `exploit (environ- 
mental factors)' seems to be roughly meant as `take advantage of (environmental 
factors)', as manifested in the functionality of the fish tail which is described as 
exploiting eddies and vortices. It remains unclear as to whether the term 'ex- 
ploit', regarding its common meaning in English, really means exploitation, as in 
autonomous agent research (see Section 2.4.1, page 38), or rather the combination 
of exploitation and exploration. Both exploration and exploitation have a bearing 
on the environment, and both are maintained by organisms' internal cognitive 
routines. However, they are different. Exploitative rules are items of heuris- 
tic knowledge that characterise environmental factors in internal processes; by 
contrast, exploratory rules are heuristic knowledge imposed on the explorative 
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activities of autonomous agents, without characterising environmental factors 
within the internal processes of organisms. 
To discuss specifically in the previous example - fish tail - it can be re- 
garded as a single autonomous agent /system that interacts with the environment 
with both exploration and exploitation. As we previously discussed (see Sec- 
tion 2.4.1, page 40) in the example of learning navigation, explorative processes 
may move /navigate to the regions with the largest estimated error, address less 
explored states (such as visiting the least recently inspected positions), or main- 
tain the planning action for exploring global states (instead of visiting the local 
state with the next nearest sensations). Exploitation is by no means the only way 
that an autonomous system can interact with the environment. As previously 
discussed, the capacity of navigation can take full advantage of the combination 
of them both. To understand their combination in the case of active perception 
systems, the previous chapters demonstrate several analyses and explanations. 
7.2.3 Summary 
Section 7.2 discusses Clark and Chalmers' externalism, which consists of two 
claims - that external processes of using operational accessories are substantially 
cognitive and that the environment drives and shapes internal cognitive processes. 
Regarding the first claim, arguments point to an inherent conceptual difficulty, 
and suggests an alternative - seeing the external processes of using operational 
accessories as extended from internal processes in the outside, by enhancing, re- 
taining, or partially skipping the functionality of internal processes beyond what 
a user's brain itself can do. Regarding the second claim, the criticism concerns 
the explanation of the effects of the environment on internal cognitive processes. 
The criticism challenges the conception of `drive' and `shape', and suggests an al- 
ternative explanation, that the environment affects the evolution or development 
of internal processes by reflecting the characteristics of the ecological niche on the 
explorative and exploitative control strategies of organisms, as indicated in the 
notion of inverse ecological niche (which was introduced previously in chapter 6). 
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7.3 The Role of Internal Representations 
in Autonomous Adaptive Agents 
The above externalist account of emergence generally stands as a reaction against 
cognitivism, especially regarding the emergence of adaptive capacities /capabilities 
in autonomous agents. Such accounts lead to scepticism about the role of inter- 
nal representations, as Clark puts it with the name `representational scepticism' 
(Clark 1995, p. 3). Clark contends that internal representations remain impor- 
tant not simply for off -line reflection or thought but also for the emergence of 
active capabilities. The point is that internal representations are not a hindrance 
to situated activities but conversely stand as their indispensable support. 
Clark's re- affirmation of the indispensability of internal representations is a 
reaction to the strong version of externalism (page 271), but this does not make it 
an uncritical revival of cognitivism. As Clark insists, the temporality of internal 
representations must be explained. The commitment is to integrate cognitivism 
and externalism, with both being modified. It can also been regarded as a part of 
multiplism, specifically a particular explanation subserving the interlock between 
various aspects of emergence. 
7.3.1 Reasons for Insisting on the Indispensability of Internal 
Representations for Explaining Cognition 
The main reason that Clark insists on the indispensability of internal represen- 
tations is the conviction that internal representations are essential to the nature 
of cognition. In this regard, Clark re -affirms a reason given by Beer (1995). 
That is, the overall `representational story'6 (of the external world) must be 
subject to de- composition, and hence there must be (the existence of) certain 
well- individuated inner sub- states or sub -processes which stand as bearers of the 
contents in the `representational story' (p. 6). The parts can accordingly be 
interpreted /understood as contributing to the causal story of the world. In other 
°Clark's term `representational story' may be understood as representational activities and 
their control. 
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words, both Beer and Clark take the semantic understanding and causal interpre- 
tation of the world as evidence supporting the existence of decomposed contents, 
which are primarily conceived as internal representations. 
On grounds of the above reason, Clark sees internal representations as in- 
terpretations (semantic understanding) of the world. Briefly, Clark insists that 
cognition must comprise content decomposition of the world, while Brooks (1991) 
claims exactly the opposite, with his idea of intelligence without representations. 
Clark's Definition of Internal Representations. According to the above 
two reasons that support internal representations, anything inside which con- 
tributes to better explaining the `causal story' of the world can be regarded as 
an internal representation. The main concern in highlighting the contribution 
of internal representations seems to be not the mechanism and code of content 
decomposition, but the various individual internal states that can be identified 
for better (causal) explanation. As a consequence, internal representations can 
be identified as the distinct internal states that subserve content decomposition 
(which is indispensable for better explaining the world states). 
Three Examples. Three example are provided by Clark to elucidate the role of 
internal representations in autonomous agents /systems. The point which under- 
lies these three examples is that internal representations indeed contribute to the 
temporal response of autonomous agents /systems, and more strongly, that such 
representations are needed for that response. These three examples are described 
as follows. 
The first example involves the environmental cues associated with single 
targets of visual search (i.e. cues that facilitate the search for certain objects in 
the environment), as seen in the yellow colour of Kodak film. Clark takes the 
yellow colour as a personal cue for those who search for the Kodak film. Because 
a personal cue is presumably an internal representation, this example is regarded 
in Clark's argument as evidence supporting the indispensable role of internal 
representations in active perception, specifically animate /active vision. 
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The second example involves the neurological mechanisms of the superior col - 
liculus that subserves gaze control. Auditory -oriented information is transformed 
into visual- oriented information, specifically into the mapping of visual position 
and the corresponding sensory -motor movements, thus the superior colliculus 
contributes to the eye- centred coordinates. The point is that the transformation 
in the above mapping must be via `a distinct on -board equipment' subserving 
the transformation of internal representations across modalities (pp. 9 -10, italics 
added). 
As the third example, motor emulation is necessary to exploit motor skills 
for higher speed, hence the fast proprioceptive feedback neural connections are 
identified as specific internal states supporting specific representational contents, 
motor skills.? 
The above examples are taken, in Clark's argument, as evidence in support 
of the contribution and the indispensability of internal representations to the 
response in the real environment. 
7.3.2 Discussion of Clark's Argument for Internal Representa- 
tions 
Clark's definition of internal representations assists in the integration of different 
computational paradigms. It can serve as a bridge between cognitivism and 
externalism, with regard to the temporality emphasised in situated robots and 
dynamical systems modelling. 
On the one hand, the definition circumvents the two main characteristics of 
cognitivism - cognitive representations as symbols and the central processing of 
symbols. It consequently reserves a means of identifying representations in the 
de- centralised approach to cognition. 
On the other hand, this definition identifies internal representations as inter- 
7There is no problem of understanding motor skills in terms of representations, because 
(as psychology textbook teaches us) they are procedural /implicit representations, as opposed 
to language -like /explicit representations. In addition, motor skills are simulated in PDP (see 
Churchland and Sejnowski (1992)), hence can be interpreted as distributed representations. 
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nal states, which is something common to situated robots and dynamical systems 
modelling, if only such states really subserve the bona fide8 representations of the 
world (i.e. contents), as opposed to simply performing various behaviours which 
are intelligent -like from the observers' point of view. To have internal represen- 
tations in this sense (i.e. contents) is indeed not a difficulty for de- centralised 
approach to cognition. Crudely speaking, except for those in Brooksian robotics 
all implementations of cognitive capabilities in autonomous agents /systems some- 
11( w fall into this category (i.e. adopting internal representations). 
For example, the PDP has internal representations, as evident in the nodes 
and the parallel distributed patterns of node activity. Dynamical systems mod- 
elling also has internal representations, as revealed in the hierarchical and het - 
erarchical structures of dynamical systems, and in the metaphors of dynamic 
systems theory, such as basin and attractors. In fact, dynamic systems theory 
sheds a new light on the general understanding of cognition (Kelso 1995), and 
in understanding psychological development, in particular (see van Geert (1994); 
Smith and Thelen (1993) (eds.); Thelen and Smith (1994)). As a further ex- 
ample, the exploitative control of autonomous agents, as seen in Steels (1991a) 
and Maes (1990b, 1995) presumes the existence and the explanatory role of in- 
ternal representations. Hence, the de- centred approach to cognition, except for 
Brooksian robotics, indeed undertakes internal representations. 
A Criticism of Clark's Definition of Internal Representations. The 
above definition is not entirely satisfactory, however. The role of those internal 
representations in the determination of cognitive activities has not been men- 
tioned. In addition, that definition does not seem to apply to the type 5 internal 
representations (see Section 2.5, page 59), which are involved in the production 
of situated activities. 
BCompared to thoughts, the internal states at the level of machine operations are surely 
needed to implement symbolic computation, but they certainly cannot be seen as bearers of 
bona fide representations. If internal representations are instead defined as mere machine op- 
erations, the understanding of internal representations is trivial (not bona fide), because any 
computational mechanism (even that in Brooksian robotics) provides internal representations 
in that sense. 
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What is defined is but the existence of internal states that subserve the 
internal control of real -time response, without actually characterising the role 
played by representations in the production of cognitive functionality. There 
is no mention as to the forms and mechanisms of internal representations and 
their indispensability to the internal control. Hence, Clark's definition does not 
address the explanatory roles played by internal representations in the production 
of situated activities. 
Without specifying those details about representations, the decomposition 
of representations and cooperation of them are conflated with a particular mech- 
anism. For example, the internal mechanism that controls motor emulation is 
surely a system for internal control, but it is possibly the case that there can- 
not be any further decomposition of representations (type 5) and cooperation 
between them within the system. An example is the retrieval of skills which are 
previously acquired by rote learning. The representations of such skills do not 
seem to be decomposable, before they are further dealt with beyond rote learning 
(e.g. when certain parts are attended to). 
The control of motor emulation is surely distinct from the control of other 
systems, as evident in single implementations, and hence different systems can 
be identified for explaining the integrated behaviour across systems. Given that 
the integration of different systems is an important concern in cognitive sciences 
the identification of individual systems does help explain behaviour, but seems 
still a long way from understanding the decomposition of representations (types 
1 to 5) and the cooperation between them within a single system. 
`'This point - that the integration of different systems is an important concern in cognitive 
science - can be seen in Norman (1985) and McClelland (1996). Norman (1985) states that 
`... because the normal mode for the human is to interact, the studies of memory and language 
and problem solving and decision making in isolation address only one part of the mechanisms 
of human cognition' (p. 328). McClelland (1996) emphasises the importance of integration 
between modules. He traces the advocacy for integration between parts to the physiological 
psychologist Teitelbaum (1967) (Physiological Psychology; Fundamental Principles. Prentice - 
Hall), who pointed out the importance of reconnecting structure and functional contributions 
in order to see how they work together. Furthermore, McClelland himself asserts that `it is 
encouraging to see just how much contemporary research builds on the contributions of the 
modularists in an effort to understand how the parts of the cognitive system work together' 
(McClelland 1996, p. 634). 
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Because that definition ends up with the attribution of certain temporal func- 
tionality to certain single networks inside organisms, it may risk being simply a 
re- affirmation of specific systems (such as neurophysiological networks) with spe- 
cific functionality in the temporal dimension, which have long been confirmed. 
Identifying individual systems for controlling different real -time functionality does 
not seem to qualify as a further step toward understanding the internal represen- 
tations (types 1 -5) relating to real -time response within single systems. 
For each single system, there can be certain internal states identified. How- 
ever, the internal states of some systems have decomposable contents (type 5 
representations, as seen in reinforcement reasoning), but those of some others 
do not (with only type 6 representations). Despite both kinds of system having 
internal states, the former systems have decomposable internal representations, 
but the latter systems do not. 
In brief, the internal states of a single system may be either decomposable or 
not. The existence of internal states does not suffice to justify the decomposability 
of internal representations. As a consequence, the definition of (decomposable) 
internal representations in terms of internal states, like what Clark provides, may 
be inadequate. The explanation of the indispensability of internal representations 
to situated activities must go a further step into the decomposition of represen- 
tations (types 2, 3 and 5) and the cooperation between them within a single 
situated system. 
A Criticism of the Internal Representations Adopted in Animate /Active 
Vision. Staying outside a system of active perception cannot help see the de- 
composition of representations (types 2, 3 and 5) and cooperation of them within 
the system that serve as various facilities of active perception. This is a problem 
in Clark's considerations of active vision, with two examples of different impor- 
tance. 
Attentive Control of Saccades. The more important example is the atten- 
tive control of saccadic movements and its internal representations (types 2, 3 
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and 5). It is widely accepted in literature on active perception that this example 
can be taken as an evidence against the full -scale model database suggested in 
Marr's vision theory. However, merely mentioning the functionality of this sys- 
tem, as a whole, does not explain the indispensability of internal representations 
(particularly regarding representations of types 2, 3 and 5). Ballard (1991) men- 
tions this example with the emphasis on its not being a full-scale internal model 
but a selective control, and hence active. There is, in that regard, still no justi- 
fication concerning the indispensable role of internal representations (types 2, 3 
and 5). Yet, it is argued by Clark that the attentive control of saccades relies `on 
some internally represented surrogate' (p. 9), and hence he takes this example 
as evidence in support of the indispensable role of internal representations. 
The problem is that the mere existence of this system does not reveal the 
existence of internal representations, let alone their indispensable role in the 
understanding of situated behaviour. To justify the indispensability of internal 
representations to the attentive control of saccades, argument should refer to the 
mechanisms of this control. The stance of internal representations would not be 
supported, unless within those mechanisms internal representations are confirmed 
as indispensable. 
By contrast, when the mechanisms of the aforementioned attentive control 
are disclosed, as discussed in Robinson (1968, 1987), Clark's stance would become 
plausible: the attentive control of saccades really undertakes internal represen- 
tations. Under the rough /gloss mechanism of visual attention (see Section 3.4.3, 
page 98), visual inputs manifest features of various weights, and one with the 
heaviest weight is singled out. Later, this mechanism compares the weight of the 
visual inputs in the visited position with that of other positions, while various 
weights are assigned to different visual features according to the required tasks. 
Those weights and their associated visual features are internal representations in 
connection to the required tasks, as regulated by the system of attentive con- 
trol of saccades. Those internal representations are indeed indispensable to that 
system, as manifested in the architectures of that mechanism. 
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Without mentioning those mechanisms and their architectures, the inter- 
nal representations of that system (from its outlook) seem to be darkened in a 
black box, within which nothing can be identified about the decomposition of 
representations and the cooperation of them in support of the required task. 
Visual Cues. Regarding the less important example given by Clark (1995), 
certain environmental cues for visual search are associated with certain objects 
to facilitate searching in the environment. Cues (properties of objects) and ob- 
jects surely can correspond directly to representations, as theorists (the third 
person) understand them. However, the association of cues with objects is not a 
direct proof of internal representations. It could happen to be the case that the 
association consists in a relation between systems, but not between the internal 
representations incorporated in a visual searching system. Specifically, when the 
agent intend to search for an object, say a Kodak film in the super store, she 
initiates the demand for a Kodak film in an intentional system, which also ini- 
tiates a particular search system specifically established for quick search for the 
yellow colour, as an ad hoc association between systems. An arm like this would 
provide no justification for the indispensability of internal representations. 
The point of our argument about internal representations is based on the 
nature of the category they fall in. The category of (bona fide) internal repre- 
sentations - i.e. contents - concerns what happens within mechanisms (e.g. the 
cooperation between representations), as opposed to pure reactive systems with 
type 6 representations. It is not a category concerning the functionality of the 
systems per se. When a system is identified with a certain functionality, say the 
functionality of wall -following implemented by Mataric (1990), there remains no 
justification for the view that the implementation of this system has actually used 
(bona fide) internal representations. 
The emphasis of Ballard (1991) regarding those environmental cues, as op- 
posed to the visual elaboration supported by internal computation, is the selective 
mechanism on account of a object- centred frame (coordinates), in contrast to the 
observer- centred frame undertaken in Marrian vision theory. The emphasis is not 
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on internal representations, but instead on the external fixation frame. It is un- 
clear in Ballard (1991) whether the external fixation frame must be represented 
internally. In fact, the external fixation frame is an effect of fixating on a fixed 
external point. When viewer moves forward, that point and the objects behind 
it move in the same direction. The simplicity consequently achieved is that the 
apparent velocity is `proportional to the distance from the fixation point' -a sim- 
ple correlation detected by observer's self -motion while fixating on an external 
point (p. 64, italics added). This is an effect of motion in the real (external) 
environment, not an outcome of anything represented internally. 
Ballard's stance on active perception emphasises the exploration of the envi- 
ronment rather than exploitative control, as seen in the AB perspective of active 
perception (see Section 3.2.1, page 82). In order to justify the role of internal 
representations in active perception, it would be better to seek support from the 
BC perspective, which emphasises the importance of exploitative control, and 
hence is a direct support for, and provides further explication of, Clark's stance 
on the internal representations with temporality. 
The Indispensability and Importance of Internal Representations in 
Active Perception are Evidently Confirmed. Internal representations are 
really indispensable and important in active perception. The main topic of this 
thesis is the exploitative control of active perception with (internal) representa- 
tions, which are not defined in terms of internal states. In fact, the concept of 
internal representations need not require a definition different from the common 
understanding in the de- centred approach to cognition. 
All the examples and discussions can be seen as evidence in support of Clark's 
insistence on the need for internal representations in active perception. Here, 
there is no need to re- iterate the detailed discussions. In the subject area we 
previously surveyed and discussed - active perception - the indispensability and 
importance of internal representations is evidently confirmed. 
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7.3.3 Summary 
Section 7.3 addresses the role of internal representations in autonomous agents 
in general, and in active perception in particular. The existence of internal rep- 
resentations in autonomous agents has been indicated by Clark (1995). However, 
his discussions do not account for the decomposition and cooperation of inter- 
nal representations. At this point, discussions in this thesis complement Clark's 
position, by showing how internal representations serve to bring about various 
facilities of active perception. 
7.4 Varela et al.'s Notion of Cognition as Embedded 
and Embodied Action 
The above discussions concern the distinction between external and internal pro- 
cesses, specifically the distinction between organism- environment interactions and 
internal representations. Posing such a distinction relates to an inquiry about 
the boundary or sources of cognitive processes. While Brooks' strong externalism 
stands in a sharp contrast to cognitivism, Clark suggests that there might be no 
such a thing as a clear -cut boundary, in response to two similar where questions 
- where lies the boundary of cognitive processes, and where are the sources of 
cognitive functionality. 
7.4.1 Terminologies - Embodiment, Coupling, and Enaction 
The Notion of Embodiment. Another inquiry about the nature of cognitive 
processes is posed from a different viewpoint. It concerns neither the boundary 
nor sources of cognitive processes, but the connotations of cognition, which can 
be seen as responding to a whether question - whether there are such things as 
cognitive representations which can be circumscribed independently from world, 
biological structures, sensory -motor and bodily actions. This inquiry is raised 
and discussed by Varela et al. (1991), who pose a strong attitude against cog- 
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nitivism, by claiming that cognitive processes intrinsically consist of a variety 
of things which do not fall into the category of representations: these things 
include the world, biological structures, sensory -motor and bodily actions, and 
cognitive and cultural context. In order to emphasise the importance of non- 
representational interactions, they adopt the term embodiment, which is meant 
in Brooksian robotics (see Section 2.3, page 34) as a radical reaction against cog - 
nitivism /orthodox computationalism. However, Varela et al. extend the meaning 
of embodiment, by assigning to it those non- representational things. 
A Novel Ontological Stance. It is worth noting that the attitude of Varela 
et al. toward cognition differs from Brooks' not simply over the scope of the key 
term `embodiment', but also on the understanding of representations. Brooks' 
emphasis is that cognition need not arise from representations; by contrast, Varela 
et al. reconstrue representations from a novel ontological perspective -a non - 
realist and non- idealist perspective. Varela et al. (1991) see their stance as `a 
middle way between' realism and idealism (p. 172). 
By the term `realism' Varela et al. mean that the role of cognition is to 
maintain `the recovery of a pregiven world' (ibid., italics added). Their stance 
would have been plausible, if this phrase pointed to naive realism, indicating 
thereby that they appreciate empirical realism - the realism that takes account 
of the contextual factors and cognitive interpretation in the understanding of 
the external world. However, it would be an overstatement, if consequently they 
argued for an ontological holism, that environment and organisms are concep- 
tually inseparable.10 Indeed, they seem to really do so, by seeing their work as 
an endeavour to restore continental philosophy (especially the phenomenology 
of Merleau- Pontyll, as discussed later), which seems to have gone beyond the 
'°As criticised by Clark (1997) and Varela et al. (1991) reflections against realist and ob- 
jectivist views of the world risk obscuring the scientific value of the embodied and embedded 
approach, on the one hand, and risk introducing the problematic idea that `objects are not 
independent of mind (Clark (1997), p. 173)', on the other. Apart from Clark's criticism, it is 
not hard to understand from a general (critical) realist point of view that objects per se are 
(ontologically) conceived by humans as independent from the mind, yet the 'understanding of 
objects are not subject to the relationship of direct correspondence: The mind interprets the 
perception of the independently existent objects. 
liThe orientation of Varela et al. (1991) in Merleau -Ponty's philosophy can be seen in the fol- 
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aforementioned critical realism in Anglo- American philosophy. 
The (empirical) realist conception of representations, which is so far assumed 
in AI and cognitive science, affirms the objective existence of realities (entities and 
events) which can be seen as epistemologically grasped in the abstract relations 
of mental /conceptual contents. Such relations and contents are generally called 
representations. As mentioned above, Varela et al. do not challenge the notion 
of representations by simply shifting to idealism, another extreme of ontology. 
Rather, they attempt to develop a novel ontological position between realism and 
idealism. 
The ontological stance of Varela et al. is as follows. They highlight the view 
that environment and organisms are mutually interdependent, which is described 
as a `fundamental circularity' between environment and mind, and assert that 
beyond this circularity `the worlds ... have no fixed, permanent substrate or 
foundation ... (p. 217)'. With this fundamental circularity they see human 
experience as `groundless', for the reasons that `we will always experience this 
familiar world as if it were ultimately grounded' and `that we are "condemned" 
to experience the world as if it had a ground, even though we know philosophically 
and scientifically that it does not (p. 218).' In this passage, Varela et al. contend 
that the world does not have an objective ground. 
In addition to the above assertion, they approach the relationship between 
world and mind by answering a related question: `how could we not experience 
the world as independent and well grounded? (p. 217)'. Among the similar 
perspectives they refer to, one is typical and concise - David Hume's view. As 
they put it, Hume `suggests that the idea of a continuous external world (like 
that of a continuous self) is a psychological construction ... (p. 231)', which 
is tantamount to the saying that there is no objective existence of a continuous 
lowing statement: `We believe that it is time for a radically new approach to the implementation 
of Merleau -Ponty's vision. What we are offering in this book is thus a new lineage of descent 
from the fundamental intuition of double embodiment first articulated by Merleau -Ponty (p. 
xvii)'. The holist stance of Merleau -Ponty's can be seen in his idea: `The properties of the 
objectivity and the intentions of the subject ... are not only intermingled; they also constitute 
a new whole (The structure of behaviour by Merleau -Ponty (1963), (p. 13); quote from Varela 
et al. (1991), p. 174).' 
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external world. 
In sum, Varela et al. (1991) deny that the external world has a fixed and 
permanent substrate, and that the external world has an objective ground; by 
contrast, they appreciate the view that there is no objective existence of a con - 
tinuous external world. This is not simply an epistemological stance as to how 
the human mind has a bearing on the understanding of the world, but a more 
radical ontological stance as to the ultimate existence of the world. As mani- 
fest in the above quotes, Varela et al. (1991) strive to eliminate the need for an 
objective substrate of the external world. As a consequence, they go beyond a 
spectrum of realist perspectives, and alternatively see the existence of the world 
as 'groundless', i.e. ontologically interacting with the mind. 
The Notion of Coupling. To support their ontological claim, Varela et al. 
(1991) highlight the strong linkage between cognitive capacities and the world, 
on the one hand, and obscure the individuation of cognitive capacities, on the 
other. As regards the former, they emphasise the import of the aforementioned 
non- representational things (except for the cognitive and cultural context), by 
arguing that such things are intrinsic to cognitive capacities in the sense that 
cognitive capacities cannot be independent from such things. As regards the 
latter, they highlight the (cognitive and cultural) contextual effects of cognition 
and the integration of neural networks. For example, in their discussions of colour 
cognition, they highlight the contextual effects and the complication of integrated 
visual features12). 
In general, for whatever they attempt to highlight or obscure, they coin a 
term - coupling - which means the strong and ultimate association of cognition 
with the aforementioned non -representational things, namely, world, biological 
structures, sensory -motor and bodily actions, and cognitive and cultural con- 
text. This term refers to both an epistemological and an ontological relationship 
between the mind and the world. 
"For this point, see Varela et al. (1991), pp. 157 -171. 
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7.4.2 The Enactive Approach to Cognition 
Varela et al. raise a novel stance on cognition - the enactive approach to cognition 
- as seen in the following paragraphs. 
Enactive Cognition - Cognition Intrinsically Supported by Embodi- 
ment. On the basis of those non -representational things, the notion of cou- 
pling covers both organism- environment interactions (given the participation of 
the world), on the one hand, and the contextual effects and the complication 
of integrated cognitive properties, on the other. In particular, for referring to 
those coupling relations between cognitive capacities and actions, another term 
is coined - enaction. The notion of enaction specifically applies to two points, (1) 
bodily actions that contribute to perception, and (2) the emergence of cognition 
out of recurrent sensory -motor actions (p. 173). Because of the participation of 
such bodily actions and sensory -motor movements, Varela et al. (1991) raise the 
stance of cognition as embodied action, as an reaction against cognitivism. This 
stance is named, more correctly13, as 
Evidence. To support the enactive approach to cognition, Varela et al. (1991) 
provide several lines of evidence. Here, we mention only three in connection to 
perception. First, they refer to the Bach y Rita's14 experiment of video camera, 
which transforms visual stimuli into a proprioceptive pattern on the skin to help 
blind people to recognise their environment. A condition intrinsic to this exper- 
iment is that the transformation across modalities would not proceed unless the 
user (the blind) maintains bodily movements. 
In a second example, Varela et al. refer to Walter Freeman's experiment of 
13The term `enactive approach to cognition' is more adequate than the previous term 'cog- 
nition as embodied action'. The emergence of cognition is understood by Varela et al. as 
intrinsically supported /mediated by embodiment, so cognition is enactive. However, the term 
`cognition as embodied action' itself is conceptually deficient, because cognition is not tanta- 
mount to action. Also deficient is the term `embodied action'. To describe action as embodied 
is a category mistake. Embodiment presumes action but the property of `being embodied' is 
used to describe the cognitive capacities that are intrinsically supported by action. 
'4The name `Bach y Rita' appears unusual, but it is actually so written in Varela et al. (1991) 
(p. 175). 
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olfaction pattern generation. Freeman inserted an array of electrodes into the 
olfaction bulb of a rabbit as a sensor to measure the global activity of olfaction 
while the animal behaved freely. The result was that no clear pattern of global 
activities took place in the bulb unless the rabbit was exposed to a specific odour 
several times such that chaotic activities could arise and subsequently converge 
on a coherent attractor. 
The third example seems more an interpretation than direct experimental 
result. Varela et al. attempt to find an evidence of enactive cognition from Pi- 
aget's notion of `circular reactions', a term cast in his constructive explanation 
of child development out of recurrent sensory -motor patterns. By directly iden- 
tifying circular reactions (the generation of recurrent sensory -motor patterns) as 
enaction, Varela et al. interpret development as grounded on enaction. 
These three examples can be seen as evidence showing the fact that percep- 
tion requires bodily actions and sensory -motor activities. 
Active Perception Can Serve as Evidence. Active perception systems 
seem to serve nicely as evidence for the above fact, that perception requires 
bodily actions and sensory -motor activities, for reasons already fully discussed 
in previous chapters. However, such a fact does not seem to well support the 
notions of enaction and embodiment, or the stance of `cognition as embodiment', 
as shown in the following discussions. 
Operational Closure vs. Coupling. An interesting point relating to the no- 
tion of coupling is that a previous view on an organism's boundary maintained by 
Varela and Maturana (1973) seems to be inconsistent with Varela et al.'s (1991) 
stance on an organism's boundary. To wit, the notions of operational closure and 
coupling appear to be mutually inconsistent: the former insists on the impor- 
tance of boundary while the latter conversely endeavours to blur it. Note that 
those principles pertain to different domains. Operational closure applies to the 
biological regularities of living, while coupling is seen as cognitive capacities. One 
may consequently say that these two domains are subject to seemingly incon- 
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sistent principles. However, inconsistency would not arise between principles of 
different domains. That is, different domains may well have different principles, 
but inconsistency is a relationship between items of the same domain. Although 
they do seem to be different, the principles of operational closure and coupling 
are not really inconsistent. 
By conception, there is no inconsistency in maintaining both operational 
closure and coupling in different domains. But even so, this does not guarantee 
that Varela et al.'s notions of embodiment, coupling and enaction are appropriate. 
7.4.3 Criticising the Enactive Approach to Cognition with Ex- 
amples of Active Perception 
In order to criticise Varela et al.'s enactive approach to cognition (i.e. the stance 
of cognition as embodiment), let us first consider their notion of coupling, 
Comparison with Clark's Notion of Coupling. Note that the term cou- 
pling is also adopted by Clark (1996, 1997) (also by Clark and Chalmers (1998)), 
but Varela et al. (1991) assign to it a wider range of relations. To advocate 
active externalism, Clark specifically uses the term coupling to mean organism - 
environment interactions. Where cognition is seen as grounded on the interactions 
between organism and environment, Varela et al.'s stance of `cognition as embod- 
ied action' stands hand in hand with Clark's active externalism. Yet, Varela et al. 
(1991) do not, unlike Clark, try to conceive of organism- environment interactions 
in terms of external sources of cognition (as opposed to internal representations). 
In fact, they doubt that there are such things as internal capacities which are in- 
dependent from the aforementioned non -representational things. Their intention 
is to bypass entirely the `logical geography of inner versus outer', but alterna- 
tively suggest that cognition be conceived of as embodied action (p. 172). As they 
contend, cognitive capacities ultimately and intrinsically consist in embodiment 
(not in the Brooksian sense but in the extended sense), specifically in enaction. 
With the notion of embodiment and enaction they regard cognitive capacities as 
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consisting neither in a `pregiven' world nor in `pregiven' categories (pp. 171 -3). 
In brief, the same term - coupling - is used by Clark and Varela et al. in different 
ontological senses. 
Active Perception Has No Ontological Implication. The difference be- 
tween Marrian visual processing and active perception research rests on the differ- 
ence between full and selective elaboration of visual information. The emphasis 
of active perception research is on information selection. There is no implication 
concerning the ontological status of the consequently understood world. However, 
the enactive approach to cognition insists on such an implication, by interpreting 
active perception as a direct evidence denying the independent existence of an 
objective world. 
Partial Recovery of the Objective World. Using the selected information, 
partial recovery of reality remains possible. The active perception research may 
adopt a realist perspective. In fact, it does so, by understanding the external 
reality and providing guidance for bodily actions to execute in the external world. 
In active perception research the fact that perception is active is not taken as 
evidence to deny the objective reality. Accordingly, it need not presume the 
enactive approach to cognition. 
Information Selection vs. Subjectivity. A confusion inherent in the enac- 
tive approach, in a nutshell, is to mistake information selection for the subjective 
shaping /interpretation of the world. This approach seems to assume that be- 
yond the actively re- constructed world there cannot be an objective reality. This 
is indeed an over -interpretation, as revealed by the objectivity of a species' eco- 
logical niche, which relates to the use of active perception (see discussions in 
Section 6.5.1, page 255), and in turn has a bearing on the stepwise computation 
of active perception (see Section 6.3.5, page 235). 
Although organisms do not understand the objective reality in the absence of 
interpretations, the organisms of the same species do have an objective ecological 
298 
niche, which can be seen as such organisms' world - their ground of living. The 
world in such a sense is objective. Properties of ecological niche (see Section 2.2.1, 
page 26), which are subject to biological and ecological conditions, would not de- 
pend on organisms' subjective activities or perspectives. That is, the ecological 
niche circumscribes organisms' behaviour, but not the converse. Hence, organ- 
isms do have an objective world, even given the fact of active perception. 
An Over -interpretation may be Conceptually Beautiful but Risks being 
Confusing. The account of embodiment and coupling seems conceptually neat 
and beautiful, with a strong flavour of wholeness and integration imposed on cog- 
nition and its relation to the environment. However, the beauty may be achieved 
at the expense of explanatory strength. In particular, an over- interpretation may 
be conceptually beautiful, but introduces extra difficulties because of the obscure 
conceptions it involve. For example, Varela et al. (1991) endorse Merleau -Ponty's 
idea by saying that `we must see the organisms and environment as bound to- 
gether in reciprocal specification and selection' (Varela et al. (1991), p. 174; 
italics added). This statement vividly paraphrases the notion of embodiment 
and coupling, but seems more figurative /metaphorical than explanatory. The 
coupling relationship between the world and the mind, as advocated by Varela 
et all. (1991), is well supported with respect to its epistemological aspect; yet, 
its ontological dimension does not seem to be consequently supported by the 
aforementioned evidence, and hence is overstated. 
Consider the idea that organisms specify and select the environment. This 
idea can be squarely understood in the context of active perception, with organ- 
isms partially elaborating their perceptual understanding and thereby making 
judgement over the conditions of the surrounding world under concern (which 
are likely to be elaborated only partially). Hence, the term environment refers to 
the external conditions under consideration (which implies the active perspectives 
of organisms), and both specification and selection are explained in the context 
of information processing. 
Conversely, consider the idea that the environment specifies and selects or- 
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ganisms. The conception of specification is best understood as the suggestion that 
the organisms' internal mechanisms reflect properties of their ecological niche (see 
Section 6.5.2, page 256). Selection may refer to natural selection. Hence, the term 
environment refers to ecological niche or milieu (which are objective), and spec- 
ification is explained in that context, while selection is explained in the context 
of natural selection. 
The analyses indicate that there is no basis to understand Varela et al.'s 
(1991) statement, in particular the phrase reciprocal specification and selection. 
The above two ideas (that organisms specify and select the environment and that 
the environment specifies and selects organisms) include three ambiguous terms - 
environment, specification and selection. Given this, these two ideas do not lead 
to a reciprocal relation. The statement made by Merleau -Ponty and endorsed by 
Varela et al. (1991) may consequently be confusing, although it sounds verbally 
neat and figuratively beautiful. 
Are Exploration and Exploitation in Active Perception Enactive? - 
Unlikely. Notice that in previous discussions of Varela et al.'s stance the term 
`enactive' applies directly to cognition in general, such as cognitive capacities and 
perception. Their argument for that stance seems to circumvent the discussion 
of enactive cognitive processes. If they discussed enactive (cognitive) processes, 
a program might arise. Their would -be discussions might reveal the existence of 
internal representations and processes, which could consequently be individuated. 
Although they can interact with (bodily or sensory- motor) actions, such repre- 
sentations and processes do not intrinsically presume those actions -a stronger 
stance - yet the enactive approach to cognition does hold that presumption, as 
discussed previously. 
Ignoring the existence of internal representations and processes does not lead 
to their inexistence. The previous discussions of Clark's usage of `explicit' (see 
Section 2, page 279) showed that exploration and exploitation control active per- 
ception with external processes, on the one hand, and internal representations 
and processes, on the other. Remember that notions of exploration and exploita- 
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tion relate to the stepwise computation of internal representations which closely 
interact with environmental factors. However, in previous sections and chapters 
there was no need to understand such close interactions through the notion of en- 
action, which presumes the ontological perspective that those perception- action 
interactions are intrinsic to cognitive processes. Internal representations and pro- 
cesses are clearly individuated in conception. They are conceptually independent 
of actions yet still theoretically interact with them. Compared to the notion of 
enaction, the individuation of internal processes and representations is better, 
because the actual representations and processes are identified and consequently 
the perception- action interactions are explained. To study the strong connection 
between perception and action need not be to link them by conception. It would 
be more appropriate to separate /individuate perception and action in conception 
but link them in theory, experiment, and consequent discussions. 
A Concluding Remark. A lesson can be derived from discussing Varela et 
al.'s (1991) notions of embodiment, coupling and enaction. The nature of the 
close perception- action relationship must be clarified with separately individu- 
ated15 representations and processes, and not blurred with Varela et al.'s notions 
of embodiment, coupling and enaction. Such notions seem to import a relativist 
perspective that cognitive representations are intrinsically relative to actions. The 
individuation would not eliminate the close relationship but conversely would elu- 
cidate the specific cognitive processes and their relationship with actions, as seen 
in the previous discussions surrounding the notions of exploration and exploita- 
tion. Before we can discuss cognitive representations, processes and actions, and 
their complex relations, they must be first individuated. Without individuating 
representations and processes it would be difficult to see that close relationship 
analysed or explained. 
IsBeing individuated means being conceptually identified, even independent of the closely 
interacting actions. When representations are individuated, their meanings need not be seen 
relative to their closely interacting actions. 
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7.4.4 Summary 
This section discusses Varela et al.'s notion of enaction, which advocates an in- 
trinsic connection between organisms and their environment, in particular the 
denial of an objective ground /substrate of the external world. A criticism raised 
in Section 7.4 led to a reconsideration of the notion of enaction, by affirming the 
reciprocally causal relations between organisms and environment but suggesting 
a way to preserve the objective status of the external world. 
7.5 The Explanatory Interlock of Emergent Function- 
ality -A Case Study of Active Perception 
Discussion now moves on to the final topic - the explanatory interlock of task -level 
emergence16 - which is vital for understanding the unity of emergent phenom- 
ena. Although it is hard to define and will be discussed in full later, the unity 
can now be roughly understood as the smooth functionality of certain emergent 
phenomena which is brought forth by gathering together the processes relevant 
to these phenomena. 
Understanding this sense17 of unity is important, because the emergent phe- 
nomena of a single system are usually understood according to different disci- 
plines or various theoretical paradigms, yet they remain presented as a single 
system in reality. To put it specifically, cognitive phenomena, which emerge 
from biological structures, are studied from a variety of perspectives, such as the 
functional specification in psychology, the identification of cortical areas in cog- 
nitive neuroscience, PDP simulation, autonomous agent research (including both 
Brooks' embodiment approach and that undertaking internal representations). 
However, it is always important to explain the integrity of cognitive capacities 
across modalities, domains and disciplines. 
16The term `interlock' orients in Clark's pursuit of `explanatory interlock of emergence'. See 
Section 7.1, page 264. 
17Another sense of unity is inter -theoretical reduction for understanding physical phenomena. 
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In particular, three aspects of emergent cognitive phenomena are identified by 
Clark (1996) for explaining their interlock - the identification of cognitive features 
in cortical areas, the exploitation of environmental opportunities by systems of 
active perception, and the emergent functionality on grounds of Brooks' embodied 
and embedded approach to cognition (see previous discussions in Section 7.1, 
page 264). Yet, apart from Clark's brief account, there is as yet no explanation 
as to the interlock of those three aspects. 
7.5.1 The Notion of Different Knowledge Sources 
Relating to the notion of various aspects of cognition (see previous discussions in 
Section 7.1.1, page 267) a similar but different notion can be introduced here - 
the notion of different knowledge sources. 
Definition: Different Knowledge Sources. The term `different 
knowledge sources' means different origins of cognitive phenomena, 
from which (origins) cognitive processes /capacities are generated. 
Different Knowledge Sources cf. Various Aspects of Cognition. The 
aforementioned two notions are similar because both largely concern many fea- 
tures of a unitary cognitive process. Yet, they remain different: various aspects of 
cognition are variously characterised capacities or processes while different knowl- 
edge sources are different origins of generation from which cognitive phenomena 
are brought forth. 
The difference between these two notions is manifested in their respective 
extensions. The notion of various aspects of cognition refers to cognitive capac- 
ities /processes which are subject to different levels of description, such as the 
three aspects of cognition mentioned in Clark's notion of explanatory trinity of 
emergence - namely, cognitive capacities as specified in detail at lower levels of 
description, the capacities grounded on the exploitation of environmental cues, 
and the capabilities of maintaining situated activities. 
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By contrast, the notion of knowledge sources refers to epistemological ideas /notions 
or computational strategies from which cognitive capacities are generated. Exam- 
ples of ideas are the considerations of adaptability vs. autonomy (which originate 
in the metaphysical contrast between the many and the one), and the contrasted 
explanatory perspectives (such as perceptual recovery /description, pragmatism, 
teleology, and mechanicalism). A further example discussed in this thesis is the 
notion of inverse ecological niche. 
Examples of computational strategies are the strategy of situated organism - 
environment interactions, the computation on the basis of internal representa- 
tions, explorative control, exploitative control, and various principles of task -level 
emergence (such as the completion of a single cycle of stepwise computation, and 
the comparison between collected information and that is yet needed for a re- 
quired task). More complicatedly, computational strategies are also exemplified 
by the notions of dynamic small modules, combinatory systems, and the combi- 
nation of exploration and exploitation. 
Conceiving the Integrity of Task -level Emergence at Two Levels. A 
further difference between the notions of various aspects of cognition and knowl- 
edge sources is manifested in their respective levels (in the sense of parts /whole) of 
integration. Various aspects of emergent phenomena are integrated at the lower 
level by processes under the combinatory control of exploration and exploita- 
tion in various active perception (sub -)systems. By contrast, different knowledge 
sources are integrated at the higher level in three steps. First, the integration 
is manifested in a variety of links, as will be demonstrated later in this section. 
Second, on the basis of such links further integration can be maintained through 
activities of conceptual sophistication. Third, the conceptual sophistication as to 
the notion of internal cohesion and the conceptual foundations centred around it 
would manifest the unity of task -level emergence. Later discussions will justify 
the integration consisting of these three steps. 
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7.5.2 Links between Various Knowledge Sources 
The present thesis presents a case study of emergent phenomena of active per- 
ception at task level, which can be seen as a response to Clark's advocacy of the 
explanatory interlock of emergent phenomena (see discussions in Section 7.1). 
However, it only addresses the latter two aspects of emergent cognitive phenom- 
ena among the trinity of emergence. Those two aspects have been discussed at 
length in the present thesis, with certain emergent phenomena beyond Clark's 
identification being isolated. As shown in previously chapters, the course of task - 
level emergence involves various types of task -specific utilities and various steps 
of process, yet each active perception system still presents a well integrated cog- 
nitive functionality. 
Below are four dimensions of integration between different sources of pro- 
cesses. Each instance of integration, e.g. the integration between situatedness 
and representations, manifests a link between two sources of process. Although 
all links commonly show integrity between the processes of different sources, dif- 
ferent links may be realised in different ways. As a rule of thumb, for different 
aspects of cognition each aspect (of cognitive phenomena) may have its pertinent 
type of linkage between the processes of different sources. Different types of link- 
age are realised in accordance with different system architectures and different 
theoretical descriptions. Although those differently realised links may be rather 
technical and consequently difficult to conceive for people in different disciplines, 
the discussions of the previous chapters provide a set of conceptual foundations 
from which to explain such links. The integration manifested in each of these 
four dimensions shows that the links between different sources of process, those 
between different computational strategies, and those between different episte- 
mological accounts (e.g. mechanicalism vs. pragmatism), have been pursued in 
the previous endeavour to build conceptual foundations. 
1. Integration of External and Internal Processes in the Determination 
of Task -level Emergence. According to the exposition of previous chapters, 
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task -level emergence is determined across the boundary of skin and skull. Even 
a species' mechanisms that realise task -level emergence reflect various character- 
istics of its ecological niche. 
Situatedness and Representations. Both embodied and embedded 
activities (which are emphasised in Brooks' situated approach), on the one 
hand, and internal representations, on the other, are used in active per- 
ception systems to realise the task -level emergence. It has been demon- 
strated that these two knowledge sources cooperate together in support of 
the smooth functionality of task -level emergence. 
The links between situated activities and the computation based on inter- 
nal representations does not seem to be describable by a single common 
conception, but rather is multiply realised, depending on the architectures 
of different systems. For example, Maes (1990b) links these two sides by 
the energy spreading across competent modules. The attentive control of 
saccades links saccadic movements and visual features by the comparison of 
weights between different visual features. Snake adopts energy control be- 
tween internal images, while the dynamical Kalman filter adopts dynamical 
systems theory to link the values of control parameters. 
Environment and Computation. The environment relates effectively to 
the computation maintained in an active perception system, as manifested 
in the notion of inverse ecological niche (see Section 6.5.1, page 255). Unlike 
cognitivism, active perception research does not see the environment as de- 
tached from internal computation. Unlike Brooks' situatedness approach, 
active perception research does not understand the contact between envi- 
ronment and organisms simply in terms of contingent activities. Rather, 
they are connected in the form of representations. The characteristics of 
ecological niche are reflected in the stepwise computation which leads to 
the accomplishment of required tasks. 
Explanations as to how each characteristic of the ecological niche reflects on 
organisms' computational mechanisms may need to be put in the context 
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of developmental or evolutionary theories. Again, the links between envi- 
ronmental characteristics and organisms' computational mechanisms does 
not seem to be explainable with a single conception, but is more likely mul- 
tiply realised in various theoretical descriptions, with different theoretical 
descriptions applied to differently generated mechanisms in the course of 
development or evolution. 
The observation that the processes of task -level emergence closely link up 
with the environment sheds light on the problem of explaining representations 
- the grounding problem of representations.'$ Based on our previous under- 
standings of task -level emergence, this problem can be explained in terms of 
both embodied and embedded activities, on the one hand, and the reflection of 
ecological niche on computation, on the other. 
In the course of task -level emergence, the across -skin computational activ- 
ities consist in two contrasting strategies: evolution brings characteristics of a 
species' ecological niche into its active perception systems (in the form of built - 
in heuristic knowledge), and the on -line computational mechanisms can set up 
several heuristics to explore various circumstances of the environment. 
Across -skin Computation Through both Exploration and Exploita- 
tion. Computation for task -level emergence, which leads to the accomplish- 
ment of required tasks, adopts both exploration and exploitation, beyond 
what Clark indicates: organisms exploit the opportunities in the environ- 
ment. That is, organisms not only exploit their ecological niches, as seen 
in the heuristic knowledge of the environment and the events in it (such 
as characteristics of how birds fly and how prey hide themselves), but also 
explore their environment, as seen in Ballard's notion of an object- centred 
frame, based on which organisms' gaze control becomes simpler and easier. 
The linkage between exploration and exploitation is subject to different 
'8A similar formulation of this problem is posed by Putnam (1994) as the hook up problem 
- how the perceptual processes on the basis of organisms' perceptual systems effectively hook 
up to the external world. That problem raises an inquiry as to the linkage across an organism' 
natural boundary - skin and skull. 
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architectures of implementation in different systems. Different systems may 
need different manners of cooperation to link these two sides of the trade -off 
relationship. 
2. Gradual Formation of Global Behaviour on the basis of Various 
Principles. The course of task -level emergence involves many steps, which may 
be subject to different principles. A variety of principles are needed, because 
tasks of active perception seem to be so complicated that they would not be 
accomplished without such different principles. Yet, different principles are even 
needed to explain the accomplishment of a single complicated task, such as gaze 
control. 
Emergence is Subject to a Variety of Principles. 
A variety of principles are needed for the accomplishment of tasks with dif- 
ferent degrees of elaboration. As previously demonstrated, certain simple 
small active perception systems suffice to carry out computation for ac- 
complishing simple single tasks. At this point, the computation is required 
to be grounded on two principles of emergence. The first is the `baseline' 
phenomenon of task -level emergence: a minimally stable and continuing 
collective phenomenon. The second is the stepwise computation with the 
comparison of the previously collected and the still needed information, a 
process that leads to an `autopoietic unity' in the sense of the accomplish- 
ment of a required task (see Section 6.3, page 227). 
Further on, the course of task -level emergence tends to become more 'elab- 
orate' for certain complicated tasks, such as gaze control and the tracking 
capacities /capabilities for various perceptual features. The task -level emer- 
gence for such tasks needs to be realised in combinatory systems, such as 
Dickmanns' car and the human system of gaze control, which comprises 
six sub -systems (see Section 3.4, page 97). To accomplish those elaborate 
tasks smoothly, a combinatory system needs to bring forth a 'hypercycle' 
of computation. 
308 
 The Internal Cohesion of Stepwise processes - For Computing Var- 
ions Perceptual Features and Environmental Factors. 
The computation for accomplishing required tasks must take account of a 
huge number of perceptual features and environmental factors, but a sin- 
gle active perception sub- system can only compute a very small (even tiny) 
number of those features or factors. Hence, computation is necessarily step- 
wise. The stepwise computation, when taking account of so many features 
and factors, must be capable of actually leading to the execution of the re- 
quired tasks. So, the stepwise processes of computation are required to show 
internal cohesion across computational steps. This requirement applies to 
not only a combinatory system but also its sub -systems. 
As discussed above, a global behaviour (of task -level emergence) is by no 
means only subject to a single principle. The behaviour is stepwise to address 
the complication of the perceptual world, yet the stepwise processes maintain 
internal cohesion to accomplish the required tasks smoothly and correctly. 
Adaptability and Autonomy. 
The stepwise computation manifests a `metaphysical beauty' of integrating 
both many and one, as demonstrated in its taking a variety of percep- 
tual features and environmental factors yet accomplishing required tasks 
smoothly and correctly. In particular, such beauty is realised in the simul- 
taneous achievement of adaptability and autonomy of emergence, which are 
two requirements of emergence usually subject to a trade -off relationship 
(see Section 2.1, page 18): an active perception system is well adapted 
to the complicated and changing environment, yet this is fully maintained 
within the coverage of its autonomy. By maintaining internal cohesion, 
an active perception system can arrange its computational processes in or- 
der to respond effectively to the complicated and changing environmental 
conditions. 
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3. Linking Perceptual Features and Motor Actions. In the central ner- 
vous systems of organisms, both perceptual systems and motor systems take 
shape in the form of (real) neural networks. Despite being similar neurophysio- 
logical structures, those two kinds of systems are largely studied with different 
emphasises of capabilities. Perceptual systems derive functional specification of 
perceptual features, which are easy to understand using the category of represen- 
tations, be they symbolic or distributed.19 By contrast, motor systems maintain 
procedural skills, which are continuous, hard delineate through functional speci- 
fication, and so seem easier to study on the basis of their performance. 
Although in reality both perceptual and motor systems are well integrated, as 
demonstrated in hand -eye coordination, computation via functional specification 
and computation via performance seem to be different computational strategies. 
When the integration between perceptual and motor systems is required, a ques- 
tion naturally arises as to which strategy most suits the connections between 
them - either functional specification or performance. 
The previous chapters show that such a dichotomy may evaporate given 
the mechanisms of quasi -functional modules and quasi- action modules, both of 
which serve to compute the factorial conditions of the perceptual features and 
the guidance for sensory -motor or bodily actions (see Section 5.4.1, page 176). 
Specifically, the computation of factorial conditions concerns the derivation of 
both perceptual features (by quasi- functional modules) and the perceptual guid- 
ance for sensory -motor or bodily actions (by quasi- action modules). Because such 
features and guidance both fall into the category of factorial conditions, such con- 
ditions form a ground on which those features and guidance are well connected 
to each other. As a consequence, quasi- functional modules link well with quasi - 
action modules without a gap between perceptual functions and motor actions. 
Active perception systems, thus, play a pivotal role in encompassing the different 
emphases on functional specification and performance. 
19The functional specification with distributed representations can be seen as innate capacities, 
in the sense of Quartz (1993), who criticises the fact that most neural network simulations are 
innate because of a designer's specification of tasks. 
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On the one hand, active perception systems connect to functional specifi- 
cation of perceptual features, because the selected perceptual information itself 
may be further computed to form full- fledged perceptual information. On the 
other, such systems bring about perceptual guidance to facilitate bodily actions. 
Active perception systems thus constitute a joint which connects two systems to 
maintain separately but gather together the perceptual features and motor activ- 
ities. Along with the course of task -level emergence, both perceptual and motor 
systems will bring forth more and more perceptual features and motor activities. 
Most important, the generated perceptual features and motor activities go hand 
in hand, demonstrating the interlock between those two systems. 
It is worth noting that the aforementioned separately maintained perceptual 
features and motor activities may be computed according to different paradigms, 
given that the previous discussions did not set constraints on the computation 
of the selected perceptual information and the guided bodily actions. It is not 
hard to realise the compatibility between the computation maintained within ac- 
tive perception systems and the further computation of the selected perceptual 
information. Although the computation with active perception systems is surely 
grounded on factorial conditions, the further computation may take advantage 
of any useful computational paradigm, including standard Marrian vision theory. 
Compared to the computation of perceptual features, the computation of guided 
motor activities seems less straightforward, because between the aforementioned 
perceptual guidance and the further elaborate motor skills certain other mecha- 
nisms may be needed. 
4. Linking Different Bases for Explaining the Generation of Percep- 
tual Understanding - Perception as Recovery /Description of External 
World, Pragmatism, Teleology, and Mechanicalism. Perception, be it 
understood by Marrian vision theory or by active perception research, intrinsi- 
cally serves to recover the external world. Otherwise, perception would have no 
objective grounds, and consequently becomes hallucination. To put it plainly, 
perception essentially serves to report or describe the external world, despite 
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the indispensable involvement of interpretation. The characteristic difference be- 
tween the two perspectives just mentioned concerns whether to recover the world 
with full elaboration or with specific emphases. It is a common assumption that 
the faculty of perception must be explained on account of its functionality - the 
recovery /description of the external world. 
Apart from the recovery of the external world, pragmatism - which concerns 
the consequence /application of a system - seems also salient in the context of ac- 
tive perception. As previously discussed (see Section 6.3.5, page 235), the content 
of the perceptual scene (i.e. the perceptual understanding) is organised based on 
its consequences - specifically, the contributions of its ingredients to the required 
task. The perceptual systems, that is, not only serve to report /describe the ex- 
ternal world, but also subserve the required tasks on account of the consequences 
of the would -be collected (or even generated) information and the subsequently 
generated perceptual scene. Hence, it is not incorrect to say that task -level emer- 
gence essentially presumes a pragmatist ground. 
Given the above, the perceptual scene not only presents descriptions of the 
external world, but also brings about the consequences of its ingredients for the 
required tasks. Perceptual understanding subserves both description (of the ex- 
ternal world) and application (to the required tasks). These two dimensions are 
consequently linked. 
A comprehensive explanation of the generation (task -level emergence) of ac- 
tive perception would need to take account of these four categories - description, 
contribution to tasks, intentions and mechanisms - without explaining any of 
them away. 
The previous chapters show the existence of those four explaining categories 
in active perception systems. Firstly, partial elaboration with emphasis and in- 
terpretation on the intrinsic functionality of perception provides description of 
the external world. 
Secondly, the category of application plays a role in explaining stepwise com- 
putation. Specifically, the stepwise computation must insure the next step of 
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sensory -motor actions or internal computational processes, by comparing the col- 
lected information with the information needed for accomplishing the required 
tasks (see Section 6.3.5, page 235). Generally speaking, the mechanisms of 
a species' active perception systems reflect the characteristics of its ecological 
niche, as discussed previously with the notion of inverse ecological niche (see Sec- 
tion 6.5.1, page 255). Hence, the previous discussions in the present thesis have 
forged a link between mechanisms and application /consequence, which can be 
seen as a link between mechanicalism and pragmatism. 
Thirdly, the category of purpose is indispensable in understanding active 
perception, because it is fundamentally a faculty aiming at carrying out tasks, 
which manifest organisms' intentions and goals. The linkage between tasks and 
mechanisms of active perception systems is seen in the notion of task identi- 
fication (see discussions in Sections 5.2.1, 5.2.2, pages 145, page 155). That 
is, intentions and goals arise from outside an active perception system but can 
be identified within the system. The identification of tasks is the beginning of 
stepwise computation. In other words, active perception systems begin with the 
commitment to tasks. Whatever is described in the perceptual scene, the per- 
ception subserves certain tasks. Those tasks manifest the related intentions or 
purposes of perceptual activities. Because active perception systems begin with 
and subserve certain intentions /purposes, it is not unfair to say that there is a 
teleological dimension20 to active perception. 
The purposes and goals are not imposed on the active perception systems 
by divine fiat, but by organisms themselves. Specifically, tasks arise either in the 
intentional systems of organisms or in the heuristic knowledge implemented in 
their exploitive control (such as pursuing water and avoiding toxic substances), 
as mentioned in Section 5.2.2. In other words, tasks either take the form of tran- 
sient goals or are shaped as heuristic knowledge, which may not be amendable. 
It is worth noting that the organism is not committed to the arising goals origi- 
nally and permanently, unlike the teleological perspective of natural history. By 
contrast, the heuristic knowledge implemented in exploitive control is a result of 
20For background information, please refer to previous discussions in Section 2.2.2, page 27. 
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evolution or learning, e.g. the learning of spotting yellow colour for searching the 
Kodak film. The purposes /goals arising from intentions are constantly subject to 
change. Yet, however constantly the organisms change their tasks of active per- 
ception, the stepwise computation of active perception systems has an inherent 
teleological dimension. 
Lastly, mechanicalism is an indispensable basis from which to explain the 
generation of perceptual understanding. This explanatory perspective seems to 
be incompatible with teleology, but in fact is not. As just discussed, certain 
goals are implemented in the heuristic knowledge of exploitive control, while 
certain others arise from outside active perception systems. The existence of 
goals and purposes does not affect the explanation of active perception systems 
from a mechanical point of view. That is, within the active perception systems 
that have been implemented (including their heuristic knowledge), such systems 
can be fully explained on grounds of mechanicalism. So these two explanatory 
perspectives are not incompatible. More strongly, they link mutually, given that 
certain goals are implemented in the form of heuristic knowledge and others arise 
from outside. 
Broadly speaking, active perception must be understood in terms of these 
four dimensions together - four explanatory perspectives. Firstly, it presumes 
the intrinsic functionality of describing the external world. Secondly, the content 
of the perceptual scene must also be understood on account of the contribution 
of its ingredients to required tasks. Thirdly, those required tasks can be regarded 
as purposes (or goals) which are imposed on the stepwise computation of ac- 
tive perception, to see it from a teleological point of view. Lastly, the stepwise 
computation of active perception systems can indeed be fully explained from a 
mechanical point of view. 
These four explanatory perspectives are not separately pursued without 
inter -relationship. The first explanatory perspective is presumed in the expla- 
nation of active perception, because description is intrinsic to the faculty of per- 
ception. The second explanatory perspective (pragmatism) concerns the selection 
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of ingredients in the perceptual scene with regard to their contribution to tasks, 
which are the targets of the third explanatory perspective (teleology). Moreover, 
the stepwise computation can be fully explained from a mechanical point of view, 
by seeing goals either as heuristic knowledge or as externally arising intentions. 
Hence, the four perspectives are connected. 
Given the above discussions, the previous explorations of active perception 
systems have established the link between those four perspectives over perceptual 
understanding - perception as description, contribution /consequence, purpose, 
and mechanism - which can be seen as internal links in a four -fold explanation, 
namely, the notion of perception as description, pragmatism, teleology, and me- 
chanicalism. 
7.5.3 How do Conceptual Foundations Elucidate these Links? 
A conceptual foundation is understood as an interpretation of links of computa- 
tional processes (or strategies), because it serves neither to describe facts nor to 
characterise theoretical properties but jumps to a higher level to explain imple- 
mentational results or theoretical properties in more intuitive terms, as seen in 
the above four points of interlock. The interpretation of conceptual foundations 
is demonstrated as follows. 
Inverse Ecological Niche The notion of inverse ecological niche, as a con- 
ceptual foundation of task -level emergence, is a conceptual foundation serving to 
interpret three links between external and internal processes. First, characteris- 
tics of ecological niche21 are reflected in the exploratory and exploitative control 
of computational processes. Second, on the basis of the exploratory and exploita- 
tive control, active perception systems can link situated activities and internal 
representations. Third, also on the basis of exploratory and exploitative control, 
a link is forged between the environment and the computation of active percep- 
21 For relevant background on the role of the environment, please refer to Sections 2.2.1 and 
2.2.2 (pages 26 and 27). 
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tion systems. Notice that at both sides of each link discussed above are two 
knowledge sources which are relevant to the functionality of active perception 
systems. Thus, the notion of inverse ecological niche serves to interpret three 
links between different sources of process, which are relevant to the task -level 
emergence realised in active perception systems. 
Internal Cohesion. The notion of internal cohesion also covers three links: 
two between the processes of different sources, and one between different require- 
ments of emergence (namely, autonomy and adaptability). 
First, in a combinatory system, processes of its sub -systems are apparently 
processes of different sources, as exemplified by the six sub -systems of gaze con- 
trol. Were it not for the control of the combinatory system, its sub -systems would 
operate separately without being organised into smooth functionality. Thus, the 
control of the combinatory system can be seen as a link between processes of 
different sub -systems. 
Second, different combinatory systems can be further linked into a yet more 
elaborate combinatory system. For example, the system of gaze control can be 
linked with systems of tracking, as demonstrated by human visual control. Thus, 
a link emerges between processes of two combinatory systems. 
Third, internal cohesion relates to another type of link - a link between 
autonomy and adaptability - which are two requirements of emergence. Their 
relationship is similar to the metaphysical ideas /categories of One and Many, 
which serve to explain the part -whole relationship of events happening in the 
world. Like the realisations of One and Many in events, the respective realisations 
of autonomy and adaptability in the course of emergence are subject to a trade -off 
relation, as discussed in chapter two (see Section 2.1.3, page 25). 
What is important in connection to the notion of internal cohesion is that it 
is a link that breaks the aforementioned trade -off relation by accomplishing both 
requirements to a high degree: each active perception system presents a high de- 
gree of adaptability to various environmental conditions and the accomplishment 
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of required tasks is maintained satisfactorily by the mechanisms of such a system 
without the need for interruption (by users or designers), and without the worry 
of getting stuck (or even breaking- down). 
In sum, the notion of internal cohesion covers three links, two between the 
processes of different sources, and one between different requirements of emer- 
gence. 
The Factorial Conditions Computed by Quasi - ,functional Modules and Quasi - 
action Modules. The notions of factorial conditions, on the one hand, and quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules, on the other, are conceptual foun- 
dations that work together to link perceptual systems and motor systems. Such 
systems can be regarded as different sources that provide processes for the step- 
wise computation of active perception. 
As previously discussed, the basis of these two notions active perception sys- 
tems (by connecting to functional specification of perceptual features and bring- 
ing about perceptual guidance of bodily actions to facilitate bodily actions) can 
connect to perceptual and motor systems respectively, but gather together their 
products - perceptual features and motor activities - between which a link is 
formed. These two sources (motor and perceptual systems) of processes appear 
to be less striking than those discussed above, but the link between motor and 
perceptual processes is by no means less important than others. This is because 
the link presented discussed here manifests the integrity between perceptual and 
motor systems, which in part explains the integrity of cognition -a major goal 
of cognitive science. 
Task Identification. The notion of task identification, as a conceptual foun- 
dation, is epistemologically intriguing because it manifests three sharply con- 
trasted perspectives for understanding the generation of perceptual understand- 
ing - mechanicalism, pragmatism and teleology. Like the contrasted categories 
of One and Many, these three perspectives are different sources of explanation. 
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The above discussions clarify a relation between scientific theories, and the 
implementations maintained in cognitive science and AI, on the one hand, and 
epistemological conceptions, on the other. That is, the unity of cognition -a 
perennial concern of cognitive science - can be conceived in terms of the links 
between knowledge sources and the conceptual foundations which elucidate such 
links. The contrast and cooperation between those links and conceptual foun- 
dations delineate a division of labour (in fact, cooperation) between science and 
philosophy. Thus, the pursuit of conceptual foundations contributes to the inter- 
disciplinary understanding of cognition pursued in cognitive science. This division 
of labour between science and philosophy is described as follows. 
7.5.4 Explaining the Unity of Emergent Phenomena 
The Unity /Integrity of Task -level Emergence. As yet, discussions in this 
chapter have neither defined the term integrity /unity nor managed to explain 
it. Now, this topic can be pursued by building on the previously established 
conceptual foundations. 
What does Unity /Integrity mean? In the consideration of emergent phe- 
nomena, the term `unity' seems generally difficult to define. The notion of unity 
points to the integrity of variously characterised phenomena, of which emergence 
is a typical example. Yet, the notion of integrity itself is in question. It too 
requires explanation. It seems that the notion of integrity is usually used inter- 
changeably with the notion of unity but neither of them is further analysed and 
explained. 
The difficulty we experience in pinning down a definition of unity /integrity 
seems to be a matter of gap, between ontological thinking and epistemological 
conception. Emergent phenomena involving a certain faculty, say active percep- 
tion, is thought along with the ontological dimension as a unity on account of 
the integrity presented by active perception systems. However, it is usually the 
case that there is neither sufficient scientific knowledge nor firm epistemological 
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basis to conceive the unity of a certain faculty. This is the case, especially given 
the consideration that different capacities may be subject to different kinds of 
integration, such as the difference between the emergence of foraging behaviour 
displayed by ants and the emergence of flying capacity in honey bees. The former 
(foraging behaviour of ants) may involve cooperation between conspecifics (with 
the allocation of certain chemical cues by some ants and the detection of such 
cues by others), while the latter (flying capacity in honey bees) seems to involve 
reflexive iteration of wings. Despite the difference, both capacities present in- 
tegrity. Perhaps, the precise definition of unity in one particular area, such as 
the aforementioned foraging behaviour, is hard to achieve in the beginning of 
study; rather, an adequate definition may need support from abundant empirical 
knowledge. 
The unity of an area, say the task -level emergence of active perception, must 
be understood on grounds of its relevant conditions. As an attempt along these 
lines, the unity of the task -level emergence can be conceived via two points. 
Definition of the Unity of Task -level Emergence - The unity of 
a certain type of emergent phenomena can be characterised with two 
emphases: (1) the smooth functionality of certain emergent phenom- 
ena (2) which is brought forth by gathering together the processes 
relevant to these phenomena. In the context of active perception, the 
smooth functionality of active perception (emphasis (1)) is the timely 
processing of perceptual inputs in support of the survival or well -being 
of a particular species. The relevant processes to be gathered together 
(emphasis (2)) are the stepwise processes leading to the production 
of perceptual guidance for bodily actions, i.e. the accomplishment of 
required tasks. 
Recall that active perception consists of various capacities, largely including 
various sub -capacities of gaze control and tracking. A sub -capacity (e.g. pursuit) 
is supported by certain task -specific utilities, as discussed in chapters three and 
four. The task of active perception - the production of perceptual guidance in 
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support of bodily actions - is accomplished by certain processes that are arranged 
at task level. The arrangement of those processes for the required tasks is an 
emergent phenomenon. 
Note that the above conception has both a pragmatist and a mechanical - 
ist dimension. Point (1) is a pragmatist concern, because the processing for 
the demanded functionality (i.e. rapid processing and production in the light of 
maintaining survival or well- being) seems to fall within a pragmatist category. 
Point (2) is a mechanical characterisation, for the emergent processes are origi- 
nally brought forth on the basis of robotic architectures, for which the relevant 
conceptual foundations can be seen as mechanicalist characterisation. The con- 
ception of the unity in question seems clear now. The following discussions are 
directed to the explanation of the unity conceived above. 
Explaining the Unity of Task -level Emergence. The explanation of the unity 
of task -level emergence can be framed conceptually, on the basis of the previously 
built conceptual foundations. Further conceptual refinement can in principle be 
maintained by scholars of different disciplines, in order to conceive of the unity 
of emergent phenomena with significant adequacy. 
The unity of the task -level emergence of active perception can be explained 
by highlighting the chains of support provided by the processes characterised 
above via points (1) and (2): 
Explaining the Unity of Task -level Emergence. What needs 
to be explained for understanding the task -level emergence of active 
perception is the successful management of emergent processes at task 
level, beginning from the processing of perceptual inputs to the pro- 
duction of perceptual guidance for the bodily actions. In a nutshell, 
such emergent processes are gathered together in the course of inter- 
nal cohesion22, the detailed processes which compose this having been 
fully discussed in the establishment of conceptual foundations. 
- Internal cohesion, according to its definition (see Section 6.4.1, page 242) is an act of corn - 
posing various forces, which is not a single cognitive process. 
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As a caveat, the unity of task -level emergence is not explained by the course 
of internal cohesion alone, but by the emergent processes which are gathered 
together in the course of internal cohesion. 
An Endeavour to Explain the Unity of Task -level Emergence. Recall 
that internal cohesion was previously defined (see Section 6.4.1, page 242) as the 
act of effectively composing all the forces involved in the serial order of stepwise 
computation, with the computational steps reflecting the various internal em- 
phases of a task. It is worth noting that the process of internal cohesion widely 
involves all details relating other conceptual foundations, with regard to the rel- 
evant environmental factors and the computational processes for accomplishing 
particular tasks. Since all such details are gathered together in the process of 
internal cohesion, the course of internal cohesion can stand as the unity of the 
task -level emergence. 
With the unity of task -level emergence being so conceived, a how question 
naturally arises: how is the unity achieved on the basis of internal cohesion? 
There is no single conception which can effectively explain all details, as re- 
vealed in the previous discussions on the multiplist interlock of emergence. Yet, 
the previously discussed conceptual foundations and the relating links between 
knowledge sources together would help us to reach the required resolution, with- 
out sacrificing the involving technical details, the resulting integrity of various 
processes in each particular implementation, or the intuitive comprehension of 
that integrity. Thus, the unity of task -level emergence may be explained by a 
multiplist combination of processes and conceptions. 
As a reminder, among the processes centred around the course of internal 
cohesion is the comparison between the gathered information and the yet needed 
information for a required task. Note that the comparison is maintained stepwise. 
In each step the computation insures a relative optimised move for the next step 
of sensory -motor action. Such a move is by no means simple, because it is based 
on the explorative and exploitative control maintained by the quasi -functional 
'nodules and quasi -action modules, which manifests a certain degree of subtlety. 
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For example, the cooperation between the control of pursuit movements and 
the attentive control of saccades presents a degree of subtlety in driving sensory 
receptors. In particular, the control of pursuit movements (see Section 3.4.5, 
page 104) presents needed compensation for various errors, which arise in the un- 
predictable environmental conditions, in order to drive visual receptors precisely 
to where is really expected by the attentive control of saccades. This cooperation 
presents a significant degree of optimality, as manifested in the real -time mainte- 
nance of gaze on the envisaged visual features. Thus, the stepwise computation 
would turn out smoothly to keep an `eye' on various visual features relevant to 
the required task. 
The course of internal cohesion is manifested in the stepwise computation 
across a number of steps, by the cooperation between the control of pursuit 
movements and the attentive control of saccades. The course of internal cohesion 
is maintained by different (quasi -form) modules, but the cooperation between 
them manifests a subtle arrangement of control processes with a significant degree 
of optimality in each step, leading to the eventual accomplishment of the required 
tasks. The integrity /unity of task -level emergence in connection to gaze control 
(with regard to keeping track of target) is thus demonstrated. 
Given the above example (i.e. the control of pursuit movements and the 
attentive control of saccades), the course of internal cohesion brings together 
various processes, with a significant degree of subtle arrangement in response to 
environmental unpredictability, which thereby leads to the accomplishment of 
required tasks. The unity of task -level emergence is well demonstrated by this 
example. 
Given the above elucidation, the integrity of task -level emergence can be 
comprehended as the emergent processes centred around the course of internal 
cohesion - specifically, the emergent processes (as subject to various principles, 
including internal cohesion) maintained by quasi -functional modules and quasi - 
action modules, under explorative and exploitative control, through stepwise corn- 
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putation with comparison between collected information and the required tasks. 
Understanding Interlock and Activeness Through the Unity of Task - 
Level emergence. The above explanation of the unity of task -level emergence 
realises (within the subject matter of active perception) Clark's request for the 
interlock of emergent phenomena. In addition, such an explanation of unity can 
also be regarded as an answer to a question raised early in the present thesis - 
activeness (i.e. what makes active perception work). With our conceptual foun- 
dations and relating expositions, both the questions of interlock and activeness 
are answered. 
With the mediation of conceptual foundations between conceptual activities 
and those differently realised links (by different theoretical constructs and the 
architectures of computer /robotic implementations), the comprehension of task - 
level emergence and its integrity becomes relatively intuitive. The comprehension 
is subject to two limitations, (1) that the details of those links seem a privilege 
of the scientists at relevant domains and hence would very likely go beyond the 
reach of ordinary people's conceptual activities, and (2) that the processes of 
emergence from local to global activities are explainable by various principles of 
emergence that may be too complex to comprehend intuitively even for scientists. 
The Importance of Conceptual Foundations and Links for Understand- 
ing the Unity of Cognition. The links between different knowledge sources 
indicate a general understanding of the unity of cognition: 
The unity of cognition in general can be achieved in terms of vari- 
ous conceptual links between knowledge sources. What exactly those 
links and knowledge sources are depends on what particular cognitive 
system is at issue. 
Such links and conceptual foundations are built for the understanding 
of scientific theories and computer implementations. Such an under- 
standing cannot be reached independently by philosophical abstrac- 
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tion, but conversely must be made available before the activity of 
philosophical abstraction is carried out. 
Consider the relationship between science and philosophy from the 
other direction. Without the above philosophical notion, the attempt 
to understand the unity of cognition merely with recourse to those 
links and conceptual foundations23 would be too scattered to grasp 
the integrity of a particular cognitive phenomenon in question, e.g. 
task -level emergence of active perception. Worse, without those con- 
ceptual foundations the endeavour to understand the unity of cogni- 
tion merely with recourse to scientific theories and computer imple- 
mentations may even risk losing most integrated perspectives. 
Given that they mediate between science and philosophy in the pro- 
cess of explaining the unity of cognition, conceptual foundations stand 
as the pivot of understanding the unity of cognition. 
This passage presents the philosophical implications of the case study carried 
out in the present thesis: a case study of emergent cognitive functionality by 
discussing the task -level emergence of active perception. 
How Strong is the Need for Conceptual Foundations? - Objections 
and Replies. Three objections may be raised against the above philosophical 
implications. The first objection concerns the scope of the conceptual founda- 
tions. The second concerns the risk of begging the question. The last one is 
about the generality regarding the pivotal position of conceptual foundations. 
First Objection and a Reply to It. The first objection concerns the 
scope of the conceptual foundations that are needed for explaining the unity of 
cognition. Discussions in this section stress the importance of certain conceptual 
foundations in understanding the unity of cognition - those mentioned in the four 
23Remember that a conceptual foundation serves to interpret a single or a number of con- 
ceptual links. Hence, simply mentioning conceptual foundations suffices to refer to conceptual 
foundations and the conceptual links of various knowledge sources. 
324 
points of interlock. Does this mean that other conceptual foundations discussed 
in previous chapters, such as the notions of process arrangement and dynamic 
small modules, are not needed for explaining the unity /interlock of task -level 
emergence? 
The notion of process arrangement seems to be less important than those 
discussed in the four points of interlock. However, this does not mean that it is 
entirely redundant. Indeed, it serves as a contrast to the notion of task identifi- 
cation in order to delineate its (task identification) ending processes. In addition, 
its role is manifested in its connection to the notion of dynamic small modules, 
which also has its role in explaining the interlock /unity of task -level emergence. 
Although this notion does not seem to turn up in the discussions of interlock, it 
is assumed. The notion of dynamic small modules serves to explain the hierar- 
chical organisation of sub- systems within combinatory systems. At this point, its 
explanatory role becomes obvious. To wit, the notion of combinatory systems is 
needed for explaining elaborate computational processes, i.e. the hypercycle of 
task -level emergence. As exemplified by the roles of these two notions (i.e. the 
notions of process arrangement and dynamic small modules), all notions discussed 
in present thesis play certain roles in the process of explaining the interlock /unity 
of task -level emergence. 
Second Objection and Reply. Another objection may be raised - 'Con- 
ceptual foundations are only needed for the case study of empirical materials but 
not for philosophical investigation in general.' According to this objection, con- 
ceptual foundations are needed for understanding the unity of cognition simply 
because the conceptual foundations of a subject matter (such as active percep- 
tion) are goals of a case study which seeks to generate a philosophical thrust by 
way of studying the conceptual foundations of scientific theories and computer 
implementations in that subject matter. In other words, conceptual foundations 
are needed because the author of the aforementioned case study happen to raise 
them together as the target of his research. As a consequence, taking a research 
target as indispensable without further justification would be a mistake of begging 
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the question. 
If such an objection is tenable than the pivotal position of conceptual foun- 
dations in understanding the unity of cognition would evaporate. In this vein, the 
study of conceptual foundations would be optional for understanding the unity 
of cognition. It might be a provocative and fruitful approach to understanding 
the unity of cognition, but it would not be necessary: certain yet un- explored 
approaches may fare equally well or even better. 
In reply, the pursuit of conceptual foundations is indispensable, in the pro- 
cess of explaining the unity of cognition, because the mediation of conceptual 
foundations between the study of the subject matter at issue (active perception) 
and eventually gaining an understanding of the unity of active perception is not 
presumed in the research target of present thesis but is a derived result. Although 
conceptual foundations mediate a priori between science and philosophy, the re- 
search of this thesis does not presume that by deriving the conceptual foundations 
of the task -level emergence of active perception the research can surely achieve 
the unity of task -level emergence. 
Specifically, the research target of the present thesis has been to study the 
emergent phenomena of active perception via considering certain conceptual foun- 
dations (and links between knowledge sources) in the hope of supporting the at- 
tempt to understand the unity of emergent phenomena. There is no presumption 
that the achieved conceptual foundations would turn out successfully to mediate 
between the emergent phenomena of the subject matter and the envisaged unity 
of this subject matter. In a nutshell, there is no presumption in the research tar- 
get that the unity can be firmly achieved simply on the basis of such conceptual 
foundations. As it turns out in the process of research, conceptual foundations 
are found as actually mediating the (task - level) emergence of active perception 
and the unity of (task -level) emergent phenomena. The successful mediation of 
conceptual foundations has never been presumed in the research at the outset, 
hence in the above claim (that conceptual foundations are needed in the process 
of achieving the unity of task -level emergence) the research does not make the 
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mistake of begging the question. The objection in question is consequently met. 
Third Objection and Reply. A further objection may be raised to chal- 
lenge the previous claim of the generality regarding the pivotal position of con- 
ceptual foundations. Specifically, one might claim that conceptual foundations 
may be simply important for the subject matter of the carried out research, but 
other research on different subject matter may show conceptual foundations as 
unimportant. The research seeking conceptual foundations of a subject may end 
up with the same: end up with what philosophical investigation alone can do 
without the engagement in the study of empirical knowledge. 
As a reply, it is logically possible, but scientifically unlikely, that understand- 
ing the unity of cognition in a different subject matter needs no significant in- 
volvement of conceptual foundations and their related empirical knowledge. For 
research that has not yet been carried out, anything is logically possible if it is 
not self -contradictory. Yet, scientific research must be grounded on likelihood, 
in addition to logical possibility. Previous research can justify the likelihood and 
generality of a certain claim, although that claim is not logically necessary. In- 
deed, logical necessity is required for reasoning, but does not seem to be needed 
for the establishing the principles of nature. 
What is demonstrated in the research carried out in the present thesis is 
that conceptual foundations are highly likely to be also indispensable for further 
researches on the unity of emergent cognitive phenomena at different subject 
matters. As is demonstrated in studying the task -level emergence of active per- 
ception, explaining the unity of emergent cognitive phenomena or even the unity 
of cognition needs to take account of conceptual foundations of the subject mat- 
ter at issue. On the one hand, without philosophical abstraction, the attempt to 
gather the cognitive unity would be too scattered or even risk losing most ideas of 
integration. On the other hand, without the establishment of various links and 
conceptual foundations on the basis of scientific theories and computer imple- 
mentations the endeavour to understand the unity of cognition would even lack 
a beginning for understanding the subject matter. Given the need of both sides 
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and the previously achieved understanding that conceptual foundations mediate 
between both sides, the role of conceptual foundations in explaining the envisaged 
unity is indispensable. 
7.5.5 Summary of Section 7.5 
Based on the discussions in the above four sections, Section 7.5 puts forward the 
main contention of the present thesis, and justifies it in the context of task -level 
emergence of active perception. To wit, the study of conceptual foundations and 
the links between various knowledge sources contribute both to explaining the 
unity of cognition (the unity /interlock of emergent functionality) and to delineat- 
ing the co- operative relationship between science and philosophy in the endeavour 
to explain the unity of cognitive emergent phenomena, and even the unity of cog- 
nition. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter seeks to derive a philosophical basis for explaining the emergent 
functionality of autonomous agents, from the discussions of task -level emergence 
(of active perception) in previous chapters. Doing so achieves two understandings. 
Regarding the first understanding, discussing the emergent functionality of 
autonomous agents by a case study - the task -level emergence of active perception 
- sharpens the focus of philosophical deliberations about emergence. Previous 
discussions in this chapter demonstrate that a sharpened focus helps to maintain 
more adequate philosophical understandings, even to diagnose certain misunder- 
standings. 
The second understanding, as discussed in section 7.5, is the cooperative 
relationship between science and philosophy for explaining the unity of emergent 
phenomena, even explaining the unity of cognition. As a main contention of the 
present thesis, conceptual foundations mediate between science and philosophy 
to explain the unity of cognition, without sacrificing either of two important 
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requirements of unity - the comprehensibility over all the relevant knowledge 
sources, on the one hand, and the integrity of all relating cognitive phenomena 




The goal of this thesis has been to explain the emergence of active perception, by 
focusing on the processes of emergence at task level. The envisaged emergence is 
considered with a multiplist notion - explanatory interlock - which is articulated 
in the establishment of conceptual foundations. 
The process of explaining task -level emergence consists of the following four 
steps - (1) identifying related questions and collecting theoretical backgrounds, 
(2) summarising the main theoretical points of active perception research and 
surveying its experimental results, (3) building conceptual foundations for un- 
derstanding activeness, and (4) explaining the contribution of conceptual founda- 
tions to understanding the integrity of task -level emergence. Because the desired 
explanation relates to both scientific theories and philosophical notions, with an 
emphasis on their cooperation, a subgoal of the present thesis has been to demon- 
strate how interdisciplinary research can lead to an understanding of the integrity 
of emergent phenomena. This subgoal is achieved in the creation of conceptual 
foundations, which offer the possibilities of further conceptual activities across 
disciplines. 
8.1 Questions and Background Knowledge 
8.1.1 Questions 
There are two aspects to an informative account of active perception - scientific 
understanding and philosophical explanation. On the scientific side, the present 
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thesis emphasises the need for an explanation of how active perception systems 
accomplish their tasks. In particular, two important properties of active per- 
ception have not been identified in previous researches - that active perception 
systems accomplish their tasks through emergence, as opposed to full determina- 
tion by design, and that the course of emergence mostly takes place at the task 
level, i.e. during run -time, as opposed to learning. 
On the philosophical side, this thesis raised the need to go beyond the dis- 
tinction of internal and external processes of emergence. As an alternative to this 
distinction, discussions in the present thesis focus on gaining an explanation of 
emergence by answering the question of why active perception systems in general 
can accomplish their tasks in the course of emergence. 
To address these how and why questions, discussions in the present thesis 
raise a notion - activeness - which concerns what makes active perception work. 
As a consequence, efforts toward building conceptual foundations can be seen as 
contributing to an understanding of activeness. 
8.1.2 Background Knowledge 
The background knowledge mainly comprises conceptual analyses and the various 
design strategies of behaviour -based systems. 
Conceptual Analyses. Certain important conceptions relevant to the expla- 
nation of emergence and active perception have been discussed. Firstly, the 
conception of active perception is defined, using a combination of requirements, 
with emphases on the movements maintained for receiving needed perceptual in- 
puts and the iterative computational processes over the needed information for 
the required tasks. 
Secondly, the notion of autonomy is analysed in relation to the notion of 
adaptability. A central component of autonomy is self -maintenance in the light 
of high adaptability to environmental circumstances. 
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Furthermore, the notion of emergence is defined, beyond the local -global 
distinction, as a negative concept of pre- determination, which is defined in terms 
of pre - categorised data /descriptions and inference mechanisms. 
Lastly, the conception of internal representations are analysed into five types, 
in order to identify clearly the various types of representations implemented in 
active perception systems. One advantage of this analysis is the understanding 
it provides of the integration of representations across types. 
Design Strategies of Behaviour -based Systems. For the purpose of dis- 
tinguishing between various design strategies of active perception systems, two 
issues are discussed. The first is the role of Brooks' subsumption architectures in 
the behaviour -based systems and the advance of internal control in an account 
of action modules which is exemplified by Maes' control of energy spreading. 
The second issue is the relationship between exploration and exploitation, two 
common control strategies. Exploration emphasises robots' directions in different 
parts of the environment, while exploitation emphasises the planning of robots' 
actions on the basis of heuristics of external events and various mechanisms of 
code arrangement, such as energy spreading (Macs (1990b)) and the differential 
equations maintained by dynamical systems. 
8.2 Theories and Implementations of Active Percep- 
tion 
The characteristics of active perception were discussed in chapters three and 
four, with regard to the general paradigm and the characteristics of various ac- 
tive perception implementations, in particular including systems of gaze control, 
tracking, and run -time planning. Identifying the theories of active perception is 
an indispensable part of carrying out a case study on active perception. Yet, 
theories only provide the paradigm of active perception, without explaining what 
makes active perception work, i.e. activeness. It is consequently also necessary 
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to go a step further in explaining the mechanisms of successful implementations. 
Discussions in chapters three and four revealed that explaining such mechanisms 
provide firm grounds for further explanations of activeness via conceptual foun- 
dations or philosophical notions. 
8.2.1 The AB and BC Perspectives on Active Perception 
In order to explain activeness, the discussions in chapter three characterised the 
paradigm of active perception research by the distinction of the AB and the BC 
perspectives of active perception. These two perspectives have certain common- 
alities but possess significantly different emphases. 
A commonality between these two perspectives is the importance of task - 
specific facilities and observers' movements for perceptual computation, in order 
to gain access to more relevant perceptual features. 
The AB perspective largely emphasises the importance of exploration, as 
opposed to exploitation, by deriving unknown parameters from the computation 
of known parameters (advocated by Aloimonos et al. (1988)) (i.e. from the 
explorative activities themselves) or by building external frames (as in Ballard 
(1991)). By contrast, the BC perspective emphasises explorative control, which 
consists of explanatory activities (stated by Bajcsy 1988) and environmental cues 
(Churchland et al. 1994). 
8.2.2 Explaining the Mechanisms of Implementations 
A significant amount of effort in the present thesis has been devoted to analysing 
current implementations of active perception. The most notable implementations 
under examination are as follows: 
Gaze Control - attentive control of saccades, the control of pursuit move- 
ments; 
Tracking - Snake, dynamical Kalman filter (including Dickmanns' car); 
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 Run -time Planning of Visual Paths - Adept; and 
Active Perception beyond Visual Modality - Roberts' system of ac- 
tive haptic perception, Allen and Bajcsy's robot of visual -tactile integration, 
and Scheier and Lambrinos' robot of active categorisation. 
8.3 Building Conceptual Foundations for Understand- 
ing Task -level Emergence 
Efforts to build conceptual foundations are presented in chapters five and six, 
which respectively address two dimensions of task -level emergence. Regarding the 
first dimension, chapter five serves to characterise the explorative and exploita- 
tive control of active perception systems in the form of conceptual foundations. 
Regarding the second dimension, chapter six strives to explain task -level emer- 
gence, specifically to account for why local activities lead to emergent phenomena 
- the accomplishment of required tasks. 
8.3.1 Explorative and Exploitative Control of Task -level Emer- 
gence 
Analysis of active perception makes a distinction between task identification 
and process arrangement. The former concerns the initiation of appropriate 
processes, while the latter regards the continuation of computation leading to the 
accomplishment of required tasks. 
Tasks Arising from Intentions or Constant Interests. Arguments begin 
with the identification of tasks, by showing that tasks arise from outside the 
active perception systems, mainly in two ways. 
In the first of these, tasks arise from intentions of real organisms but are 
identified within active perception systems via representations, such as weights 
in attentive control of saccades. This kind of task identification can be imple- 
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mented by designers' intention and robots' internal representations (specifically, 
templates of environmental circumstances). In the second way, tasks arise from 
constant interests, as manifested in reflex activities of prey in response to the 
perceptual cues of predators approaching, which can be implemented through 
the exploitation (heuristic knowledge) of environmental factors. 
To consider the relationship between exploration and exploitation, discus- 
sions highlight the need for exploitative control (implemented by cues and tem- 
plates of environmental circumstances), although gaze control and tracking would 
unavoidably involve a significant degree of explorative control. 
Process Arrangement. The explanations of process arrangement involved 
three steps. First, attention is directed to the nature of active perception systems, 
as discussed in the notions of factorial conditions and quasi- functional modules 
and quasi -action modules. Second, discussions characterise process arrangement 
by certain requirements, as manifested in the notion of dynamic small modules. 
Third, it is argued that dynamic small modules are exclusively realised by quasi - 
functional modules and quasi- action modules. 
Factorial Conditions. Discussions made it clear that active perception sys- 
tems do not identify tasks explicitly. This point is addressed in the notion of 
factorial conditions. The notion of `factorial conditions' is introduced to mean 
the perceptual factors caught through sensors and transformed via numerical 
computation, such as the visual contours dealt with under a visual filter (e.g. 
I {alman filter) and the features fetched in the attentive mechanism of saccades. 
Thus, factorial conditions are not functional descriptions, but numerical trans- 
formations (through various perceptual mechanisms) of the perceptual features 
of the external world. Because perceptual inputs are represented in the form of 
factorial conditions, the implementation of active perception systems identifies 
tasks implicitly. 
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Quasi -functional Modules and Quasi- action Modules. The present the- 
sis argued that the basic components of active perception systems are neither 
functional nor competence modules, although such components do manage to 
compute certain functional descriptions and indeed give rise to guidance of bodily 
actions. Thus, such components were characterised in terms of quasi -functional 
modules and quasi- action modules. 
Dynamic Small Modules. The architectures of active perception systems are 
discussed using the notion of dynamic small modules, which basically consists of 
three points - that successful process arrangement is based on small -size (sim- 
ple) modules which constitute operation -specialist systems, that the elaboration 
of active perception systems must impose hierarchical or heterarchical orders 
on operation -specialist systems, and that the arbitration between those modules 
must be sufficiently dynamic. This notion is further specified by the following 
two characteristics: (a) dynamic small modules should be capable of maintain- 
ing stepwise and iterative processing gradually to address the external enquiries 
(i.e. perceptual tasks) in the real environmental conditions; (b) dynamic small 
modules must be capable of grasping and keeping track of fast - changing shapes 
accurately. 
Dynamic Small Modules Must be Exclusively Realised by Quasi -functional 
Modules and Quasi- action Modules. This suggestion marks a considerable 
difference between active perception systems and other behaviour -based systems. 
As has been demonstrated, the reasoning behind this suggestion is grounded on 
the previously derived characteristics of Marrian theory of vision, active percep- 
tion systems, and other behaviour -based systems, such as Brooks' subsumption 
architecture, Steels' exploitative control, and Maes's system of energy spreading. 
In particular, the reasoning takes advantage of four types of exploitative con- 
trol provided by quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules: judgement 
under uncertainty, using templates, using dynamical systems, and planning of 
actions. 
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After this suggestion has been defended and justified, the characterisation 
of active perception is completed. Later parts of this thesis aimed to explain the 
principles of task -level emergence. 
8.3.2 Understanding Emergence 
The understanding of task -level emergence is based on four principles extracted 
from four models of life origin, and, in addition, a novel notion - internal co- 
hesion - which particularly characterises the formation of serial orders in the 
task -level emergence of active perception. 
Extracting Principles of Life Origin and Thereby Establishing Prin- 
ciples of Task -level Emergence. The first model is Rosen's (M,R)- system, 
which reveals two points for understanding task -level emergence. First, while 
the fundamental structures of life origin are biochemical structures, those of 
active perception may refer to the stepwise computation that brings forth the 
guidance of bodily actions. Second, the task -level emergence grows from base- 
line to elaborate patterns of emergent phenomena, specifically from several 
small operation -specialist systems to a combinatory system, as exemplified by 
gaze control and Dickmanns' car. Corresponding to the baseline patterns is the 
second model, Kauffman's autocatalytic network, which reveals the minimum re- 
quirement of the stepwise computation of active perception, namely, the stable 
and continuing processing within one single step of computation. Correspond- 
ing to the elaborate patterns is the third model - Eigen's model of hypercycle, 
which reveals that the stepwise computation of a combinatory system is based 
on mutual support between several sub -systems. 
Common to both baseline and elaborate patterns is Maturana and Varela's 
notion of autopoietic unity, which hints at a principle of task -level emergence - 
that the basic computational cycle of task -level emergence consists in the com- 
parison between collected and still needed information, in order to insure that 
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the previous outcome really contributes to the required tasks. This is in part a 
mechanicalist and in part a pragmatist characterisation of emergence. 
Apart from the above four principles, the following notion is very important. 
Internal Cohesion. The notion of internal cohesion denoted the act of neatly 
arranging serial steps of computation by transforming or scheduling the forces 
taking part in a particular system, with such forces manifesting various inter- 
nal emphases of a task (in the derivation of perceptual guidance). This notion 
applies to stepwise computation in both a single simple system and a combi- 
natory system. This notion highlighted a remarkable point about emergence, 
that the internal control of active perception systems is not explained purely by 
the relationship between internal representations, but is also driven by various 
aspects of the task corresponding to environmental conditions. That is, active 
perception systems stepwise refer to perceptual inputs from various environmen- 
tal circumstances and then strive to put together relevant computational processes 
that generate the guidance for the required task. 
The notion of internal cohesion has an impact on the link between envi- 
ronment and the internal processes, as demonstrated below in the relationship 
between environment and the stepwise computation of task -level emergence. 
8.3.3 Understanding the Impact of Environment on the Explo- 
rative and Exploitative Control 
The environment is seen in autonomous agent research as the indispensable medi- 
ator of emergent functionality. In addition to this understanding, the last section 
of chapter six provides a novel viewpoint to account for the relationship between 
the environment, on the one hand, and the explorative and exploitative control 
of behaviour -based systems, on the other. This point of view is captured in the 
notion of inverse ecological niche, which states that for a certain organism the 
mechanisms of its active perception system reflect various characteristics of this 
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organism's ecological niche. In addition, the stepwise computation of the needed 
information for the required tasks manifests the organism's `strategy' of carrying 
out those tasks in its ecological niche. 
8.4 Links, Conceptual Foundations, and Integrity of 
Task -level Emergence 
The previously built conceptual foundations contribute to the conceptual under- 
standing of various aspects of task -level emergence. Chapter seven shows that 
such conceptual foundations can be integrated by several philosophical notions - 
nmltiplist interlock of emergence phenomena, various aspects of cognition, and 
links between knowledge sources. 
The Notion of Interlock. The first notion is multiplist interlock of emer- 
gent phenomena. This notion originates in Clark's conception of explanatory 
interlock over the trinity of emergence, and is further supported by the multi - 
plism which conforms to Clark's conception of explanatory trinity: the various 
aspects of cognition can be seen as multiple emergent phenomena, which arose in 
response to a variety of evolutionary problems and turn out to be characterised 
at different levels of description. 
Links between Different Knowledge Sources. The multiplism introduced 
would risk ending up as mere eclecticism, unless the multiple interlock of emer- 
gent phenomena can be successfully explained. The interlock of emergence is 
considered by Clark as a target of explanation between various aspects of cog- 
nition, without being further accounted for. The present thesis established an 
interlock for a specific subject matter - the task -level emergence of active per- 
ception - via several links, as seen in four dimensions of integration over different 
sources of knowledge. 
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1. integration of external and internal processes in the determination of task - 
level emergence; 
2. explaining global behaviour on the basis of various principles; 
3. linking perceptual features and motor actions; and 
4. linking different accounts which explain the generation of perceptual under- 
standing - perception as recovery /description, pragmatism, teleology, and 
mechanicalism. 
Each instance of integration in one dimension of integration, e.g. the in- 
tegration between situatedness and representations in the first dimension (see 
Section 7.5.2, page 306), constitutes a link between different knowledge sources. 
Although a demonstration of integration between different knowledge sources is 
common to all links, different links may be realised in different ways. As a rule 
of thumb, for different aspects of cognition each aspect (of cognitive phenom- 
ena) may have its pertinent type of linkage between different knowledge sources. 
Different types of linkage are realised in accordance with different system archi- 
tectures and different theoretical descriptions. Although those differently realised 
links may be difficult to conceive of, the conceptual foundations developed in the 
present thesis serve to explain such links as intuitively as possible. 
The links demonstrated in the above four dimensions of integration can serve 
to explain the notion of multiple interlock. On grounds of the already built con- 
ceptual foundations, the integrity of task -level emergence can be comprehended 
as the emergent processes centred around the process of internal cohesion: specif- 
ically, the emergent processes (as subject to various principles, including internal 
cohesion) maintained by the quasi- functional modules and quasi- action modules 
of a simple specialist or a combinatory system, through stepwise computation 
with comparison between collected information and the required tasks. 
Although understanding the links between different knowledge sources of 
task -level emergence may be difficult for philosophers, ordinary people and even 
the scientists of different areas, those conceptual foundations are intuitive. Such 
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conceptual foundations offer possibilities of further interdisciplinary deliberations 
on the integrity /unity of emergent cognitive phenomena. 
A Demonstration of Cooperation between Science and Philosophy. 
Based on the discussions of links, this chapter explains the unity of cognition 
(the unity /interlock of emergent functionality) and delineate the co- operative re- 
lationship between science and philosophy in the endeavour of explaining the 
integrity /unity of cognitive emergent phenomena. 
8.5 Future Research 
Certain extensions of research on active perception can be pursued. Firstly, the 
biological systems of active perception are largely unknown (except for the short 
work by Churchland et al. (1994)). Although robotic implementation is taking 
account of some biological systems, it is likely that evolution implements active 
perception in a way different from robotic design. It is likely that the role of the 
environment will consequently become more clearly explained. 
Secondly, the conception of active perception can be extended to systems 
that maintain selection over perceptual inputs on grounds of attention. It will be 
intriguing to see how attention interacts with explorative and exploitative control. 
Thirdly, particularly for philosophers, the definitions of emergence and pre- 
determination can be refined, especially considering the integration between task - 
level emergence and the emergence at other levels - the emergence of (real and 
artificial) life in evolution, (embryogenetic and psychological) development, and 
constructive learning. If there can be a common definition of (artificial and real) 
life (as has been debated in ALife study), can there be a common definition 
of emergence? In addition, for explanations of different emergent phenomena, a 
further question is worthy of deliberation: does the integrity of different emergent 
phenomena, e.g. evolution vs. development, conform to the same groups of 
principles? 
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Lastly, the conceptual sophistication imposed on the conceptual foundations 
of a subject matter, such as the subjects mentioned in the three points above, 
may provoke interesting deliberations on the subject matter, at least over the 
definition and explanation of the unity /integrity of that subject matter. As a 
further example, the generation of perceptual understanding has been studied 
on grounds of four explanatory perspectives - the perceptual understanding as 
description, pragmatism, teleology, and mechanicalism - which together address 
the broad relatedness involved in the unity of perception. Although these are 
likely to be complicated, such deliberations may result in a more profound un- 
derstanding of principles of nature than that which arises when philosophy and 
science are pursued separately. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Active perception research introduces a new paradigm for understanding percep- 
tion, hut the distinctive type of emergence underlying active perception - task - 
level emergence - has received little attention in recent studies of emergence. This 
thesis has presented a set of conceptual foundations for explaining the task -level 
emergence of active perception. Such conceptual foundations elucidate various 
links to merge different aspects of emergent phenomena in connection with active 
perception. By building those conceptual foundations for a particular subject 
matter - active perception - the present thesis has demonstrated a cooperation 
between science and philosophy for the purpose of understanding the unity of 
emergent cognitive phenomena. 
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Appendix A 
Two Implementations Using 
Exploitative Control 
A.1 Steels' Implementation: Various Properties of Wave 
The task of Steels' implementation is to establish a mobile robot which can ex- 
plore the environment by wandering around it, detect moving food sources of 
different types, exploit internal representations by building a dynamic map of 
those moving food sources, and find a route to catch the food. This implementa- 
tion provides a prototype that manifests the emergent foraging behaviour of low 
organisms. Of course, certain primitive adaptability for the foraging behaviour 
must be derived from the robotic implementation, specifically from a limited 
number of simple reactive and diffusive activities which are detected in the bio- 
chemical nature of low organisms. Steels conceives of such activities in terms 
of the activities performed by autonomous agents, in the context of multi -agent 
automata, which comprises sensor, effector, and a simple instruction set (Steels 
calls it the `script') that serves to control the activities of an agent by specifying 
how it should respond to a message received from other agents. 
Steels implements two groups of representations, one representing the imme- 
diate conditions of the external world, the other serving as a memory of external 
conditions. As a simplification, the targets - food sources - are implemented by 
different light sources. He does not attempt to reconstruct the external world, 
but only records what the light sensors bring to the internal states. The robot 
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acts to catch the food of a certain type by exploiting internal representations, 
and it does so after it detects the food of that type in the course of its 'ex- 
ploratory' activities. Note that when the robot derives a food target (of a certain 
type) at a certain location and manages to arrive there, the food source may 
have moved elsewhere (be eaten or run away!). There must be a comparison, 
hence, between two groups of representations, in order to update the recorded 
representations /knowledge. It may be contended that working out a route in the 
map (memory) is less efficient than direct reaction. However, the manipulation 
on a map is more effective (than direct reaction) with regard to the planning of a 
route which can avoid the recorded obstacles and lead to food of a certain desired 
type. In a complicated case, when the robot is tightly surrounded by obstacles, 
it needs to remove certain obstacles on its way to the target. The robot can 
even record a corner and later avoid passing by that location. It is evident, from 
human experiences, that the adoption of an internal map would make foraging 
(or shopping in the town) more effective than reactive behaviour which needs to 
work out a route from scratch every time. 
The internal representations, by which the robot records the external world, 
are largely analogical but with some markers which take note of certain specif- 
ically identified objects. The representations of a certain group, both the im- 
mediate representations of the external world and the memory, are allocated in 
the form of a grid. Such an allocation (the combination of analogical represen- 
tations and specific markers) capture, to a high extent, the common nature of 
a map, be it a geological map printed on paper or a mental map roughly main- 
tained by attention. Accordingly, the external world and internal memory are 
not represented by syntax and specific contents of lexicons, but by the analogi- 
cal (typically, spatio- temporal) inter- relations between different parts of the grid. 
Thus, the internal states of Steels' implementation consist of non -symbolic rep- 
resentations but still represent the external world, even with memory. Note that 
the immediate representations and the memory should not be divided according 
to the dichotomy of input data and a common storage which represents the in- 
formation of the external world, unlike the symbolic approach in traditional AI. 
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Rather, either of them forms a single group of internal representations. Different 
groups are allocated in separate grids, which are subject to comparison, on the 
basis of their respective spatio -temporal inter -relations. 
Steels' Exploitation of Internal Representations. A further difference be- 
tween Steels' approach to internal representations and the symbolic representa- 
tions in traditional AI, is the strategy of search across the internal representations. 
Of course, the search in Steels' implementation cannot consist in the matching 
across syntactic representations. It must take advantage of the spatio- temporal 
inter -relations. Steels identifies the search with two activities. One is to find out 
the location of the target food type from the standpoint of the current position, 
while the other is to find a route to that location. 
Steels identifies the food sources of different types with lightsources that re- 
spond differently to longitudinal waves with different wave -length. Such a design 
relies on temporal inter -relations, because the waves of different wave -length can 
be identified (from the standpoint of a specific food sources) by the difference 
in wave frequency between different wave types. A wave with a certain length, 
which stands for a certain food type, is issued from the current position of the 
foraging organism. The wave can proceed everywhere in the memory grid, and 
consequently the location of the target food source can be identified straightfor- 
wardly, on the basis of different wave frequencies. 
Later, what is needed is to find a route from the current position of the for- 
aging organism to the target food source. This is done, in Steels' implementation, 
by the emanation of a gradient field which propagates over the grid. A built -in 
sensor serves to trace the gradient field from the current position, which probes 
from lowest to highest gradient, where the target food source is located. Thus, 
the route toward the target food source is identified, if that food source is not 
hindered severely by obstacles.2 
'Steels sees the food source as an agent, as opposed to the agent of the current position. 
Hence, the term `standpoint' is not inappropriate. 
2 I the food source is unfortunately surrounded by obstacles, the robot needs to remove those 
obstacles directly on the way toward the target, be it can trace the gradient field emanated 
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Emergence. The task, as a global behaviour, is accomplished without global 
representations of locations and actions. Rather, it is achieved on the basis of 
certain simple local operations, namely the waves of different wave -length, diffu- 
sion of wave, and the decay of the gradient field. Although the wave and gradient 
field can traverse across the whole memory grid, the identification of the target 
food source and that of the route toward it are not global behaviours. This is 
because the implementation needs no common geographical representations of 
locations and routes. The identification of food source and route, as a global 
behaviour, is facilitated by the analogical (spatio -temporal) inter -relations main- 
tained by those operations. Such operations can be seen as action primitives 
working in the internal models, and the derivation of global behaviour is based 
on local activities. Like the behaviour -oriented agents approach with regard to 
the activities in the environment, Steels' approach also supports emergence on 
grounds of local activities. 
Note that the above local activities are reactive activities, despite their being 
reactive on the basis of internal representations and internal actions. Agent 
behaviour may well be reactive not only between organism- environment but also 
between internal agents and internal representations. Apart from reactive local 
interactions it is hard to find any machinery of emergence in Steels (1990). The 
notion of emergence via exploitation, though, can be further elaborated, as we will 
see in Maes (1990b). She implements a network of differently weighted (explicit) 
goals, over which action selection is determined by the change of weights. 
A.2 Maes' Implementation: Energy Spreading 
The architectures of Maes (1991), which adopts the control of energy spreading, 
is described below. 
from the target food source. In Steels' implementation, the facility of the required removal 
is demonstrated. The obstacles to be removed are exactly those encountered in the course of 
tracing the gradient field toward higher gradient. 
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The Our 
Figure A.1: An Example of Action Modules, Implemented by Maes 
(1990b). The goals and pre- conditions are represented explicitly, but there is 
no explicit specification as to how the robot can manage to take right actions. 
In the following is an example of internal representations - the action module 
PICK -UP- SANDER: 
PICK -UP- SANDER 
: action ... 
: condition -list `(hand- empty, sander -on- table) 
: add -list '(sander-in-hand) 
: delete -list `(hand- empty, sander -on- table) 
: activation -level 18.678 
(an example in Maes (1990b), figure 1, p. 53; the above figure is not in Maes 
(1990b) but is drawn by the present author according to Maes' descriptions of 
lier own implementation.) 
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The Architecture of Planning. Maes (1990b) implements a robot to carry 
out a task: pick up the sander in order to take the sand from the table surface to 
a board. The task is complicated by a sprayer, which is left beside the sander. 
As an interpretation, an action (e.g. the action specified in PICK -UP- SANDER) 
can be seen as a global goal of this task (i.e. to achieve the state of sand -on- 
board). Accordingly, a subgoal of this task can be taken as the achievement of 
one description in the condition -list of PICK -UP- SANDER. e.g. the achievement of 
'hand- empty'. 
Before it can accomplish the task, the robot must ensure that its hand is 
holding the sander. Otherwise, the robot needs to manage to put down whatever 
is already grasped in the hand (in this toy modela, the only alternative is the 
sprayer), and alternatively find the sander and pick it up. As is demonstrated by 
Maes' implementation (see figure A.1), the network of goals, specifically, consists 
of: 
Action Modules. A set of action modules`, such as PICK -UP- SANDER, is 
characterised in language -like representations. 
The Internal Representations of a Certain Module. A particular action 
module, in turn, consists of (1) an action to take, (2) a list of (conjunctive) 
pre- conditions, (3) a list of (conjunctive) descriptions to be added, (4) a list of 
(conjunctive) descriptions to be deleted, and (5) a threshold of activation energy 
for this in particular module. Any goal, be it a global goal or subgoal, must take 
the form of action; by contrast, states of the external world should take the form 
of description. The latter four elements constitute the condition of a module 
x - (cr, asdx, ax), with two kinds of output - (a) activation energy distributed 
between modules, and (2) the initiation of the specified action. 
3Maes (1990b) states that more elements, goals or descriptions, can be added into her im- 
plementation, and consequently extend the repertoire of the robot's capabilities. 
"Notice the nature of such action modules, as opposed to the functional modules proposed in 
Fodor (1983). Such action modules are named by Maes (1990b) (1991) as `competent modules'. 
Because the outputs of such modules are motor actions (by the implemented robot), we name 
the competence modules as action modules. 
348 
Activation Energy. The actions of particular action modules (in this con- 
text, we simply call them `modules') are controlled by a quantity called activation 
energy. When activation energy flows, a module receives (i.e. is assigned), or has 
removed, a certain amount of activation energy. Such activation energy can be 
added up accumulatively, or be gradually reduced. The specified action of a mod- 
ule will be initiated, when (and only when) the activation energy distributed to 
it grows up to, or beyond, the specified threshold. 
The flow of activation energy, under the design of Maes (1991), is initiated 
in three ways - observation, goal, and coherency. As a conceptual foundation of 
her design, the reasons for these three ways of energy flow can be understood5 
as follows. First, an observation of a robot, presumably, must change its internal 
states, for any design of mobile robot with internal representations. Second, the 
achievement of a general goal may amplify the activation levels of those processes 
that contribute to it, and conversely lessen the activation levels of those inhibit it. 
Such a strategy of design can be understood analogically in terms of politics, that 
a winner in an election campaign rewards his supporters and simultaneously man- 
ages to suppress the possible influence of the leaders of the antagonists. Last, a 
design must strive to maintain the coherency of goals; otherwise the performance 
might be awkward. For example, if the activation level of the action module 
PICK -UP- SANDER is not reduced immediately after its action being initiated, it 
is very likely that the network will request, shortly later, a second initiation of 
that action module, which requires the robot to pursue `hand -empty' as a sub - 
goal. Then, the robot manages to initiate PUT -DOWN- SANDER, which soon makes 
the previously achieved global goal undone. The robot may consequently never 
actually succeed in achieving a required global goal (picking up the sander), and 
in turn it would never achieve the task. Therefore, the coherency between goals 
must be maintained. 
5When Maes (1990b) describes the technical details of those three ways of energy flow (p. 
54), she does not explain the reasons for her design. 
349 
Activation by Observing the Current Situation. An observation (through 
the sensors of the implemented robot) of the current situation (of the external 
world) comprises a set of descriptions. The effect of an observation is the spread- 
ing of (a certain amount of) activation energy toward every module with one of 
those descriptions in its condition list, e.g. from the observation of a sander on 
the table and the empty hand to the module PICK -UP- SANDER. Thus, observation 
initiates the flow of activation energy in the network. 
Activation and Inhibition Maintained by the Achievement of a Global Goal. 
Once a global goal, say the action of `pick -up- sander', is achieved, the action 
modules that support `pick -up- sander' must make available its pre- conditions 
(i.e. `hand- empty' and `sander -on- table') in their respective add -lists. The 
activation levels of those supporting action modules, under Maes' design, will 
be increased, in the further activities of planning in the network. By contrast, 
the activation levels will be reduced for those action modules that will undo the 
global goal at issue, i.e. those action modules (e.g. PICK -UP- SPRAYER ) with 
a description in delete -lists (`hand- empty') that is also a pre- condition of the 
global goal `pick -up- sander'. As an intuitive interpretation of Maes' design, the 
promotion of those supporting modules together with the suppression of those 
conflict modules is a strategy for facilitating the quick initiation of the same 
global goal (i.e. the action of `pick -up- sander'). The quick initiation of that 
global goal can be foreseen, straightforwardly, because the later processing would 
be more likely to select its supporting action modules but less likely to select the 
action modules that undo it. 
Maes suggests that some, or all, action modules, which once are initiated, 
can be habituated. Such a suggestion can be understood intuitively, as we may 
realise, that the implemented robot may consequently become more interested 
in trying new controls, by arranging new action sequences to accomplish the 
required task. 
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Three Types of Links. In the light of maintaining the mutual coherency 
between different action modules, the activation energy flows (by design) between 
those modules through three types of pre- specified links. 
(1) Successor Link from Module x to Module y: if an element of module x's 
add list is also an element of module y's condition list, the activation of the module 
x will cause the distribution of activation energy from x to y. That is, the module 
x spreads activation energy forward to module y. For example, there is a successor 
link (but not the converse) from PICK -UP- SANDER to PUT -SAND -ON- BOARD. The 
arrival of activation energy (of a certain amount) in module y will not necessarily 
be sufficient to initiate the action of its specifies, but will be added on the top 
of its previous activation level. Note that a successor has a single -way direction 
from a specific module to another. 
(2) Predecessor Link: For every successor link from x to y, there exists 
another link, called predecessor link. If y is not yet executable (i.e. when its 
activation energy is lower than its threshold), y sends a fraction of its activation 
energy backward to x. Such a direction of energy distribution, according to Maes' 
exposition, is to make y facilitate itself by making easier the activation of x, its 
predecessor. 
As a criticism, such a route of distribution, designed by Maes, seems to 
be counter- intuitive, because it confuses us in our understanding of two other 
directions of reasoning. First, according to abductive reasoning, the execution 
of y would also increase the activation level of x. The module x, then, will be 
increasingly more likely to activate, no matter whether y is excutable or not. 
This becomes a difficulty of Maes' design. Second, if certain pre- conditions of y's 
are denied, and hence y becomes not executable, x (as a predecessor of y) should 
consequently become not executable. There is no reason, then, to make easier 
the activation of x (by increasing the activation energy of x). 
A reasonable design of the predecessor link, as is demonstrated in these 
two types of reasoning (abduction and converse deduction), should be corrected, 
according to the ways of energy distribution we suggest. However, despite the 
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above criticism, the notion of a backward link from y to x is understandable, 
given that such a link can realise the above two types of reasoning. 
(3) Conflicted Link from x to y: if a description in the condition list of x also 
appears in the delete list of y, i.e. if the action of y will undo x (and consequently 
undo the action- to -be- carried -out specified in the action module x), the activation 
of y should lead to the inhibition of x (i.e. the reduction of x's level of activa- 
tion energy). For example, the action of the action module PICK -UP- SANDER (y) 
inhibits a later activation of itself (x), because the description `hand- empty' ap- 
pears in the delete -list of y but also appears in the condition -list of the x (the 
later action). 
Competition between Action Modules. Within the network, the activation 
levels of action modules are subject to competition: the strongest one is selected, 
by carrying out its specified action. On the occasion that two action modules 
turn out to be equally strong in their activation levels, according to Maes' design, 
one of them is selected randomly. With such a design, the network will single out 
a global goal smoothly, if the process is not locked by a loop. Loops are possible 
to happen, however, for the system in question does not maintain a history of its 
past behaviour. Maes foresees this problem, and suggests two solutions. One is 
simply to introduce a certain degree of randomness in the system. The other is 
to set -up another network to monitor possible loops in the first network, and take 
action when loops are detected. Thus, the network can go smoothly to single out 
actions, according to its task, the relating goals, and subgoals. 
Retry. When the robot system in question fails to take any action, all the 
thresholds will be (automatically) lowered by 10 %. They will not be reset to their 
respective initial values until the specified action of one action module is taken. 
Hand -setting the Relative Influences of Goals vs. Internal States. Maes de- 
signs two global parameters, ¡y and (among others), for weighting the importance 
of either goals or states, as we have seen previously that the flow of activation en- 
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ergy (in the network) may be initiated by either an observation or a goal. These 
two parameters must be hand -set before the robot system begins to run in the 
given environment. The amount of their values has far -reaching impact on the 
following three types of trade -off relations. 
Trade -off Relations. Three trade -off relations can be inferred as follows from 
those two parameters, in consideration of their respective impact on the process 
of emergence. Such an impact can be seen as an arrangement over the spreading 
of the activation - energy ratio between -y and 0 (Maes 1990b, p. 56), e.g. between 
goal and current states. 
Goal -orientated vs. Opportunistic. 
As Maes (1990b) points out, the reactive activities become more oppor- 
tunistic, when the ratio of over -y increases, i.e. the activation - energy 
becomes being determined more by current situations than by goals.6 
Notice that the situated agent researches are not exclusively grounded by 
Brooks' stance (see Brooks (1991a)) - that representations are unnecessary 
in robotic implementation. According to such a stance, no situated activ- 
ities would be pushed forward by learning or the exploitation of internal 
representations and goals. 
On -going plans vs. Adaptivity. 
Another trade -off relation can be maintained between the influences of 0 
and activated y, on the one hand, and the average level of activation within 
the network (named as 7-), on the other. That is, the values of both 0 
and activated y may fall onto a spectrum, from very small to very large, in 
comparison with the mean value 7r of activation energy. For example, when 
0 and activated y are set very small, the agent behaviour will be put under 
the direct influence of the global goal and hence be adhesive to the on- 
going plan. As a consequence, the agent is only slightly influenced /biased 
6Maes names this difference in terms of a contrast between 'situation-orientedness' and `goal - 
orientedness' (Maes 1990b, p. 61). 
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by environmental conditions and the opportunistically achieved subgoals. 
The same effect is produced, in IVlaes (1990b), by reducing the threshold 
of whole system. The following discussions are equally applicable to either 
way of value decrease (i.e. either threshold, on the one hand, or 0 -and- 
activated -7, on the other). To economising on space, we only discuss the 
decrease of 0 and activated y. 
A system sticking to an already carried plan, is presumably hard (`reluc- 
tant') to change adaptively and opportunistically. Such a property of per- 
severance is implemented by reducing the influence of 0 (the activation 
spreading of encountered situations) and the activated y (the activation 
spreading of activated subgoals). As is demonstrated by l\'Iaes (1990b), af- 
ter a system has carried out a plan on the basis of a global goal, the system 
does not shift to a better global goal and its relating plan. Note that an 
implicit assumption of a system is that it can have more than one global 
goal. The system tends to stick to an old plan, even when an alternative 
global goal with a shorter path (i.e. with less required modules) is added 
to the system. The system is found to continue working on the previously 
attached global goal. In other words, the environmental conditions and the 
opportunistically achieved subgoals do not seem to take effect in the process 
of determining a new plan. This is an effect of perseverance. Here, we can 
understand this point intuitively by an example - with a written examina- 
tion. Once a student makes a plan of answering questions and thereby starts 
to consider how to answer a particular question, he will be very unlikely 
to shift to another one, even though serious difficulties of answering the 
present question are encountered and the newly detected question seems to 
be much easier. The student, in this example, is adhering to a certain plan 
of question answering, and is not flexible in arranging a new plan adaptively 
and opportunistically. 
Thoughtfulness vs. Rashness into Local Minimum in the Energy Landscape. 
It is not necessarily good to favour the adaptive environmental conditions 
and opportunistically achieved subgoals over a certain global goal and a 
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Figure A.2: An Example of Conflict Goals. The initial observed situation is 
S(0) _ (clear -a, clear -b, a- on- c). The goals are G(0) = (a -on -b, b- on -c). 
As is determined by the nature of the required task, the latter item b - on - c 
should be achieved first. That is, once a - on -c is achieved, it becomes more 
difficult to achieve b - on - c. However, the system, instead, is very tempted to 
achieve the former goal a - on -b immediately, because the pre- conditions of this 
goal are readily matched in the present situation. The problem is, as is indicated 
by the nature of this required task, that achieving this goal (a - on - b) conflicts 
with the achievement of the global goal G(o). (Re -drawn with configuration from 
Maes (1990b), p. 64.) 
fixed plan. On the contrary, such a preference may deadlock the system in 
a local minimum of activation energy. In the case where a subgoal conflicts 
with a global goal, the system risks going to go rashly toward a limited 
amount of subgoals in the near future, but consequently straying farther 
away from the global goal (see figure A.2). 
To escape from such a deadlock situation, the system must be more `thought - 
ful', in the sense of being less inclined to take action and more likely to 
travel a wider range of processes. This can be done, as IVIaes indicates, by 
increasing the threshold of activation level, which makes the activation of a 
single module less easy and consequently makes the spreading of activation 
energy wider in the range of on -going processes. As a consequence, the sys- 
tem would not go rashly into, say, the achievement of the tempting subgoal 
a - on - b, because a inhibition link of b - on -c suffices to prevent the 
immediate activation of a - on - b. As a particular method of preventing 
inappropriate activation, not(a - on - b) (meaning that a is not on b) can 
be put as a pre- condition, among others, of the subgoals b - on - c. If 
the threshold is set significantly high, when the system begins to spread 
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activation energy to the modules a - on - b and b - on - c, neither of these 
two modules would collect enough activation -energy. The advantage of the 
inhibition link is that the threshold of a - on - b is raised higher. As a 
consequence, the threshold of b - on - c would be reached earlier than that 
of a - on - b, which is a satisfactory control. 
Thoughtful and Pragmatist Flow Toward the Task. The energy control 
between modules manifests a certain degree of thoughtfulness, in that the estab- 
lishments of (successor, predecessor, and inhibition) links cannot abstain from 
thoughtfulness entirely. However, the thoughtfulness for energy control is limited 
to reactions of primitive behaviours, about which the relating circumstances are 
simple. To define such behaviours, simple automata would be suffice. No further 
deliberations over the world's conditions are needed, unlike the programming in 
traditional AI, the success of which relies heavily on programmers' deliberations. 
The success of I'daes' arbitration between goals is grounded by, to a certain extent, 
pragmatist flow control. 
The steps toward the accomplishment of a task can be regarded as being 
determined, via situated activities, in the pragmatist information flow. Prag- 
matism is a doctrine that emphasises determination by practical consequences. 
Correspondingly, the information flow, within the network of (global and sub -) 
goals, is regarded as being pragmatist in the sense that the global goals and sub - 
goals are arranged according to their practical consequences in the real situations. 
Those practical consequences are foreseen by the activation -energy flow within 
the network of goals with the situations being taken into account. 
The arbitration between goals, specifically, is mediated by the activation en- 
ergy which is controlled by the non -zero - and - non -infinite 7/0 ratio and the robot's 
situated activities. Because both -y and have non -zero values respectively, the 
energy flow is controlled by the pursuit of goals under the circumstances of the 
robot's encountered situations. The plan for accomplishing the required task is 
neither grounded on functional analysis, nor purely opportunistic. It stands in 
between. That is, a certain plan emerges depending on the goals constrained 
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by situations. The robot will arrange further goals and subgoals according to 
the encountered situations. Goals and subgoals are taken on the basis of their 
respective impacts in the encountered situations. The flow of activation -energy is 
subject to pragmatist control insofar as the robot takes account of its immediately 
encountered situations in its arrangement of goals. Although the encountered sit- 
uations are not tantamount to the practical consequences of goals which are to 
be adopted, the derivation of those consequences depends on the situations. The 
derivation of (global and sub -) goals is really determined by the encountered situa- 
tions, specifically under the design of action modules and the network connecting 
them. With such a network, the determination of goals, i.e. the arrangement of 
plans, is subject to pragmatist control. 
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Appendix B 
Harnad's Explanation of the 
Symbol Grounding Problem 
The symbol grounding problem concerns the connections between symbolic rep- 
resentations and the external world. Hamad (1991) presents a grounding scheme, 
of which the applicable assignment of semantic meaning to symbols are mainly 
subject to two tests -a formal test and a behavioural test. 
The formal test is a test as to the representations which are formed in the 
shape of a formal /symbolic system. Hamad suggests that the symbolic repre- 
sentations are composed, at a lower level, of a dedicated symbol system, which 
has more constraints on symbol tokens than merely syntactic constraints. Unlike 
those of the higher -level system, the representations of such a lower level system 
are elementary representations: specifically they are nonarbitary shapes. Such 
lower level representations comprise the iconic representations and categorical 
representations, the former being analogues of proximal sensory projections of 
distal objects and events, and the latter being acquired or innate feature detec- 
tors that serve to pick out invariant features from the above sensory projections. 
Such representations are readily grounded, as Hamad argues, because they pass 
another test - the behavioural test, a test based on the discrimination and iden- 
tification of objects and states of affairs, to which the elementary symbols refer. 
It is primarily this latter test that constitutes the behavioural capacity of the 
dedicated symbol system, which accordingly fixes the semantic meaning of the 
higher level system. As a consequence, Hamad states that he presents such a 
grounding scheme in the spirit of behaviourism. 
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Hamad views his grounding scheme as supportable by a hybrid connection - 
isml, for the dedicated symbol system can be simulated in terms of connectionism, 
which supports the detection of invariant patterns out of the approximate sensory 
projections by `exposure and feedback' ( p. 344). 
Behaviourism does not, in Harnad's grounding scheme, serve to explain all 
aspects of cognition; rather, it is proclaimed as being only applicable to the 
picking out of invariant features from the proximal sensory projections of distal 
objects and events. The terms `exposure' and `feedback' may be too simple to 
describe connectionism, but they manifest a general outlook of (behaviourist) 
association, which not only may serve to explain the grounding of elementary 
symbols, but also can be viewed as a basic type of connection between features of 
the external world and the internal mechanisms of organisms. 
A Revelation. Of course, the above features of external world are not meant 
as the equivalent of ecological constraints. However, Harnad's grounding scheme 
may be taken to reveal that the signals an organism receives in the niche can 
connect to the organismic internal mechanisms under the support of behaviourist 
association, and that the behaviourist association may further connect to other 
types of information processing, such as connectionism. 
Behaviourist association is deemed by Hamad not only to be the basis of 
symbol grounding - connection between an agent's internal mechanisms and the 
external world - but also as the type of processing at the lowest level, with 
the function of pattern generation, by extracting patterns out of proximate sen- 
sory projections. The present thesis will reserve the behaviourist association as 
a primordial connection between ecological constraints and organismic internal 
systems in the simplest cases of emergence (as is manifested most in simple types 
of training in low -level organisms), but propose an alternative2 type of pattern 
1Harnad's idea is very close to the connectionism described in Smolensky (1988), which 
mainly consists of sub- symbolic representations and traditional connectionist processing. 
Smolensky claims that the PDP modelling here does not serve as implementation of those 
sub- symbolic representations, but derives them on the basis of connectionist associations. 
2Self- organisation may be incorporated in connectionist algorithms. In this sense the PDP 
modelling and systems dynamics are not mutually exclusive mechanisms. Yet, they differ in the 
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generation, namely the self -organisation of dynamic systems, as is manifested in 
the internal dynamics of organisms. An interesting feature of external -internal as- 
sociation in the present thesis is, like traditional behaviourism, its dependence on 
multiple environmental determinants, on the one hand, and its result in providing 
certain initial conditions for the systems dynamics of internal systems (a signif- 
icant deviation from traditional behaviourism), on the other. As a consequence, 
developmental factors would not suffice to determine the process of pattern gener- 
ation in the organisms, but only serve to bridge ecological constraints and internal 
systems dynamics with the result of initiating the process of self -organisation in 
the organismic internal systems. Such a two -folded association will, unlike the 
attitudes of traditional behaviourists (Skinner 1971), not only enable us to re- 
serve the autonomy of cognition within the internal systems, but also qualify us 
to explain the adaptability of organisms to the ecological factors in terms of the 
dynamics of organismic internal systems. 
sense that systems dynamics concerns characterisation at a higher level as to the interactions 
between control parameters, and concerns the effect of their interactions on the trajectories of 
interesting collective variables. In such a case, the PDP modelling and dynamic systems are 
directed to the same system in an ontological sense but are different in an epistemological sense, 
as they are characterised from distinct perspectives. 
360 
Appendix C 
Sprite Adaptive Local 
-Navigation on account of 
Reinforcement Learning 
Algorithm 
A task of navigation can be learnt in a two -dimensional environment with unmod- 
elled slow- moving obstacles, as demonstrated by Prescott and Mayhew (1992), by 
their mobile robot `Sprite' which has simple sensors, reflexes, and internal states. 
Because the obstacles are not only moving but also unmodelled, i.e. unknown 
previously to Sprite, and because Sprite can learn (within one hour) to navigate 
everywhere in different unmodelled environments, Sprite's capability for navi- 
gation can be seen as adaptive, as its designers (Prescott and Mayhew (1992)) 
claim. 
The performance of perception per se does not seem to be active, because 
there is no indication as to what selective processes of navigation it can perform. 
Rather, Sprite is active with regard to its learning task. That is, the task of Sprite 
is the active learning (of navigation). Its learning process is active, as we will see, 
in the sense of selection over learning processes. This is a sense of active learning, 
as specified by Thrun (1995), in which agents learn not by staying stationary, but 
by interacting with the environment. Apparently Sprite learns while it is running 
in the field. Its learning of navigation is consequently active. 
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Figure C.1: Sprite's Environment Sprite emanates three rays in a two - 
dimensional world. Re -drawn of the Figure 13.2 of Prescott and Mayhew (1992), 
with modification. 
Architecture. 
Sprite's architecture is described as follows. 
Sensors. Sprite has three ray sensors of depth heading in the left ( -60 °), right 
60° and central directions 00, together with an additional sensor of touch, which 
detects the collision of Sprite with a wall to an obstacle (figure C.1). 
Reflexes. When it encounters an collision, Sprite has three reflexes that sup- 
port it to reverse, rotate with a random angle between 90 -180 degrees, and move 
off from its original heading direction. 
Reactivity Accomplishment. Sprite's capability of reflex is purely reactive, 
in the sense that it responds only to the immediate sensor input, as opposed 
to any internal drive, such as a retrieved image. However, through organism - 
environment interaction within a short period of time, it eventually becomes 
capable of producing navigating trajectories. 
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Internal States and Reinforcement Learning. Sprite's capability of navi- 
gation is accomplished by an algorithm of reinforcement learning. 
Reward. First, the sensor input is recorded, and the immediate reward rt 
in the time t is assigned a value, specifically a negative value (as punishment) if 
colliding, and the value zero (as encouragement) if Sprite's current velocity rises 
up to 4/5 of its top speed. The value rt is extended to computing the expected 
reward Rt.1 which is accumulated from time t to t + k, by 
Rt = rt+i + 71r1+2 + 72rt+3 + 73rt+4 + 74rt+s + 
where 'y is the discount factor (0 < 7 < 1). The multiplication of a y value 
with an incremental degree can be understood as a value serving to capture the 
intuition that a later reward has a less powerful influence. 
Policy Functions. A policy function controls the action to be carried out 
at a given state, i.e. II(xt) = at where at is the action determined for Sprite to 
carry out at time t. In Sprite's architecture, a policy function has two components 
f and O corresponding to the desired forward and angular velocities of the vehicle. 
They are converted by simple inverse kinematics into desired left and right wheel - 
speeds, where the third wheel acts simply as a castor in consideration of stability 
of the mobile robot. Thus, a policy function II consists of an ordered four -tuple 
(fµ, fa, BN,, ea), where (fµ is the actions of left wheel when Sprite moves forward, 
etc.). The internal state of Sprite store five values in the course of learning - 
evaluation and this four -tuple. 
The trajectory of Sprite's vehicle is controlled by a sequence of actions carried 
out in discrete time steps. In each time interval Sprite acquires new perceptual 
data from its sensors, then it generates associated responses, by performing one 
of the aforementioned actions, or by issuing a feedback signal that indicates a 
current collision, which will lead to a prevention of moving forward controlled by 
'Rt is named by Prescott and Mayhew (1992) as expected discounted return. 
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the evaluation system, followed by a reverse movement, a rotation, and a re -start 
(Prescott and Mayhew 1992, p. 209 -210). 
Evaluation and Error. A new state xt (at time t) may be evaluated by a 
value V(xt), as Prescott and Mayhew (1992) consider, in an attempt to estimate 
the accumulated reward that Sprite will receive from time t onwards, if it keeps 
following the current (time xt) policy II(xt), which returns the action at to be 
taken at the current state xt, e.g. moving straight forward or rotating with a 
random angle. The error 6(t +1) that happens at a later time (xt +1) is defined as 
et.+1 = [rt+1 + yVt(xt + 1)] - Vt(xt) 
In this definition, the error detected at time t +1 is understood as the difference 
between the evaluation managed at the present state V(xt) and what can be esti- 
mated at a later time - rt+i (i.e. the immediate reward) as a realised evaluation 
plus the discounted evaluation yVt (xt + 1) on the basis of the state (xt +1) for the 
expected accumulated reward from the time t + 1 onward. 
The estimated error et +1 can be used, as Prescott and Mayhew (1992) in- 
dicated, to predict the expected evaluation at the current state xt (supposing 
that it is time t at the moment) according to an evaluation function introduced 
by Watkins (1989). Such an evaluation is of fundamental importance for a re- 
inforcement learning algorithm, which needs to take account of the evaluation 
of a current state under expectation, given a current policy function II (under 
the condition that it is held constant at all later steps). The evaluation system 
will be reliable if such an evaluation will always be convergent on a certain value 
for a given current state xt, given that it has a certain policy function II stored 
in the internal state. Prescott and Mayhew (1992) adopt a training method - 
the gradient descent rule introduced by Watkins (1989) - which he proves to be 
capable of converging in a sufficient trials: 
Vt+1(xt) = jl (xt) + aet+1 
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where a is a learning rate. With this training method, the expectation of the cur- 
rent policy function can be evaluated, which subserves the reinforcement learning 
algorithm undertaken to generate trajectories of smooth navigation in real -time. 
Improvement of the Policy 
The thrust of the reinforcement learning process is that the policies (actions) to 
be carried out are expected to improve in the course of learning, provided that the 
result of evaluating the robot states under control is rising. To improve Sprite's 
policy, Prescott and Mayhew (1992) use a method adopted by Williams (1988), 
where actions are represented in terms of random variables specified by Gaussian 
probability distributions and the policy is improved in association with the error 
e(t + 1). Note that the immediate reward and the evaluation of robot states are 
incorporated in the definition of the error et +i (see discussion in Prescott and 
Mayhew 1992, p. 207; for more details see Williams 1988). 
Result 
As an examination over the effectiveness of the adopted reinforcement learning 
algorithm, Sprite is tested for ten runs in a variety of environments, each of 
which runs fifty- thousand training steps (note its sample rate being 5 Hz, so the 
learning process with fifty thousand steps will not take a long time). In each 
test, Sprite does learn, as evident from two observations: the average distance 
of travel between collisions increase significantly from 0.9m (before training) to 
47.4m (after training); and the average velocity is approximately doubled (note 
that moving fast is rewarded by an internal detecting function, as previously 
mentioned) . 
An impressive performance of Sprite is the demonstration of actions at wider 
ranges. The learning system, in the beginning, undergoes an automatic annealing 
process (Williams 1988) which converges to a certain local maximum. Later, the 
width of each Gaussian distribution can increase provided that the local optimal 
mean value allows for more exploratory behaviour, as Prescott and Mayhew (1992) 
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conceives. 
The term `explanatory behaviour' is sometimes used in the literature of ac- 
tive perception, e.g. Bajcsy (1988), but without further exposition as why motor 
activities, as opposed to language performance, can be regarded as explanatory. 
We can try to make sense of that term by seeing the motor activities that con- 
tribute to selection (over actions or learning processes) as being explanatory. 
In the circumstance where the local optimal mean value allows for more 
exploratory behaviour, the annealing process becomes more global, as demon- 
strated in the implementation of Prescott and Mayhew's. Then, the range of 
acceptable actions becomes wider. As an example given by Prescott and May- 
hew (1992), Sprite has a narrow range of acceptable actions when it is restricted 
to a tight corner. By contrast, the range of action performance becomes wider 
when it successfully moves to open spaces (p. 211). Prescott and Mayhew (1992) 
see this performance as showing an evidence that Sprite, after the reinforcement 
learning, is no longer limited to the performance of reflexive actions, although 
its architecture is purely reactive as aforementioned (p. 204). When its range 
of actions becomes wider, Sprite's policy function is improved, and thereby it is 
more competent to achieve a long -term goal, as is evident in a more complicated 
environment (pp. 204, 207). 
In the above discussions, the learning process of Sprite demonstrates a type of 
embodied perception, on account of reinforcement learning algorithm, where per- 
ceptual activities2 give rise to reward and evaluation of robot states, and thereby 
previous perceptual activities together with their motor actions contribute to 
train the robot in support of the gradually learnt navigating trajectories. The 
response in real -time is grounded mainly on two training methods, the gradient 
descent rule introduced by Watkins (1989), i.e. the convergence of evaluation in 
sufficient trials, on the one hand, and the training of policies (actions) established 
by Williams (1988), on the other. 
2Prescott and Mayhew (1992) claim that they have demonstrated a learning process in which 
previous experiences influence the generation of navigating trajectories. 
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The robot is a reactive device, yet it shows active learning with the effect 
of learnt competence from local to global navigation. The learning is active, 
in a sense different from the sense of being active for gaze control. Here, by 
contrast, the task is active learning. It is active because it learns in the course 
of interactions in the environment, specifically iterative trials of running and 
modifications of annealing processes - the processes of learning. More specifically, 
the interactions with the environment lead to the selection over the processes of 
learning, i.e. the annealing processes span from the local to the gradually more 
global. 
If we see the gradually global annealing processes as a particular type con- 
struction, compared to the construction considered in developmental psychology, 
we can derive for later use a hint of activeness - construction of interacting ac- 
tivities with the environment (construction in the sense of gradual selection on 
the basis of previous selective outcomes) is an active process. 
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Appendix D 
Active Perception in Relation 
to Non -Visual Modalities 
It is natural to try and extend discussion of active vision to non -visual modalities, 
in order to evaluate the plausibility of proposing active perception as a general 
scientific paradigm (Bajcsy 1988). This has notably been done in the case of 
touch, and a number of studies have been done as active haptic perception (also 
called active touch) (e.g. Allen and Roberts 1989; Bajcsy 1985; Roberts 1989). 
In this section we do not plan to review the active haptic perception research 
in detail; rather, we aim to highlight the possibility of extending active percep- 
tion research from visual to haptic modalities. For this purpose the discussion 
will be divided into the following three parts. First, we present an example of 
active haptic perception, which is implemented by Roberts (1989); second, we 
discuss an example of active perception across modalities - the categorisation 
implemented by Scheier and Lambrinos (1996); last, we discuss the contribution 
of joint modalities research to active perception. 
Adaptability at Three Levels. In this section we will see, via discussion of 
three types of robotic implementations, three levels of adaptability - adaptability 
by (1) changing the degrees of internal correlations between different components 
(which can be conceived as a change of data), (2) changing internal processes, 
and (3) changing algorithms of processing. These three levels of adaptability are 
demonstrated in the respective implementations by Scheier and Lambrinos (1996) 
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(Section D.3, Figure D.3), Roberts (1989) (Section D.1. Figure D.1), and Allen 
and Bajcsy (1985) (Section D.2, Figure D.2). 
D.1 Active Touch on the basis of Optimal Surface - 
Tracing Moves 
Roberts (1989) implements a robot system of haptic recognition, of which the 
task is to find a paired correspondence between 3 -D polyhedral objects on the 
basis of two transformations - translation and rotation. That is, two objects 
are recognised as being correspondent to each other if they are mutually trans- 
formable (without changing their shape). As we will see, his implementation is 
a system of active haptic perception, like the aforementioned systems of active 
vision. 
The problem of establishing the aforementioned correspondence is the iden- 
tification of the equivalence of two polyhedral objects under translation and ro- 
tation. To respond to this question, Roberts develops a certain type of data 
structure to represent polyhedral objects, which is neutral to those two trans- 
formations; on the basis of that data structure, he develops a system which is 
able to identify the encountered polyhedral objects by certain activities of haptic 
exploration. After all, the haptic recognition on grounds of random search seems 
to be inefficient. 
Architecture. In Roberts (1989), the method of recognising polyhedral ob- 
jects consists of three steps. First, certain geometrical constraints are set between 
primitive components of the polyhedral objects - vertexes, edges, and faces. In 
the envisaged haptic recognition system, several geometrical relations are imple- 
mented for later tests. For example, an edge can be paired with another edge 
such that they are commonly adjacent to a face; a face can be paired with an- 
other one, where they are adjacent to each other. Based on such geometrical 
relations a polyhedral object can be represented in the form of tree structure, 
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Figure D.1: Roberts' System of Active Haptic Perception, with Three 
Admissible Surface -tracing Moves - Face Move, Edge Move, and Ver- 
tex Move. Surface move is a trace across the face in a chosen direction until it 
reaches an edge; edge move begins at a point on it moving in a certain direction, 
out of the only two possible directions, until it reaches a vertex; vertex move is a 
move around (and hence near to) a vertex, which begins at a nearby position of 
the vertex, moving on a circular path until a new edge is reached. 
which consists of the primitive components and adjacent relations. In Roberts' 
strategy of implementation, the matching of such tree structures constitutes a 
ground on which polyhedral objects can be identified. 
Second, admissible surface- tracing moves are found, and for each move its 
cost is calculated, which is defined as the travelled distance (along the path of a 
move) weighted by a difficulty factor (given that different moves may have differ- 
ent degrees of difficulty). There are typically three types of admissible surface - 
tracing moves - those along a face, an edge, and around a vertex. The move along 
a face is a trace across the face in a chosen direction until it reaches an edge; the 
move along an edge begins at a point on it moving in a certain direction, out of 
the only two possible directions, until it reaches a vertex; by contrast, the move 
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around (and hence near to) a vertex begins at a nearby position of the vertex, 
moving on a circular path until a new edge is reached. Such moves constitute the 
possible activities of haptic exploration. 
With such explorations, the respective shapes of encountered polyhedral ob- 
jects can in principle be identified, but Roberts has a further consideration as to 
the determination of a shape under the real -time constraint, which is important 
for any active perception implementation. 
Third, among the admissible surface- tracing moves an optimal surface -tracing 
move is found as the next move. As defined by Roberts, an optimal surface - 
tracing move is the surface -tracing move that eliminates the largest number of 
interpretations with regard to the shape of the envisaged polyhedral objects. In 
addition, the efficiency of a candidate move is defined as the number of interpre- 
tations expected to be eliminated per unit of move cost; consequently, the optimal 
surface- tracing move is in fact the optimally efficient surface- tracing move. 
Based on the geometrical representations of the polyhedral objects and the 
contribution of surface -tracing moves to possible interpretations, an optimal move 
can be obtained fairly simple by the following reasoning. For an encountered 
object, an optimal surface- tracing move can be determined, against a certain 
number of possible interpretations of polyhedral shape (to be represented in tree 
structures). Insofar as the data components have been collected, the respective 
efficiency of several moves can be examined. The efficiency of a single move can 
be determined by carrying out a surface- tracing move and counting the number 
of interpretations that are accordingly rejected. Thus, the efficiency of different 
moves can be compared, and a most optimal one can be found. 
Roberts (1989) provides an example regarding the contribution of a surface - 
tracing move to the reduction of possible interpretations. As he puts it, a certain 
interpretation implies the condition that `if we move along edge E2,5, we will reach 
a vertex after travelling a distance of 2.3 plus or minus the data error bounds' 
(p. 11). 
Such an interpretation can be tested with the aforementioned (vertex, edge, 
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and face) moves, by testing whether carrying out the move along the edge with 
that distance leads actually to the reach of a (random) vertex. Because of its 
contribution to the test of possible interpretations, such a move, according to 
Roberts' strategy of active haptic perception implementation, is typically an ex- 
ploratory activity that a robot can take in order to accomplish the required task, 
i.e. determining the shape of polyhedral objects via haptic exploration. With 
the above three steps, the identification of the encountered polyhedral objects 
can be maintained on grounds of their representations in tree structures, based 
on which two transformable polyhedral objects are seen as equivalent, and hence 
correspondent. 
To summarise, the haptic perception implemented by Roberts (1989) is ac- 
tive, based on the gradually determined sequence of the optimal surface- tracing 
moves. 
D.2 Tactile Information as a Complement to Binocu- 
lar Depth in Support of Stereo Image 
Tactile information can complement visual processing by way of active tactile ex- 
ploration, as is demonstrated by Allen (1985) and explained in brief by Allen and 
Bajcsy (1985). The task of their works is to reconstruct1 the stereo information of 
the objects with a smooth surface. They propose to support the visual processing 
(specifically the depth recovery on the basis of zero -crossings) by adding tactile 
information. 
The problem of the visual processing relating to this task rests on the smooth- 
ness of the surface. Against the smooth surface, the recovery of a stereo image 
on the basis of zero -crossings is not supported by sufficient information. This 
is especially true under the circumstances of poor illumination. As is pointed 
out by Allen and Bajcsy (1985), `neither edge features nor other variations are 
'Please refer to our later discussion of their concept of reconstruction, in connection with 
their active approach. 
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Figure D.2: The Results of Active Tactile Sensing, Demonstrated by 
Allen and Bajcsy (1985). Left: the integration of stereo contour information 
and active tactile sensing. Right: the surface normals computed from the surface 
in the right figure. Re -drawn with configuration from the figures 4 -2 and 4 -3 of 
Allen and Bajcsy (1985). 
present in these [homogeneous] regions ...' (p. 3). It is not difficult to realise 
that the smooth surface looks virtually like a homogeneous region, for there is no 
sufficient visual information to mark such differences on such a surface. 
Although visual processing does not suffice to reconstruct the stereo con- 
ditions of the surface, it may be sufficient with additional supports from other 
modalities. A resolution is provided by Allen and Bajcsy (1985), which they 
name as active tactile exploration, on the basis of the information made available 
by force /position sensing and pressure /position sensing. Their strategy, in brief, 
is to support visual processing with the tactile information extracted from the 
curves (detected by the force /position sensing and pressure /position sensing) of 
the tactile boundary, differentiate them, scale the tangents to reflect the change 
of parametric information, e.g. the distribution of surface normal (i.e. the di- 
rection perpendicular to the tangent line at a surface point) (Figure D.2). To 
make available such tactile information, the haptic system finds a surface con- 
tact and traces the tactile surface of the visually smooth regions, which in their 
implementation amounts to the whole surface of a pitcher. 
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The tactile information is integrated with the visual information (i.e. the 
zero- crossings), by first preserving the readily available visual `parameterization', 
secondly additionally making available the tactile information, and then com- 
bining these two sources of information (p. 5). The added tactile information, 
specifically, is computed globally based on the changes of the aforementioned pa- 
rameterization, which are reflected in the differentiation of the curves and the 
scaling of the tangents, as seen in figure D.2. Note that the computation of 
zero -crossings is based on the points matching at local regions. The addition of 
the global information must be combined with the local information consistently. 
The integrated visual and tactile (thus the local and the global) properties, are 
regarded by Allen and Bajcsy (1985) as higher level surface descriptions that can 
be used for surface matching, like lines and corners, as opposed to the low level 
properties such as local stereo matching. 
It is worth noting that the integration across modalities takes effect only 
when the surface is smooth, otherwise the information on zero - crossings would 
he sufficient for the recovery of the stereo surface. Thus, the higher level inte- 
gration and the condition of smoothness consists of a basis for considering why 
the implementation of Allen and Bajcsy (1985) conforms to the active perception 
approach. 
Reconstruction. Recall that the required task in Allen and Bajcsy (1985) is 
to reconstruct the stereo information of the objects with a smooth surface, and 
that they support this task by seeking the visual information of zero -crossings 
and via the active tactile exploration. The appearance of these two terms in the 
same paper may be seen inconsistent, because the active perception perspective 
does not seem to view the perceptual processing as a process of reconstruction. 
Indeed, the stance against reconstruction is the beginning point of the active 
perception perspective. For this point, see our discussions in Section 3.2. 
Yet, Allen and Bajcsy (1985) do actually use both the terms `active' and 
`reconstruction' in the same paper. In their abstract, it is written that `[wie 
argue that other sensory information is necessary for more complete surface 
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reconstruction (italics added).' In the text, it is stated: `[t]he approach being 
followed here is that relatively sparse visual data ... is supplemented with active 
tactile exploration (p. 2; italics added).' 
Under a sympathetic reading, the inconsistency can be eliminated by con- 
sidering that the reconstruction envisaged by Allen and Bajcsy (1985) does not 
begin entirely with the retinotopic maps, which is the specific circumstance of 
reconstruction challenged by the active perception perspective. Other processes 
need to be manipulated in support of the required tasks. As Allen and Bajcsy 
(1985) argue, the reconstruction of stereo information needs to be complemented 
by tactile information. They specifically deny the effectiveness of reconstruction 
which is entirely beginning with the retinotopic maps. 
One may still cast doubt on the active status of the implementation, by 
arguing that the combination of visual and tactile information ends up with a 
common ground for reconstruction, for reconstruction may be pursued across 
modalities. 
To respond to this challenge, consider how Allen and Bajcsy (1985) imple- 
ment the visual and tactile integration. As we have discussed, the implemented 
integration across modalities is grounded first on the condition of smoothness and 
the higher level integration. Regarding the smoothness, the two modalities do 
not stand equally on the same common ground, because the tactile sensing is car- 
ried out only on the condition of surface smoothness. In other words, the tactile 
processing takes effect under conditions, and consequently occurs later. Regard- 
ing the higher level integration, the visual and tactile information is combined 
consistently with a level difference, in that one is local and the other is global. 
Specifically, the local parameterization is preserved, and the global information 
is the changes over the local parameterisation. As the information at a global 
level, the tactile information does not stand on its own, but instead presumes the 
visual parameterization, by specifically computing its changes, thus a higher level 
computation. The eventually combined properties, as a consequence, stand on a 
higher level. Hence, the visual and tactile information do not stand on a common 
375 
ground for the reconstruction across modalities, and thus do not accord with the 
reconstructionist assumption that sensory information stands as the beginning 
stage of processing. 
Summary. As a brief overview of the visual -tactile integration implemented by 
Allen and Bajcsy (1985): it is active because the tactile information is manipu- 
lated (by hand movement) to support visual processing when needed, with the 
effect of bringing about integrated information and thereby reaching the required 
task (the reconstruction of a stereo surface) more effectively. 
D.3 Active Categorisation Across Modalities 
The active competence of categorisation implemented by Scheier and Lambrinos 
(1996) is jointly subserved by visual and haptic modalities, unlike the implemen- 
tations of active vision. It is straightforward to realise that the role of haptic 
sub- systems is important, because without them the identification of conductiv- 
ity would be utterly impossible. Interestingly, the role of the visual sub -systems 
is equally important, for without them their robot could not eventually learnt 
to identify remote objects, find them uninteresting, and ignore them. The robot 
would then be unable to categorise objects simply on grounds of visual modality, 
which the implementation with joint modalities is capable of, in contrast. 
The advantage of active perception with joint modalities lies in the identi- 
fication across modalities. That is, the identification of properties of a modality 
can be carried out by systems of another modality. In our discussion, the cat- 
egorisation of objects with the property of conductivity, a haptic modality, is 
eventually carried out by visual systems only, as is evident when the robot can 
ignore un- interesting objects without touching them at all. 
In this implementation it is not the case that the visual systems or the haptic 
systems are active. Rather, it must be that the whole system of categorisation is 
active. 
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An Implementation of Categorisation According to the active perception 
perspective, categorisation can be representation -free, unlike the traditional per- 
spective, the processing on account of hierarchical modules. Categorisation of a 
certain domain, e.g. food, is traditionally seen as a module of high -level percep- 
tion, which takes effect by dealing with the output of previous modules, i.e. lower 
level ones in the hierarchical order. Because it deals with the outcomes of those 
previous modules, the processing of categorisation presumes representations. In 
contrast, the active perception perspective may see categorisation in a different 
way, as a result of sensory -motor coordination, suggested by Scheier and Lam - 
brinos (1996). They design a mobile robot for recognising and discriminating 
objects of different types, on the basis of the sensory -motor coordination of two 
modalities, as they claim, namely visual and haptic modalities. 
Overview of the Architecture. In overview, their mobile robot is imple- 
mented with visual and haptic systems, which are connected by re- entrant cor- 
relations. Each system consists of four parts, to wit a sensory map, a motor 
map, an attention map, and a feature map (Figure D.3), each of which com- 
prises a number of nodes connecting to the nodes of other maps. Between the 
sensory map and the motor map lies a connection, called the attentional sensory - 
motor loop, which is a feedback loop linking categorical responses, i.e. the motor 
responses to sensory inputs, with the attention map. The attentional sensory- 
motor loop is gradually modulated in robot -environment interactions. The main 
strategy of implementing categorisation consists of the modularisation of the two 
attentional sensory -motor loops respectively, on the one hand, and the re- entrant 
connections between those two modulated attentional sensory -motor loops, on 
the other. Such a strategy can be discussed in detail as follows. 
Modularisation. The attentional sensory -motor loops of both modalities are 
modulated, with respect to visual and haptic modalities, in that the sensors 
are gradually directed, as a result of sensory -motor coordination, toward certain 
salient sensory stimuli, such as light. 
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Figure D.3: The Categorisation Robot implemented by Scheier and 
Lambrinos (1996). Re -drawn with configuration from Scheier and Lambrinos 
(1996), figure 4, p. 69. 
The attentional sensory -motor loop with respect to visual modality (in short, 
the attentional visual -motor loop) responds selectively to light. Later, wheels 
of the robot move by orienting the robot2 toward the direction of the source 
of light. The bright part on the top left, as an example provided by Scheier 
and Lambrinos (1996), will lead to a certain allocation of the attention map 
which causes forward translational and left rotational movements. Furthermore, 
the visual -motor loop is modified gradually in the course of subsequent (visual - 
motor) coordination activities influenced by the re- entrant connections across 
modalities. The modularisation of visual motor loop results from the iteration of 
such modifications. 
Like the attentional visual -motor loop, the attentional haptic -motor loop is 
modulated, specifically by conductive materials. For this specific robot, it ex- 
plores properties of the targeted objects only by the haptic modality, while vision 
serves simply to guide the robot in question near to those targeted objects. The 
attentional haptic -motor loop, is controlled by Hebb's rule, which similarly leads 
to lateral inhibition. The modulated attentional haptic -motor loop drives the 
robot to carry out appropriate motor activities in support of object exploration, 
2For the robot in Scheier and Lambrinos (1996), the front side, to which the robot is to 
orient, must be the side where both the visual sensors and the arms are located, in order to 
facilitate the visual -haptic re- entrant connections. 
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specifically lowering the arms, grasping the object, and only picking up conductive 
objects with others being ignored. 
Feature Maps. The connections between the attentional visual -motor loop 
and the attentional haptic -motor loop are mediated by a visual feature map and 
a haptic feature map. As seen from figure D.3, a feature map, say the visual 
feature map, receives inputs from both the (visual) sensory map and the haptic 
feature map; in addition, the feature map feeds forward to the (visual) attention 
map. 
Regarding the inputs from the (visual) sensory map, the feature map re- 
sponds selectively to textures, specifically the horizontal and vertical edges, with 
the corresponding nodes in the feature map being activated; on the other side of 
a coin, for the non- responding inputs. their corresponding nodes in the feature 
map are inhibited, so that those inputs are virtually `ignored' (p. 71). Later, the 
neighbouring nodes in the feature map are regulated by Hebb's rule, in order to 
enhance the activities of the feature map locally by lateral inhibition. As a result, 
the horizontal and vertical edges of the given target object are selected, as the 
visual characteristics of the categorisation at issue. 
The (haptic) feature map is trained in a similar way, so that certain haptic 
features are selected (in Scheier and Lambrinos (1996), it is solely conductivity), 
as the haptic characteristics of the envisaged categorisation. 
Re- entrant Connections. The selected characteristics of different modalities 
must be connected to completed the categorisation in question. This is done by 
the re- entrant connections between the feature maps of two modalities. Their 
correlations are affirmed by reinforcement learning, which is mediated by a value 
system, consisting of a limited number of nodes. The reinforced weight is fed 
backward to the visual attention map and the haptic attention map, respectively. 
Eventually, the attentional visual -motor loop and attentional haptic -motor loop 
are mutually coordinated, in support of the recognition and discrimination of 
conductive objects located randomly in the environment, as is evident in the ex- 
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perimental result achieved by Scheier and Lambrinos (1996). Thus, the robot is 
trained to perform the task of categorisation successfully, with regard to conduc- 
tivity. 
Active Categorisation This implementation of categorisation is grounded on 
the gradual modularisation of attentional sensory -motor loops (of the visual and 
haptic modalities, respectively), on the one hand, and the re- entrant connections 
between feature maps of the two modalities, on the other. Throughout their 
design, Scheier and Lambrinos (1996) do not adopt hierarchical modules in their 
architecture. Hence their approach to the robot architecture is not reconstruc- 
tionist. 
Simply because their approach is not reconstructionist, Scheier and Lambri- 
nos (1996) see their implementation as an instance of active perception. They 
claim that their implementation of categorisation in the mobile robot is grounded 
on sensory -motor coordination, but not on hierarchical processing. 
It is reasonable to argument that the categorisation implemented by Scheier 
and Lambrinos (1996) is active, because the robot's association with the targeted 
haptic feature (i.e. conductivity) leads to the selection of its visual features and 
consequently gradually circumscribes its subsequent targets of exploration, given 
that more and more objects are gradually ascertained to be non -interesting. 
In more detail, the active categorisation, specifically the active recognition 
and discrimination of the objects of certain visual and haptic properties (i.e. 
conductivity, and its associated visual properties, in this particular robot im- 
plementation), is accomplished, on grounds of reinforcement learning, which is 
autonomous. The reinforcement learning maintained in the re- entrant connec- 
tions between the visual feature map and haptic feature map first associates 
conductivity with certain visual features, and accordingly gradually modulates 
the attentional visual -motor loops, also on grounds of reinforcement learning. In 
the course of reinforcement learning, the robot gradually focuses on certain visual 
characters which are associated with the targeted haptic feature (conductivity). 
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The robot, thus, can be understood as being interested in just those objects. In 
addition, the 'interest' is not only realised in the weights of the attention maps but 
also in bodily movements (moving toward)3, by the attentional visual -motor loop 
and attentional haptic -motor loop. The robot turns out, insofar as the present 
implementation of categorisation can control, only to move toward conductive 
objects and to only grasp those types of object. 
The implemented categorisation can be seen as achieved through active learn- 
ing. The learning is seen as active in the sense that the gradually achieved cat- 
egory (i.e. Conductivity), through gradually narrowed focuses in the selection 
of visual materials, can be seen as resulting from the construction of interacting 
activities with the environment, like the construction understood in the case of 
Sprite (see Section C, page 367). Like the construction understood in the case of 
Sprite, here the construction is understood in the sense of gradual selection (over 
the categorised materials) on the basis of previous selective outcomes - specifically 
the gradual modularisation of the attentional visual -motor loops. Remember that 
the active learning of Sprite is also implemented with the reinforcement learn- 
ing algorithm. This is an evidence indicating that the reinforcement learning 
algorithm can serve to implement active learning. 
D.4 Summary of Non -visual Active Perception 
The present theories and implementations of active perception research are mostly 
focused on visual modality. A goal of the present thesis is to bring active percep- 
tion beyond the limitation of vision modality. This attempt is supported in two 
steps. Firstly, attention of the present thesis directs to active haptic perception, 
by discussing the robot implemented by Roberts (1989), which accomplishes the 
task of identifying polyhedral shapes by stepwise determination of an optimal 
surface -tracing move for a next step of haptic exploration. As it turns out, the 
steps of robot exploration gradually narrow down the possible interpretations and 
3By contrast, the oculomotor activities of the visual attentional visual -motor loop remain 
functioning. Bear in mind, besides, that there would be no movements of arm and grippers for 
those objects that are not even approached to by the attentional visual -motor activities. 
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eventually single out the geometrical shapes of the given polyhedral object. The 
previous definition of active perception is indeed extended from visual modality 
to haptic modality. This implementation exemplifies the active perception with 
a non- visual modality. 
The second step is to show cross -modal active perception, which is exem- 
plified by two implementations - Allen and Bajcsy's robot of visual- tactile inte- 
gration and Scheier and Lambrinos' robot of active categorisation. The former 
robot carries out the task of shape identification, even to identify a transparent 
curvature. The robot demonstrates that information of a non -visual modality 
is sought when it is needed to complement visual processing in support of the 
required task. According to the definition of active perception, the robot of Allen 
and Bajcsy's shows across -modalities active perception. 
The latter ( Scheier and Lambrinos') robot maintains visual categorisation of 
a haptic property - conductance. The robot the association gradually circum- 
scribes the subsequent targets of haptic exploration with certain visual features, 
and thereby successes to associate conductible objects with their visual features. 
Because it can stepwise circumscribes its subsequent targets for accomplishing 
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